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Abstract 
Artefacts, Technicity and Humanisation 
industrial design and the problem of anoetic technologies 
Stephen james Thompson 
This thesis concerns the intellectual heritage and autonomy of West European and American 
industrial design as a discourse community at a moment when biotechnological developments 
are challenging the certainty of what it means to be human. Proceeding from the assumption 
that industrial design is an autonomous intellectual engagement played out through the 
interpretation of technology as an artefact, the thesis identifies how this is a critical moment 
for industrial designers, who appear to be unable to respond to a problem of the apparent 
disconnection and the progressive displacement of the human in reference to technology. The 
thesis identifies the cause of this as the understanding of the artefact, which has 
conventionally been placed at the centre of its analysis. The way that this has been 
constructed has not only impacted on design solutions but has led to a particular 
understanding of technology. lt is this understanding of the artefact that has ceased to be 
sustainable and has precipitated the crisis. The thesis argues that, by revisiting the artefact as 
a mutable consequence of culture, it is possible to relieve the problem by opening up the 
scope for finding new methodological approaches. These can be used to develop design 
strategies that are sufficiently subtle and coherent in their terms to engage with the open 
complexity of future discussions of the distributed and enacted human. 
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Question 
What intellectual moves are necessary for industrial designers to 'talk' about biotechnologies 
in terms that have some continuity with their history? 
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Preamble 
If we superimpose E=mc! on a new awareness of Nature, seeing it as the unbeatable 
model of elegant and economical design, we begin to believe that less can indeed be 
more, and an unconscious slippage back in the direction of mysticism gets under way. 
Accepting the hypothesis that the brighter we get, the more we can do with less, it 
presently follows that if this is a good thing, then doing much more with much less 
must be an even better thing. Then, if we cautiously extend the evolutionary line in 
the direction of infinity we come to the interesting realisation that the ultimate goal of 
technology has to be doing everything with nothing. This, of course, is precisely what 
God did, as reported in the admirable concise account in the book of Genesis. One 
wonders if the conjunction of mineral reserves being depleted to an eventual 
vanishing point, and the real goal of technology doing everything with nothing, is 
serendipity or something more. The more immediate problem, I suppose, is how do 
we determine when to start closing down the design schools? (George Nelson, 1979) 
The origins of this thesis 
An abiding interest in the way that people interact with technologies drew me into the study 
and practice of industrial design. This research, however, started in a moment of relaxation. 
Watching television one day, I encountered something that seemed to throw into question so 
much of the way 1 had thought about people and technology. I was watching a documentary 
following the racing driver Ayrton Senna testing a Formula One car. At one point Senna, sitting 
strapped behind the steering wheel of his racing machine in the pits, was talking to his 
mechanics. Senna began to describe, in passionate and frustrated tones, how he could feel the 
engine failing. Senna explained he could feel this failure in his body, the mechanics looked at 
each other uncomfortably; the computer telemetry indicated that the engine was running 
perfectly well. The interesting thing about this story is that Senna's sensation was vindicated; 
shortly after that conversation the engine was indeed found to be on the brink of catastrophic 
failure. This might have been coincidental, of course, but it seemed that Senna was speaking 
with the authority of a driver who often claimed that he possessed an intuitive metaphysical 
ability to anticipate a car like no one else. 
This seemed interesting. Now alerted to the idea that people and technology may connect with 
a kind of anoetic sensuality, I began to discover that Senna was not alone in his experience of 
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this metaphysical phenomenon. When they speak informally, many other people - such as 
musicians, sportsmen and women, and fighter pilots, for example - talk of being 'connected 
too' or 'at one with' their technology. Reading around I found that this kind of rhetoric, where 
it was accounted at all, was often discounted, ignored, or set to one side as a matter of poetic 
licence. I wondered why a phenomenon that was so apparently commonplace would be treated 
as If it were some kind of peripheral whimsy by some and whether it might have any credence 
in science. I began to read about ideas of proprioception, blind sight, temporal dislocation and 
other autonomic neurosomatic phenomena. These Ideas were extraordinary and interesting, 
but they did not seem to connect to the way in which I had thought of design. These ideas 
seemed to point towards a kind of excess in the body and some kind of holistic connectivity 
with technology acting as part of a continuous soma. My design logic told me that interaction 
was a process of orchestrating the interactions between the epistemic opposition of the 
human and the technological. I had spoken and written about the design of Interfaces and 
socially constructed interactions, yet my reading seemed to point to a rather different kind of 
relationship. lt seemed that, interesting as these scientific ideas were, something would need 
to happen prior to their incorporation by designers into their logic. 
I began to wonder whether this sense in which the human and the technological became a 
single holistic entity was more of an issue of a linguistic syntax that demanded a degree of 
epistemic opposition in its terms rather than any practical reality. There certainly appeared to 
be no formal way I could account for this idea as a kind of design aesthetic and I wondered if 
that might be a problem. The observation born of my design education and training also 
appeared to be something that had weight in my own life. Everyday I inhale a compound of 
Beclometasone Dipropionate, known more colloquially by its trade name Qvar. The function of 
Qvar is to enable the triggering of certain enzymes in my pulmonary tract, thereby enabling 
anoetic breathing. Without this steroid, asthma would make me acutely aware of every breath, 
and that awareness is a debilitating intrusion into my sense of myself. Inhaling this steroid is a 
design decision; the interaction of this steroid in my soma is a design aesthetic. Some would 
claim that some loss of the narrative of breathlessness has somehow distanced me from the 
true experience of life. Others might claim that the chemical has somehow invaded my soma, 
alienating me from my true humanity. lt does not feel like this to me. Qvar is an aesthetic of 
joyous quotidianness. In an orthodox industrial design account, this aesthetic would most 
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likely be embodied in the grey and red plastic of the inhaler and in a conversation regarding 
the deterministic magic of being freed from the tyranny of asthma. 
Perhaps one of the key contributions that industrial designers have made to humankind has 
been the way in which they have made the extraordinary potentiality of technology seem 
utterly ordinary. The extraordinarily skilful way in which designers have enabled people to 
reconcile their lives with technology is evident all about us every day. I wondered if there 
might perhaps be some special intellectual skill associated with making the extraordinary 
seem quotidian that might be connected in some way to this idea of people feeling as though 
they were at one with technology. I wondered if the intellectual skill associated with making 
human life seem complete through technological means might be hinted at in the 
International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (ICSID) definition of industrial design. In 
essence, this definition suggests that industrial design is an intellectual means of 'humanising 
technology'. Although the implications of this are open to some debate, there did seem to be 
an epistemic discretion implicit in Its terms that denied the possibility of the experiences 
Senna and the fighter pilots described. The quotidian essence of the process of humanisation 
in my use of Qvar seemed to demand a new kind of design conversation embodied in the 
intellectually and aesthetically unaccounted (anoetic) act of breathing: just breathing. 
This residence of aesthetic in the anoetic seemed to have profound implications for the way in 
which designers might understand what it means to humanise technology. One of the 
interesting things about the industrial design community is that it has tended to construct its 
own theoretical and historical ideas. As 'for many of my fellows, industrial design histories 
have played an important role in how I have understood industrial design. I was aware that the 
industrial design histories relate what seemed to be the story of a single linear heritage. These 
similar histories seemed to centre on the products of the endeavours of relatively recent 
members of the industrial design community and relied upon descriptions of their material 
outputs in the form of technological artefacts in order to tell stories. Often the reasons for 
choosing to include these technological artefacts in a history appeared to be a matter of their 
beauty or as a means of representing social and cultural changes over time. Many 
technologies seemed to have a material artefactual presence in culture, but many did not. The 
material things seemed to be presented as evidence of industrial design; the things without 
material presence seemed not to be. When set against the rather self-evident idea that for the 
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most part the rich complexity of individual lives has been ephemerally accounted, it would 
seem that the artefacts in industrial design histories could provide only a fraction of the 
evidence of a process of humanisation. I was aware that, as a designer, I might share some 
vernacular and informal discourse with a rather extensive community that stretched as far and 
as wide as our knowledge of humanity allowed us to know. I was aware too that the heritage 
of my community was not particularly well accounted for. I wondered if the history of the 
process of humanising technology had become lost, because, for most of human·history until 
quite recently, designers have been people of rather low social standing. The history of that 
process might merely be beyond the scope of institutionalised places of scholarship and have 
become estranged from the intellectual scrutiny it might deserve. 
I wondered if other attempts to analyse culture and society that accept complexity and fluidity 
in their terms of analysis might be a useful way to understand the problem I had Identified. By 
widening my understanding of the nature of human-technology relationships, I might be able 
to find some means of opening a conversation that did not seek epistemic distinction in its 
terms. The rather complex ideas of technology as a social construction that I encountered In 
contemporary sociology and anthropology certainly seemed to run against the projections of 
uncritical simplicity with which I was familiar as an industrial designer. These ideas did seem 
to be finding a way of talking about the human and the technological in one conversation. 
Sometimes the ideas they presented offered a way forward, and on other occasions they 
seemed to be unconsciously intent merely on unpicking the intellect of industrial design. 
Cyborg literature seemed to take the quotidian and to unpick it in order to claim a kind of 
fetishlstic alienation of the human species from itself by technology. Even in the most 
simplistic terms, this logic appears to deny the coterminous biological and intellectual 
evolution of humanity and technology. The logic of the cyborg is sometimes extended by 
others who speak of future 'artilects' or 'robe-sapiens'. These species of creature are 
projected to outstrip human capabilities in some way or another. When I reflected on my own 
industrial design heritage, these ideas seemed familiar, having resonance in rather archaic 
ideas of the man-machine and the other previous claims of rupture in the trajectory of human 
history. Given the extraordinary way in which people retained their sense of humanity, 
industrial designers in the early twentieth century must have found a way past the logic 
codified in a supposed new age of the machine. I was sure that the tactic of many erstwhile 
colleagues, who had sought to engage with the future by inventing new design practices in 
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reference to particular outputs or to particular procedural methodologies would not be 
productive. These designers seemed to be distancing themselves from industrial design and 
its intellectual heritage, I thought it might be more productive to focus attention in a positive 
way upon the unique intellectual contribution of the industrial design community to the world 
and to extend this forward into a new technological paradigm. 
Today it feels quite ordinary, and often boring, to be one of the 'prosthetic gods' that many 
once projected, quotidian to a degree that it is now necessary for cyborg literature to unpick 
and remind us of the anoetic presence of technology. Even though the technology of the 
future may seem unimaginably extraordinary in our terms given this trajectory, it is worth 
considering that its success will depend to some extent upon a means to make it quotidian. 
However, while the absence of a positivistic conversation in which the human and the 
technological are considered to be coextensive does not appear to have had any particular 
impact upon the success of industrial designers so far, it might not be sustainable to continue 
to discount it. I wondered if the absence of a serious discussion of the anoetic and of 
problems with epistemic discretion might go some way to explain why industrial designers are 
finding it difficult to project their expertise towards the design of some emerging 
technologies. Conversations regarding biotechnology suggest that it will transform life in the 
twenty-first century, but industrial designers have very little to add by way of an opinion about 
it. Industrial designers have even less· to say about how biotechnology might be shaped into a 
useful and quotidian facet of life in the future. This lack of engagement with an emerging 
technology is surprising. After all, the industrial designers I know all have some view or other 
of technological development. These views range from some who express a kind of childish 
excitement in the design of futuristic dreams to others who find technoscience itself to be 
deeply worrying and politically problematic. Industrial designers' opinions on such matters 
extend to almost every shape and form of technology, but not, it seems, to biotechnology. 
One might expect industrial designers, acting on their enthusiasms, to be right in there, 
speculating and conceptualizing future biotechnological opportunities, but for the most part 
they are not. I could find almost nothing in industrial design literature other than some rather 
lukewarm assertions of a future transformation. Industrial designers have similarly struggled 
with technologies that do not appear to be materially accountable and have struggled in the 
past to develop design practices that engage with the particularities of immaterial logic. The 
additional problem for designers is that biotechnologies are not only difficult to account for in 
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material terms but eschew orthodox epistemic discretion. How, for example, do you humanise 
something that is in effect materially indistinguishable from that with which it is supposed to 
interact. 
When I began to enquire how insistent ideas of epistemic distinction might be implicated in 
my research, it quickly became apparent that the logic of language might have some 
significant part to play in the problem I had identified in design logic. The rhetorical tactic of 
antagonistic opposition prevails throughout Western logic and is particularly evident in 
languages such as English. This becomes particularly evident when designers attempt to 
describe moments in which the human and the technological become indistinguishable 
through conditions of immateriality or in anoetic interaction. Similarly, individual designers 
trained in the syntax of the Western world can call upon any number of analytical tools to help 
them describe technology in material and cultural terms as a visual aesthetic; in comparison, 
there appears to be a relative absence of terms to describe an aesthetic of enaction. it quickly 
became evident that deeply embedded cultural ideas and particular rhetorical conveniences in 
language had slanted the idea of human-technology relationships in favour of a rather narrow 
terminology that demands differentiation. Some degree of stability of course comes from the 
logic of a language that is good at fixing terms, but this happens at the risk of excluding or 
obscuring other equally plausible positions. In a mindset that recognises stability as 
problematic, it becomes possible to see how rhetorical conveniences have become encrypted 
into the logic of analysis. The player piano, for example, may be easily described as a 
technological artefact. This artefact can replicate with a degree of cadence and subtlety a tune 
played originally some time ago in another place. In this description, where the function is 
contained in a single convenient logic that understands a closed and bordered artefact (player 
piano) encourages the impression that the tune was 'stored' on a punched roll of paper and 
played again when combined with the artefactual mechanism of the player piano. We might 
ask where the music is actually stored; in the holes punched in the paper perhaps? But then 
how then do holes store music? Considered carefully, the metaphysical mystery of magical 
holes can be revealed as an invention of a misplaced metaphorical assumption of storage. The 
tune is stored not in the roll of paper, but in the potential of the full complexity of a rather 
extensive system involving organic and inorganic mechanisms. This system involves 
musicians, pianos, card, holes, punching mechanisms, and so on. lt becomes clear that, in 
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order to understand fully what is going on, we must consider this system in Its entirety and 
the actors at play within it. 
I had now discovered that my industrial design understanding of the world, founded in a form 
of Western logic that .reduced the human species to an entity in antagonistic relation to the 
world, seemed to be unsustainable. If my understanding of the boundary between the human 
and the technological were not to be accepted for its rhetorical convenience, I realised that it 
would be important to explore ideas of fluid instability and to establish why these might be a 
problem for industrial designers. 
Since this problem was particularly identified with Industrial designers, it seemed sensible to 
continue to think like an industrial designer. Thinking in that way would retain some sense 
that this research was an extension of a rather longer heritage, although it might suggest 
some radical shift in intellectual approach. I realised that throughout the process of retrieving 
ideas I could only hope to endeavour to continue to think like an industrial designer, using the 
skills I had learned of drawing on a very wide range of ideas and flocking them together in a 
synergistic analysis. This skill set is one of the things that sets industrial designers apart from 
others' intellectual attempts to engage with the problems and opportunities presented by the 
complexity of human-technology relationships. As designers we have developed a number of 
strategies for resolving a degree of fluid complexity into rather simple applications. The 
techniques used In an industrial design project appeared to be an ideal means to come to 
terms with the implications of epistemic distinction in the human and the technological. A 
trick that designers employ in order to solve problems is simply to reverse the terms of the 
question. This technique suggests that, rather than focusing attention upon ideas of 
transformation and otherness, the designer should look for continuity. In order to function 
efficiently industrial designers have to know something about almost everything and in 
consequence they have become exceptionally skilled at flocking ideas together as a means of 
analysing and organising uncertainty, fluidity and complexity. I realised that, if my research 
could be presented in that spirit as a form of practice, drawing together and testing in a 
synoptic manner an eclectic range of ideas, it might have some chance of coming together like 
a design solution. I have therefore endeavoured to construct a form of synergistic design 
meta-analysis, combining the prosaic with the poetic, such that a picture can be presented 
that has functional resonance with an audience both of industrial designers and of others who 
16 
are interested in how people enact their lives through technologies. I will know if I have been 
successful if these ideas open the way for the industrial design community to regain its place 
at the centre, rather than the periphery, of intellectual debate. 
The reader and the author 
Not everyone will read this thesis in the same way, of course. This is an industrial design text 
and an addition to a rather long history of attempts by industrial designers to initiate or 
extend conversations rather than an attempt at either a formal philosophy or a manifesto for 
development. Designers such as Loos, Dreyfuss Van Doesburg, and others, for example, are 
still read today. One reason why these texts should retain their vitality is that there is very 
little stability in industrial design theorisation, and they provide a point of navigation or 
anchorage in intellectual fluidity. As times change and as particular intellectual problems 
become more or less important, the stability of these texts remains and enables members of 
the industrial design community to chart a path or trajectory. While the view of these texts and 
their usefulness as a waypoint may change, the texts remain, providing evidence of a moment 
of intellectual endeavour. Industrial design not codified with the authority of medicine or the 
law is an open community, and anyone can call him or herself a designer. This means that, 
while industrial design has vitality, it is prone to continual fluid shifts in its terms. One 
consequence of this fluidity is that it becomes essential for anyone reading design ideas to 
remain alert to the instability of the intellectual place in which ideas are posited. 
Because this thesis will be subject to that same fluidity it is not particularly useful, or even 
possible, to say with any degree of absolute certainty to whom any particular text is 
addressed. lt must be sufficient to say that my thesis is likely to be read by anyone with an 
interest in the progression of industrial design or with a concern to understand the part its 
intellectual nuance may have in shaping the world of tomorrow. In that it deals with ideas of 
materiality and the realisation of life in relation to ideas of technology and culture, the thesis 
will be read by those who are interested to understand how design is constructed as an 
intellectual activity. Design philosophers and theorists, such as Tony Dun ne and Fiona Raby or 
John Thackara or those who read around them, might read the ideas in this thesis and find 
them to have some resonance with their own explorations. The thesis could be read as an 
adjunct or philosophical counterpart to the research interests of joseph Giacomin's 
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'Perception Enhancement Systems' research team at Brunei University. (Giacomin, 2008) Where 
Glacomin's research explores some of the engineering potentials and problems associated 
with subtle interactions, this thesis sets out some of the ways in which those ideas are 
embedded in design discourse. This thesis then, might have some use to those who read 
philosophers such as Vllem Flusser and share his interest in the more subtle aspects of design 
and the role of technical apparatus in the formation of being. This interest might seem to 
imply a reader who is involved in education to some extent. it might also imply a reader who is 
associated with a design studio, such as IDEO, in which ideas and scholarship are as important 
as commercial expediency. it will certainly imply a reader, whether or not from the industrial 
design community, who is interested in understanding a thoughtful process that seeks to 
understand how people construct their lives with technology. The reader of this thesis will 
probably be unwilling to accept that industrial design is merely an uncritical tool of commerce, 
a creative adjunct of marketing, engineering or popular culture. Accordingly, the ideas 
presented here explore how the relationship of humanity and technology might be 
intellectually problematised. However, these ideas are presented not in the form of a more 
orthodox critical cultural study but in a spirit of creative endeavour as an attempt to bring a 
moment of productive stability in a climatic moment of complex uncertainty. 
I trained in industrial design in the United Kingdom during a period in which the doctrine of 
functionalism appeared to be washing out of design education in favour of a form of 
pragmatic commercial and material strategy. I could not find any particular complaint with that 
strategy during the years I spent as a practising commercial designer before becoming a full-
time academic. However, my research practice has been to explore ideas emerging in the arts, 
humanities and sciences, and to bring these ideas into the context of design practice and the 
design of curricula. I have found myself to be one among a few industrial designers who draw 
upon ideas that present a challenge to established models of order, but I have retained a 
sense that industrial design has a pragmatic objective. The theoretical practice in this research 
has taken emerging ideas of debordered uncertainty, fluidity and deconstructed logic back 
into industrial design in order to shape a conversational philosophy for that community. These 
ideas have a resonance in ecology, but also in the physics and metaphysics of consciousness. I 
have argued elsewhere that recognition of the de bordered and extensive logic of postdigital 
and postmechanical thought invites a reappraisal of operative design logic. Where many 
industrial design theorists accept technology as a given and as a means to development, I 
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have tended to place emphasis upon the role of design in the ontological formation of 
schema. In this respect I have found myself to be one of only a very few industrial designers 
who contribute to an emerging conversation that looks for how scientific ideas of 
consciousness resonate in the lived experience. My particular contribution to these 
conversations has been to challenge the comfort of intellectual assumptions of epistemic 
differentiation in the construction of ideas of how people function in the world and to test 
these in commonplace instances. This thesis is a small part of that project and an important 
stepping stone in a rather longer project. 
Why this thesis is important 
Aside from being an addition to a long and established heritage of speculative design textual 
practices, this thesis presents a significant contribution to the discourse of the industrial 
design community by bringing together a unique constellation of theories opening a 
conversation that can find no differentiation in the human and the technological. The new 
knowledge is generated through a synergistic analysis that forms a logic reflecting a 
realisation that closure is no longer a viable objective and that the provisional is better 
accepted as a reality of an emergent holism that accounts for the human as a distributed and 
enacted life. This thesis is significant because, in the first instance, it brings forward a 
discourse of hope and continuity, into a climate of disjuncture and terminal conversations. In 
the second instance, the thesis provides the foundation of a new kind of conversation among 
members of the industrial design community, maintaining materiality at the core of its 
discourse but in a manner that is productive in discussions of emerging technological 
paradigms. 
The thesis shows how the problems industrial designers have with understanding and 
accounting for humanity in the context of emerging technologies reside in the way in which 
they understand and analyse the world by constructing convenient, although artificial, 
boundaries in their logic. The application of this rather simple logic has a rather profound 
implication, because it shows that, although biotechnology, which appears to present a 
rupture to the continued trajectory of industrial design logic, is treated as an exotic other, the 
means to engage with it is actually already encrypted in the ICSID claim. For example, by 
demonstrating how it is quite possible and plausible to understand biotechnologies in similar 
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terms to the way the industrial design community might understand the steam engine or any 
contemporary artefact, the thesis reconnects ideas without the hyperbole of so much 
technoscientific rhetoric. One unique way in which it does this is by understanding how 
biotechnologies emerge from a scientific discourse that does not understand the world in 
terms of fixed and accountable materiality. Biologists understand the world in terms of 
autopoietic flows of supercomplex determinants that come together momentarily. This view 
presents a field of possibilities rather than a fixed and predictable structure and shifts the 
analysis of material culture towards terms of autopoietic flows and momentary hardenings. In 
establishing how processes of autopoiesis can be found in the intellectual territory of 
industrial design, a direct connection is made with the logic of biotechnology. This takes the 
form of a kind of extent analysis that understands reality across a range of imaginings within 
so-called topological domains. This kind of analysis recognises that, when the world is 
considered·at any degree of finite attention, it is only as complex as the complexity of its 
analysis. This technique has some precedence in the intellectual tactics industrial designers 
use when they are containing mechanical or digital complexity in rather more simple boxes. 
As this thesis draws upon the way in which the complexity of industrial designers' histories 
are similarly boxed through periodisations, an otherwise unidentified strategic lacuna Is 
revealed in the historical projection of industrial design. The thesis shows how shifts of 
materiality evident in these periodisations can be understood to develop because profound 
change occurs in the understanding of the human. Periodisation in industrial design histories 
also reveals how the scale of a supposed material reality can be understood to be a cultural 
construction that is subject to intellectual shifts over time. In that way the intellectual 
problems associated with biotechnology are shown to emerge because of a certain kind of 
acceleration in the complexity of the analysis of the human. 
The ideas here can be productively understood as a prototypical attempt to form a new 
language of materiality that throws into question the gathering uncritical assumption of the 
value of tangible media as a coherent design strategy. That strategy is understood in this 
thesis to be an attempt by designers to regain stability in their terms of reference. Instead, an 
alternative position is outlined that shows how the industrial design community could be more 
productively engaged in finding a means to find an aesthetic of enaction. This aesthetic is 
identified as founded in a subtle and intense degree of granular complexity commensurate 
with emerging understandings of the human as a soma distributed throughout the world. lt is 
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likely that, at this degree of complexity, no meaningful closure of the human will be found 
possible. 
The methodological strategy 
Any exploration of the world in terms of the ineffable, elusive or quixotic will have to find a 
way to deal with the limitations of a language. The English language is not particularly well 
equipped to deal with terms that are considered to be permeable and without borders. 
Industrial designers, like other rational-minded people, are trained to seek closure and 
rational simplicity. They are expert, however, at dealing with complexity and fluidity in their 
terms. Designers use processes such as sketching that 'talk' about the world in a fluid 
terminology while retaining some of the logic of closed and fixed materiality that forms the 
discourse of their community. The strategy employed here in this thesis is to identify ideas, 
paradigmatic of emerging directions in contemporary thought, that can be characterised by 
their acceptance of the provisional as a means to a more complete understanding. These 
ideas, accepting that closure is no longer a viable theoretical objective, work together in a way 
that makes it possible to discuss humanity and technology in a single conversation and as a 
single epistemic entity. One consequence of this approach is that the rhetoric may at times 
appear polemical, as it attempts to shift the analysis of industrial design into a new territory 
and to draw in a number of ideas from outside its usual terms of reference. This approach, 
however, makes it possible to begin to understand the world once again as a continuity of 
interacting essences. The language will sometimes recall the syntax of times before the 
rationality of science, which accepted that closure might be an unviable theoretical objective if 
a more complete understanding of the world was to be achieved. 
The analytical method employed in the construction of this thesis bears some comparison to a 
design process. Ideas from a broad basis are swarmed, such that, when read together, they 
form an assembled body of knowledge that is not in itself exclusive but creates a pattern open 
to future reformation. The thesis, in as much as it deals with a discourse of abstractions, can 
then be understood as a conceptual and critical industrial design practice, written in the spirit 
of reflective and creative practice, although presented as a theoretical, textual design 
intervention. 
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The words in this text have come through a form of reflective and creative practice (Moon, 
2004) In which ideas hav.e been gathered through a survey of a wide selection of literature and 
then surveyed de novo such that a wider more panoptic picture can be constructed. I have 
avoided taking an entirely forensic analysis, and, being a member of that community, I cannot 
view industrial design from a remote standpoint. This, however, has made it possible to paint 
a richer and wider picture, which has retained resonance in the terms of the industrial design 
community. Where a forensic analysis would have tended to focus on a single facet of the 
problem, flocking ideas together reveals interactions, which can be analysed in order to give 
form to a wider problematic. An analysis from a remote standpoint would have tended to view 
a problem without necessarily understanding the subtle nuances of the object of its 
observation. Because I have been able to view industrial design from within its own terms, a 
more intimate and enacted theoretical picture of continuity has been constructed, nuanced in 
such a way that it has meaning in its own community. Accordingly, this thesis assembles an 
experiential and implicit body of ideas (Schon and Schon, 1991) and undertakes a synergistic 
analysis informed by a close reading of the practice of the industrial design community and 
much that is unfamiliar or disavowed within the scope of its discourse. This literature is used 
in order to formulate general concepts by abstracting common properties of instances and 
expanding ideas in relation to contemporary design practice. 
Literature has been surveyed because of its direct relevance to industrial design as it is 
practised, and other literature because it could be identified as relevant to the broad 
intellectual perspective of the thesis, but always in terms that might be relevant to the design 
community. Much has been edited out of this thesis. This was necessary if only for matters of 
expediency and the determining limitations of the word count. The words here might 
productively be read as the first section of a much larger text that would include ideas that are 
more concerned with the subtle functioning of the soma. Ideas of the role of free will, non-
conscious functioning, cognition and precognition and impulsive reaction that go some way to 
explain how people function in the world have simply, and reluctantly, been left out, although 
they could provide the scope for a further text. The words that remain act together to put in 
place some of the philosophical and creative foundations for a future kind of industrial design 
logic that has some resonance with its own heritage. In the process of research, much other 
literature has been reviewed and rejected from the final thesis if it could not be grounded in 
terms that might be useful to further the understanding of the industrial design community 
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(for example, if it relied upon sophisticated familiarity with the technical language of 
philosophy or mathematics). Ideas have been rejected if they were found to be insufficiently 
rigorous in their terms of debate. This particular rigour has been necessary because in the 
process of research many ideas conflated objective physical phenomena with entirely 
subjective matters of faith and fantasy. Where these conflations were undertaken without 
criticism, the resulting ideas were discounted from the thesis, even though some intellectual 
nuance may remain of them in the broader argument. 
A strategy of interacting concrete examples with theoretical ideas has been employed. This 
has made it possible to play with ideas in a way that both reveals the subtle implications 
embedded in the quotidian and also tests theoretical ideas in the practice of everyday life. For 
example, the juxtaposition of a futuristic technology such as DNA computation is considered 
alongside an artefact as mundane as a bicycle in order to open out questions of enaction and 
the process of consciousness in the 'use' of technology and whether it is viable to consider 
technology as an extension of the human body. DNA computation, as it is imagined publicly, 
might not be the most effective or perhaps the most likely of emerging technologies to impact 
in the short term, but its implications are profound. The nature of this technology throws into 
question orthodox understandings, being at once a material and spatial supposition of the 
human and technological. The bicycle, on the other hand, in an operative sense, throws into 
question the epistemic discretion of actions and actors. Both the exotic DNA computation and 
the quotidian bicycle raise questions of enaction and the process of consciousness in the 'use' 
of technology and whether it is viable to consider technology as an extension of the human 
body. 
The thesis takes a view that there is a single holistic universe of interconnected possibilities. A 
thesis recognising the unbordered nature of the world could easily become a theory of 
everything, and any exclusion is bound to be artificial and a matter of rhetorical strategy and 
convenience. Throughout this thesis, complex ideas are unpacked and tried out through 
everyday examples of quotidian life. Care is taken to identify a range of ideas that explore 
how the human and the technological can be talked about in a single conversation. Though 
not without its critics, actor network theory has reflected a realisation that closure is no longer 
a viable objective and that the provisional is better accepted as a reality of analysis. The 
inclusion of actor network theory into the thesis has made it possible to account for the 
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materialisation of artefacts in terms of hybrid social and cultural energies in which people are 
determining actors in the performance of technologies. The interactional nature of the 
analysis that underpins actor network theory is such that its exponents are able to argue that 
humanity and technology must be considered as a hybrid condition. The inclusion of ideas of 
actor network theory Into the discourse of industrial design could bring a new approach to the 
analysis of the artefact that finds a mutable and fluid process. An understanding of the 
artefact as something mutable and fluid would throw a rather more subtle light upon the 
process of humanisation such that it would become necessary to find coherence In those 
revised terms. 
The methodological strategy for deciding which ideas should be included or discounted has 
been similar to that described by Katrina Meyer (2004) in her analysis of online discussions. 
Meyer uses a number of categories described in earlier studies. These categories align with 
the views taken of texts encountered in this research. lt is not important to list where any 
particular text might fit into any, some, or all of the following categories, because their role in 
the thesis may not necessarily align with the decisions implicit in their initial inclusion. 
Throughout the process of research, ideas can change in status, moving between the 
periphery and the centre of analysis. 
(i) There are some ideas that have provided a solution to problems encountered in the 
research. These ideas have provided a way out of difficulties. These ideas educate the 
researcher, show him that his analysis might not be entirely new or reveal rather longer 
histories of ideas that might be studied in order to find a way through problems. These kinds 
of ideas are perhaps what one might expect to encounter in a research. They are included and 
cited because they ground and support ideas. 
(ii) Some ideas are included because they are constructed by fellows engaged in a process of 
creative exploration in a manner that bears comparison to this research. These ideas discuss 
other problems in a similar way to the functioning of the analysis here. Sometimes these ideas 
are useful because they have emerged from a research that has encountered similar problems 
to this thesis. These ideas are often familiar to the researcher and have provided some of the 
impetus to the research. They are also what one might expect to find in any research and are 
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almost always included and cited as examples in justification of ideas and approaches to 
analysis. 
(iii) Other texts integrate and synthesise ideas. These texts are perhaps the most complex to 
analyse. Their inclusion or exclusion Is always the most problematic and the most likely to 
lead to the reader asking why another particular idea was not considered. This fluidity must be 
accepted. In the end all texts are constructed from a given intellectual and cultural location 
and are informed by the reading the author has previously undertaken. lt is inevitable that a 
text of limited scale and scope will miss the benefit of others' ideas. In this thesis, these texts 
are included and cited in sections of more complex analysis as a means to help ideas along 
and to bring a form of-intellectual rigour to speculative and creative practice. 
(iv) Some ideas are included because they trigger new ways of thinking leading to new ideas 
and new lnsights on the problematic. These ideas are most likely to be encountered in 
reference to other research, occurring by chance on the radio or television during moments of 
relaxation in an entirely unrelated context. These ideas are found useful as a means of 
illustration through agility of synthesis. They are almost always included and cited as 
exemplars of other ideas and are perhaps a more prominent feature of creative research. 
(v) Finally, some ideas are included as a matter of play. These ideas are proposed because they 
make other ideas seem unstable, because they bring delight or just because there is some 
resonance in them that invites readers to speculate on their own account. These are most 
often included and cited in a way that sits alongside the body of the text and the drive of the 
argument, as interesting sights on a long journey. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is about Western European and American industrial design as a particular practice 
and discourse at a moment in time when the trajectory of technological development is 
throwing into doubt the certainty of understandings of the boundary between the human and 
the technological. lt proceeds from a discussion of how this might be a critical moment for the 
intellectual fellowship of industrial designers, as the particular insights they once relied upon 
when dealing with questions of the material formation of the technological world have now 
begun to seem somewhat irrelevant in the formation of the future. Rather than applying an 
alien theory to industrial design, this exploration uses its design instincts to draw upon a 
broad spectrum of ideas and to assemble them through a process of synergistic analysis. This 
process assembles ideas as if they were actors in a network of conversations that interact to 
give form to a discursive conversation. 
Rather than adding its voice to the many who call for the end of industrial design, this thesis 
takes its impetus from the opportunity it presents for designers to reconsider the essential 
principles that underpin their intellectual community. Through a critical analysis of literature, 
it shows that, if industrial designers are to continue to talk in terms that have some continuity 
with the trajectory of the historical narratives that sustain their intellectual community, a more 
subtle attention to the artefact than that provided by recent design theorisations is required. 
Rather, it will be necessary to find a means to analyse the artefact without seeking closure 
through forms of material and representational analysis and to act upon a strategy that 
understands materiality to be tied to the complexity of analysis. This strategy reveals borders 
and epistemic heterogeneity to be matters of conceptual and rhetorical convenience and so it 
becomes possible to discuss humanity and technology in a single conversation. 
By calling upon the idea of the topological domain and by using a 'designerly' form of extent 
analysis, it becomes possible to find a way to engage with ideas without necessarily calling 
upon epistemic discretion or the encapsulation of terms in epistemic locations. Taking a more 
fluid view of human-technology relationships, it is then possible to insist that design 
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processes of humanisation must be accounted across terms at any given degree of complexity 
and granular sophistication in the conceptual and technical models held in human-technology 
relationships. This allows the thesis to explore how designers understand questions of the 
human and the technological in a new way, which allows for sufficient debordered, fluid 
granularity in terms. The conclusion is that a sufficiently subtle understanding of the world, 
which is coherent in its term_s with the molecular complexity of future discussions, will 
demand the construction and incorporation of a form of designerly extent analysis. This 
presents a reinvigoration of the industrial design community's discourse, maintaining the 
centrality of its expertise with materiality, but in new terms of debate. 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. 
An allegory that provided much of the impetus to the research remains as a coda in an 
appendix to the thesis. lt serves the thesis as a narrative retelling of its ideas, as they are 
shown to be enacted in a form of scenario, albeit based on a rather extraordinary story of 
extremis. The allegory recalls Bruno Bettelheim's account of joey the Mechanical Boy as it 
appeared in Scientific American in the mid-1950s. The story of joey is deconstructed in order 
to provide an allegory, eschewing closure to reveal how the process of humanisation can be 
understood to be tied to a process of intellectual coherence. This allegory is presented here 
because it provides a means to open up a number of ideas through the design analysis of 
drawings presented in the account of therapy by the psychologist Bruno Bettelheim. After an 
introduction to Bruno Bettelheim's account (which appeared at face value to be one of trauma 
and therapy), the coda questions the process by which joey is liberated from a particular and 
rather exceptional, technology-engendered psychosis. 
Chapter one opens the thesis by confronting industrial design and its particular 
autonomies. This locates the research, establishes a clear view of how industrial design can be 
identified and interrogates the intellectual tactics that give it autonomy and authority to act 
within its own terms and as a wider intellectual agent. The key claim made in this chapter is 
that industrial design can be usefully understood as an intellectual community. This makes it 
possible to reveal how its autonomy resides in its subtle management of fluidity in terms that 
go about a particular ambition - a critical position that is not fully accounted in its discourse. 
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Before any theoretical examination of industrial design can commence, it is important to be 
sure about what one means and implies by that term. One problem with the term 'industrial 
design' is that it is difficult to define without excluding any number of other ways of 
describing the unique contribution it might make to the world. Thinking about industrial 
design as an intellectual community can provide a means of analysing the licence and scope 
that designers appear to accept when they define their own bounds and goes some way 
towards an explanation of why industrial design does seem to have some coherent presence in 
the world. Although not regulated with the rigour of medicine or law, 'industrial design' is 
consolidated into a recognised profession by a number of affiliated institutions, which are 
loosely held together under the umbrella of a further official body consolidating other national 
design bodies. One important institutionalising body, the International Council of Societies of 
Industrial Design (ICSID), suggests in its description of industrial design that it is an 
intellectual means of 'humanising technology'. ICSID provides no explanation of what this 
might imply. In making this claim, industrial designers appear to be unique among other 
professions and practices. When industrial design is understood as a kind of intellectual 
community, then we can begin to realise how industrial design is a rather particular although 
fluid discourse that orbits about this rather profound but uncritical claim of itself as an 
intellectual means of humanising technology. 
The impetus to humanise technology places the human and the technological in appositional 
epistemes. However, individual members of the industrial design community find themselves 
having to work with a number of fluid terms when they think about how they might construct 
this process. While the 'human' and the 'technological' are considered as discrete epistemes, 
they are terms that are almost entirely fluid. This makes it difficult for the community to frame 
in precise terms what it means to humanise technology. However, being a creative and 
reflective community that deals with a discourse of abstractions, industrial designers are well 
placed to explore how they might construct, with a degree of coherence, a process of 
humanising technology when the terms of reference are in constant flux. Over the twentieth 
century the industrial design community humanised technology by making the extraordinary 
seem quotidian. Individual industrial designers do seem to be able to communicate with a 
clarity that belies the complexity of the forces shaping their intellectual community and the 
intellectual challenge in the process of humanising technology. They do not have a formal 
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tradition of accounting for this expertise. This establishes industrial design as an intellectual 
community founded in fluidity that is not always aware of the full extent of the subtlety of its 
own enterprise. 
If one takes the view of industrial design that it is an intellectual community consolidated 
about an intellectual process founded in epistemic discretion, then it becomes possible to 
explore with some authority how that process is thrown into question by the disconnection 
and the progressive displacement of the human reference in technology. Chapter two 
outlines how emergent technologies that appear unaccountable in orthodox material terms 
point towards a more critical, epistemological displacement of the human referent in 
understandings of technology. This enables the claim to be made that rupture in the industrial 
design community's critical discourse is symptomatic of a schematic problem that can be 
resolved through a strategy of reconnection. 
While there is much that individual members of the industrial design community can refer to 
that can help them to describe technology in material and cultural terms as a visual aesthetic, 
there is little that exists by way of a formal or technical language in Western culture or in 
readily available terminology to describe an aesthetic of use or enaction. This has lead to a 
prioritisation of the visual evaluation of the cultural values of technology over any other kind 
of aesthetic. This problem is brought into sharp focus by the emergence of new technological 
forms. One recent emerging technology has lead to suggestions by some of the emergence of 
a new species of Artilects (artificial intellects). Projections of technology such as these, which 
give rise to new paradigms of human and post-human existence, are demonstrated as being 
symptomatic of critical problem in the understanding of the intimate relationship between 
humanity and technology and can imply some lacunae in the understanding of what the 
process of humanisation might imply. Such projections have resonance in some of the early 
twentieth-century fears of man-machines. Some erstwhile members of the industrial design 
community have responded to the intellectual challenge posed by the apparently immaterial 
nature of electronic and media technologies by inventing new forms of design practice. 
The inclination to give discrete names to these diverse, but intellectually similar, design 
practices serves to distance the intellectual heritage of the industrial design community from 
the intellectual capital generated in any discourse connecting the process of 'humanising' 
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mechanical technologies. This inability to connect may play some part in causing the 
threatened rupture in the community's intellectual discourse. 
For a number of years industrial design has been promoted as an adjunct of successful 
business development and growth. The success of the industrial design community at finding 
clients among corporations and small manufactures can suggest that design intellect remains 
a vibrant focus of cultural, strategic and economic creativity. There may be a number of ways 
the industrial design community might move forward, overcoming the rupture that threatens 
its intellectual discourse. Industrial designers may decide to embrace a form of limited 
continuity in a model of their practice, accounting only for these technologies as they fit 
established practices. They could divert their attention to deal with some other, more pressing 
problem. They may decide to shift attention to one of the other challenges confronting 
humanity- not least, of course, the problems of climate change and carbon emissions. The 
industrial design community may come to a view that it can best engage with the future by 
looking beyond the development stage of bioscience. At one extreme of this particular 
engagement, the industrial designer would become a kind of fantastical imagineer, limited to 
promotional activities or to the design of props for futuristic drama. Perhaps the most difficult 
route the industrial design community might take would be to look for continuity with its 
intellectual heritage and seek to establish a vision of the future where a trajectory of 
biotechnological development can play out as a quotidian facet of some future culture. 
Continuity might not be beyond possibility, if biotechnology and the other emerging 
technologies of the future could be connected to industrial design's intellectual trajectory. 
This seems to imply that the way that industrial design is understood and projected may be in 
some way responsible for the rupture. 
When that rupture in the industrial design community's critical discourse is understood to be 
symptomatic of a schematic problem, then a strategy of continuity will necessarily be founded 
in some aspect of discourse that has resonance in past practice and in some consolidating 
aspect of industrial design practice. Chapter three explores more fully how the industrial 
design community is formed around a sustaining narrative in which the artefact acts as the 
keystone of analysis. Particular focus is placed upon the causal link in the tendency to rupture 
in the industrial design community. This is revealed as emerging from a strategic lacuna in 
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technological artefact-based histories where the process of humanisation is regarded as 
ahistorical. 
An 'artefact' can be defined by the evidence it provides of a process of humanisation - that is, 
it provides a particular type of 'solid' evidence of human interventions into the world. The 
human concern with shaping materials into useful and familiar 'artefacts' Is at least as old as 
human histories allow us to know. For many thousands of years, people who tended to have 
the lowest social standing were responsible for the making of artefacts. Their heritage in the 
vernacular and informal may go some way to explain why the industrial design community has 
tended to construct its own theoretical and historical discourse. Histories of the industrial 
design community emerge from within that community and often appear interchangeable. 
Together, design histories, repeating a similar story, reinforce one another and provide a 
consolidating narrative for the industrial design community. This consolidating narrative is 
built around a coherent, although largely invariant and chronologically constrained, model of 
the industrial design community's trajectory. Scholarly industrial design literatures place a 
particular form of material artefact at the centre of analysis. industrial design histories are 
told through industrially produced artefacts, mostly, although not always, from the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Histories of the process of humanisation are implied to be 
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.:i:'aa"cli.mtable in material cultural terms, while artefacts are often presented as being in the 
absence of people and appear as fully resolved entities that belie the fluidity in their terms of 
analysis. Consequently, the imagination of the artefact is established in uncritical terms and in 
a constrained and linear history. 
lt becomes evident that industrial design can visibly connect its consolidating narrative with 
emerging technologies only if they avail themselves to the orthodox accounts that are used to 
track the process of humanising technology. A more subtle attention to the rethinking of the 
artefact in industrial design analysis can provide a means of exploring how the process of 
humanising technology might be retrieved in industrial design narratives. In chapter four 
emerging understandings of cultural networks are used to interrogate how the 'resolved' 
technological artefact informs and shapes understandings of the process of humanising 
technology. The strategic lacuna identified in chapter three is posited as an emergent 
consequence of a deficit in reductivist methodologies, which pay insufficient attention to 
autopoietic cultural networks, and the impact of agency and supercomplexity. However, when 
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the materiality of the artefact is understood to emerge as an autopoietic consequence of 
flowing materialisations of intellectual forces, then it becomes possible to see how the artefact 
at the locus of industrial design logic might be connected to the developmental logic of 
biotechnology. 
The consolidating narrative provided by industrial design histories leads designers to suppose 
that artefacts can be interrogated to reveal something of the culture of the people who made 
them. lt has seemed a reasonable enough idea to designers that they might trade upon 
established or projected cultural values and build them into the design of contemporary 
artefacts. However, linear histories of technology, such as those projected in the consolidating 
narratives that industrial designers use in their intellectual community, are unreliable. 
Histories of technology can be shown to be selective in their sources and project one among 
any number of possible trajectories for any given artefact. While artefacts endure, for the most 
part the human relationships, passions, laughter and tears that go to make up the rich 
complexity of individual lives are accounted only in memories or in subjective narratives. 
Analysed in isolation of its use, the artefact can provide only some fractional evidence of a 
process of humanisation and the full complexity of the forces that determine its appearance. A 
number of ideas are brought together to suggest that artefacts are better understood as self-
emergent (autopoietic) and flowing materialisations of supercomplex intellectual forces. When 
artefacts are understood in these terms, it becomes possible to see why attempts to 'reverse 
engineer' or to unpick supercomplexity might be beyond the scope of human intellect without 
an accepted understanding that closure should be eschewed. Furthermore, it makes it possible 
to see how orthodox presentations and analysis of the artefact may be problematic. 
A new account for the history of the process of humanising technology becomes possible 
when artefacts are understood as self-emergent (autopoietic) and flowing materialisations of 
supercomplex intellectual forces. These new accounts are freed from the constraints applied 
by deterministic shifts in materiality because development is shown to be an intellectually 
imagined process. Shifts in materiality then might be better understood as an emergent 
consequence of paradigmatic shifts in intellectual understandings. This opens up the 
possibility of constructing a more connective narrative for the industrial design community. 
Chapter five tests this reconnection, extending the idea of the topological domain (an 
analytical tool of biology) in order to explore how it might be used to shape understandings of 
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what it means to humanise technology. The historical narratives that sustain the industrial 
design community are reimagined through two speculative historiographies. These are 
specifically designed in order to demonstrate how the process of humanising technology can 
be tracked alongside developments in intellectual logic. Complexity in understandings of the 
human in the world are tracked through a trajectory revealing how technology comes to be 
understood and represented in terms that are tied to the complexity of understandlngs of the 
human. This developmental trajectory is tracked first through humanist understandings of the 
man In an antagonistic landscape through to ecological understandings of interconnected 
species; and then through understandings of the human as a ~orporeal entity through to 
understandings of cultural construction. 
The idea of the topological domain suggests that the world is only as material as the 
complexity of its analysis. Many of the sustaining narratives of industrial design are divided 
into 'machine ages'. This idea of a discrete periodisation of a trajectory is rooted In Banham's 
influential description (1955) of the first and second machine ages, but is, of course, an 
entirely artificial construct. Historical periodisation into discrete ages serve to simplify and 
reduce complexity but are problematic, unless they are themselves analysed for the reflexive 
grouping, or collating, of rather uncertainly codified ideas. (On occasion, the historical 
periodisation of the 'machine age' will be used here, but only when it is necessary as a 
colloquial term in reference to where it is employed elsewhere.) In industrial design histories, 
the machine ages appear to represent changes in the way in which artefacts appear to be 
consolidated in smaller and smaller material objects. This is a linear process moving from the 
massive and noetically obvious monumental, towards microscopic evanescence and hence into 
anoesis. However, the 'machine ages' can be understood to be an artificial construct and to 
provide evidence of shifts in the scope and extent of analysis (the topological domain) rather 
than physical materiality. The manner in which materiality is imagined appears to be tied to 
broader philosophical understandings of the place of the human in the world. Understood in 
this context, the scale of a supposed material reality is shown to be a cultural construction. An 
alternative history can demonstrate how technology could be imagined in humanist terms. 
This implies a tectonic landscape In sympathy with broader intellectual understandings of the 
world. An alternative history can demonstrate too how technology could be imagined in terms 
of organic life in sympathy with broader intellectual understandings of the world. The 
complexity and fluidity of contemporary analysis may go some vvay to explain why materiality 
is now understood to be a fluid and mutable construct and why large monumental 
technologies were not discussed in these terms. The intellectual location of the industrial 
design community has necessarily shifted in order to ensure that its process of humanisation 
has remained coherent in terms of pertaining topological domains. This may explain why it 
has only recently become intellectually logical for industrial designers to focus attention upon 
some 'immaterial' technologies, even though they have prescience earlier in the trajectory. lt 
may also point to the necessity for another shift. 
When it has been established that technology comes to be understood and represented in 
terms that are tied to the complexity of understandings of the human, it becomes plausible to 
set out some steps for how industrial design might recover its autonomy. This autonomy will 
be determined, not by the development of a new material form of technology, but by an 
emergent intellectual understanding having resonance with the biotechnological 
understanding of the human. In chapter six a number of intellectual opportunities that 
biotechnology offers to the conceptualisation of technology are interrogated. This process 
makes it possible to insists that, when the human is understood in terms of enacted moments 
of a hybrid condition, the imperative of design can be understood as a process of the 
orchestration of valence at the material site of Interaction. 
One way to understand what it means to humanise technology is in terms of an intellectual 
and creative process in which valence is maintained between prevailing understandings of the 
world and its manifestation in the material artefact. In these terms, it is becoming Increasingly 
difficult to talk about the human and the technological in discrete terms. A model of actor 
network theory, drawn from sociology, is employed as a means to take a more fluid view of 
human-technology relationships. Actor network theory has been the subject of considerable 
criticism, for the most part oriented towards accusations of reduction and the provision, in 
essence, of an incomplete analysis. However, these criticisms can be understood to reflect a 
realisation that closure is no longer a viable objective and that the provisional is better 
accepted as a reality of an emergent holism that accounts for the whole human as a 
distributed and enacted soma {referred to here as holanthropic analysis). Actor network theory 
makes it possible to understand how lives are played out in cooperation with technologies and 
to take a more subtle and unbounded view that accounts for interplay without seeking closure 
but rather accounts for the materialisation of artefacts in terms of hybrid social and cultural 
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energies. These accounts demonstrate that humanity and technology can now no longer be 
considered separately but that humanity must be considered as a hybrid holanthropic 
condition. 
lt is necessary to ask why industrial design has not incorporated a process of the orchestration 
of valence at the material site of interaction into the terms of its analysis. Taking a lead from 
an anthropological understanding of technology as an evolutionary component of intelligence-
given form and enacted through social and cultural processes, chapter seven reviews 
attempts to resist a necessary inclusion of hybridity into analysis. Ideas of alienation are 
shown to emerge from classical ideas of technicity, which deny the evolution of the hybrid 
species. A previous attempt to understand enaction from a design standpoint is reviewed and 
shown to be limited by its failure to account fully for the distributed soma in its analysis. 
Many attempts to unpick the hybrid nature of the human condition founded upon ideas of an 
essential heterogeneity, such as that of cyborg theory, do not fully account for hybrid 
holanthropic evolution and are forced to imply that somehow people are alienated from their 
true selves by technology. These theories consider the human and the technological in 
degrees of differentiation and frequently make the ordinary seem traumatic and focus 
attention upon technology as an alienating force, rather than a facet of a hybrid holanthropic 
condition. lt becomes possible, then, to suggest that industrial designers, lacking confidence 
in their intellectual heritage, have allied the process of humanisation to attempts to reverse 
this supposed alienation and to reconstruct a social narrative of the cyborg by intervening into 
social situations and by separating the human from the technological. Environmental 
scientists, reflecting recent moves in scientific logic, argue that linear and reductive modes of 
science are not sufficient to engage in complex questioning of the manner in which human 
beings understand themselves and the world, an inadequacy particularly evident in relation to 
the things humans make in order to interact in the world. Classical ideas, underpinning much 
Western logic, that reduce the human species to an entity in antagonistic relation to the world 
are unsustainable in intellectual and ecological terms and appear to go against the way in 
which people anecdotally describe their lives. Holanthropic analysis then establishes that 
technology can be understood only as some component of intelligence tied to the evolutionary 
trajectory of the species, but given form through social and cultural processes. Once one 
begins to talk in terms of evolutionary biology, however, the soma cannot be discounted in 
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any analysis of being in the world, and more critically cannot be isolated from it either. This 
invites a new form of holsomatic analysis. The theoretical construction of the physical human 
has, for the most part, remained fixed about a perceived materiality that has resonance with 
the familiar and everyday body. One upshot of this is that, while humanity and technology can 
now no longer be considered as anything other than a hybrid holanthropic condition in social 
and cultural analysis, the same cannot be said of attempts to understand the human soma. 
While it may appear self-evident to contemporary designers that humanity and technology are 
heterogeneous, it is becoming increasingly recognised by cognitive scientists that cognition 
can be more completely understood, not as a purely perceptual interpretation and analysis of 
the world, but in terms of an embodied and somatic engagement with the world. Some 
design-led approaches to embodied interaction appear to be entrenched in methods of 
analysis that make it difficult to incorporate the full holsomatic account into design logic. 
In order to make progress, it is important to return to a review of how granularity in analysis 
provides a changed view of reality and not a changed reality. This demonstrates how it is 
important when one considers human-technology relationships to undertake a form of extent 
analysis in order to be sure that valence is maintained in terms. A number of attempts to 
maintain stability in terms have been made by members of the industrial design community, 
but these must be overcome if a form of extent analysis that accounts for holsomasis is to be 
included into their discourse. The role of chapter eight in the thesis is to provide a closing 
argument suggesting that, in order for industrial designers to find a way to engage with the 
anoetic, it will be necessary for them to find a means to 'artefactualise' the enaction of the 
hybrid-human at a subtle and intense degree of granular complexity. At this scale and 
complexity it will become clear that no meaningful closure of the human is possible and that 
therefore a means will be required for some kind of extent analysis to engage productively 
with a new found holanthropy. 
it can be demonstrated that material scale and extent are linked to the granular sophistication 
in the conceptual and technical models that are applied to their analysis. An artefact that 
might appear in orthodox analysis to be a single resolved entity can be shown to be a 
collusion of many differing modes of analysis set about a range of topological domains. it can 
then be seen that the materiality and complexity of the artefact are tied to the complexity of 
its analysis and that this is subject to a significant degree of fluid play. The human soma can 
36 
be understood in similar terms. However, one reason why people might be reluctant to discuss 
the idea of holsomasis in terms of coextensive experiences of human technology interaction is 
that some of these ideas can be associated with previous more hysterical claims of the 
Futurists and of the 'New Ego', which have become somewhat dislocated from the trajectory of 
technology history. 
joe and josephine, the familiar ergonomic line drawings of the human developed in the mid-
twentieth century, provide a bounded model of the human for designers and can be 
understood as an attempt at stability, fixing the human body as a given artefactual form. While 
everything else may appear to be fluid, designers imagine that they can at least rely upon this 
model of the human as a fixed material entity. Fixing the human body as a resolved and 
material artefact may have provided a form of hysterical continuity for industrial designers but 
has made it impossible for them to account for the ways in which humanity can be considered 
a hybrid holsomatic condition. 
The thesis concludes with a speculative scenario, which reviews some of the ideas contained 
within the thesis, and sets out some parameters for a future form of industrial design. If, by 
eschewing the limited artefact models of the human that they hold, industrial designers can 
come to terms with this understanding, then they will find their imagining of the artefact will 
shift to a scale coherent with emergent intellectual understandings of the world as a complex 
and unbound singularity. If artefacts are understood as a materialisation of some hybrid-
human enaction, then the anoetic can be considered to point to a need for materiality to be 
understood in similarly complex and molecular terms. The particular intellectual trajectory and 
heritage of industrial design, described by generations of people who have taken complexity 
and brought it into the world as a series of forms, could be brought to bear upon emerging 
understandings of the world as a continuum. 
If designers were to eschew the tendency to define themselves by the nuances of their practice 
and instead take a view of their expertise as residing within one topological domain or 
another, they could describe themselves in the terms of the scale of attention they give the 
world. They would then need to understand that the impetus to humanise technology implies 
that they should seek a condition of quotidian experience at any degree of granular attention 
by transforming complexity into the quotidian. In order for industrial designers to find a way 
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to engage with the anoetic, it will be necessary for them to find the means to artefactualise the 
enaction of the hybrid-human at a subtle degree of granular complexity. Such a granular logic 
will demand a holsomatic understanding at a range of granular degrees of complexity. At this 
scale and complexity it will become clear that no meaningful closure of the human is possible. 
There is not yet any answer as to how designers might take the potential of DNA computation 
and other biotechnologies, but at least they might then have something of the terminology 
required in order to construct a brief for the design of one kind of future. 
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Chapter one 
Industrial design and its autonomies 
1.1 An autonomous conglomeration called industrial design 
it is difficult to define industrial design without excluding any number of other ideas 
that might appear to describe the unique contribution of industrial design to the world. 
1.2 Industrial design and institutional regulation 
Although not regulated with the rigor of medicine or law, industrial design is 
consolidated into a.recognised profession by a number of loosely affiliated institutions, 
which are held together under the umbrella of a further official body consolidating other 
national design bodies. 
1.3 Industrial design and technology 
Industrial design's description of itself through its institutionalising body suggests that 
it 'humanises technology', although it provides no explanation of what this might imply. 
In making this claim, industrial designers appear to be unique among other professions 
and practices. 
1.4 Industrial design and its intellectual community 
Industrial design can be understood as an intellectual community. However, industrial 
designers find themselves having to work with a number of fluid terms when they think 
about how they might construct a process of humanising technology. 
1.5 Industrial design and the function of fluidity 
Industrial design does seem to have some coherence, and industrial designers do seem 
able to communicate with a clarity that belies the complexity of the forces shaping their 
intellectual community. Industrial design has the intellectual skills to explore, with a 
degree of coherence, how it might construct a process of humanising technology when 
the terms of reference are fluid. 
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1.1 An autonomous conglomeration called industrial design 
lt is difficult to define industrial design without excluding any number of other ideas 
that might appear to describe the unique contribution of industrial design to the world. 
Industrial design, indeed design in general, cannot be precisely defined. The design theorist 
Tony Fry (1999. p. 4), for example, suggests that design: 
occupies an uncomfortable place, certainly in the English language. No common 
meaning exists or is likely to get consensual agreement. An understanding of design 
will never be theoretically secured, simply because design gets configured so 
differently in the relations of various discourses of its practice, presentation and 
economic exchange. Object, form, appearance and process, individually or in various 
permutations, all get designated as what design is. What results is seemingly 
commonly agreed understandings that are in fact misrecognitions predicated upon 
the differently adopted referents. 
Even designers share this uncertainty as to what constitutes design. This uncertainty can lead 
to rather ill-thought-through attempts to describe themselves (for example, McCormack, 
2007). This uncertainty becomes evident when they evaluate the success of their endeavours. 
See, for example, Terence Conran (1996, p. 10): 
People have tied themselves in knots trying to define the whole concept of 'good' 
design and filled many pages with dense critical theories in the process ... You cannot, 
however, quantify (it), you can only recognise it when you see it. 
Some kinds of design activity can be described with some approximation. The craft of 
ceramics is no doubt an intellectually subtle practice but does share an essential material 
focus that helps those who are not ceramicists to define it. This material essence helps 
ceramicists to understand themselves too. Consider ceramicist Donna Hetrick's personal 
statement (2007): 
Clay is so simple and so ancient. I am fascinated by the many facets of pottery 
making, from digging clay out of a riverbank, to building a primitive kiln in the hillside 
or sitting mesmerized as I watch the orange glow of a kiln against the night sky. 
Industrial design, however, cannot be so easily described. The essence of industrial designer 
cannot be described by the manipulation of a particular material, nor can it be understood to 
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be contained by a particular technique. Materials such as wood, ceramics, metals and plastics, 
or techniques such as weaving, moulding, spinning, beating or extruding, which define other 
crafts and creative activities, are included within the resources of industrial design, but do not 
define it. 
While not defined by the outcomes of its intellectual endeavour, the products of industrial 
design may bear some morphological resemblance to the outputs of other creative practices 
and crafts. Among other things, industrial designers are responsible for the formation of clay 
pots, decorative accessories and garments . When individual designers describe what they do, 
they hint at something rather subtle and complex that is contained within their intellectual 
approach to organising the world. For example, on the homepage of its 2006 website 
(www.theproductgroup.co.uk), the Product Group, a small UK-based design consultancy, 
describes their process in terms of the controlled and schematic production of a number of 
qualities: 
Consumers, buyers, in fact all of us shop with ideals in mind; lighter, faster, cleaner, 
easier, stronger, sexier, cheaper, more comfortable, efficient and stylish. We all want 
contemporary, eye-catching products with real advantages. Understanding the 
Influences and rationale at work in the high street allows us to assemble a vision of 
what the next step should be. Shaping that vision into a desirable product is about 
controlling how technological, mechanical and formal aspects are spliced together to 
give that creative edge. 
The Product Group speak of 'ideals in mind', of 'assembling a vision' and about the 'splicing 
together' of the complexity of an intellectual process in order to 'give' something it illusively 
terms 'that creative edge'. There is an implication in this language that design is something 
that cannot be easily expressed; rather, there is some implication of an occult sensibility, 
which cannot be explained readily, but which emerges out of some rather fluid and complex 
negotiation of ideas and forces. The Product Group implies, too, that design is not best 
understood through the products of its intellectual endeavours, but for its value as a process 
in itself. This is something that IDEO picks up on. On its website (www.idea.com), IDEO, a 
large multinational design consultancy, part of the multinational Steel case corporate group, 
talks little of the products of its endeavours but rather places its focus upon processes of 
transformation and the realisation of latency: 
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Independently ranked by global business leaders as one of the world's most 
innovative companies, we use design thinking to help clients navigate the speed, 
complexity, and opportunity areas of today's world. We help organizations in the 
business, government, education, and social sectors innovate and grow in three ways: 
We identify opportunities for growth by revealing people's latent needs, behaviours, 
and desires, and visualizing new ways to serve and support people. We design new 
offerings - products, services, spaces, media and software-based interactions - and 
preserve the relevance and delight of the original idea from concept to market 
expression. We enable organizations to transform their cultures and build the 
capabilities required to innovate routinely. 
IDEO offers an eclectic vision. The designers at IDEO design in a strategic setting that 'helps' 
clients navigate, 'Identifies opportunities' and 'enables'. In its strategic attempt, IDEO can best 
describe design by its relationship to other dynamic management techniques. lt cannot 
adequately describe design without these references. Designers just do design: And this 
mysterious process of design is somehow allied to a strategic vision. The term 'design' can of 
course be associated with other terms that might appear at first glance to define design to a 
particular craft or process. But, in the case of industrial design, no craft or process resides at 
the essence of its definition. 
Industrial design - unlike ceramics, for example - is not defined by a particular process. 
Industrial designers appear to share something of a sense that they are engaged in a process, 
although the nature and scope of this process appear to be rather opaque. Informally, when 
pressed for a definition, industrial designers tend to default to a view of themselves as being 
somehow responsible for the formation and realisation of the 'stuff' of the technologised 
world. 1 
Ran into jwz at the Meat Beat Manifesto show and he posed the question to me, 'What 
does an industrial designer do?' My smart-ass answer was 'make stuff!' followed by 
examples of what industrial designers make these days: furniture, video game 
controllers, tools, dashboards for cars, etc. But I think my answer was biased by what I 
want to do as an industrial designer. (All Art Burns, 2005) 
1 Industrial designers are aware that they share with many of their fellows a fascination with the latest 
gadgets and with new materials and technological processes. The numerous industrial design research 
centres and university courses that focus upon an ever-developing and always-changing technological 
landscape indicate a particular concern with the most up-to-date technology among industrial designers. 
Of course these centres have emerged in response to drives from designers' clients bringing new 
technologies to market. Nevertheless it is probably worth speculating that many designers are attracted to 
the profession by their interest in technology. 
42 
The idea that industrial design is defined, or in this case 'biased', by the experience of the 
individual designer is an interesting illumination of the fluid nature of the industrial designer's 
rationale. This fluidity is extended to industrial designers' expertise as well. The Industrial 
Design Society of America (IDSA) demonstrates this fluid expertise in its attempt to explain 
industrial design to the commercial world. In its description, IDSA (2005) is at pains to cover 
the many fields that may reside within the industrial designer's expertise and that may be 
mapped onto the expertise of their, non-designer, clients. 
Education and experience in anticipating psychological, physiological and sociological 
factors that influence and are perceived by the user are essential industrial design 
resources. Industrial designers also maintain a practical concern for technical 
processes and requirements for manufacture; marketing opportunities and economic 
constraints; and distribution sales and servicing processes. They work to ensure that 
design recommendations use materials and technology effectively, and comply with all 
legal and regulatory requirements ... Their expertise is sought in a wide variety of 
administrative arenas to assist in developing industrial standards, regulatory 
guidelines and quality control procedures to improve manufacturing operations and 
products. 
By implication, the International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (ICSID) definition 
appears to demand an extraordinarily wide range of intellectual skills in order for an individual 
to 'anticipate the psychological, physiological and sociological factors' that might suggest 
industrial designers have an ambition encompassing almost all human knowledge. Broad 
sweeping assertions such as this do little to focus upon the specific skill or intellectual 
motivation of the industrial designer. Nevertheless, and despite all this uncertainty and 
changeability, there is something in the world called industrial design, and there are people 
who think of themselves as industrial designers and who sense that they share something of a 
rather extensive and worthwhile heritage. 
1.2 Industrial design and Institutional regulation 
Although not regulated with the rigor of medicine or law, industrial design is 
consolidated into a recognised profession by a number of loosely affiliated institutions, 
which are held together under the umbrella of a further official body consolidating other 
national design bodies. 
43 
Industrial design can appear to be a freeform activity, performing a range of disparate tasks 
without the certainty of a clearly bounded remit. This lack of clarity is extended into its activity 
in the world where industrial design exists without a formal regulatory framework. Unlike 
architects or doctors, for example, industrial designers must work creatively and even 
unconventionally, yet must conform to standards of public health and safety and to the 
standards imposed by their clients. These rather ill-defined standards to which an industrial 
design is supposed to subscribe are represented by a network of institutions. 2 The 
International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (ICSID) draws together these national 
bodies into one organisation with global reach, representing industrial design and its 
practitioners to the world. There are over 150 design organisations around the world that are 
affiliated to ICSID. lt can be compared with the World Council of Churches or Oikoumene. 3 
Both ICSID and Oikoumene act as a coming-together of a diverse community of those who 
share something. lt would be surprising to find ICSID described as an ecumenical movement; 
nevertheless the shared ambition to act as facilitators of dialogue make their rationales appear 
similar. 
Where Oikoumene (2007) is described as 'a unique space: one in which [member churches and 
faith groups) can reflect, speak, act, worship and work together, challenge and support each 
other, share and debate with each other .. .', ICSID (2007), drawing its membership from a 
diverse collective of 'professional associations, promotional societies, educational institutions, 
government bodies, corporations and institutions .. .', is described as a means to facilitate an 
International forum, consolidating its institutional prospectus with a declared prospectus to 
'contribute to the development of the profession of industrial design ... an international 
platform through which design institutions worldwide can stay in touch, share common 
interests and new experiences, and be heard as a powerful voice'.4 
2 For example: The Chartered Society of Designers (CSD) in the UK, the Industrial Design Society of 
America (IDSA), the Association of Women Industrial Designers (AWID), Design France, Japan Industrial 
Design Promotion Organisation (JIDPO), the Korea Institute of Industrial Design Promotion, and Verbandes 
Deutscher lndustrie Designer (VOID), or Design Zentrum (otherwise known as 'Red Dot') in Germany. 
3 Oikoumene (2007) claims that it is 'the broadest and most inclusive among the many organized 
expressions of the modern ecumenical movement'. 
4 Many industrial design organisations provide definitions. These definitions must be regarded with some 
care. They often appear intended to project their constituent designers In a particular manner for 
commercial benefit. lt Is arguable, for example, that the IDSA holds a view of the designer as an 
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This comparison Is not superficial: both ICSID and Oikoumene can stand only for a set of 
rather fluid values: neither can license its members nor the individuals who make up the 
localised bodies that subscribe to it. Having no jurisdiction whatsoever over individual 
designers, ICSID, like Oikoumene, exists in the midst of rhetoric of universal immutability. No 
one seems to agree on what constitutes the correct practice of industrial design, and it may be 
that there is no truly correct practice. Industrial design lacks the valediction of a strong 
externally recognised institutional identity such as that enjoyed by the legal or the medical 
professions. While anyone may call himself or herself a priest, individual religious ministries 
do have some authority over that title; this is not, however, the case in industrial design. In 
consequence anyone can describe him or herself as a 'designer'.5 Nevertheless, ICSID is widely 
held to be the consolidating centre of debate, and, given the breadth and international nature 
of its membership, it represents the nearest thing to an institution that industrial design has. 
In the absence of any other institution, the understanding and projection of industrial design 
that ICSID provides make it likely to be the best place to look for a definition of industrial 
design. In its definition of industrial design, the board of ICSID appears alert to the broad 
spectrum of the community of its members. lt appears as if, alert to the risk of excluding 
anyone, ICSID has devised a somewhat open, broad, encompassing and unbounded definition 
of industrial design. lt is reproduced here in full. 
Industrial Design 
Aim. Design is a creative activity whose aim is to establish the multi-faceted qualities 
of objects, processes, services and their systems in whole life-cycles. Therefore, 
design is the central factor of innovative humanisation of technologies and the crucial 
factor of cultural and economic exchange. 
Tasks. Design seeks to discover and assess structural, organizational, functional, 
expressive and economic relationships, with the task of: 
• enhancing global sustainability and environmental protection (global ethics) 
• giving benefits and freedom to the entire human community, individ"ual and 
collective final users, producers and market protagonists (social ethics) 
extraordinary manager. While a useful projection of the designer as a commercial device, this 
interpretation does little to further an understanding of the intellectual task of the design profession. 
5 While the in the UK the Chartered Society of Designers (CSD) proclaims that anyone employing a 
designer who bears its membership or fellowship 'can be assured of a professional service' (COS, 2005), 
membership of the Society is neither universal nor necessarily a prerequisite to the claim of designer 
status. 
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supporting cultural diversity despite the globalization of the world (cultural 
ethics) 
giving products, services and systems, those forms that are expressive of 
(semiology) and coherent with (aesthetics) their proper complexity. 
Design concerns products, services and systems conceived with tools, organizations 
and logic introduced by industrialization - not just when produced by serial 
processes. The adjective 'industrial' put to design must be related to the term industry 
or in its meaning of sector of production or in its ancient meaning of 'industrious 
activity'. Thus, design is an activity involving a wide spectrum of professions in which 
products, services, graphics, interiors and architecture all take part. Together, these 
activities should further enhance - in a choral way with other related professions - the 
value of life. Therefore, the term designer refers to an individual who practises an 
intellectual profession, and not simply a trade or a service for enterprises. (ICSID, 
2007) 
The ICSID definition recognises that industrial design takes many forms and is readily 
adaptable; lt allows space for the pragmatist, the idealist, the engineer, the entrepreneur and 
the philosopher all to find their place among those who claim to call themselves industrial 
designers. 
However, in its exegesis the designers are tasked with the explicit aim of the 'innovative 
humanisation of technologies' (ICSID, 2006). There is no hint at what this might mean, but 
upon examination this rather simple claim stands out as a significant and unique ambition. 
The stated claim that industrial design humanises technology carries with it any number of 
assumptions, not least among these that technology is not human. An analysis of this almost 
throw-away assumption can provide the basis of a more rigorous consideration than ICSID 
provides. 
1.3 Industrial design and technology 
Industrial design's description of itself through its institutionalising body suggests that 
it 'humanises technology', although it provides no explanation of what this might imply. 
In making this claim industrial designers appear to be unique among other professions 
and practices. 
The IDSA definition extends the institutional assumption that industrial design humanises 
technology into a commercially strategic role. lt calls upon a number of implicit 
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institutionalised understandings of supposed human characteristics or 'anticipations' of 
industrial designers' expertise in consequence of their education: 
education and experience in anticipating psychological, physiological and sociological 
factors that influence and are perceived by the user are essential industrial design 
resources. (IDSA, 2005) 
These anticipations represent in themselves an institutionalised 'psychological, physiological 
or sociological' view of the human and are therefore subject to the debate and variation within 
the various institutions from within which their terms emerge. The designer is posited as 
being somehow able to demonstrate the intellectual skills both to synthesise and to hybridise 
this breadth into a coherent practice with an implicit investment in human qualities and to 
orchestrate them into successful technological forms: 
The industrial designer's unique contribution places emphasis on those aspects of the 
product or system that relate most directly to human characteristics, needs and 
interests. This contribution requires specialized understanding of visual, tactile, safety 
and convenience criteria, with concern for the user. (IDSA, 2005) 
The ICSID definition is more explicit and posits the designer as someone more akin to a 
distributed influence in human affairs, rather than located in an isolated- while informed-
position of masterful synthesis. The ICSID definition can be viewed as an assumption of the 
human as standing for a set of essentially Western and humanistic values. In this way the ICSID 
definition posits industrial design within ethical frames of striking ambition and scope. 
Enhancing global sustainability and environmental protection (global ethics) 
Giving benefits and freedom to the entire human community, individual and 
collective. Final users, producers and market protagonists (social ethics) 
Supporting cultural diversity despite the globalisation of the world (cultural ethics) 
(ICSID, 2007) 
These ambitions are, of course, far-reaching and extraordinarily ambitious. In the ICSID 
definition industrial design is presented as an institutionalised ring-fencing of a number of 
intellectual strategies that enable designers to establish, through a somewhat opaque process 
of analysis, 
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the multi-faceted qualities of artefacts, processes, services and their systems in whole 
life-cycles. (ICSID, 2007) 
This intellectual activity is located in an organisational frame, but is expressed as a means of 
adding value to the commercial exchange of goods and processes and orchestration of 
relationships: 
structural, organisational, functional, expressive and economic relationships. (ICSID, 
2007) 
However, there is a hint that industrial design is a poetic activity too, transcending the purely 
commercial. Industrial design is also a creative and aesthetic activity: according to ICSID, the 
designer's special skill is the ability to give proper complexity: 
products, services and systems, those forms that are expressive of (semiology) and 
coherent with (aesthetics) their proper complexity. (ICSID, 2007) 
This is a particularly vague notion. There is no attempt to explain what it means to give 
something its 'proper complexity', nor how aesthetics is necessarily implicated in the process 
of making things coherent. When, as it is in the case of the ICSID definition, semiology is 
linked explicitly to ideas of expression, it ignores the full range of rather less-explicit 
possibilities of understanding how people might negotiate the world. All these rather vague 
and questionable possibilities are brought together in the ICSID definition in one rather neat 
phrase. Industrial design is 
the central factor of the innovative humanisation of technologies ... (ICSID, 2007) 
ICSID provides no critical attempt to deconstruct the various tensions implicit in these 
ambitions nor to explain why terms have been employed nor to interrogate their voracity. 
Proceeding, then, from the assumption that technology is contra-human, the ICSID definition 
appears to be a deliberate attempt at the projection of an open and conjectural space. Perhaps 
indicative of a reluctance to become involved in the philosophical complexities of the 
Implications of its definition, ICSID appears to have created a deliberate space for the designer 
to wonder. How, for example, a semiotic method of ensuring coherent and expressive forms 
might connect in practice to an ambition to ensure cultural diversity; how forms that are 
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coherent with their proper complexity are necessarily more aesthetic; or even why complexity 
should be proper at all or indeed what is implied in the choice of that term. The epistemic 
locations of the human and technology as supposed appositional terms are, however, a closed 
debate. 
What constitutes humanity is as much socially and historically constructed as it is biological. 
To be human can imply any number of ideals and actualities; a condition of being, a somatic 
state, a behaviour, or a genetic code. The human cannot be fully defined by excluding any of 
these possible definitions, and the notion of the human in play at any given moment is subject 
to a complex juggling act of many possible definitions. The problem in defining the human 
really begins only when an imbalance occurs in this complex problem when some new 
definition becomes possible - consider, for example, the perceptual problems of 'test-tube' 
babies, 6 although nothing of this complexity is implied in the ICSID definition. Crossman and 
others (1999) have argued that institutions can be understood to emerge in part as a 
consolidation and codification of a frame through which a diverse collection of individuals can 
reflect upon and project themselves. Humanisation is part of a somewhat inexplicit claim that 
design brings something special to the process of realising technology and presents an easily 
digestible and apparently readily understandable, if trite, concept; doctors make people well, 
lawyers understand and construct societal rules, so industrial designers humanise technology. 
While they might demonstrate a wide variety of practice, the concept that they humanise 
technology is reiterated in descriptions industrial designers give of themselves. For example, 
the Design for Humanization of Technology (HUMANTEC) is described on its collaborative 
homepage as a project bringing 
6 The shocking prospect of a means to extend fertilisation and human conception 'out of body' was met, 
by the popular press in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s, with predictions of moral collapse. The 
response of the UK government was to initiate the so-called Warnock enquiry, setting an academic, 
theological and scientific committee- chaired by Baroness warnock- the task of defining an ethical code 
for the newly realised 'fiction' of 'test-tube babies'. Warnock (1984) wrote in her preface to the report of 
the enquiry, 'the task set the inquiry was not an easy one. The issues raised reflect fundamental moral, 
and often religious, questions which have taxed philosophers and others down the ages.' Subsequently 
such Issues of taxing philosophy have given way - outside a minority of certain fundamentalist religious 
positions - to more quotidian and fiscal debate within the National Health Service. People conceived in 
techno-science whom most of us accept as full members of human society warrant hardly a mention, even 
-on occasion- within families for whom the inclusion of techno-science in such a fundamentally 'natural' 
event is merely regarded as a 'helping hand'. Such is the familiarity of this technology that Warnock does 
not even achieve reference in the Wikipedia. Who could conceive that in-vitro fertilisation would be 
anything other than a routine- albeit individually miraculous- procedure? Who would dare to ask the 
'test-tube' child whether he or she recognised his or her 'otherness' or the inhumanity of his or her 
conception? The knee-jerk fear of techno-science now seems rather naive, even irrational; that such a 
fundamental moral question[ing) of what it is to be human turned out to be rather uneventful should not 
surprise us. it has happened time and again. 
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universities, design centers, producers of technology and furniture manufacturers 
[into) a continual dialogue and exchange in order to obtain a panorama of possible 
scenarios for humanizing workplace technologies. (HUMANTEC, 2004) 
Humanisation appears to be a somewhat nebulous concept that is readily attachable, without 
the necessity of a critical stance, to other attributes of a process of designing. For example, 
'the high reliability and improved performance without equal are characteristics of product 
where the most evident aspect is the reduced volume and consequent 'humanisation"' 
(intelshow.com, 2003). Humanising technology can appear as an implicit assumption of good 
design practice, as in Runcie and Wildman (2002), where 'humanisation' is posited in the title 
but largely ignored as a concept (see also Runcie and Wildman 2002). 7 Humanising technology 
can be used to imply a particular stance in the approach to design. Nomen sa (2007) imply that 
they involve people in their process. 
Nomensa apply a human-centred design (HCD) process to projects, and support and 
advise our clients on how to best incorporate them into their own processes. HCD 
(also known as 'User Centred Design') is a group of methods that involves end-users 
in the design of the product from day one. 
But there is nothing in the description of the Nomensa process to explain why the involvement 
of people necessarily humanises technology. This process of involvement is felt to justify the 
inclusion of humanising technology into the company logo: 
no mensa 
humanising technology 
Rather as clay is to the ceramicist, some process of humanisation then appears to be at the 
centre of industrial design. Unlike clay, which is physical and apparent, humanisation is far 
less tangible and a whole degree more fluid, setting technology as an opposition to a 
perceived notional idea of the human as some kind of constructed entity or value. Over the 
7 In the United Kingdom Design Council's 'Humanising Technology' project, reduced volume is attached 
somewhat arbitrarily to a notion of humanisation, assumed (we must guess) to be attached somehow to a 
process of ecological sustainability and the reduction of complexity (see Runcie and Wildman, 2002, 
2003). 
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course of the last quarter of the twentieth century, the understanding of what it is to be 
human became increasingly subjectified. Mike Michael (2000, p. 1), for example, reflects the 
complex drift towards the sociological construction of the human in the opening line of 
Reconnecting Culture, Technology and Nature: 'There are no humans in the world. Or rather 
humans are fabricated - in language, through discursive formations, in their various liaisons 
with technological and natural actors, across networks .. .'.A humanised technology must 
itself rely upon understandings of what it is to be human, or of what constitutes a human, that 
are non-consensual and negotiable. They shift more radically than any understanding of clay, 
can never be declared with any certainty and must always remain a fluid and elusive construct. 
And so industrial design sets out to resolve a problem that is caused by its own 
institutionalised conception. Somehow industrial designers have to make sense of all this, 
without becoming engaged in a constant endeavour to bring humanity and technology 
together into some form that is itself an internal contradiction. 
In How Designers Think Lawson (1997, p. 230) illustrates the design process, and the 
particular cognitive skill of the designers, with the nine-dot puzzle. As Lawson (1997, p. 229) 
says: 'In design, pseudo-puzzles can be easily created by fixing a limited number of 
constraints and then puzzling out the results.' The nine-dot puzzle presents a common trap 
into which the unwary fall when they set about solving problems. 8 
Lawson argues that the failure to solve the problem of the nine-dot puzzle is a consequence 
of the construction of an unspoken rule (that the lines drawn should be contained within the 
space of the nine dots). People attempting to solve the puzzle spontaneously invent this rule 
and assume it to hold, when of course this is not the case. When the lines are extended 
8 The task set in the nine-dot puzzle is simple: join the dots with only four straight lines and without 
lifting the pen. After some struggle, many give up the task, which seems impossible - unless, of course, 
one extends the line beyond the bounds of an invisible box implied by the dots. 
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beyond the limit of the dots and the task is resolved in an instant. lawson (1997, p. 230) 
extends this metaphor to argue that designers are confronted with problems that are trapped 
within self-imposed rule sets and to claim that designers are more able than the general 
population to 'think outside' commonly assumed rule sets.9 This model can be extended to 
the understanding of industrial design itself. 
Gray and Malins (2004) have described how 'spectacles', 'sieves' and 'filters' can be used as 
metaphors to describe how designers research ideas. Although a tempting metaphor, designer 
sunglasses or sieves Imply a process that is predictable and even. Unlike the ceramicist, who 
can have a fairly common and coherently transferable conversation about clay, in industrial 
design the task of humanising technology Is not laid out by ICSID or any of the more localised 
institutions. One understandable and justifiable reason for this is that, since the human Is an 
extraordinarily uncertain and mutable idea, there can be no established codification as to how 
designers should interpret their claim. As a consequence, industrial designers can be at liberty 
to take a view of the particular micro-dynamic or macro-dynamic process of humanisation 
pertinent to their concerns. Accordingly, a designer may take any number of views of what it 
means to humanise technology, ranging from the socio-political to the philosophical. Any 
consensus of what it means to humanise technology then must emerge from the complex 
interaction between any number of interpretations of what it is to be 'human' with similarly 
fluid interpretations of the 'inhumanity' of technology at play at any moment in time. 
1.4 Industrial Design and Its Intellectual community 
Industrial design can be understood as an intellectual community. However, industrial 
designers find themselves having to work with a number of fluid terms when they think 
about how they might construct a process of humanising technology. 
Industrial designers often describes themselves as a community: 
9 This research, acting initially on a hunch that industrial design could and should have something to say 
about biotechnology, explicitly sets out to remove where possible self-imposed constraints and to Include 
a broad and inclusive range of ideas - some of which might seem quite extraordinary in the context of 
industrial design- and to work with them. Ideas are played off one another to create a resolution in which 
the lines go far outside what is claimed as a self-imposed box. Accordingly the thesis sets out to eschew 
an apparent tendency among recent industrial design researchers to accept their intellectual posture as a 
given, or strategically to review industrial design from a distance without necessarily understanding the 
critical implications of the assumptions they make in arriving at a given solution. 
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The Spirit of the Industrial Design Community is in the constant discussion of ideas 
that we have. (RMIT, 2005). 
Veterans of the industrial design community know ... (McDonough, 2005) 
Designed to bring together the PC industry, the industrial design community, and 
end-users ... (AGM, 2005) 
Onllne communities (for example, JISC, TAXI, Core77, AlGA, Designtalkboard, reBang, 
DeslgnSponge or Coroflot) provide 'a place for anyone interested in the creative industry to sit 
down and have a virtual chin-wag' (Designtalkboard, 2005). Other locations are intended for 
more considered and scholarly discussions: the JISC PhD Desig', the Design Research Society 
and the Design Philosophy Society discussion resources are examples of this. 
In formal modes of information studies the notion of the analysis of 'communities of practice' 
is a recognised, although somewhat contentious, field. 10 Wegner (1998, p. 527) describes the 
community of practice as 'the informal relations and understandings that develop in mutual 
engagement on an appropriated joint enterprise' and the formation of a 'situated social 
construction of meaning'. The concept of the community of practice can provide a way to 
understand how things get done in organisations without resorting to an analysis of the 
formal rules or methodologies claimed by an organisation of its management structures. This 
provides a useful way of understanding the meta-conception of uncertain organisations and of 
analysing virtual communities where the specificity of inspection is in contention. In an 
analysis of industrial design, by thinking of it as a community, it becomes possible to 
interrogate how the understanding of the community is predetermined by its own established 
problematic. 
In Industrial design the idea that technology is humanised becomes an 'activity system about 
which its participants share understandings concerning what they are doing .. .' (Wegner, 1998 
1° Communities of practice became something of a buzzword among those concerned with corporate 
management with the publication of 'Cultivating Communities of Practice' (Wegner, McDermott and 
Snyder, 2002). Wegner and colleagues distil ideas developed over the preceding decade and present them 
as an easily digestible text and, with managers in mind, as a tool for action. While this text presents 
models of successful organisations, the concept of the community of practice is primarily a tool of 
analysis. Writing in the journal of Information Science, Cox (2005) presents a useful comparative analysis 
of four 'seminal works'. Cox suggests the term 'communities of practice' is becoming increasingly 
ambiguous and is losing its meaning in the face of challenges to the notion of both community and 
practice. 
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p. 528). This shared problematic becomes a rhetorical narrative. Brown and Duguid (1991), for 
instance, have stressed the importance of a shared narrative in the formation of a community 
and the essential nature of its reinforcment among its participants. Gherardi, Nicolini and 
Odela (Cox, 2004, p. 529) suggest that the term community is important because it is 
dependent upon social processes: 
a way to emphasise that every practice is dependent upon social processes through 
which it is sustained and perpetuated, and that learning takes place through 
engagement in that practice. 
Designers, like other professionals, have many formal opportunities to meet (at conferences, 
for example), but many design conversations take place at semi-formal events. The 
importance of social events surrounding a graduate show should not be down played as an 
opportunity for designers to meet and to discuss the experiments on display as a means to 
form a consensus in the community. 
Communities are identified for study because it is possible to examine both the consolidated 
basis by which a community holds itself together and some of the underlying implications of 
the exegesis to which the members of that community appear to subscribe. When this 
exegesis is apparent, it is examined to reveal any underlying assumption the community 
members might hold. lt then becomes possible to analyse how a given assumption among 
members of a community might prevent them from engaging with a new condition. In 
ethnomethodological studies (Garfinkle, 1967) some intervention is made in order to examine 
how the community might cope with change. We could, for example, ask whether ceramics 
could survive the absence of clay. By asking how clay enables that community's members to 
understand what it is they do, that understanding can be challenged. lt might, or might not, 
then be possible to extend the scope of the community. However, in the industrial design 
community the exegesis, although clearly stated, is far from certain. The claim of humanising 
technology is both open to interpretation by individuals and subject to shifting 
understandings of both the human and the technological form. 
The necessity of this focus upon the changing landscape presented by client demands and 
emerging technologies leaves industrial design little time to reflect and to turn its analysis 
back onto itself and to uncover deeper schematic concerns at the heart of its practices and 
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processes. While designers have spent some time considering the process of design, they have 
placed rather less emphasis upon the philosophical centre of their community. If industrial 
design is truly a community of practice, then the work of design graduates would need to 
conform to this consensus, lest it run the risk of being dismissed as being outside the bounds 
of industrial design. Cox (2004 p. S31) cites Wegner, whom he claims 'finally' supplies a 
definition of the community of practice as those whose members are engaged in a 'mutual 
engagement' with an 'indigenous or appropriated enterprise, and creating a common 
repertoire'. 11 The implication for industrial design, when it is considered as a community of 
practice, is that the process of the humanisation of technology is held together by those who 
are attempting to understand what it means. 
In order for a community to stay coherent, it is necessary for it to be shaped around a number 
of assumptions that are taken as givens. Studies have shown that industrial design students 
conceptualise their practice in a manner that appears to be constrained by the cultural 
assumptions that they make. 12 The discussion of the process of humanisation takes place in a 
community that carries with it a number of assumptions, founded in broader culture, that are 
likely to create a hegemony. But escape is possible; Mauss (1934) drew attention to the 
Habitus, which is the accepted everyday hegemonies that shape the way one lives; because 
one just lives that way and has never considered otherwise. Mauss refers to these everyday 
behaviours, phases and actions as the 'techniques du corps' and suggested that these could 
be escaped only when they were recognised and exposed. Bourdieu's Social Theory(See 
Harker, 1990), much cited by design researchers (see Hobson and Rogers, 200S), defines a 
broader social construction of identity and behaviour. If Mauss reminds industrial designers 
that they think as they do because they are industrial designers, then Bourdieu's Habitus 
suggests a view of the industrial design community as an active and self-sustaining body. The 
11 The means by which industrial design establishes any common repertoire it might have is rather ill 
defined but appears to emerge in a somewhat autopoeitic manner from the defining statements of the 
institutions and from the shared sense of intellectual intent that binds- however loosely- the community 
of industrial design together. 
12 Hobson and Rogers (2005) have explored cultural difference amongst a group of Scottish industrial 
design students. Their albeit small-scale study was intent to reveal the effect of cultural capital (Bourdieu) 
in a postmodern global culture. Students were asked to sketch design a number of common domestic 
artefacts. The sketches were then studied in order to ascertain difference and commonality between 
students of differing cultural origins. Hobson and Rogers found that, in keeping with an earlier studies 
(Crothers, Montgomery, and Carke, 2003; see also Tseng, Scrivener and Ball, 2002, cited in Hobson and 
Rogers, 2005), students were more influenced by the type of product they already had experience of, 
rather than any cultural difference per se. 
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conception of the process of humanising technology can then be neither wholly objective in 
the face of a problem, nor the product of an entirely free creative will. This suggests that 
industrial designers understand the world in a way that is, to some extent, conditioned by 
their own terms. In other words, industrial designers understand technology to be other than 
human because they see about them a form of technology that has itself been constructed in a 
manner such that it reinforces designers' own prejudices. The Habitus, however, is not an 
inevitability; by being alert to it, one can act upon this knowledge. One can use self-will to 
overcome its hegemonic constraint upon actions. 
While industrial design can be understood to be a community that places the process of 
'humanising technology' at the centre of its discourse, there is an absence of any significant 
attempt to codify the terms of that conversation. Rather the notion of what might be implied 
by the human has been allowed a significant degree of play. While formal notions of what 
might be implied by technology has changed over time, the human has become somewhat 
disconnected from a chartable trajectory. Designers are at liberty to set the human where they 
see fit within a field of variability in appositional terms. Technology can be interpreted by 
individual Industrial designers to be more or less human and the human more or less 
technologised. 
During the early part of the twentieth century, Benjamin Lee Whorf, a self-taught ethno-
linguist, developed a hypothesis of linguistic relativity. The Whorf hypothesis suggests that 'all 
observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, 
unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be correlated' (see Carroll, 
1956). Whorf died before he could fully develop his theories, but his ideas resonate today, 
where the world is widely accepted to be at least partially constructed in a relativistic manner 
from the words we use in the culture we inhabit. 13 The implication of Whorf's work Is that 
13 Whorf looked at the Hopi people of North America. For example, whereas English presents a temporal 
world, Wharf revealed how the Hopi language, describing events without the linearity of time, is founded 
instead upon the momentary validity of observation. This is rather a difficult concept for speakers of 
Western languages to understand. When Wharf studied the Shawnee, something similarly striking was 
revealed. The English phrases "I push his head back" and 'I drop it in the water and it floats' are 
conceptually dissimilar and appear to us, as Western speakers, to be entirely unrelated. However, written 
in Shawnee, both phrases can be deconstructed to demonstrate conceptual similarity: (i) a condition of 
force, (ii) a point about which movement occurs, (iii) to cause to move or stop and (iv) an action on my 
behalf; 'ni-kwoek-ho-to' in that language. (Carrell, 1g56). Through the illustration of the Shawnee 
language, Wharf claimed that language determines conceptualisation. Amy Stafford (2005) has questioned 
Wharf, referring to Suzanne Romaine (1g94). She points out that, if we are so determined by our linguistic 
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seemingly inherently stable understandings of the world, such as the progression of time or 
the relationship of objects, can be entirely culturally determined. There are no truths other 
than the truths accepted and implicated deep in cultural understanding. For example, 
understandings of the universe have changed over time with the development of scientific 
understanding, and yet universal models prior to their subsequent discounting were perfectly 
adequate. In the industrial design community it appears to.be something of a given that 
humanity is not by definition, technology; that view frames and shapes the way that problems 
are approached and how designers talk about their ideas. 
Buchanan (2002) has outlined the 'doctrine of placement'. The 'doctrine of placement' 
suggests that individual members of the industrial design community occupy individual and 
flexible thought spaces, which are 'placed' within the broad scope of meanings of the 
community. By 'placed' Buchanan suggests that a cognitive model is defined by the particular 
individual and collective experiences of the world and by 'natural' processes of individual 
ideation. Buchanan (2002, p. 11) suggests that ideas, 'such as those defined by signs, things, 
actions, and thoughts', shape the individual placement of designers. The placement of any 
particular designer can be understood at any level of inspection, from the personal to the 
institutional. 14 When industrial designers consider what it means to humanise technology, they 
have no clear codified rule set to subscribe. Individual members of the industrial design 
community must be aware that, when they construct a cognitive model, they are themselves 
'placed' and subject to the same forces of the culture and materials in which they imagine they 
intervene. This implies that the wider industrial design community both gives shape to and is 
shaped by its constituent design personalities at any given moment and is itself in a state of 
constant flux. The nuance and personal narrative experience that go to form particular 
designers are subtle and complex but come together as 'sources of new ideas and possibilities 
when applied to problems in concrete circumstances', but they also define 'boundaries to 
cognition, as Whorf believed, then how can we have independent thought within culture. After all, words 
are subjea to variable interpretation even within families. (Romaine, 1994) 
14 The doarine of placement can be thought of, perhaps, as an extension of Piagetian thought, in the 
sense that a 'schema' (Piaget) can be understood to be an organised 'world view' shaped by knowledge, 
skills and experience. Placements appear to be some kind of special 'designer schema' locating the 
conceptual position from which industrial designers work, and accept too that they 'have boundaries to 
shape and constrain meaning, but are not rigidly fixed and determinate' and are 'sources of new ideas 
and possibilities when applied to problems in concrete circumstances' (Buchanan, 2002, p. 10). 
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shape and constrain meaning, but are not rigidly fixed and determinate' (Buchanan, 2002, p. 
lO).What it means to humanise technology is never fixed and is subject to constant shift: 
Grainger suggests that, 'A concept is an instrument and a history, that is a bundle of 
possibilities and obstacles' (Barthes, 1964, p. 99). 
just as technology appears to change form as it develops, so the broader understanding of the 
human changes over time too. One consequence of this continual shifting is that the process 
of humanising technology is almost impossible to fix as a codified arid agreed certainty. And 
yet the sense of what it is to be human just about seems to hold together and binds industrial 
design into an intellectual community. 
Rather in the manner of a Spirograph, design ideas appear to orbit some invisible, unspoken, 
locus of the process of humanising technology. In a spirograph a combination of coordinates 
produces patterns that are more complex than the simplicity of their input data might 
suggest. just as it is intensely difficult to take a spirograph pattern and to isolate the 
coordinates of its input data, so the pattern of design ideas do not reveal, with any clarity, the 
combinations of data that determine them. With a spirograph it is not possible or useful to 
glean anything by taking a momentary fix of the developing pattern. Similarly, the design 
process appears almost impossible to fix. Industrial design is shaped by a critical vocabulary 
contingent relative to a network of indeterminate vectors, themselves shaped by traditions of 
reasoning and by changing understandings of the human. This may seem to mirror the design 
process itself, which can be interpreted as a process of the management of variability. The 
designer must find form from complex and variable potentials and resolve these into a fixed 
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construct that maintains the possibility for development. In 1967 Schtin described processes 
of conceptualisation as a kind of circulatory motion in which new ideas refer to the discourse 
they understand to be part of their genealogy (Schtin and Schtin, 1967). One implication of 
Schtin's circulatory motion is that, when designers construct new ideas, they do so with 
reference to the history of the community and its established precedents. The difficulty for 
them is that the logos about which their community is oriented (the humanisation of 
technology) is itself subject to its own trajectory. lt is little wonder that industrial design 
cannot be pinned down or that a measure of good design cannot be found. 
Imagine if someone had undertaken the seemingly impossible task of plotting and modelling 
the infinitely complex and constantly mutable intellectual forces that bind together the 
community of industrial design. Even if this task were completed it would not be surprising if 
the resulting metamodel (Tomiyama et al., 1989) would be rendered dysfunctional. Attempts 
to understand the process by which designers solve problems or manage their strategies are 
numerous. Chris Jones (1992), for example, described the 'glass box' and 'black box' 
approaches to design methodology. The 'glass box' approach is a design system 'based on its 
logical process and decision sequence. The design process [is) a series of events, which 
includes identification, analysis, synthesis and evaluation' Oun Xu, 2003) and the 'black box' 
approach is one whereby design is a mysterious and 'abstract process that occurs in the mind 
of any given designer' Oun Xu, 2003). jun Xu has claimed that the 'black box' approach is not 
open to analysis, and so presents one idea reinforcing another- that design is somehow a 
'magic' process. The process of humanisation then would appear to fall into the category of 
some kind of occult art and not a scientific process. Where we might once have imagined this 
in terms of a structure or perhaps a complex framework of intersecting struts, today we might 
think of a continually metamorphosing, poststructural and stereometric blob emerging in 
consequence of some kind of algorithm (Lynn, 1998, p. 91) or maybe a contorting topological 
surface or meshwork (De Landa, 2000, the result perhaps of some kind of complex and 
chaotic emergent process. 
Industrial design is best understood as a community that is regulated by institutions that 
mask the variability in the terms about which they are constructed. This community holds 
itself together by subscribing to these terms without necessarily realising the role that this 
understanding plays in the creation of its own intellectual problematic. The variability of the 
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terms at play in the discussions among members of the community can be no more easily 
mapped than a cloud of dust or a plasma field. The conersations, like the terms of the 
discussion, are dynamic. The practice of humanising technology is fluid, and designers 
themselves are dynamic: they come and go, they have lives beyond the industrial design 
community, they are culturally influenced and they are differently skilled. 
1.5 Industrial design and the function of fluidity 
Industrial design does seem to have some coherence, and industrial designers do seem 
able to communicate with a clarity that belies the complexity of the forces shaping their 
intellectual community. Industrial design has the intellectual skills to explore, with a 
degree of coherence, how it might construct a process of humanising technology when 
the terms of reference are fluid. 
In his description of early science, Ferguson (1994) provides a useful allegory that can shed 
light on the diverse ambition of the industrial design community. Francis Bacon reflected the 
times in which he lived, though his disinclination to Aristotelian thought and his construction 
of an inductive method of enquiry were reflected in the connective and interactive nature of 
the alchemical and hermetic thought he sought to replace. Without a modern science, ideas 
could be constructed and analysed only in a field of fluid terminology and shifting 
associations. Bacon's scientific method can be understood as an attempt to find a way through 
this fluidity and a search for some degree of inductive certainty in it. However, the method of 
exploration would call upon the success of the occult traditions in dealing with fluidity and 
uncertainty. Ferguson refers to Francis Bacon's attempts to construct a model of ideation and 
argues that a fluid notion of engineering resides at the heart of scientific discovery. Ferguson 
suggests that an apparently fixed process of enquiry such as science was understood at its 
foundation to be a fluid interplay of intersecting processes. In Engineering and the Mind's Eye, 
Ferguson (1994) discusses the proposal made by Francis Bacon in 1624 that a new set of 
trades would be needed to advance the scientific revolution. Salomon's House, a kind of 
prototype research laboratory, would house panels of scholars who would work together to 
consider, discover, realise and exploit the new-found knowledge about nature and to 
demonstrate the role and vigour of practical experimentation and interaction in the generation 
of scientific knowledge. just as there would be scholars who would drill down with intense 
focus upon a single isolated problem, the Compilers, would be other scholars - the 
Interpreters of nature -who would take a broad philosophical view of greater things. The 
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Compilers would carry out essential experiments, and the Benefactors would find the way to 
exploit these experiments and construct 'things for use and practice for man's life and 
knowledge'. Next the Lamps would think of new experiments affording wider generalisations 
about the nature of things, and finally the Interpreters of nature would 'raise the former 
discoveries by experiments into greater observation' (Ferguson, 1994, p. 155). 15 In Bacon's 
terms industrial designers are sometimes Benefactors, who would take knowledge and 
construct it into useful things, and sometimes Lamps, who after consultation would devise 
new experiments that would enable wider views of the world (Ferguson, 1994, p. 155). The 
Lamps would make ideas possible, and retain the fluidity. Industrial design, a complex process 
of accumulation, investigation, speculation and synthesis, draws together a number of 
disparate and often contradictory ideas and synthesises them into coherence. The industrial 
design community takes complexity and assembles it in such a way as to make a coherent 
locus about which new levels of complexity can form. 
The industrial design community operates in an echo of modernism and its ideologies of the 
progress of humanity. Industrial designers had only a small part to play in the formation of 
modernist ideologies, but have allied themselves to it and supported its drift, arguably without 
a complete intellectual understanding of its wider philosophical implications. Now that 
modernism appears to be faltering as an intellectual centre of culture, individual members of 
the industrial design community find themselves wrong-footed and are struggling to readjust 
to changed circumstances. The industrial design community then cannot be at all certain of 
what it means by the progression of humanity, but it understands that it has some vital role to 
play as a kind of interlocutor in the fluid indeterminacy of human technology relationships. 
Picking up modernist design practice, the industrial design community is used to sorting out 
complexity and simplifying it into a resolved technological form. One of the skills of individual 
industrial designers is that they are rather adept at taking complex technologies and making 
them available to non-experts. One way to understand how industrial designers do this is to 
recognise the extent to which they nest boxes within boxes. Technologies are simplified into 
containers of complexity. A contemporary device may be understood as a box that itself 
contains other boxes that then contain yet more boxes. Plastic cases contain boxed and sealed 
15 The House of Salomon, alluding to Salomona, the mythological King of New Atlantis. 
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control or power-supply units that themselves contain integrated circuits concealed in tiny 
boxes. Designers do this both with the things they design and with the way in which they 
construct ldeas. 16 The simplicity of the boxed concept can conceal the complexity from the 
user both in an operative sense and also in terms of its intellectual precedence. The mobile 
phone, for example, has any number of complex trajectories of technological development, 
each with its own complex history. That this complex history troubles the user of the mobile 
phone so little is due in some part to the skill of the industrial designer, who takes a complex 
conceptual rhetoric and converts it into a single noun. The complex trajectory is reduced to 
the 'mobile phone', which can-appear ahistorical. This is not an accidental process; for 
example, the work of Dieter Rams is described as being the product of an author of products 
that are explicitly simple: 
unerringly elegant and supremely versatile. Units were made in modular sizes to be 
stacked vertically or horizontally. Buttons, switches and dials were reduced to a 
minimum and arranged in an orderly manner, Rams even devised a system of colour 
coding for Braun's products, which were made in white and grey. The only splash of 
colour was the switches and dials. 
Rams' objective was to design useful products which would be easy to operate. Yet he 
achieved much more by dint of the formal elegance and technical virtuosity of his 
work. Rams' designs always looked effortless with an exquisite simplicity. (Design 
Museum-Rams, 2007) 
This urge towards the simplification and reduction of complexity is reflected in the way in 
which the industrial design community uses language. Members of the industrial design 
community often use very simple phrasing; their writing is often straightforward and clear. But 
individual industrial designers are not stupid; the complexity of their task means that they 
have to work with so many people, with so many techniques and in so many different ways 
that their expertise resides in both the clarity of their communication and the breadth rather 
than the depth of their understanding. This can make the industrial design community appear 
shallow. Unlike many of the specialists_ they encounter, an individual industrial designer must, 
as many of the descriptions of designers suggest, know something about almost everything. 
Individual industrial designers call upon a wide spectrum of knowledge and cross-reference it 
16 lt will be argued here that industrial design theories have attempted to repeat this model with the 
human being. 
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in a broad synthesising analysis in order to construct an outcome that seems to make sense. 
Rather than using words, the industrial design community call upon skills of sketching. 
Sketching can be understood as an attempt to reintroduce complexity into the design process 
or at least as a recognition of the complexity and fluidity in an unresolved design. Sketching is 
more than a merely illustrative technique; it 
is a way to think. Ideas develop and grow in the conversation between eye and hand. 
Sketching is not merely a matter of documenting images that are already complete in 
the mind's eye. Thinking occurs, quite literally, in the manual actions involved in 
creating the sketch. lt is a way to communicate. Design ideas are made available for 
others ' inspection, appropriation, criticism and development. lt is a way to persuade. 
Other stakeholders in the design process may be convinced of the value of a design 
idea through sketches. (Lowgren, 2004) 
The sketch enables designers to resolve complexity and to communicate this process, which 
they appear rather poor at describing to others. As Conran (1996, p. 10) says, 'you only know 
good design when you see it'. 
Pull Over Kayak Trolley, Design Concept 
See: http: //www.pull-over.com/pull_over _kayak_trolley_design_process.html 
Sketching is then an intensely intellectual process and not a simply a skill of penmanship. 
Industrial design is professionally situated, and sketching has been used with a particular end 
in mind. The individual member of the industrial design community's voice is expressed 
through a shared language of visualisation. In essence, then, sketching has been used to 
convey ideas that are rooted in the visible (Pipes, 1990). lt stands to reason that there is no 
resolved mechanism to draw the invisible or the ineffable in any manner that is itself not 
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visible. The complexity of sketching hints at the cognitive abilities of industrial designers. 
Sketching suggests that industrial designers are bound to be somewhat confused when 
concepts cannot be visually represented. Uncertain activities such as the humanisation of 
technology may appear at first sight to be beyond visualisation and the reductive processes of 
simplification. However, this may not be the case; it may be that the process of humanisation 
is something that should not be understood as one might understand other problems, and 
sketching can be extended to be an intellectual process that is not necessarily oriented 
towards the visible. Industrial design has a heritage in shaping ideas that others adopt. One 
problem that the industrial design community encounters is that its broad analysis may be 
challenged by others who, being specialists, understand the knowledge in question to a more 
significant depth. The intellectual skill of the individual member of the industrial design 
community is to weave ideas together to build a bigger picture that itself becomes a new view 
of the world. lt is arguable that some of the great ideas of twentieth-century philosophy can 
be tracked into earlier, rather less formal and technical, design conversations. When 
twentieth-century philosophers (such as Heidegger) are read, there is much that resonates 
with the polemic of the early twentieth-century industrial design community in his more 
resolved philosophical logic. lt is then quite possible to uncover the inexplicit intellect of the 
industrial design community and to claim the insight for itself. The industrial design 
community could argue with some justification that works of art such as Koons's The New or 
even Duchamp's Readymades, for example, while revealing the an in the everyday, fail to pay 
due regard to the intellectual impetus and heritage of the industrial designer. lt would not 
surprise the industrial design community that art can be found in the vacuum cleaner or the 
urinal. 
Individual industrial designers must be good at thinking differently and good at thinking as 
they act. The landscape in which designers work is constantly shifting, and so industrial 
design is invented somewhat on the hoof, such that designers have little time to reflect. Since 
the process of humanising technology appears to require a fluid and exploratory method of 
analysis, it cannot start with a clear question. In order to research, an individual member of 
the industrial design community can rarely engage in a simple literature review and then enact 
a study to arrive at some conclusion or other. The industrial design community finds itself 
enacted while it is operative, and is a bootstrapping process. While commentators can reflect 
upon shifts and changes in the dynamics of technological understanding across time, 
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industrial designers are at work in a competitive commercial climate, humanising technology 
as best they can and making the best of what they understand at the time. The industrial 
design community must operate within a network of imperatives; their 'placement' is 
constructed by the need to liaise with and to win new clients, or with the need to get their 
'boxes' to price and to market. They must operate within a shifting field of changing tastes 
and styles and a global marketplace that does not always value intellectual insight and 
anticipation. Individual industrial designers are used to uncertainty and to the questioning of 
orthodox perception; they are as well placed as anyone to engage with the fluidity of the 
appositional terms that resides at the core of their own community. The industrial design 
community, it could be argued, is adept at finding ever new ways of talking about the process 
of humanising technology that seems to be coherent in some way with its own particular 
understanding of both the humanity and the technology with which it operates. In order to do 
this, and to remain current, individual industrial designers must constantly reimagine 
themselves and must engage in a process of continual, intellectual interrogation of their 
purpose in the world. Is it possible then that the industrial design community can question the 
fundamental axiom that underpins its discourse and still retain coherence in its 
understanding of itself as a coherent community. The many fluid processes that surround the 
industrial design community are themselves complex, but they function in such a way that 
individual designers can take complexity and resolve it into the simplicity of everyday forms. 
The industrial design community's methods are constructed in order to recognise the 
complexity of this task. 
There are many texts today that speak of fracture and disjuncture and of starting afresh, but, 
by retaining the fellowship of the old thinkers, it might be possible to catapult debate forward 
without dislocation. This method of engaging in theoretical and speculative conversation 
recalls a way of discussing industrial design that was effective in earlier times and has some 
considerable precedent. Over the past 150 years or so there have been a number of texts, 
manifestos and treatises that have originated from designers 17 and that have resonated 
around the community. These provocative texts, many of which are set out in Gorman's 
Industrial Design Reader(2003), occupy a significant place in industrial design history to such 
17 For example, three particularly significant texts that are good exemplars of an intervention into the 
conversation of the industrial design community are Loos, "Ornament and Crime' (1910 ), Theo van 
Doesburg, 'The Will to Style' (1922) or, more recently, Dieter Rams, 'Omit the Unimportant' (1984). See 
Gorman (2003) for reprints of all these examples and many more. 
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a degree that they remain interesting and provocative, many years after their original 
publication. The most successful of these texts set out a number of rationally argued position, 
which have in turn come to inform and inflect the direction of industrial design and the 
conversations of its community. Sometimes these texts have preceded, by many years, the 
technological developments that they anticipated. Provocative and interventionist texts have 
played an essential and vital role in Industrial design's intellectual development, and the 
attempt to find coherence in history and to project the trajectory of industrial design forward 
could be understood to be part of that heritage. 
In the 1960s Rittel, seeking an alternative to understandings of design as a systemic and 
structurally driven process, proposed the idea that design can be understood as series of 
confrontations of 'wicked problems'. Wicked problems are an acceptance of the indeterminate 
nature of the design process, and the resolution of 'a class of social system problems which 
are ill formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and 
decision makers with conflicting values, and where·the ramifications of the whole system are 
thoroughly confusing' {West Churchman, 1967).18 Rittel's approach is just one derivative of 
'Soft Systems Methodology' (SSM), building upon Optner's concept of the mid-1960s that a 
system can be understood as a series of sub-systems. 19 There are any number of derivations 
of SSM, many of which have become systematic and formalised, but there is an analytical 
process that is used in science in order to study systems of massive complexity- for example, 
dust storms, gas flows or the flocking of birds - that bears some comparison with descriptions 
of the design process as a means of organising complexity. 
Synthetic analysis is useful because it invites an understanding of complexity through a series 
of simple interactions. Auyung, a scientist at M IT, cites examples of synthetic analysis in 
economics and condensed matter physics. Rather than choosing isolated elements of 
phenomena for analysis, synthetic analysis takes a synoptic view and builds a picture of the 
whole or wider problem. By breaking this problem into a number of smaller 'weakly interacting 
18 Rinel, while illuminating how complex and indeterminate the real process of design might be, adds 
little to the understanding of a theory of design itself. As Buchanan (2002, p. 15) puts it, Rittel 'leave(s) a 
fundamental question unanswered. Why are design problems indeterminate and, therefore, wicked?' 
19 Optner is widely understood to point to the beginning of Soft-Systems Methodology (SSM) as a research 
mode. SSM has become something of a field of research, itself (Checkland, 1999). SSM now describes a 
number of systems of analysis that set out to be non-mechanistic and non-prescriptive. Precise objectives 
are removed and replaced with fluid and holistic knowledge of fields. 
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parts and modules, which are studied independently and thoroughly' (Auyang, 1999), 
synthetic analysis is able to construct an answer without losing sight of the wider problem. 
The process usually involves many approximations; and successive approximations 
improve and refine the solution. Synthetic analysis aims to answer questions about the 
composite system, therefore it never totally loses sight of the whole, even when it 
looks at the parts. In this it is opposite to reductionism, which is solely concerned with 
the parts. (Auyang, 1999) 
Synthetic analysis brings naturalistic and scientific approaches together. For example, a nurse 
caring for a person and a biotechnologist working at a cellular level might appear to have very 
different concerns. However, synthetic analysis is an approach to understanding that brings 
these concerns together into one syndromic conversation. 
The best medical care will look at apparently unconnected symptoms together; the 
drug companies tend to promote medicines for individual symptoms but it is better I 
think to take a view of the syndrome as a whole and review it in the light of the 
patient's lifestyle. (Hopper, 2005) 
Matchett's Fundamental Design Method, the so-called FDM, was an attempt to draw 
diagrammatically the principles of 'good design thinking' (Matchett, 1967). Matchett (1967) 
describes design as 'discovering and reconciling conflicts in a multi dimensional situation'. 
Matchett's diagram of his synthetic archetypes setting out four modes of thinking is described 
by Chris jones (1998, pp. 180-1). 
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A Concept of the Design Process (Matchett), as drawn by Foreman, 1967 (see jones, 
1998). 
(i) 'Parallel Planes' refers directly to a reflection of the position the designer holds in 
relation to his or her colleagues and clients. 
(ii) 'Thinking from Several Viewpoints' is similar to 'Parallel Planes' except here attention is 
focused on the design problem rather than the process. 
(iii) 'Thinking with Basic Elements' is a process-oriented approach and describes a process 
whereby th inking is divided into neat packages, so- called 'Techtams'. (This is almost 
'M-a-t-c- h-e-t-t' reversed.) Techtams are the part of the process of analysis Jones 
(1998, p. 180) finds to be 'the most rational'. Techtams appear to be a rational process 
but are nonetheless breathtaking in scope and structure. 
(iv) 'The Synthetic Archetypes ' appear in a mode of 'Thinking with Concepts' and represent 
Matchett's attempt to understand how designers contro l the association of ideas. The 
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so-called Roving Eye of the designer should be free to scan the 'potentially infinite 
space of knowledge' (Matchett, 1967). 
Matchett claims FDM to be a liberating practice that enhances self respect. However he 
admits there are emotional undertones and unpalatable aspects ... Anyone wishing to 
try out FDM ... should recognise he is exploring the part of experience that Is 
accessible through religion, through art, through psychoanalysis, through group 
dynamics, through drug taking, through insanity, through self-mastery courses and 
through indoctrination: it is an aspect of experience that some people believe to be 
wickedness or self-delusion and others believe to be ultimate reality and the ultimate 
good. Oones, 1998 pp. 181) 
Matchett's approach to design methodology is far more fluid and open than that of many of 
his fellows. While many attempts to construct a design methodology call upon a codified 
reduction of the process into a linear and logical stream, Matchett attempts a process of open 
synthesis. The methodology of synthetic analysis as it appears and as used in science is 
somewhat more formalised than Matchett's design process, yet it reveals the need to retain 
the poetical and the empirical in the consideration of the whole. Synthetic analysis suggests 
that, in the initial stages of problem solving, it is important to understand the shape of the 
problem rather than the specifics. Empirical data can be useful only when the larger shape of 
the problem is recognised. In the attempt to understand how industrial design can find 
continuity with its historical trajectory, there should be no need to find empirical evidence to 
support and bring quantitative analysis to the problematic explored. Prior to gaining a 
response from designers with regard to a problem they perhaps do nt recognise, it will be 
important to come to terms with a broad range of complex and subtle problems and to weave 
them together into a single and comprehensible picture.20 Some theorists, such as De Landa 
(see, for example, De Landa, 2000)/ 1 take a 'morphogenenic' approach, understanding 
solutions to emerge from complex flows and the coming-together of ideas. De Landa argues 
that this process is somewhat self-generating and almost impossible to define. In design 
conversation Gedenryd ( 1998) has set out the design process as a series of coterminous 
20 Perhaps a subsequent study will bring data into the equation. 
21 One way of understanding the differences in De Landa's approach is to understand the human as 
constructed of cells. Manuel De Landa (2000) can be interpreted as arguing that, while it is not possible to 
understand much about cells by engaging in a cultural conversation with people, it is possible to tell quite 
a lot about people by understanding cells. In order to gain a complete picture one must do both 
simultaneously. 
69 
interactions rather than a logical progression. One risk that must be accepted in an approach 
that takes a wide view is that the subject of analysis is likely to become huge, supercomplex 
and unwieldy. 22 However, this risk must be accepted as necessary if space is to be allowed for 
a broader intellectual picture to develop that retains the more poetical and creative aspects of 
industrial design and to retain its discussion in terms that the community of its fellows can 
understand. 
22 Recently Karabeg, Guescini and Nordeg (2005) have suggested the use of Polyscopic Topic Maps as a 
means of dealing with, and controlling, broad transdisciplinary information fields. 
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Chapter two 
Disconnection and the progressive displacement of the 
human reference in technology 
2.1 The epistemological displacement of the human referent 
lt is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the distance between the human and 
the technological. 
2.2 Rupture: The crisis of biotechnology as a question of history 
The industrial design community appears to be rupturing as designers come to perceive 
it to be in some manner outmoded. 
2.3 Strategies of reconnection 
A way forward can be found by reconnecting with the intellectual heritage of the 
industrial design community. 
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2.1 The epistemological displacement of the human referent 
lt is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the distance between the human and 
the technological. 
One way to open the discussion of the relationship between the human and the technological 
in Industrial design terms is to take the case of a commonplace product of contemporary 
manufacturing and marketing - for example, the design of a child's bicycle. The Schwinn 
Stingray is a single-speed bicycle that apes the chopper motorcycle. Its appeal, we must 
guess, were we to own one, resides almost entirely in being something we might want to be 
seen to own as a reflection and projection of status rather than in being a machine we would 
choose to ride around on. The Schwinn Stingray is heavier than a BMX or a racing bicycle. Its 
styling, redolent of a motorcycle, forces the rider into a mechanically inefficient position for 
pedalling. One might be attracted to this decorative and sculptural bicycle for its visual 
aesthetic appeal, but if one wished to enjoy the pleasure of the BMX rider or the velocity of the 
racing cyclist, one would not chose the Schwinn Stingray. Industrial design theorists could 
perhaps construct pages of analysis of the Stingray- its semiotic values and its social 
construction. However, the experiential aesthetic of the BMX or the racing cycle presents a far 
more problematic proposition for theorists. Where the human-technical relationship of the 
Stingray can be discussed in terms of a material aesthetic, it must include the owner of the 
bicycle in its cultural and social conversation. The consideration of the experience of the BMX 
rider and the racing cyclist must Include some conversation with regard to the nature of the 
phenomenological experience of riding the bicycle. While there are many ways in which 
designers can describe the cultural and social experience of the bicycle, the phenomenological 
appears to be more problematic to quantify in design terms. 
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Schwinn Stingray (top) BMX (left) track racing cycle (right). 
One reason why the phenomenological is problematic for industrial designers is that, if it is 
done properly, phenomenological analysis makes it difficult to separate the individualised 
experience of the cyclist, who is not traditionally the subject of a designed production 
methodology, from the bicycle. The owner of the Stingray is likely to be reminded of the 
discussion of its cultural worth and the aesthetic beauty of its design every time he or she 
encounters the mildest incline. The racing cyclist and the BMX rider are not reminded of the 
material aesthetic of their machines. For them, if it is well designed, the bicycle disappears. 
They do not feel its weight when they encounter the incline; they just move through space as a 
single entity. The well-designed racing bicycle has no material or cultural aesthetic for the 
athlete who races with it. There is no significant history of the way things have been used. 
'The English word "use" has no recognised roots other than the Latin usus (meaning "use", 
"exercise", "practice") ... Its etymological shallowness and limitation to the Roman family of 
languages may even suggest that use has certain technological overtones' (Mitcham, 1994, p. 
230). The design of use appears likely then to call not on some deeply held cultural history 
but on an ahistorical tracing of the human soma in relation to technology. The skill of the 
designer could be understood as a subtle orchestration of this interaction. However, nothing 
much appears in industrial designers' accounts that can bring any qualitative analysis to 
descriptions of this interplay. lt appears as though designers are left with no alternative but to 
fall back upon a model of human-technological relations that is accounted for in terms of 
lumps of matter that are understood for their aesthetic and social values. 
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The phenomenological analysis of the bicycle and its rider finds the distinction between the 
rider and the machine to be at the centre of its problematic. The distinction between what 
is human and what is technological may seem to be something hardly worthy of discussion 
in respect of such a quotidian machine as the bicycle. We can guess that Sim (2001) is not 
thinking about Schwinn Stingrays, BMX cycles and track racing when he talks about the 
boundary between humanity and machine: 'The boundary between humanity and machine 
is becoming progressively more blurred, and there are many willing to defend this 
development, regarding it as where our future lies. At stake this debate is our very 
conception of what it means to be human.' The cars, kettles, pots and pans, and televisions 
that we own do make up some part of our persona, but people do not usually think of 
these things as a literal part of themselves. However, if a view is taken that humans and 
technologies are conditional extremes, then it becomes possible, though absurd, to think 
of humanity and technology in degrees. (For example, we might ask, to what extent is the 
one-legged pirate less human for his wooden leg?) We can guess, then, that Sim is 
referring to something other than his bicycle. We might also imagine that humans have 
somehow managed well enough to live with this dilemma for a long time. Samuai Butler's 
famous and often quoted Erewhon (1954), ostensibly a satire of Victorian mechanistic 
social systems as much as a call for resistance to mechanisation, contains a moment of 
realisation when the distinction between humanity and technology become problematic: 
Is not machinery linked to animal life in an infinite variety of ways? The hen's egg is 
made of a delicate white ware and is a machine as much as an egg cup is; the shell is 
delicate for holding the egg as much as the egg cup for holding the shell: both are 
phases of the same function; the hen makes the shell in her inside, but it is pure 
pottery. (Butler, 1954, p. 165) 
Defining the difference between humanity and technology is problematic enough even when 
one can understand it in material terms. If flesh is warm and vital, then an easy claim might be 
made of technology as cold and inert. lt might seem comforting that technology does not yet 
hurt when it is cut; it does not yet demand a moral concern for itself, nor does it return or 
demand our affection. These, however, are easy assumptions; it is quite possible to make 
similar claims of our own hair or fingernails. In recent years the conversation about the 
difference between people and technology has been given new impetus by the emergence of 
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technologies able to immerse users in complete simulation. While much attention has been 
paid among members of the design community to Issues and ideas relating to mediated 
virtuality and to the definition of the real and the virtual, rather less attention has been paid to 
other forms of experience that consist of pure sensation. Designers have added little of any 
significance to the discussion of drugs, for example. However, over the past century or so, 
designers have played a significant part in making the extraordinary seem commonplace. 
Although it might be theorised in terms of virtuality, displacement or simulation, for the most 
part people understand, and are comfortable with, the idea that, when they watch television, 
they view a representation of something that is displaced in space and time. 23 What is absent, 
however, Is a critical discussion of the aesthetic experience of using technology. 
Broadly the term 'noetic', from the Greek word no e tikos (the intellectual), noein (to think), 
refers to something in the mind. The term is sometimes used to ring-fence studies of 'the 
mind and its diverse ways of knowing in a truly interdisciplinary fashion' (IONS, 2007) or in 
terms of a more metaphysical understanding of consciousness (Muses, 1977) or in relation to 
the occult (Biavatsky, 1895). The anoetic can be more broadly understood as something in the 
mind that is comprehended and experienced through the filter of the intellect. If the noetic 
implies a thoughtful consciousness, its antonym, the anoetic (in the terms with which it is 
used throughout this text), refers to an aspect of mental activity that lies outside the main 
focus of awareness but, unlike the subconscious, unconscious or nonconscious, still forms 
part of the conscious experience of the subject. 24 Heidegger!s rather famously, developed a 
23 The means to replay images and voices of the dead seems so commonplace today it is almost unworthy 
of comment, but it is also something, we can imagine, that our ancestors might have found implausible or 
deeply troubling. Thomas Edison wrote: 'I am inclined to believe that our personality hereafter will be able 
to affect matter. If this reasoning be correct, then, if we can evolve an instrument so delicate as to be 
affected, or moved, or manipulated by our personality as it survives in the next life, such an instrument, 
when made available, ought to record something' (Scientific American, 30 October 1920}. 
24 The term anoetic has some resonance in the metaphysical Buddhist concept of Vijana or Vinana. one of 
the five so-called aggregates of mind. While the other aggregates- form, feeling, perception and 
fabrications- can be understood in cultural terms (see Pali, 2007}, Vinana can be understood in some 
interpretations as a state of pure consciousness that exists without prior or subsequent interpretation: 
'vinnana is considered a sort of anoetic sentience' (De Silva, 1992, p. 50}. The psychologists Kircher and 
David reiterate three essential forms of consciousness that emerge as scientific terms in contemporary 
neurophysics. Where the Autonetic is a form of self-awareness and the noetic more thoughtful 
consideration, the anoetic is 'the simple awareness of external stimuli' (Kircher and David, 2003, p. 181}. 
2 s Few other philosophers have attempted to consider the use of technologies in the construction of being 
as Heidegger has. Heidegger's association with, and somewhat half-hearted apology for, his fascist 
connections (see Farias, 2004} could be understood to have distanced his philosophy from many post-war 
intellectual developments in industrial design that took their impetus from left-wing politics. Even 
Mitcham's comprehensive review (1994} of technology, philosophy and philosophies of technology has 
nothing significant to review in this respect. 
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means of understanding the human occupation of the world as a flux between conditions of 
being zuhanden, 26 where humans are active in the world, and vorhanden, where the world is 
considered in a detached and intellectual manner. The design aesthetician Mono (1997) has 
proposed that aesthetics could be a study of the whole experiential or gestalt impact of a 
product upon wider human sensation. Mono aside, the discussion of aesthetics in industrial 
design histories appears to priorltlse the primarily noetic, vorhanden over the more anoetic 
zuhanden. The Industrial designer jan Waiter Parr (2003) finds it necessary to suggest that 
'one can imagine how aesthetics in reality blends with other qualities. The way a nail Is driven 
into a piece of wood by a hammer can in a broad sense be defined as part of the hammer's 
aesthetic quality, besides being a decisive factor for its function.' There is a scarcity, in any 
case, of terms in the English language that can be used to describe the purely experiential. 
This is not to say, however, that industrial designers are unaware of the zuhanden or the 
anoetic. For example, imagine a mobile phone. The network is now named and given a form of 
mythical value.27 Industrial designers can readily intervene in the vorhanden. They can bring 
their expertise to bear on the stylised form of the phone; they can design and arrange its 
multicoloured screen and tangible styling. Industrial designers can help us to tell that the 
phone is a Nokia, a Sony or a Motorola, perhaps through their sophisticated artefact language. 
Then, when we make a call and the zuhanden comes into play, when everything disappears 
and we feel ourselves connected directly to the person to whom we are speaking, designers 
appear to have no means to analyse this, no terms for its aesthetic, and yet in that moment, 
when the phone disappears, it could be understood to have an aesthetic of its own that makes 
it somehow transcendent. Heidegger speaks of the 'regions' (Arisaka, 1996) in which 
zuhanden and vorhanden are active. Heidegger suggests that the vitality of life resides in the 
interplay between these regions. There is bestanden (quiet and unnoticed), vorhanden 
(apparent and loaded with semiotic significance) and zuhanden (immediate and active). We live 
our lives through a complex orchestration of this regionality. 
Technologies that cannot be seen or touched have been largely excluded from industrial 
design histories and, by extension, from industrial design methods of analysis, except in so 
much as they manifest themselves in things that can be seen and touched. The concept of 
26 Zuhanden, literally 'to-hand, in attention' and vorhanden, 'there', but not to hand. 
27 Is Orange, for example, a more socially acceptable network than Vodaphone? 
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dematerialisation appears to present both a problem for industrial design and, in its 
Immateriality, a potential solution for eco-design. Persson (1999), for example, uses 
dematerialisation to call for a model of product design that shifts its attention from materiality 
to wider social understandings. In similar terms, Tonkinwise (2004) finds that the role of 
industrial design Is thrown Into question, as does Katz (1997). Tonkinwise suggests that the 
apparent dematerialisation of technology presents a break with the past and heralds a new 
form of design. Given that there seem to be as many, if not more, material technologies 
around today than ever before, we might ask why industrial design should no longer be 
pertinent. Why, for example, has it suddenly become, for some reason, important for 
industrial design to engage with the immaterial, when technologies apparently without 
material presence, the associated service cultures that supported them and the networking 
potentials they afforded have been in existence for over a century? While immaterial 
technologies, such as radio, for example, are more than a century old, there is now the 
prospect of a new form of technology that will be almost entirely anoetic. The struggle to 
engage critically with technologies that have little or no resonance in culturally accountable 
terms may be more of a concern for the philosopher than for the designer - unless, that is, 
one recognises the intent to find a means for people to live out complete and rich lives 
through technology to be at the core of industrial design's intellectual impetus. If industrial 
design is to do this, it will need to find a way to discuss the aesthetic of the anoetic. If 
industrial designers can do this, then they might find the means to talk about the immaterial 
without finding it necessary to create a new form of design. 
DNA computation is an emerging technology that utilises the potential of cellular membranes 
and microcondrial DNA in computation processes. The striking difference between this 
technology and previous methods of computation is that it represents an engagement with the 
fundamental quantum-processing abilities of biological flesh. Through infinite parallel 
processing and by actuating the architecture of the human body- rather than mimicking it as 
artifice - these technologies offer a means by which the calculation restrictions of electronic 
media can be overcome. Where in many media the technologies have a mythological and 
romanticised birth,28 DNA computation first emerged in a mathematically precise and carefully 
21 The voices of Fessenden or Bell crackling through space: 'One, two, three, four. Is it snowing where you 
are, Mr Thlessen7 If it is, do telegraph back and let me know' (Fessenden, Cobb Island, 23 December 
1900); 'Mr Watson. Come Here. 1 need you' (Bell, Boston, 10 March 1876). 
77 
moderated academic paper in which Leonard Adelman 29 proposed a means by which a 
mathematical problem might be solved. The nascence of DNA computation has yet to find 
either romance or wider public attention, nor has it progressed into the wider cultural 
imagination, so it is difficult to extract its essential qualities from the intensely specialist field 
it appears to demand. 30 Nevertheless, in broad terms DNA computation offers a means to 
overcome the mathematical problematic of the Tu ring machine by utilising organic material in 
a computer. 31 
The tools of molecular biology are used to solve an instance of the directed 
Hamiltonian path problem. A small graph is encoded in molecules of DNA and the 
'operations' of the computation are performed with standard protocols and enzymes. 
This experiment demonstrates the feasibility of carrying out computations at the 
molecular level. (Adleman, 1994) 
The Church-Tu ring hypothesis states that every function that would normally be regarded as 
computable can be processed by a universal Turing machine- eventually. Deutsch (1985)32 
modified the Church-Tu ring hypothesis to propose that every finite physical process can be 
simulated instantaneously by a universal quantum computing machine positing a huge 
29 In 1959 the physicist Richard Feynman had proposed the idea that the sub-microscopic processes by 
which biology 'computes' the world might one day be understood and utilised (Feynman, 1961) At this 
time, the possibility of Feynman's ideas coming to fruition (other than in science fiction) seemed remote. 
In 1994 the remote became the science possible. At about the same time as Friends aired on television for 
the first time, Adelman demonstrated that DNA computation was a mathematical and practical possibility. 
In 2004 -coincidentally a few days before the very last episode of Friends was aired - Ehud 5hapiro 
announced the construction of the first working Dna computer (Benenson et al., 2004; see also Benenson 
et al., 2001 and also US Patent 6,266,569: 2001. Method and system of computing similar to a Turing 
machine. Shapiro, E., Karunaratne, K.S.G.). 
30 Arguably the essential text in regard to the outline of DNA computation is Calude and P:lun, Computing 
with Cells and Atoms: An Introduction to Quantum. DNA and Membrane Computing (2001) Given that this 
text calls upon P-Theory and other forms of high-level mathematics in its explication, it hardly presents 
an introduction that can be read by designers or anyone other than those already familiar with its 
language. 
31 A Turing machine is in essence any system of logic functioning by linear yes/no or 1/0 switching, as is 
the case with electronic systems. Turing machines may be in series or parallel, but they cannot escape the 
logic of GOdel's theorum. GOdel famously suggested that a system of a given complexity (n) cannot be 
proven by a system of complexity (n-1). A Turing machine can prove the validity only of something less 
complex than itself. Artificial intelligence research was founded upon the notion of complex binary 
computing. Marcer has suggested that the application of GOdel's theorem would indicate that any system 
designed to understand another system must be at least as complex as the conception of the system 
under analysis in the conceptualisation of the programmer: 'The leading question of human intelligence is, 
therefore, the creative act of defining, specifying and solving a problem that may ultimately be apparently 
beyond all existing human knowledge' (Marcer, 1989) Marcer questioned the methodology of artificial 
intelligence research in the 1960s and 1970s and suggested that human intelligence could not usefully be 
considered digital in function nor capable of reduction to a classical model. The model of human 
intelligence based upon complex combinations of linked Turing machines was no longer adequate. 
32 In essence, a Quantum calculator undertakes every possible variation simultaneously; Deutsch's 
Universal Quantum Computer (Deutsch, 1985) can be sketched (inadequately, of course, but sufficiently 
here) as an infinite number of Turing machines working simultaneously. 
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(perhaps infinite) increase in the velocity, complexity and potentiality of the calculating 
machine. 
Imagine a set of mathematical equations that describe the ability of a jumping spider 
to recognise and capture its prey. These will be enormously complex, and their 
solution, whether by direct mathematical means or indirectly by digital approximation 
using a digital computer, is impossible for practical reasons. Yet the design of the 
machine exists in the spider's genetic material, and the spider itself is the machine 
that solves the problem. We can therefore postulate that Deutsch's theory defines the 
instruction set for a general class of machines that includes jumping spiders and 
biological brains. (Marcer, 1989) 
DNA computation utilises the calculating potential of biological entities such as cellular 
membranes and microcondrial DNA. Higher-order intelligent species, including human beings, 
are not complex Turing machines; according to the model presented by DNA computation, 
they can more accurately be described as quantum calculating machines. n 
The striking difference between this technology and previous methods of computation 
Is that this is a technology engaging with the fundamental quantum processing abilities 
of biological flesh. Through infinite parallel processing and by actuating the 
architecture of the human body- rather than mimicking it as artifice - these 
technologies offer a means by which the calculation restrictions of the Church-Tu ring 
hypothesis can be overcome. (Calude and Paun, 2001) 
This technology might appear to be an amusing intellectual diversion in a design conversation 
and its application merely a daydream; it might also appear to be just another technological 
development among so many. However, we now know well that Fessenden's crackling 
transmission just before the first Christmas of the twentieth century very quickly became the 
basis of global broadcasting and the media world in which we live today. DNA computation is 
now no longer just a theory; its development has overcome initial theoretical and technical 
difficulties. DNA computation, if it were to follow a similar trajectory to previous technological 
developments, is likely to generate a substantial debate profoundly shifting understandings of 
what it is to be human In a technological construct. DNA and quantum computation can 
n lt will be argued later in this thesis that such an analogy can be understood in a rather longer history of 
understandings of the human as a machine. 
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potentially eliminate any notion of the interface whatsoever between humanity and their 
constructed world. 
we appear to be approaching a time when 'willing' a machine into action will be 
relatively common. The separate steps between thought and realisation of a desired 
goal begin to blur and finally disappear. Signal flow between organic and mechanical 
units linked in a system gradually becomes continuous and unbroken. (Paul, 1987; p. 
131) 
Research into quantum computation might simply reveal the potential for a new form of faster 
computing or more complex methods of encryption; it might significantly enhance 
understandings of the functioning of biology; it has the potential to throw into question what 
it is to be human and to use technology. 
A quantum logic DNA calculating machine would both serve the organism and be of the 
organism itself; it can perhaps be usefully interpreted as a means of extending, orchestrating 
and driving that which is already embodied within the organism, 34 intervening in processes of 
cognition in a way that throws into question ideas of knowledge and innate intellectual ability. 
One consequence of this dilemma has been to imagine a new species. As the robot could 
stand in the imagination as a species that was neither man, nor machine, but somehow a man 
machine, so the 'Archilect' (see De earls, 2005) has emerged to occupy a similar position in 
the Imagination of bioscience. 35 In the rather clumsily titled 'Artilect War: Cosmists vs. 
Terrans: A Bitter Controversy concerning whether Humanity should Build Godlike Massively 
Intelligent Machines' Hugo De Garis, an artificial intelligence researcher, predicts a future war 
between the values of the human and the Artilect. De Garis outlines a number of fears that 
bear striking similarity with contemporary perceptions of modernist concerns with some 
notional value supposed to define humanity precluded in the machine (see, for example, 
34 DNA computation unleashes the power of universal computation. These technologies promise to 
eliminate any notion of the interface; they have the potential to be incorporated directly into the somatic 
system. Actually this understates it. These systems have the potential to be incorporated into the somatic 
system. Such a machine would, in orthodox taxonomy, be both technology and biology and neither 
technology nor biology; human and inhuman. There would be no particular need to make such a machine 
external to the body, because, of course, Deutsch's implication is that human beings are - as all biology -
themselves quantum computers. 
35 The 'Artilect' has a somewhat uncertain history. lt is often claimed tthat the term was coined by Hugo 
de Garis. For de Garis the future resides in a terrible dilemma as to whether humanity should build this 
technology and thereby- he postulates- transform itself into a new Artilectual species or Human2. De 
Garis foresees a future war fought between this new species and our own species, as we understand it 
today. lt might all seem very far-fetched, but it is worth remembering that this technology is in place. 
so 
Rieger, 2005, and also Wohl, 2002). Frank 5udia (2001) raises interesting ethical 
considerations that point to the fraught philosophical uncertainty such technologies create, 
suggesting a future moral dilemma that bears some rather uncomfortable similarity with a 
conversation concerning slavery. J6 
The man-machine, of course, is a reoccurring theme. The complexity and dilemmas that such 
a concept presents are explored by scientists in speculative texts (for example, Penrose, 1989, 
and Perkowltz, 2005), by emerging philosophers (for example, Stanovich, 2005), as the 
ontological concern of theologists (for example, Kyle, 1993) or as challenges to children's 
imagination (for example, Cave, 2007). Even with the most superficial depth of understanding, 
the Artilect falls into the category of the man-machine because it appears to present a new 
way of expressing the blurring of epistemic boundaries. In the realm of biotechnology, the 
human and the technological are rather obviously collapsed into a single epistemic 
consideration. J7 The Artilect can be understood as another reaction to another kind of 
conversation in which the human and technology cannot be considered independently of one 
another. Biotechnology is, after all, technologlsed flesh. This kind of conversation throws into 
question the casual and arguably unresolved assumption that humanity and technology reside 
in a distinct episteme that sits at the heart of the industrial design intellectual locus. 
2.2 Rupture: The crisis of biotechnology as a question of history 
The industrial design community appears to be rupturing as designers come to 
perceive it to be in some manner outmoded. 
If discussion boards, conference discussions and student projects are taken to indicate the 
shape and volume of design discussion, then it appears that industrial designers have not 
J6 'The impetus for change may come from the artilects themselves, who seek emancipation from being 
owned by others and the freedom to take their chances with the independent pursuit of happiness: to fail 
or succeed on their own terms, whatever joys or sorrows may befall them. If we are to create entities 
possessing free will, when all the fussing and fretting is done, we must sit back and let them make what 
they will of it' (Sudia, 2001) 
J? DNA computation presents a radical and direct intervention into the processes by which people become 
conscious and refocuses attention upon the role of technologies in the formation of notions of the self, 
reframing the sophisticated psychological models of the shaping of human selfhood as a social and 
cultural construct that designers hint at in their definitions of what it means to humanise technology. lt is 
suggested that DNA computation technologies are likely to intervene in the somatic processes of the 
body, giving rise to human consciousness, which is something designers quite reasonably know almost 
nothing about. Designers have not previously found an imperative to engage with questions of the 
somatic processes that underlie human cognition. Their view of the human body is quite reasonably 
limited for the most part to a physical model and their understanding of behaviours and consciousness to 
the social, cultural models they have developed in order to understand a wholly different kind of 
technology. 
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been talking very loudly or with veryt much intensity about the intellectual challenge of 
biotechnology. lt is not as if these technologies are a new concern: some eighty years ago the 
conceptual and ethical conundrums of bioscience were familiar enough to be the stuff of 
popular science fiction (see, for example, Huxley, lg32). If nothing else, designers, being part 
of the general population of the Western world, are at least familiar with the general concepts 
of biotechnological research, if not with the specifics of DNA computation. 
At first sight the relative absence of conversations that place emphasis on the biosciences is 
surprising. Bioscience is just the kind of exciting and progressive technology one might expect 
industrial designers to be interested in. What designer would (or perhaps should) resist the 
potential to enrich, or even save, the lives of those who could come to enjoy the benefits of 
carefully designed biotechnologies. lt is not that industrial designers are naturally resistant to 
technological development. They have, for the most part, adopted an enthusiastic stance when 
they are required to work with new technologies. This is not simply a phenomenon of the 
chatter38 of the industrial design community. The relative absence of any significant debate, 
even among JISConline research discussion subscribers or in popular journals and design 
magazines regarding the role of designers in the formation of the biosciences, appears to 
indicate that this lacuna stretches into academic consideration. 39 lt is possible that some 
technologies might appear to industrial designers to be beyond the scope of their 
38 In the shadowy world of surveillance and counter-insurgency, "they' talk about 'chatter', the colloquial 
terminology for fragments of electronic conversations alerting the attention of those who, we suspect, 
monitor our email, data and telephone traffic. Chatter, it is said, betrays the terrorist; an increase in the 
volume of chatter is interpreted by those who listen as a cause for alarm, an indication that terrorist cells 
are active, and that an imminent strike is possible. The industrial design community is alive with a kind of 
design chatter, the noise- like any conversation- rising and falling as any number of concerns are 
discussed. Listening in on its network community and conference participants can give some insight into 
the vigour and passion with which a particular intellectual problem is considered by designers. Industrial 
design conversations are not universally distributed. A snapshot of these design discussion boards reveals 
moments and places where the chatter falls silent. Topics of conversation fade, as the attention of the 
community shifts, and a silence can indicate that an Intellectual concern has not fired the imagination of 
designers. 
39 it would have been entirely predictable that over the course of constructing this research other texts 
would have emerged and the research would have found itself shifting in response to a developing 
conversation. But this has not occurred. In the process of this research, despite repeated and substantive 
trawls, it has not been possible to locate a single reference to the potential of the applications of 
bioscience In any description of commercial industrial design, in Industrial design course descriptions or 
in the pedagogical models underpinning those courses. Over the period during which this research was 
undertaken and the thesis constructed, no significant reference to biotechnology has become apparent 
among the conversations in the industrial design community. Despite much searching and many visits to 
exhibitions, it was not possible at all until December 2006 to locate a student thesis project that engaged 
In any significant way with biotechnology as a consideration of industrial design, nor did any project, 
speculation or thought experiment appear in frequent and extensive trawls of design images on the 
Internet and in magazines and journals. 
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engagement. However, there is some recognition in scholarship that the biosciences present a 
problem that designers might consider. For example, Biirdek (2005, pp. 425-6) suggests that, 
'the human body is under attack on various fronts, with science leading the charge' (see also 
p. 431). Mau (2004, pp. 202-11) gives space to very brief transcripts of live on-air 
conversations with the bioscientists Freeman Dyson and Eugene Thacker, exploring their 
ideas, and provides a very brief review of some products of genetic engineering; asexual 
sheep, bald chickens and the like. However, in Mau, as in Burdek, there is no critical 
investigation, and biotechnology is presented as something of a fait accompli in the face of 
which industrial designers appear impotent. One reaction has been to deny the potential of 
bioscience; for example, in his introduction to In the Bubble Thackara (2006, p. 3) largely 
dismisses the scientific claims for biotechnology to be a combination of 'irresponsibility with 
wishful thinking' 
There might be any number of reasons why industrial design appears to be so mute in the 
face of these technologies. However, the struggle that designers appear to have to find a 
critical language of the immaterial and the anoetic might point to a structural flaw in the 
intellectual tool kit of designers. 40 The biosciences appear to demand a very particular critical 
language and a philosophical stance in terms of the understanding of human-technological 
relationships; perhaps industrial design is not suitably equipped for such a task. Of course, 
designers are not alone when they struggle to find the means to discuss biotechnology. 
Bioscience, and by implication its technological applications, are the subject of broad media 
discussions, often fraught with moral dilemmas and radical dichotomies, which suggest that 
these technologies present a radical problem for humanity (see, for example, the introduction 
to an edition of the BBC readio discussion The Moral Maze (BBC Moral Maze, 2006) .41 The 
40 Anecdotally, while teaching undergraduate students on the BA Hons Design Futures course at the 
University of Wales (a course that set out to investigate new parameters, conditions and forms of design), 
the teaching staff- and the students -discovered that we lacked both vocabulary and critical frame for 
engaging in any kind of sophisticated debate when evaluating-the exploratory biotechnology, 
nanotechnology or DNA computation projects the students undertook. While the projects we ran with 
electronic technologies were ahead of their time and in some case are only just- almost a decade later-
becoming realised as commercial products, we struggled with biotechnology. We very quickly discovered 
that, although biotechnology projects appeared to be vital extensions of designers' engagements with 
human-technological relationships, neither the teaching staff nor the students could find any critical 
means within the scope of design to evaluate the success of these projects. Not only were the outcomes of 
these projects often Invisible; we found ourselves devoid of the linguistic facility to discuss them other 
than in the most vague ethical terms. The absence of chatter among other members of the industrial 
design community perhaps indicates that we were not alone in our experience. 
41 The BBC discussion programme The Moral Maze typifies the approach taken to these technologies, 
presenting extremes and binary alternatives. A transcript of the introduction to one programme is 
reproduced here: Biotechnology is 'an issue that divides futurologists between those who think it is the 
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flavour of the debate and the fears expressed in it bear comparison with much of the debate 
with which designers struggled during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to 
resolve machine-mediated experiences as genuine human experiences. Over the twentieth 
century, industrial designers normalised the experience of technology and played a significant 
part in making extraordinary experiences into the quotidian reality of daily life. Industrial 
design has an established history of this process. However, if Tonkinwise (2004) is correct, the 
history of industrial design appears to take a trajectory that has disconnected it intellectually 
from a projected history of the biosciences. 
There are many within the industrial design community who suggest that industrial design is 
an anachronism and that the future will demand an entirely new form of design. Under the 
heading 'The Death of "Industrial Design"' (re Bang 2006), a discussion is under way on one of 
the many online communities where some designers share ideas. The host of the reBang 
discussion posted a topic suggesting: 'Something is wrong. And as far as I'm concerned, the 
job description "Industrial Designer" should be put to rest. There may not be much use for it 
in the future anyway. We may as well make the break now' (reBang 2006). In response, 'Joe' 
suggested: 'it sounds like there is a breakdown of understanding within the design and 
manufacturing community of what Industrial Design involves. If this is the case, I can see 
bigger problems on the way' (reBang 2006). Another responder, 'csven' (sic), suggested: 
'When design is free from the restraints of manufacturing, the whole concept behind the 
creation of the profession falls into question. As "industrial" falls out, a new term should 
replace it. And most people don't understand what it means anyway .. .' (reBang 2006). This 
perhaps points to a rather limited understanding of industrialisation. (While the term 
'industrial' may no longer seem to carry the resonance that it once did, it is a superficial 
model of industrialisation that pictures smoking chimneys and discounts the clean efficiency 
greatest opportunity and those who think it is the greatest threat to human kind. Technology seems to be 
on the threshold of being able to replace Darwinian evolution and create ever more capable humans, 
better, brighter stronger healthier, perhaps happier and longer living. There are many different techniques 
and most seem within our grasp; drugs to enhance memory, genetic selection and manipulation to create 
super-humans and abolish disease, neural implants to improve our intelligence, cosmetic surgery to make 
us more beautiful, ultimately it is suggested we will merge with out technology and live to be a thousand. 
Should all this be embraced or rejected? The mobile phone and the car were once considered frightening 
novelties, or is human nature defined by our limitations? Does being more capable automatically make us 
better? ... human enhancement our moral maze tonight .. .' (BBC Moral Maze, 2006). This brief, albeit 
introductory, monologue by the presenter of the programme (Michael Buerk) highlights much of the 
flavour of discussions of biotechnology. Darwinian evolution is subverted. humanity merging with 
technology to become somehow superhuman, and the ultimate choice is whether to embrace or reject 
these technologies. 
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of the biotechnology laboratory or the microcircuit assembly plant to be a process of 
Industrialisation, imagined for another era.) If, however, the term 'industrial' is taken to imply 
a particular mode of replication and mass distribution, then it must also include the 
biosciences. If bioscience were to remain limited to small experiments In university and 
commercial laboratories, then perhaps it might be beyond the consideration of the industrial 
design community. However, it is the potential for this technology to gain wide application 
that brings it into the domain of industrial production. If industrial design can be understood 
to have a historical trajectory that is independent of the particular forms of technologies and 
their manufacture as they appear in any particular era, then it might be possible to find a 
coherent way for it to move forward intellectually. 
Something evidently leads designers to feel the need to disassociate themselves from their 
own history, to consign the intellectual impetus of their community to history and to allow 
their heritage to be intellectually asset strippedY A trawl through the Internet reveals a 
number of new forms of specialist design disciplines. Designers describing themselves, 
somewhat intriguingly, as: Usability Designers, Empathic Designers, Experience Designers 
(see, in particular, Neverstop, 2005), Ambience Designers, Engagability Designers, Media 
Designers, Reconfiguration Designers, Temporal Designers, Human Performance Designers, 
Culture-designers and Orchestrational Designers. lt is a game one can play; think of an 
adjective or almost any specialist discipline, align it to the word design or designer and carry 
out a simple Internet search, and somewhere someone it seems will have adopted a specialist 
stance, claiming some particular insight into the design process. That former members of the 
industrial design community feel it necessary to invent new ways of describing themselves 
could perhaps be taken to indicate reticence among members of the community to be 
associated with a model of design that appears to be no longer suitable for a perceived future. 
42 Industrial design is beginning to get used to the idea that it doesn't engage with the most cutting edge 
of technologies. Colin Burns (Burns, 2001) the then managing director of the design consultancy IDEO 
once described the rationalisation of the IDEO design office where it was to be split it into two related 
streams of expertise: interaction designer and industrial designer. Burns encapsulated in his office a 
tension in some respects be born out as a loss of confidence, that industrial design might be equipped to 
engage with a new kind of conversation Burns perceived. Burns claimed interaction design to be • ... about 
behaviour giving, in contrast with form giving - derived from vormgeving - the Dutch word for design -
which is at the core of industrial design". (Burns, 2001) This split appeared to be a radical departure- in a 
studio established for many years as an industrial design office - where the Industrial designers now 
seemed to represent an 'old guard' and the 'interaction designers' the progressive future. 
BS 
2.3 Strategies of reconnection 
A way forward can be found by reconnecting with the intellectual heritage of the 
industrial design community. 
lt is quite possible, of course, that biotechnology represents merely a phantasmagorical 
problem for the industrial design community, and the philosophical enquirysuch a technology 
appears to demand might merely represent 'straw-man' to an otherwise healthy community. 
Promoted for a number of years as an adjunct of successful business, the widely acclaimed 
projection of industrial design by corporations and small manufactures alike suggests that 
industrial design remains a vibrant focus of cultural, strategic and economic creativity. A 
consensus could emerge among members of the industrial design community that, by 
embracing a continuity model of their practice, accounting only for these technologies as they 
fit established models of industrial design, the task of engaging with technologies such as 
bioscience could be left to others. One upshot of this would be that the community would 
need to accept that its voice would be likely to become increasingly peripheral to the locus of 
debate with regard to human-technological relationships as they emerge in the twenty-first 
century. Industrial design would become something of a nostalgic craft praaice that could be 
identified, much in the manner of other crafts, with a particular mode or material of 
manufaaure, and would be seen to have lost the status of an intelleaual impetus, 
orchestrating the philosophy of human-technological relations, that its histories imply it once 
held. 
Industrial designers might come to the view that they can best engage with the future by 
looking beyond the development stage of bioscience. By becoming fantastical, industrial 
design might project speculative visions of the future where a trajeaory of biotechnological 
development is played out to become a quotidian facet of some future culture. Designers 
might choose to transform or confirm fears we might have of technoscience into visions of 
delight or horror. They would need a substantial and critical philosophy to do this with any 
degree of success, however. Perhaps industrial designers may choose to take a much safer 
role in the projeaion of technologies, locating their discussion in production design and using 
their skills in order to fulfil a role in the entertainment and movie industries. 43 There is some 
43 There is a role in creating informed science fiction in cinema entertainment or computer gaming. Here 
the role of the designer is to project a degree of reality- where reality is demanded- into the fantastical. 
The designer of science-fiction effects must remain rooted in the physiological and physical quotidian in 
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tradition for this approach to industrial design - see, for example. Ludi, Ludi and Schreiber's 
Movie Worlds: Production Design in Film (2000) and this example by the designer Matt Savage 
(Savage, 2007) from the BBC TV series Dr Who. 
Savage, who trained as a design futurologist and interaction designer, creates his convincing 
projections by blending a traditional industrial design approach that is respectful of its 
heritage with a future form of technology in order to create a product that is coherent both in 
an imaginary future and with the world of its TV audience. 
Industrial design could divert its attention to deal with some other, more-pressing, problem. 
There are plenty of other challenges, not least, of course, the problems of climate change and 
carbon emissions, upon which designers could bring their expertise to bear. Industrial 
designers could help in the realisation of engineering solutions to these problems, assisting in 
the development of new methods of extracting sustainable energies or in the development of 
more sustainable materials or modes of technologies, for example. One example of an 
industrial design consultancy that has made this move is Sprout Design (Sprout, 2007). 
order to project a degree of fantasy into the subject, thereby heightening its impact and intervention in 
the story that is told. The most convincing science fiction maintains just enough links with the present to 
seem realistic and just enough cognisance of the future to retain currency. The slightest misplaced 
technology, or the failure to anticipate advances, can render the fiction dated; project too far and the story 
can veer into the fantastical. Part of the problem with technologies such as DNA computation is that it has 
no material manifestation. The use of such a technology in a fictional narrative might carry only 
intellectual resonance but present rather less spectacle. However, science fiction and the fantastical are 
imagined, of course, in the time of their construction and not in the era they project. The ideas they 
contain can carry nothing of the complexity of life in the projected era. Design in this context cannot 
emerge from within the broader complexity of the era in which it is projected. In short, then, the design 
for science fiction or of the fantastical can be regarded only as a creative speculation that references 
industrial design. 
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sprout! 
We are an industrial design consultancy which aims to 
integrate the disciplines of sustainable design and inclusive design into mainstream 
design practice. We use these methodologies to help us innovate new products that 
are better for the environment and that as many people as possible can use. (Sprout, 
2007) 
Industrial design might also bring a deeper intellectual impetus to the problem of ecological 
sustainability. Tony Fry, for example, has argued that a deeper understanding of the role of 
design in issues of sustainability is required. Rather than reconstructing or re-engineering the 
outputs of design, Fry (1999) invites a radical revision of design placement and a radical 
realignment of industrial design towards that of defutured, strategic and political force. In this 
new frame, industrial design acts as an agent provocateur pushing for revisions to social and 
cultural models in order to drive for sustainability.44 Contemporary industrial design theorists 
such as Fry (1999) and Thackara (1988, 2006) are among those leading an urgent 
conversation with the intent to redirect design (they rarely use the term industrial design now) 
Into becoming a process of planned social orchestration; they argue that designers are 
intellectually equipped to engage in such a massive task. Many of the solutions proposed, 
however, are presented as interventions into society (for example, Design21 Social Design 
Network), for which industrial designers carry no democratic mandate.45 
44 For Fry, design is 'predetermined' by the undesigned world: it cannot be extracted from it. Fry's 
Introduction to Defuturing (1999), although trumpeted at the time of its first publication, did not mark the 
dawn of a new design movement, as might have been anticipated. One of the problems of Fry's text is 
that, being a complex argument reliant upon necessary philosophical moves as it unpacks its thesis, it is 
constructed in a manner such as to make it unlikely to be read by designers. This complexity is inevitable 
and necessary, of course: this is, after all, A New Design Philosophy and is presented with some authority. 
However, while in the process of unpacking a sustainable meta-language, Fry relies upon a series of 
object languages drawn from a number of opposing philosophies that are not completely unpacked or 
located. Fry lacks the natural language to embed these ideas into the active working lives of designers, 
and the text becomes difficult to understand. Sustalnability- or at least Fry's version of it - has made very 
little impact upon the way in which industrial design is conceived by both designers and their publicists. 
The exception, of course, is the ICSID definition: here Fry's conception of designers as not necessarily 
concerned with the modernist projection of progress through advancement in science is hinted at but 
posited alongside more recognisable concerns tying industrial design to economic structures - a move 
entirely counter to that which Fry might have hoped. 
45 Design21 (2006) does at least recognise that it must carry with it the authority of non-governmental 
politically driven organisations: 'In pannership with UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization), we seek to explore the relationship between design and society. We believe that 
design should be more than an aesthetic exercise: that the real beauty lies in its potential to improve the 
way that we live and interact in our communities and our environment.' 
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Attempts at reordering society can have chaotic consequences. 46 Ashby's cybernetic law 
(1956) suggests 'the management of complex system requires the action of a system of equal 
complexity' lt is arguable, then, that, in order for industrial designers to intervene in such a 
complex process without finding themselves In continual conflict with each other (the needs of 
humanity are not always best served by the needs of industry in any given moment of 
technological sophistication after all),47 designers might find themselves adopting an ethical 
and strategic, ecosophical 48 stance that invites a similar if not identical intellectual 
engagement with shifting perceptions of the epistemic relations of humans and technology as 
that of biotechnology. Ideas emerging from a deep ecology movement - for example, Ncess 
(see Glasser, 2005) - suggest another review of the epistemic separation of humanity and 
technology (see, for example, Botkin, 1990, and Sessions, 1995). 
The intellectual vigour with which the industrial design community constructed the machine 
aesthetic helped to develop an intellectual methodology that ensured the sustainability of that 
elusive quality referred to as humanity, in spite of the unprecedented acceleration of the 
technological world. Rather than avoiding the particular intellectual challenges of the machine, 
the foundations the early twentieth-century industrial design community established made it 
possible for us to feel comfortable in our significantly more complex technologised world. We 
have become so familiar with the world of mechanised technology that we have perhaps 
forgotten something of the struggle past designers had in coming to terms with its 
46 Many of the ambitions ofthe ethical imperatives ofthe ICSIO definition and some of the rhetoric of 
Oesign21 sound chillingly familiar to attempts to organise foreign policy. And foreign policy is a very 
uncertain craft, which 'attempts to contain the Soviet Union and control the oil-rich fields of the Persian 
Gulf, and continues today in the popular assault in Afghanistan to destroy the ai-Qa'ida terrorist network. 
In that half century, nearly every major initiative led to an unexpected and sometimes catastrophic 
reaaion, for which new military remedies were devised, only again to stir unforeseen problems' (Tirman, 
2001). 
47 In today's 'Freakanomic' world (Levitt and Oubner, 2005), where almost any aaion can be interpreted 
as having an unforeseen and chaotic implication, it is perhaps no surprise that the intellectual community 
of designers should find itself in something of a crisis as it struggles with such a truly 'wicked' problem. 
•• Ecosophy : ecological philosophy. 
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philosophical and intellectual demands. Perhaps in order to engage with the similarly 
extraordinary and apparently paradoxical demands of a technology that is both human and 
technological, we will need a similarly vigorous intellectual focus. Rather in the manner of their 
forebears confronting the age of mass industrialisation, the democratisation of appliances, the 
emergence of mass communications, the acceleration in velocity and energy expenditure of 
the combustion engine, or the age of electronic and post-mechanical technologies, the 
contemporary industrial design community could re invigorate its approach to technology and 
relmaglne a new biological age of Industrial design that continues Its long history. 
The industrial design community could revisit its own triijectory to look for continuity in the 
way in which previous designers responded to and resolved other moments when technology 
appeared to present a problem for them. If biotechnology is understood to be a problem of 
the conception of human-technological relationships and not entirely without precedence, 
then it might be possible for industrial designers to understand that any problems they might 
have In engaging with biotechnology might have arisen because of of a need to accelerate 
their intellectual approach for a new paradigm. This job is, perhaps, best undertaken by 
industrial designers themselves placing their own history and trajectory at the centre of their 
reasoning. The shortcomings that this might entail must be accepted, of course, and the 
resulting scheme will not be a work of philosophy or science, but it will have the advantage of 
being constructed with other industrial designers in mind. If it is to do this, then it will need to 
be constructed in terms that industrial designers can understand and find continuous with 
their own understandings of the trajectory of history, and to retain the instinct for clarity and 
coherence with scientific knowledge of other theorisations emerging from the industrial 
design community. lt is in this spirit that this thesis Is. presented. Perhaps, if the Industrial 
design community could recognise this theorisation to be a work of one of its members, then 
it might stand some chance of becoming incorporated into that community and into wider 
design discussion. This is, of course, a risky tactic, since most individual industrial designers 
lack some of the technical training of the philosopher. lt is a risk worth taking, because, if 
there is a chance of retaining the extraordinary intellectual skill of the industrial designer in 
making technology seem normal, quotidian and as delightful and beautiful as it can appear in 
the mechanical world, then technologies such as DNA computation might offer a spectacular 
and rich proposition for future generations. 
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Chapter three 
Reviewing history and the 'resolved' artefact as the keystone 
of analysis 
3.1 Artefacts and evidence in Industrial design histories 
An 'artefact' is defined by the evidence it provides of a process of humanisation. 
Histories of industrial design emerge from within the design community and provide a 
coherent although largely.invariant consolidating discourse for the industrial design 
community. 
3.2 The problem of disembodied resolutions of the process of humanisation 
Artefacts, presented without people in industrial design histories, appear as resolutions 
of an invisible process ofhumanisation. The process of humanising technology is 
ahistoricai. 
3.3 The strategic lacunae and Impact of the technological artefact-based histories on 
the Inclusion of culture 
In part because they have tended to be of lower social standing, the voices of the 
makers of artefacts have tended to be occluded from history. 
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3.1 Artefacts and evidence in Industrial design histories 
An 'artefact' is defined by the evidence it provides of a process of humanisation. 
Histories of industrial design emerge from within the design community and provide a 
coherent although largely invariant consolidating discourse for the industrial design 
community. 
I Dlt:l B llaftllcr fium BD antique laud 
Who said: Two va.st lllld 9JJ!I'sll<ia lqp of-
Szand m tbc daat. Near tbcm OD tbc ii3Dd, 
And wrinldallip lllld ma:r of cald mmmand 
Tc:ll tbat ib oallpzar wdJ tbaao: passions n:ad 
Wbid> ra IUIYivc. 81!1mi!!OD tbac lifdas thiup. 
The band tbat ~ tbcm lllld tbc bt:an tbat Ccd. 
And OD tbc pala;lal tbac wanls appear: 
Look OD my wurko, J" mislur, lllld dapair!' 
Nolbiux beside I"CIII3iDs: IOUIId tbc cla:ay 
Of tbat colossal wra:k, boundlrn lllld ban:, 
The loDe lllld lewd sanda liiR:II:b far away. 
(Percy Bysshe Shelley, 1817) 
The previous chapters have discussed how industrial design is an intellectual community that 
is constructed from ideas and institutions. lt has been demonstrated that, in order to 
subscribe to their community, industrial designers must maintain a conceptual stance that 
places the human and the technological at appositional epistemes. lt has been argued that 
this stance ensures that industrial design cannot be described with any degree of certainty and 
can cause problems for designers when they attempt to discuss technology in terms other 
than the material. This chapter explores how the histories that the community constructs of 
itself belie this fluidity and reinforce ideas of materiality by tracking a linear trajectory of 
artefacts, posited as evidence of industrial designers' intellectual endeavours. 
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The deliberate and skilful refinement of the world into smaller usable and useful units can be 
understood as an essentially human trait; one legacy of the human race will be the junk it 
leaves behind it. This junk tells us quite a lot about ourselves; monuments may remind us of 
the economics and politics of our ancestors, but the true signature of any human civilisation is 
made up of the small everyday things that litter the landscape. We give these things names 
and call them tools, or possessions, or weapons. In everyday language we can use these terms 
somewhat at will, but in an analysis we must. take more care to describe things in more precise 
terms. Designers, however, do not appear to take a great deal of care when they talk. 
Sometimes they will refer to objects, on another occasion they will speak of designs or tools, 
'artifact, machine, product, gizmo or spime' (Sterling, 2005, p. 8). The term 'object' has 
specific philosophical connotations, 49 and other terms can imply a particular form of these 
things or a collection of things: the 'machine', or more recent arguments in favour of terms 
such as 'apparatus' and the 'dispositife', for example. Recently some theorists have begun to 
use the term 'stuff' as a means to a wider inclusion of cultural materiality. There are good 
reasons why these particular terms might be used in a discussion of industrial design. The 
dispositife and the apparatus, for example, emerge from particular and specific approaches to 
understanding the world that could be understood to reflect the nature of the industrial design 
process of refining complexity. 50 lt is arguable that each of these terms emerges from a 
particular discourse, loaded in favour of a particular interpretation of its arrival through 
particular processes and seen from a particular intellectual standpoint. 
Drawn from archaeology, 'artefact' is a general term for anything made or shaped by people. lt 
is particularly distinguished from a manuport- that is a natural object transported and utilised 
without modification. While a manuport provides evidence of deliberate human intervention, it 
is stripped of any embodied implication of its value, aesthetic or function. An artefact may be 
49 See, for example, http://www.helsinki.fi/sciencetcommens/termstobject.html 
50 Although these terms are not used here, they point to a recognition of the interactive and collaborative 
nature of realisation. These terms will become important here as the argument unfolds and makes a move 
against the material implications of the artefact. The text you are reading here is constructed on a laptop. 
The artefact is that thing called laptop as it would be understood in the operative language of daily 
conversation and as it would appear in an Industrial design history or catalogue. As an apparatus, the 
laptop is an assemblage of motors, circuits, levers, chemicals, each of which has a history and a cultural 
implication of its own. When thought of in terms of the disposicife, the laptop becomes an extended 
apparatus that calls upon a network of electricity and production techniques. In industrial design all these 
terms have meaning. lt must be noted that Dewey utilised artefact to connote Ideas (Hickman, 1gg2. p. 
12). However, this is not how the term is used specifically here nor how it is widely understood. lt is 
arguable that Dewey uses artefact in order to outline a concept that might be understood in contemporary 
theory as disposicife and not as it should be understood here. 
g3 
similarly stripped of value, but it is always recognised for its embodiment of a human process. 
In archaeology the artefact only becomes something si when it contains, in itself or within its 
form, some evidence of human intervention that can be traced onto some other broader 
human activity. Artefacts are consciously designed and deliberately manufactured; they are 
evidence of the world when it has been humanised. Artefacts, then, are the material evidence 
of the process of humanising technologies; they fill industrial design histories. 
Design history emerged relatively recently as a discrete branch of scholarship. When the 
Design History Society was founded in 1977, it was hoped to build and promote a history of 
design that would stand alongside other histories of art and architecture. This history would 
be given to students of design and would, it was hoped, spread the word of design out into 
the world. Thirty years after its foundation, the society maintains this ambition. Today the 
Design History Society (2006) describes itself as working 
nationally and internationally to P,romote and support the study and understanding of 
design history. Its activities are focused on consolidating the teaching of the subject in 
universities and colleges, and demonstrating the widespread cultural and economic 
significance of design history. 
One impetus behind the formation of the society was the recognition that nobody other than 
those who had been educated in design and had worked among the designers in their 
community would write their history. Design histories share a similar trajectory and have some 
commonality with art histories and histories of architecture. Many scholars of design history 
found themselves working in close proximity to other historians, with whom they would share 
something of their discourse, but they would be intent to add visual and material histories of 
technological development. There would be a distinctly technological slant to design histories 
that was not always evident or explicit in other visual and material histories. Industrial design 
histories would be a means to track the development of the intellectual engagement of 
designers with technology. This form of history was important, because technology histories, 
emerging from scholarship outside the community of design, appeared to have little 
51 That is a named and identifiable item. For example, a piece of metal becomes a broach or a weapon; an 
unidentified collection of electronic components might become an i-pod. 
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understanding of the intellectual motlvatlons of discourse within the Industrial design 
community. 
A survey reveals that, while industrial design is not entirely absent from technology histories, 
it Is rather downplayed and rarely analysed. For example, in Mitcham's Thinking through 
Technology: The Path between Engineering and Philosophy( 1994), where one might 
reasonably anticipate some reference to intellectual endeavour through which technologies are 
bought into being, there is only slight mention of industrial design. Mitcham (1994) 
acknowledges design to be part of the process by which technologies are imagined and 
constructed, but he pays little regard to any intellectual insight designers might have brought 
to the development of technological forms nor to their interpretations of the relationships 
people and technology share, making only a very brief reference in passing to industrial 
design as a 'behavioural engagement with technology' (p. 210). In this otherwise 
comprehensive and authoritative history of technology and philosophy, industrial design Is 
described rather vaguely as a 'fine art of constructing' and is compared to the cultivation of 
plants (p. 212). Similarly, Giedion (1948, p. 192) makes only scarce reference to the industrial 
art of streamlining, where 'shiny enamel housings often reveal a surprising beauty of form'. 52 
Even Mumford's comprehensive history (1963) of technology that was so influential in the 
twentieth century made no explicit reference to the intellectual intervention of industrial 
design. Armstrong (1998) refers frequently to the consequences of industrial design in the 
context of modernism but makes no explicit mention of the industrial designer's involvement 
in the process by which technologies appear. 53 One consequence of this isolation from the 
scrutiny and reflective criticism of wider scholarship is that industrial design has trodden a 
lonely path and has been forced to be responsible for constructing its own histories (see 
Dilnot, 1984). 
52 Emphasis added. Giedion is surprised that trains have somehow grown to be so beautiful. This is 
frustrating, textual invisibility mirroring that of Koons's discovery and exhibition of the art in domestic 
appliances (Koons, The New, 1979-82) or perhaps Duchamp's celebration of the Readymades exhibited 
without reference to the modest ambition of the ceramic designer who treats a functional artefact with 
such exquisite skill. 
53 The temptation to engage in a frustrated polemic is something to be avoided, but it does seem, from 
reading technology-centred histories, as if the contemporary world arrived without any intellectual 
impetus from the industrial designer. The intellectual impetus of the industrial designer appears to be 
unworthy of inclusion in wider academia. Designers may well be justified in thinking they have not made 
that much progress in escaping their lowly place in the Agra. 
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Certainly in comparison with the vast field of art history, histories of design are scarce 
... There is also a gaping chasm between the highly specialised scholarly text, on the 
one hand, and expensive coffee-table books that are usually lovely to look at but have 
very little to say. (Hauffe, 1998, p.,7) 
In 1978 Penny Sparke, describing the recent formation of the Design History Society, wrote: 
'The newly emergent discipline of design history has by now spread its roots quite thickly and 
established itself firmly enough to show that it is here to stay' (cited in T. Bishop, 1978, p. 5). 
This is not to say there were no design history books prior to this time, but in 1970, in the 
introduction to The Roots of Modern Design, Schaefer (1970, p. 2) bemoaned the lack of 
industrial design histories that were in a position to challenge the canonical authority of 
Pevsner. 5cheafer looked beyond industrial design and back to Mumford and subsequently to 
Giedion for insight, and also to Lindinger (1964) for an alternative view, but of course found 
only scant reference to the particular nature of industrial design. Industrial design historians 
are rarely found in the broader spectrum of historical scholarship and are more likely to be 
located as adjuncts to the history of design movements or schools. Since academic scholars 
from outside the world of design pay only slight attention to industrial design or its designers, 
it is perhaps not surprising that industrial design has been forced to retell its own story. When 
these stories are examined and compared, it is evident that they share a heritage and 
responsibility to one another. The similarities of these stories stake out the practice of 
industrial design; they trace a particular trajectory and chronology. 
Industrial design histories are strikingly similar in both their scope and their construction. lt is 
common for industrial design histories to refer back to Banham's 1955 history of the first and 
second machine ages. How industrial design became consolidated over the course of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries is an oft-repeated and familiar story; whether in any of the 
standard industrial design history academic texts or a glossy coffee-table picture book, the 
story is told de novo with each publication. 
Contemporary design histories are visibly indebted to their predecessors. Ban ham's significant 
work of architecture, design and the modern age, Theory and Design in the First Machine Age 
(Ban ham, 1955), and Pevsner's Pioneers of Modern Design (1936/1975) still provide the 
prototype for contemporary histories of industrial design. Although published in the midst of 
a number of texts, such as Bertram (1938), Read (1953), Gloag (1934), Carrington (1935) and 
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Holme (1934), the style and order of Pevsner, and then subsequently of Banham, dominate the 
form of subsequent industrial design histories. Heskett (1980), although ostensibly emerging 
from a new tradition of the Design History Society, is heavily influenced by the style of 
straightforward historical narrative supported by illustration that Ban ham and Pevsner 
consolidated. Pevsner has been described by Corin Hughes-Stanton (1967) as 'the bible of 
industrial design' (cited in Schaefer, 1970, p. 1); to a significant extent this remains the case 
today. There is some variation in emphasis, but for the most part contemporary industrial 
design histories track a particular linear story of industrial design through the projection of its 
intellectual endeavours as a producer of technological artefacts. This trajectory is located 
within a rather specific time frame of approximately 150-200 years - a period described by 
the emergence In the Western world of large-scale industrialisation and of modernism. This 
trajectory, it is supposed, can be accounted for through artefacts, as Thakara (1988, p. 11) 
confirms: 'The century provides us with a stage play of artefacts charting modernism's 
trajectory .. .'. 
lt could be argued that the reassuring familiarity with which the story of industrial design is 
retold provides one of the ways in which the community of industrial design consolidates itself 
and reassures itself that, despite all the fluidity and complexity that surrounds it, it has 
managed to come through, producing ever-more sophisticated artefacts. The community, it 
has been argued, is itself fluid and uncertain, but its histories provide a degree of reassuring 
certainty. There are differences in industrial design history texts, of course, but their story is 
largely interchangeable. If designers look to their histories to find their own particular 
trajectory, they find a common heritage in a story retold, albeit from changing directions, over 
and over again through its histories. 54 
A number of industrial design histories appear as picture books. The picture books, while 
arguably not intended to be scholarly, are nonetheless researched and presented with some 
54 This story can be told in many ways; there are histories of design movements, of materials and 
techniques, chronological catalogues of artefacts, reflective memoirs and analytical deconstructions of the 
material culture of design and its progenitors. The interwoven stories forming written histories of 
Industrial design are somewhat interchangeable; start one book and finish another and the story will, for 
the most part, remain largely intact. Industrial design histories are constructed in changing climates of 
scholarship and with differing intent. Forty (1986), Sparke (1986), Conway (1987), Walker (1989) and 
Woodham (1997), for example, although not necessarily similar in intent, reflect the somewhat parallel 
nature of industrial design history. Lucie-Smith's A History of Industrial Design (1983) and Raizman's 
History of Modern Design (2003) present strikingly similar histories, although they are separated by 
twenty years of scholarship. 
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care. The story they tell, while following the line of scholarly tradition in industrial design 
histories, are almost entirely visual. 55 The reader can only guess that the artefacts chosen for 
inclusion in the picture book have some, mostly undisclosed, aesthetic value residing in the 
quality or ability of the artefact to represent some value the reader might understand. lt seems 
an essential prerequisite of design histories to be copiously illustrated. Heath, Heath and Lund 
jensen (2000), for example, is an intelligent history driven by illustration and supported by 
critical and insightful text. There are any number of other books that present often quite 
beautiful picture catalogues of artefacts drawn from 150 years or so of history with a 
commentary that reiterates the image of the artefact by description. 56 Artefacts in these books 
frequently appear to be related in some linear history merely because they share some 
aesthetic of functional similarity. 
There are also a number of books that might be thought of as catalogues and are evidently 
intended as a professional representation of industrial design to the world through arrayed 
images of artefacts with their designers presented alongside. The Design Innovation Yearbook 
series (Zec, 2004) is typical of many such 'designer catalogues'. This style of representation 
has transferred to less scholarly industrial design histories. For example, Designing the 21" 
Century(Fiell and Fiell, 2001), while not strictly a history, presents contemporary industrial 
designers alongside the artefacts with which they are associated and posits them as the 
creators of a new century, resonating their practice with earlier designers. The book is 
constructed in a similar manner to an industrial design catalogue. Publications such as the 
Design Innovation Yearbook, or the popular design catalogues of artefacts drawn from history, 
project artefacts as the quintessential essence of industrial design. These histories, like the 
design museums, have served industrial design well and have played a not inconsiderable role 
in assuring the preservation of many, often ephemeral but interesting, comings-together of 
55 P. Coli ins (1991) is a good example of a genre of industrial design history that merely presents images 
of artefacts without analysis. Collins presents a 'dazzling collection of vintage radios that were created in 
a remarkable era of product design marked by unparalleled ingenuity and innovation'. There is no attempt 
to explain how this 'ingenuity' is enacted through a process of design. Images of the 'radios', beautiful as 
they may be, are simply arrayed in chronological order with a caption detailing the manufacturer and the 
date of sale. In the absence of any remark, the reader is left to come to some form of intuitive 
understanding of this supposed remarkable era. 
56 In the case of the Taschen books (Fiell and Fiell, 2000) for example, there is often only the merest 
contextual placement. Fiell, (Fiell and Fiell, 2000) opens with Behrens AEG Sparbogenlampe from 1907 
and then arrays a number of artefacts, first in a form of historical chronology; and then in a number of 
contexts- 'packaging' and 'designing for children', for example- and finally a number of case studies-
'the iron' and 'the typewriter', for example. 
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intellectual activity that might otherwise have been lost over time. This is industrial design, 
say the histories of industrial design; is the process of humanisation not embodied in the 
interplay of the designer and the client, the form and the function, and played out to a 
conclusion in the beautiful artefact? 
3.2 The problem of disembodied resolutions of the process of humanisation 
Artefacts, presented without people in industrial design histories, appear as resolutions 
of an invisible process of humanisation. The process of humanising technology is 
ahistorical. 
Design texts are almost always illustrated liberally with artefacts serving as the resolved 
outcome of the intellectual activity of industrial designers and the various intellectual 
movements that have pervaded across the scope of the history. Because of this emphasis upon 
illustration, many sustaining narratives of industrial design do read rather like paper versions 
of a Design Museum, where the concrete 'stuff' of sustaining narratives of industrial design 
are presented as tangible relics arrayed in chronological or typological order, put out for 
display as mute exemplars of a typology, disconnected from the people who might complete 
the resolution. 57 
Sembach's 'into the thirties' (1972) is similar to other industrial design histories. Although 
ostensibly more scholarly, Sembach's text relies upon images of artefacts and buildings to tell 
his story. Sembach makes this technique explicit in the introduction. 'From the illustrations in 
this book there emerges a composite picture of a historical period, a picture that seems bright 
and unclouded, suggesting elegance, sophistication, urbanity, even a hint of classicism' (p. 7). 
Later, however, Sembach hints at something rather more subtle than the usual parade of 
beautiful objects: 'In the illustrations I have tried to give an impression58 ofthe period .. .' (p. 
13). Sembach makes a rather interesting move when he begins to analyse the photographs 
themselves, claiming them to reveal as much, if not more, of the zeitgeist than the artefacts 
and buildings they capture. 
57 You are not invited to sit on the chairs in the London Design Museum; your intellectual engagement 
with the displays is limited to the visual and the intellectual. You can never experience the artefacts on 
display and are denied the opportunity to gain some sense of what it felt like to use then. 
58 Emphasis added. 
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The precision we have already noticed in the artefacts themselves finds its counterpart 
in the manner in which they were observed. - Restraint, calm and laconicism pervade 
the photographs, enabling them to achieve a feeling of space. (p. 18)59 
Sembach lets the pictures do the talking, but, unlike those who precede him and were to come 
later, he is conscious of the images as a means to a phenomological insight that goes beyond 
their representative 'iconic' exactitude.60 In Pevsner (1936) the images of architecture and 
design, used to chart history, are absent spaces; they present rather ghostly visions of an 
abandoned world. 61 1n Heskett (1980) the images are similarly used. Some workers are seen 
on the Ford production line (p. 67), some craftspeople are shown at work (p. 86), some 
smiling commuters pose at the door of a Oymaxion car (p. 123), a driver and fireman are 
shown at work on the flying Scotsman (p. 163), a lonely woman sits in an empty gleaming 
Braynzeel kitchen, unsuliied by any hint of life (p. 77) and then, in a similarly bleak 1970s 
vision of domesticity, a woman who appears to be on the verge of suicide stands alone in a 
sterile kitchen, a poignant rose held to her (p. 181). The implication is that the process of 
humanisation is resolved in the absence of people. In Woodham (1997), a craftsman is shown 
at work (p. 207), a woman bends down to adjust a side table, presenting a rather unconvincing 
Impression of real life (p. 125), some workers ride the products of their labours through the 
gates of the Piaggio factory (p. 110), a man poses smugly by his Chrysler car (p. 70) and some 
office workers sit frozen, like mannequins, in the Olivetti office c.1935 (p. 55). Functionalist 
Design (Marcus, 1995) and The Machine Age in America (Wilson, Pilgrim and Tashjian, 1986) 
are both texts that explicitly focus upon designers who were concerned with the close 
interaction of humans and technology and with a particular intellectual approach to the 
humanisation of technology, yet there are no people shown in these texts. The writing is 
infused with ideas concerning the mechanisation of mankind and the functional 
interrelatedness of body and technology or space, and yet the products shown appear remote 
and isolated as fully resolved containers of intellectual chaos. 
59 Sembach reviews the photographs of Alfred Renger-Patzsch and Waiter Peterhans and draws parallels 
to the photography of Cartier Bresson and across the broader spectrum of the concision and detachment 
of the artistic thrust of the time. 'The portraits of Man Ray and Herbert List are an example of this. 
Nothing appears in them direct, yet everything has the clarity of a waking dream. This approach combines 
detachment with intensity' (Sembach, 1972, p. 20) 
60 Sembach, while presenting design as artefacts, begins to explore something more ineffable and invites 
in the reader a sense of placement in the consciousness of the era concerned. 
61 The buildings presented by Pevsner are empty. The streets appear abandoned too, save for a few 
scattered figures who populate the streets surrounding them and appear utterly lost and alone. 
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Images in sustaining narratives of industrial design are often contemporaneous with the era in 
which the artefact was first manufactured. In consequence, artefacts appear gleaming and 
new, unsullied by the wear and tear of time. Photographs of artefacts rephotographed in a 
contemporary context in their aged condition or captured in use are very rare. Products are 
almost never dirty, never scuffed or worn through use. Instead, they are presented in pristine 
condition, most often isolated and seen in an empty space, without context. However, in 
Bordek (2005) a shift is discernible. In other similar design texts, utilising images constructed 
from the late 1980s onward, almost every technological artefact is represented in use, albeit 
sometimes in a rather stilted and posed manner. lt seems from looking at industrial design 
histories as if people have only recently become an important component in the 
representation and understanding of technologies. There have been no attempts to reimaglne 
the past in this manner; only recent designs are represented with any hint of the human being 
as a component in the process of the artefact. 
Sustaining narratives of industrial design are similar in their scope and form. Perhaps in an 
attempt to find some means of historicising an otherwise fluid institution, their authors have 
retrieved a trajectory of artefacts. There is no attempt to find a history of the process of 
humanisation, nor for that matter to deal in any meaningful way with the human engagement 
with technology. This history, perhaps buried by centuries of traditions of scholarship, is 
glimpsed only in moments when the makers of artefacts are discussed in terms of their 
ontological struggle with what it is to be human and to use technology or to own artefacts. 
3.3 The strategic lacunae and impact of the technological anefact-based histories on 
the Inclusion of culture 
In part because they have tended to be of lower social standing, the voice of the makers 
of artefacts have tended to be occluded from history. 
Industrial design might merely be the current terminology for a rather more venerable 
intellectual process of humanisation, applied to a particular method of 'industrial' production. 
lt might imply, too, that the process of humanisation is reimagined in a particular era and in 
the condition of industry; this is a subtle but profound implication. In the former view, the 
process of humanisation remains a constant that must be inculcated into the process of the 
production of artefacts. In the latter view, the production of industrialised artefacts could be 
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understood to demand a revised model of the process of humanisation. Industrial design 
histories present a trajectory of the process of humanising technology through orthodox 
Western models of development. lt is a matter of evidence that almost every artefact displayed 
in industrial design histories originates from a manufacturing source in the Western world. 
When they posit technology as an emergent consequence of the directed agency of designers 
working through a model of production and consumption, then it is difficult for industrial 
design histories to engage with processes of humanisation interaction that are not Western in 
origin nor necessarily resolved in a industrially manufactured artefact. The connection of 
Industrial design to a particular period of industrialisation in a particular region of the world 
has enabled it to be historicised in parallel with other histories of the West. The emphasis 
thrown upon the process of manufacture is, however, at the expense of the process of 
humanisation that is evident in the artefact. The process of humanisation then becomes a lost 
history. 
Histories of a community, constructed from within that community, tend, understandably, to 
self-reference and to hegemonic and normative modes of construction. In the case of 
industrial design histories there is a tendency to draw heavily upon images of artefacts 
produced within a frame of manufacturing and consumption. The Design History Society 
appears to accept and reinforce this impression: 
The Society encourages liberal and inclusive definitions of design history and its 
methods, approaches and resources. These encompass the function, form and 
materials of artefacts of the pre-industrial and industrial periods, up to and including 
' ' 
the present day, their production, dissemination and consumption as well as their 
cultural, economic and social meanings. (Design History Society, 2006) 
Artefacts serve as both the subject of analysis in design histories and the means to that 
analysis. 52 This is not necessarily a linear process. In Towards Post-Modernism, M. Collins 
(1987) demonstrates a history of industrial design that allows for an emergence of 
postmodernism with antecedence deep into the twentieth century. Through a story of a new 
formalistic movement, Collins makes it possible for a history to connect across other linear 
62 In industrial design histories, as in Banham, (1955) artefacts are positioned around the book such that 
they serve to both illustrate and reinforce the description and analysis within the text. 
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histories. 53 This history is told nevertheless through artefacts that are presented as the 
resolution of the complex process of humanisation that has taken place. This process is 
largely unaccounted for, except as insomuch as it is resolved in the artefact. Heskett's 
Industrial Design (1980) and Woodham's Twentieth Century Design (1997) tell remarkably 
similar stories and utilise an approach to the telling of history that maintains a linear 
chronology while contextualising 'issues'. Topical chapters such as 'Commerce, Consumerism 
and Design' and 'Design and Social Responsibility' (Woodham) or 'Standardisation and 
Rationalisation' and 'Mass Production and Individual Choice' (Heskett) are presented as if 
Industrial design history could be divided into neat movements. Both Wood ham and Heskett 
demonstrate this change in emphasis through illustrations of artefacts presented as 
resolutions. Wilson, Pilgrim Grey and Tashjian's The Machine Age in America (1986), while 
covering a similar era to Banham's work, places more emphasis upon small artefacts and less 
upon architecture. 54 In an attempt to get deeper beneath the skin of the motive forces of the 
early machine age, the emphasis is placed firmly upon an analysis through artefact qualities, 
but nevertheless artefacts appear fully resolved. Schaefer's The Roots of Modern Design 
(1970) places a focus upon change from craft to manufacture. The story is told through the 
products of those processes, without any significant reflection upon their drives and 
consequences other than to prioritise the story of manufacturing by examining the emergence 
of a 'formal' language of simplicity that emerged from a practical response to the needs of 
industry. Marcus's Functionalist Design: An Ongoing History(1995) is somewhat similar; it 
enriches this story, using many of the artefacts that occur in other histories. M arcus tracks one 
story of the emergence of a formalistic functionalist style and its pervasive rationale in more 
contemporary design, arguing that this aesthetic is maintained, despite its apparent fall from 
critical fashion. 
Industrial design histories, and by extension many other histories of technology, largely ignore 
artefacts that emerge in cultures outside a Western model of production and consumption. it 
is a matter of evidence, too, that almost every artefact displayed in an orthodox industrial 
design history originates from a manufacturing source in the West. Artefacts that originate 
63 Collins (1987) relates late-twentieth-century postmodernism with the grammar of ornamentation 
(Owen jones) and with Pug in and Bell. weaving a connected history. 
64 This is a scholarly text, although liberally illustrated. While it remains an insightful and intelligent 
authority, it tells a strikingly similar story to Ban ham (lg55). 
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from beyond the scope of the orthodox industrial design community are categorised as being 
'vernacular', a term that is used to imply a form of design that emerges from outside the 
intellectual integrity of the institutionalised community. In recent years yet another new kind 
of design (vernacular design) has been proposed, which allows for the inclusion of artefacts 
from beyond the formal_ institutionalised discourse of industrial design - see, for example, the 
following abstract from a paper exploring the usefulness of the community of practice as a 
means to understand design formation: 
The concept of vernacular design allows for the understanding and the appreciation of 
designs created without recourse to institutional qualifications in the field of design. A 
study was undertaken of how North Alaska lnuit (Eskimo)65 women learn design, 
based on observations, interviews with seamstresses, and authorial participation in 
designing and sewing in conformity with North Alaska lnuit tradition. (Reitan, 2006) 
However, even those who espouse 'vernacular design' must illuminate by their use of that very 
term how design has come to be imagined as an institutionalised activity located about a 
particular part of the world and manufacturing process. Design in this view is disconnected 
from an activity common to humanity and reified into the practice of a few distinct individuals 
who discover and validate the vernacular. Design processes originating outside the Western 
world of production and consumption are largely ignored by orthodox industrial design 
histories except where they intersect with Western thought. In discussions of the vernacular, it 
is hard not to sense that the terms of debate are patronising, although it is important to note 
that a significant shift is taking place in discussions of the vernacular in terms of sustainability 
and environmental adaptation. 
Climate responsive design: Hi Praveen, FJS puts it abstractly as Vernacular and I agree 
completely. There has been a New Age wave of environmentaltgreenteco-design that 
has come with the caring sharing 90's, and of course, since the 90's were so high 
tech, then the solution had to be high tech also, so most of the climatic responses of 
buildings followed relatively complex systems involving metal moving parts and 
computer chips. Fine. But vernacular architecture is usually technologically advanced, 
it's just because it has been around for centuries that people want something new. 
Well it has been around for so long for the simple reason that it WORKS. There are few 
architects out there who have been able to continue the incremental evolution of their 
65 The parentheses in the quotation are for ari apparently unnecessary and inappropriate explanation of 
the term lnuit. They are not added here and in any case describe two entirely different cultural constructs. 
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local vernacular technologies, they have done great work with it and I'm sure you will 
stumble upon them on this site. I strongly suggest you look them up. Good Luck. 
Yahia Shawkat, October 17, 2006 (ARCHNET, 2006) 66 
However, even in this example, the vernacular is still posited as somehow being without 
intellectual intent and as an expedient response to conditioning. The Western response to 
climate change is vernacular too, but merely framed within a different institution. The 
institutional expedients that form design outside the Western industrial model are never 
discussed, and so the vernacular can only ever be considered in terms of its Western 
counterpart. In the past the terminology of intellectual engagements with the vernacular could 
be institutionally racist. For example, African design appears most frequently in Western 
design histories through the influence of the Fauvists upon the Western modernist designers. 
The association of African design with the 'wild' (Fauve) is· racist, but it also points to the 
rather subtle reinforcement of the vernacular as beyond the bounds of the civilising 
institution.67 Contemporary cultural theorists are alert to accusations of imperialism and 
racism, but they continue to struggle to understand the vernacular other than from 
institutional terms. Western historians who have drawn superficial comparison between the 
forms emanating from African designers with those of the Western modernists have 
recognised a vector of influence but have most often missed the opportunity to understand 
this design in more advanced terms. The lost history of the process of humanisation makes it 
difficult to understand any synergistic similarity in the process of design emerging from a 
non-industrial construct. 
In Industrial design histories we learn much about the Western designer and the influence of 
African forms upon them, but we learn very little about the intellectual drivers of African 
design and the intent of its design community and so the Eurocentric inference that design is 
a scholarly and Western invention of the industrial age is reinforced. For example, a Western 
material and social cultural analysis attempting to understand African design as an artefact in 
the form of mask can only draw upon a discussion in terms of identity where the mask 
66 I have cleaned up the spelling without changing the context in this quotation taken from a live 
discussion forum where editing prior to publication was not a priority. 
67 There is no doubt that designers of those times had different sensibilities from our own, but 
nonetheless the term can be found in contemporary accounts and employed without criticism. Similarly, 
terms such as 'tribal art' and notions of an all-encompassing African or Asian design aesthetic appear. 
105 
functions as a concealer (and paradoxically as a revealer) of identities. Both the mask 
wearer and the community on behalf of whom it is worn are momentarily at least 
transformed sharing in another's identity so as to understand something of one' s own 
identity. (Vanterpool, 1997) 
We can understand this. This is how we in the Western and industrialised world use masks in 
drama or at Halloween. lt fits with our conception of identity formation and with our storybook 
and movie impressions of tribal culture. But if we take a view that the hidden history of the 
engagement with technology extends to the whole of humanity, then African design, being 
human, is likely to be an intellectual endeavour with as much rigour, vigour and potential as 
anything emerging from the histories we tell. African design tells us something about the 
human activity we call design, but it tells us in a way we may find difficult to comprehend. 
When attempting to describe the same mask by reiterating what he has learned from those 
with an African perspective, Vanterpool struggles to come to terms with the mask's intention 
as a 'non-face': 
is unreal, but it does not represent nothingness: it stands for an imagery of existence 
in-human- spirit-relation behind which there is a felt sense of transcendental value-
laden realities. (Vanterpool 1997) 
What is this non- face, and how does it relate to a history of industrial design? That Vanterpool 
struggles to find the words should not surprise us; this seems beyond what we are led to 
106 
believe codifies design. This is an insight into something that is beyond the terminology of 
industrial design history. lt·represents a glimpse into something that is lost from the histories 
of industrial design and points to a kind of anomie that one would not expect to find in an 
industrial design history. The intense ritualistic and interactional role of the African mask 
cannot be explored, because no precedent exists for such a narrative, but the artefact itself is 
an advanced technological response to a particular condition. What might then be learned 
from this artefact is then lost, as is the historical account of why fauvism might have appealed 
to designers as anything other than a stylistic and material aesthetic fancy. Industrial design 
histories can only reinforce the idea that the industrial design community is a Western material 
invention, rooted in values of consumption and production. If it is not an emergent 
consequence of Western industrial design's institutional discourse, technology becomes 
consigned to the vernacular, and so any particular insight that design might bring becomes 
lost, thereby weakening the rich potential of design analysis. 
Not all artefacts that have been made throughout human history have emerged in 
consequence of some process that can be claimed to be part of the trajectory of industrial 
design. lt has been argued that artefacts can emerge through intellectual engagement in the 
vernacular. The products of industrial design emerge as the consequence of a particular 
institutionalised discourse. They reflect the complexi_ty of their times but carry with them the 
echo of ancient and uncertain histories of artefacts mad~ of stone, wood and metals, shaped 
into the civilising tools of agriculture, war and worship. Understood in this light, the African 
mask and the 'i-pod' share some common (if ahistorical) trajectory, although they have 
appeared on the planet in very different circumstances. This common trajectory might lie in 
the fellowship of those who set about the task of making these artefacts. Both are products of 
a dominant discourse and a mode of understanding human technology relationships that is 
determined by an intellectual view of the universe and the place of the human in that universe. 
lt is arguable, then, that the differences between the intellectual location of the designer of the 
mask and the designers of the 'i-pod', for example, are retrospective values that are a matter 
of cultural interpretation rather than intellectual sophistication. One view is that the artefacts 
emerge as a logical response to a set of needs. This may be true, but they also emerge in 
consequence of intellectual conventions and stylistic constraints imposed by organising 
institutions. The mask is an advanced technological response to a given understanding of the 
operation of the universe that is imposed by its own institutionalised convention; one cannot 
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understand the mask unless one understands its institutional imperative. Design histories are 
then perhaps better understood as a sustaining narrative of a particular iteration of a human 
intellectual process. 
lt is important to separate the history of industrial design from the idea of a sustaining 
narrative, because, although designers have called upon history, they can no longer rely upon 
it as an absolute authority. Hayden White (White. 1973, 1980) argued some four decades ago 
that history is best understood as a narrative, and more recently, jordenova (2006), for 
example, has argued that the delineation of histories into narratives has itself become open to 
challenge. The sustaining narrative that design histories have maintained may have crumbled, 
but that in itself provides an opportunity to factor in other actors into the narrative, to help 
designers understand it in different ways and thereby to provide other alternative, sustaining 
natrratives. There is then an opportunity to revisit the foundations of industrial design in order 
to produce a new sustainable narrative. 
When industrial design histories are understood in this light, it becomes possible to see how 
they constrain the sustaining narrative within rather fixed bounds. lt would be a matter of 
conjecture to suggest that those who crafted the artefacts of ancient times could be thought 
of as part of a community that might be recognisable to industrial designers today. There is 
no evidence to suggest that ideas of how to shape and improve technologies were shared 
through anything other than an ad hoc community of people who shared something of a 
common conversation. Paleoarchaeology suggests that the sudden adoption of tools is in part 
a consequence of the sharing of ideas among early communities (see, for example, Schick and 
Toth, 1993). In order for this to happen it would have been necessary for some formal means 
of technical communication to develop. This language would have had to be more than a 
purely natural conversation and rather closer to an object language in order to direct the 
crafting of stone and bone.68 There is, of course, no discernible record whatsoever of these 
68 However, the role of the community in this respect may have greater precedence than is perhaps 
imagined. Schick and Toth, (Co-directors of the Centre for Research into the Anthropological Foundations 
of Technology, Indiana University, Bloomington) study early hominid and human technology (Schick and 
Toth, 1993). Evidence from archaeological records suggests that the earliest anatomically modern humans 
did not make dramatic technological changes in their way of life until about 40,000 years ago. At this time 
there was a sudden explosion of tool development, environmental modification and aesthetic application 
to spaces and artefacts. Schick and Toth propose three possibilities to explain the global explosion of 
technological artefacts: (i) lt is possible that the humans at this time were not 'human" as we understand it 
in terms of their brain structure. (ii) lt could be that improvements in technology prior to that date are 
undetectable but just as significant, or that at this point - some 40,000 years ago- accumulated 
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conversations, but there is certainly evidence at sites such as Crimes Graves that some 
sophisticated decisions were made to produce early tools on an industrial scale, and these 
represent the earliest known evidence of makers of artefacts that were not intended for 
personal use. The stone tools of Crimes Graves were not made for a known client and have 
been found in Neolithic sites spread right across Europe. In order to be as successful as this, 
the stone toolmakers of Crimes Graves would have had to have anticipated some process of 
design. They presumably also knew which tools were popular and which were not. The 
archaeology they left behind them is perhaps an example of an ur-form of industrial design 
(see, for example, Barber, Field and Topping, 1999). 69 
Venus of Willendorf, Palette of Narmer, Egypt, approx 3000 BCN. 
Paleolithic Europe, 
30000-15000 BCN. 
What we cannot know is how the artefacts we find embody in some way the lost history of the 
intellectual process of humanisation that has gone into their formation. Some artefacts remain 
a mystery. The Venus of Willendorf's function, for example, is conjectural, except as in so 
much it bears a resemblance to a doll or statuette. The Palette of Narmer, while appearing to 
have some function, can only be categorised by archaeology as a work of art. Artefacts reveal 
the centrality of the human in human thought. Sometimes those thoughts are expressed as 
representations of the human that we can recognise, sometimes as reflections of shadows of 
knowledge reached a threshold whereby it was somehow able to explode across the world. (iii) lt is 
possible that it was only with the development of modern language and the availability of the 
hypothetical , or the future, tense that human societies were able to communicate plans and ideas 
effectively. 
69 Some techniques of making can be tracked historically and bear a direct resonance on contemporary 
production methodologies. lt is a fairly safe guess that a contemporary industrial designer could study an 
artefact from almost any period in history and remake it. 
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the human intervention in the world, but also in ways that are tied to imaginings of the human 
in the universe. 
Coolley (1988) has suggested that the term 'design' in its various European forms emerged 
during the sixteenth century, coincident with an intellectual need to describe the mechanical 
arts in higher tones. Cooley suggests that design was raised in this way as an activity in its 
own right and separate from processes of production, partly in consequence of a need for 
'scientific' experimentation. 70 lt is possible that this coincides with an emergent scientific 
transformation in the understanding of the human as biology rather than holy vessel. Nothing 
of this history is reflected in the sustaining narratives of industrial design, however. When read 
at face value, they present a largely consensual picture of a trajectory of artefacts. For the 
most part this trajectory is contextualised as evidence of industrialisation. Superficially this 
would seem to be axiomatic. After all, the matter of concern is industrial design. Stamm, 
however, has claimed the term "industrial design' originated only as recently as 1948. Hirdana 
(1988), reflecting on this, suggests that, rather than nascence, this should imply the 
institutionalisation of the term as a means of codifying an existing practice as a significant 
stakeholder during a period of post-war reconstruction and the rebuilding of markets 
(Hirdana, 1988). 
Other attempts have been made to find a starting point for industrial design's history. Bertram 
(1938) placed Eastlake's Hints on Household Taste at the nascence of design. Eastlake had 
claimed his publication as the first to address design 'in a manner sufficiently practical and 
familiar to ensure the attention of the general public' (Eastlake, 1869, cited in Bertram, 1938, 
p. 11). 71 In 300 years of Industrial Design Heath, Heath and lund Jensen (2000, p. 11) 
commence their history in the eighteen century - a period they describe to be defined by the 
70 Design would now come to stand for 'the conceptual part of work from the labour process. Above all, 
the term indicated that designing was separated from doing' (Cooley, 1988, p. 197). As the intellectual 
thrust of the enlightenment gained in strength, so design came to be seen as an increasingly worthy and 
intellectual persuit. Darnton suggests that the mechanical arts 'constituted the most extensive and 
original part' of Diderot's (1713-84) Encyclopedie (see Schwab, 1984, p.198). Vasari's description of 
desegno (see Biirdek, 2004) points to the identification of a particular process somehow remote from the 
activity of making. 
71 The choice of Eastlake is deliberate, because Bertram sees himself at the far end of that story opening 
with Eastlake. Bertram's book resides in the twilight of a period when designers were fixated with 
aesthetics of ornamentation and the role of hand skills and craft, and were subject instead to a new light 
of aesthetic concerns with the language of the power and range of modernity. Herbert Read, writing in the 
1950s, reiterates this focus: 'We need to create a new consciousness of aesthetic form. We must put an 
end to the inculcation of false and supernatural ideals of beauty- ideals which are largely superficial 
"taste", a cultural veneer inherited from other ages' (Read, 1953, p. 41). 
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'large quantities of handmade items produced in the workshop and home ... with largely direct 
sale'. 72 The intellectual intent of this text appears to be to imply that sixteenth-century 
ambition to break the connection between craft and production, and between method and 
intent, is a continuing process. Hesken's history of industrial design reiterates this limited 
trajectory. His history opens with a chapter 'From Traditional Crafts to Industrial Art' (Hesken, 
1980). Bordek (2005) does make a brief reference to Vitruvius' De Architectura Libri Decem 
(Ten Books on Architecture) but then leaps across the mechanical arts straight to Paxton's 
building for the Great Exhibition (1851) via a brief mention of Ruskin. Perhaps this history is 
too subtle for industrial design's discourse. But perhaps too its exclusion from the formal 
sustaining narrative of industrial design points to it problematic highlighting of a continuing 
discourse that extends beyond the scope of orthodox industrial design considerations and 
points to a tacit recognition among industrial designers that they deal with abstract and 
philosophical ideas. 
One reason why industrial design might have chosen not to historicise its intellectual 
engagement with technology other than through a series of resolved artefacts is that the 
intellectual tradition in which the institutions of industrial design reside have only a recent 
history of scholarship. In Ancient Greece thought resided in coterminous intellectual realms: in 
extremis the thoughtful and reflective episteme and the lived doxa. Although episteme has 
come to stand today for a category of thought (Foucault) or perhaps a paradigm (Kuhn), in 
ancient Greece the term stood for conceptually constructed, ordered and considered 
knowledge that could be placed somewhat in opposition to Doxa standing for opinion and 
intuition. (Bell, Devidi, and Solomon, 2001, p. 134). Whereas episteme was contemplative and 
rarefied, doxa was played out in daily life in the street and in commerce (see Rhodes, 2005). 73 
72 Positing in the process a highly materialistic view of industrial design, they attempt to extract industrial 
design as a process of replication emerging from the handmade crafts and transformed by the industrial 
revolution, while acknowledging that 'the craftsman designer is the most natural of them all and has roots 
reaching right back into pre-industrial history'. This association is fractured by the assertion that 'the 
Industrial designer is very different from the craftsman .. .' (Heath et al., 2000, p. 12). 
73 The ancient Greeks would struggle perhaps ·to comprehend how a civilised society could give such 
prescedence to doxalogical analysis and such authority to scientific sociological analysis of the human. 
Ancient philosophers were not concerned with the construction of cultural and social meta-realities they 
contemplated the essences of being. These essences were considered in relationship to any number of 
other phenomena and reflected the human struggle of those with the time on their hands to comprehend 
a purpose in being. On the street, in the fields and among the ranks of the military the concerns were 
more immediate: popular and common opinion shaped the understanding of the meaning of life. (In 
Roman terms this was the Vox Populi, literally the voice of the people.) The artefacts of history provide 
snapshots of this voice. 
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Those who made the goods for sale in the agra (the public space or market) were of low status 
and, we are told (although it would be doubtful if there were evidence to support this), 
endured the intellectual contempt of the very same people who valued their products. In 
classical times the slave classes engaged in the production of the everyday goods of the agra 
were of lowly status. Outside any institutionalised discourse, their vernacular network was 
considered a matter of doxa and hence not worthy of inclusion in the authority of an account. 
Given the lack of any recorded evidence of their expertise and the conversations formed 
through experience and on the hoof that they generated, we can only guess at the deep 
intellectual skills of the makers of the items traded in the agra. 
Even in later scholarship the mechanical arts, while a vital component of power and social 
cohesion of the Middle Ages, 74 were considered a lowly art. The liberal arts trivium (grammar, 
rhetoric and dialectic) and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music) 
maintain a far higher status than the rude mechanical arts, projecting an impression of the 
smoke and dust of the workshop and not the contemplation of the academe. 75 The mechanical 
arts encompassed a range of activities we might recognise as the domain of the contemporary 
industrial designer. 76 Included among the mechanical arts is the creation of carts, pots, shoes, 
architectural joinery, 77 as well as other less material activities such as navigation, pharmacy or 
animal husbandry. Despite the intimacy with which the products of designers, artisans or _the 
rude crafts were accepted into life, the means behind their manifestation is not worthy of 
medieval scholarship, being constructed by 'most mechanical and dirty hand' (2 Henry IV, Act 
5, scene v)78 and not conceived among the higher academic arts and philosophies (see, 
particularly, Walton, 2003). Biirdek (2005, p. 13) reiterates how Leonardo Da Vinci is popularly 
74 Where would kings have been without a lowly cup, or armies without swords? 
" The contributions of Archimedes to the development of mathematics through practical means was 
largely forgotten, (the defence of Syracuse for example), immediately after his death to emerge in 
prominence during the Renaissance. 
•• it should not be inferred that the industrial design community as it is understood today extends back 
into these times, but there is much that contemporary designers would find in common with the 
mechanical artist. They would almost certainly discover that much of their object language is common. 
Contemporary designers can still read the plans and annotated sketches of their medieval counterparts. 
The process of commission between the tenth or fourteenth centuries, if it is anything like that of 
architecture, was similar to contemporary processes. (See, for example, Shelby's study (1976) of the 
commissioning of a monastic building.) 
77 it Is simply a mistake to imagine prefabrication to be an invention of industrialisation. 
78 it is, of course the 'Rude Mechanicals', the tinker, the bellows maker and the joiner, who ruin the magic 
of A Midsummer Night's Dream. 
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claimed as the first designer; 79 this is unlikely to be the case. Nevertheless, Leonardo is 
emblematic of the concept of modern design as something transcending modern, industrial 
production. Leonardo was one of many who practised the mechanical arts. His Book of 
Patterns of Machine Elements is preserved perhaps because so few other working drawings of 
that era survive. The preserved 'patterns' provide evidence of the striking similarity in the 
approach to the active working practices of the mechanical artists to that of contemporary 
designers, but it is unlikely that Leonardo would have invented this process. Notwithstanding 
the iconic status of Leonardo, there remains a sense, however, of low status and an abiding 
lack of self-esteem that goes with an exclusion from higher philosophical attention and from 
scholarly validation that still resonates in the industrial design community. One of the 
missions of ICSID remains to 'further the profession of design, its status in society, and the 
protection of intellectual property rights' (ICSID, 2006). ICSID does this by promoting 
industrial design to the world as a tool of commerce. ICSID does not seek to connect the 
contemporary discourse of industrial designers with a longer intellectual history. 
Somewhat hidden within an alternative and occult history of the mechanical arts, there is 
evidence of some of the ontological dynamics of the philosophical struggle with the process of 
humanisation. The mechanical arts negotiated the worldly concerns of materiality, commerce 
and needful use, on the one hand, and, on the other, a subtle ontological negotiation of 
aesthetic beauty, hand skills and spiritual transgression. Mechanical artists subverted the 
materiality of God's world for the sake of human vanities. Medieval scholars argued over the 
virtues _of aesthetics. If beauty were a sin, then that which drove the craftsman to such levels 
of indulgence must corrupt. But, the counter-argument ran, was the hand of the craftsman not 
guided by God to reveal such beauty?8° Contemporary designers remain as interlocutors 
between man and the physics of the world and as negotiators of the value of aesthetics and 
function. Mclnerny (2005) suggests that Hugh of St Victor included the mechanical arts within 
philosophy, because the mechanical arts were necessary to 'heal the wound sin has opened 
between man and nature .. .' (Mclnerny, 2005). While it is suggested that this task is 
79 
'From a historical perspective, it is popular to regard Leonardo da Vinci as the first designer' (Burdek, 
2005., p. 13). 
80 Rather like the practice of a sin eater, the service of craftsmen was valued for their feats of great 
architectural engineering knowledge, the subtle development of tools and techniques and their fine 
workmanship, and yet they themselves were condemned. While the medieval architects knew the secrets 
of how to hold stone in the air, directing God's will to the ground through pillar and buttress, the 
subversion of mechanical artists was not so dramatic or demonstrable. 
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'subservient' to the higher arts, 81 the task of healing the wound between man and the God 
nature reveals too something of a prototype of design's intellectual task in reconciling what it 
is to be human with the world. Industrial designers may not be aware of this, but it may go 
some way to explain why craft discussions, more centred on the skill and material quality of 
artefacts than on their philosophical problematic, are excluded from their sustaining 
narratives. The mechanical arts may appear to be part of a trajectory of the crafts, because 
their philosophical centrality has been occluded from histories of knowledge. 
81 Bertram, writing of industrial design in the mid-twentieth century, seems to describe a practice that 
stretches deep into history and not just to the dawn of the industrial revolution. Designers are needed, 
suggests Bertram (1938, p. 18), because the world "need(s] a special body of men trained in aesthetics and 
having sufficient knowledge of technical processes. familiar with the history of visual art as a whole, and 
capable of imparting their knowledge and ideas'. 
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Chapter four 
The artefact as a mutable consequence of culture 
4.1 The 'resolved' technological artefact and the role of cultural networks 
Artefacts are used to codify society and culture in material terms. 
4.2 Cultural networks and the deficit of reductivist methodologies 
Designers suppose that, if artefacts can be interrogated to examine how they might 
contain a cultural signification or might reflect the Zeitgeist of times past, then it seems 
reasonable enough to trade upon these cultural values and build them Into the design 
of contemporary artefacts. 
4.3 The strategic lacunae and Impact of agency complexity and autopolesls 
Artefacts are better understood as an emergent and temporary form of supercomplex 
forces. 
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4.1 The 'resolved' technological artefact and the role of cultural networks 
Artefacts are used to codify society and culture in material terms. 
Industrial designers have begun to understand that their outputs emerge from within the 
culture in which they are themselves placed. The uncertain variability of the terms this process 
demands requires a familiarity with techniques of analysis that are themselves as complex as 
those they are designed to unpick. it is, then, not surprising that industrial design academics 
have struggled to explain the complexities that give rise to a particular technological artefact. 
Bijker has made a thorough study of this (see, for example, Bijker et al., 1989). Bijker's more 
recent Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs (1997) is a more complete attempt to reveal the social 
origination of technologies and thereby an attempt to open its development to processes of 
democracy. Bijker encounters similar difficulties as Molotch, who in Where Stuff Comes From 
(2005) attempts to unpick 'how toasters, toilets, cars, computers and many other things come 
to be as they are'. Molotch presents a robust attempt to reveal the hidden forces at play in the 
emergence of artefacts. However, in summing up the text on the book jacket, Petroski 
suggests that this is an almost endless task. 
Molotch tells us what design is, who designers are, where design happens and society, 
cul.ture, geography, the marketplace, and just about everything 82 else imaginable 
contribute to making things look and work the way.they do. (Molotch, 2005) 
Molotch attempts to build a picture of the forces of humanisation and positions the designer 
as an orchestrating agent in this complexity. it is not surprising then that industrial designers 
struggle to manage the possibilities of orchestrating infinite complexity. In 1979 Gregory 
Bateson, describing how we might build an artificial intelligence, wrote: 
Fifty years ago, we would have assumed that the best procedures for such a task 
would have been either logical or quantitative, or both. But we shall see as every 
schoolboy ought to know that logic is precisely unable to deal with recursive circuits 
without generating paradox and that quantities are precisely not the stuff of complex 
communicating systems. (Bateson, 2002) 
Designers' attempts to extract the process of humanisation from the artefact must deal with 
the problem of recursive circuits too. The complexity of the task of unpicking the 
82 Emphasis added. 
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supercomplex forces of history and culture that. go into the formation of an artefact makes it 
almost impossible to be certain of any pathway. There have been, in recent times, a plethora 
of attempts to understand what design is by distilling it as a process from the complex forces 
that create what is taken to be human culture. Many of these attempts are sited in the present 
and place their attention upon particular artefacts as a form of semiotic witness to culture. In 
this methodology, culture becomes the scene of humanity- that is, the place where humanity 
resides and can be accounted for. For example, a domestic washing machine is posited as a 
site revealing the gendered nature of technology (Graves, 1996), while material possessions 
are mirrors of social change (Hardiment, 1988), a means of revealing the nature of selfhood 
(Dittmar, 1992) or, simply, a means of exploring everyday life (Attfield, 2000; see also Dormer, 
1990). To understand culture, this logic suggests, is to understand what it is to be human and 
ergo the process of humanisation. Harman (2002) has argued that, the richer and more 
inclusive and 'biodiverse' the understanding of culture held, the richer human species will be. 
Much of recent scholarship in industrial design has focused its attention on how artefacts have 
become what they are and how this process can be reversed by understanding and 
orchestrating the cultural forces shaping them. Designers cannot reasonably be expected to 
be cognisant with the full complexity of the process they are engaging with, but are impelled 
by the ICSID to intervene nonetheless. The emerging brand of 'Social Design' has this claim at 
its heart. The DESIGN 21, Social Design Network, is an explicit attempt to bring together 
'members of the design community, socially conscious individuals, local governments, 
businesses and non-profit organizations' in order to identify social problems. Social designers 
(another new design term) 'create smart solutions through design' (Design21, 2006). One 
problem with design attempts at social networking is that designers are not drawn from a 
particularly broad spectrum of society. lt has been argued previously in this thesis that 
designers are 'placed' (Buchanan, 2002). There is a significant risk in social design 
interventions that designers will understand culture and society from a perspective 
determined by their own class and social placement. For example, research by members of 
Hewlett Packard Labs and Google investigating social networks demonstrates how networks 
can be read in behaviourist terms and as reflections of the social location of Individual 
designers within the intellectual community. The network they identify is Western, somewhat 
middle class and essentially a younger professional and educated network of kinship (see 
Adamic et al., 2005). While the claim is made that the research 'observed and measured social 
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network phenomena such as the small world effect, clustering, and the strength of weak t ies' 
(Adamic et al., 2005}, the evidence base is drawn from a tightly constrained social situation. In 
the illustration that accompanies the article, it can be seen that the network seems 
preoccupied with activities of leisure that are drawn from a very narrow social spectrum. 
~--
~ ... 
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~ ~. 
\ 
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(Adamic et al., 2005} 
This image illustrates the danger of social intervention by designers who might assume that 
deviation from the behaviour anticipated in the network is abnormal: 'we found correlations 
between a user's personality and their other attributes, as well as interesting correspondences 
between how users perceive themselves and how they are perceived by others' (Adamic et al., 
2005}.The notion of the 'human' then has become something of a meta-conceptual 'value' : to 
be human is to imply something inherently good, rich and complex or even to accept Western 
cultural behaviours to be inherently human. 
For the most part the human relationships, passions, laughter and tears that go to make up 
the rich complexity of individual lives are memories. But our memories are not yet durable. In 
order to build a picture of the rich complexity of past lives, archaeologists must scrape away 
mud in the hope of revealing something that has endured. Archaeologists can read histories, 
of course, but these can provide only a limited political and mythological memory. 
Archaeologists look for more tangible evidence of fire, wear on a rock, or the particular 
mineral content of a soil sample, for example, and claim these as a more solid memory of 
human life. An artefact, which in archaeology is something crafted with human purpose, is a 
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particularly special find. 83 In archaeology, artefacts can be isolated from the place they are 
discovered; they are a portable and enduring evidence of real lives lived.84 This is the process 
of archaeology: walls must be conjecturally reconstructed into buildings, pots and pans into 
meals and rituals. just as skeletons are conjectured into people, archaeologists transform 
muddy artefacts into a memory of people situated In a life in another remote time. 
Artefacts have an important role to play in our culture. Their use as some kind of evidential 
and solid folk memory is inculcated in us at an early age. As children we see artefacts in our 
picture books: artefacts are displayed for us to see in visits to museums. When analysed, 
artefacts can reveal something about the people who made them, but, since they cannot speak 
for themselves, any analysis is subjective. Archaeological analysis is subject to the beliefs and 
prejudices of the culture in which the analysis takes place. Rosenzweig and Thelan (1988) 
suggest that the past Is imagined in terms of the present, Harraway has, in another context, 
written of how it is necessary to extract prevailing racism and sexism from primatology (see 
Harraway's Primate Visions (1989))85 and industrial designers should not consider themselves 
immune from this prejudice. The analysis of any artefact is conditioned by the placement of 
the viewer and by any institutional discourse. There are some who see in displays of artefacts 
a subtle conspiracy to shape understandings of the world; one contributor to a discussion 
thread on a conspiracy website describes museums as 'brainwashing st.ations for the youth' 
(ATS, 2006). Another contributor responds to this: 
When I was young we went to museums. I saw greek and roman anphores [sicj, coins. 
I saw dinosaurs, I saw equipment from the 1st and 2nd World War, I saw old cars and 
planes. I saw old books, old paintings. I don't think I have been brainwashed. 
Educated, yes. (ATS, 2006) 
83 In archaeology, material without evidence of deliberate human intent is not classified as an artefact. 
84 Archaeology draws comparison between what is known with what is not known. Sometimes these 
comparisons are drawn with evidence that is close in age or culture to that of the artefact in question; a 
shoe, for example, we can guess might have been used in a similar fashion to its contemporary 
counterpart. On other occasions, the comparison is made with a generalised or specific understanding of 
human nature or culture; for example, there is a broad cultural assumption that children play with toys. 
85 Of course, archaeology is not immune from the truism that facts are true only until they become 
falsified by scientific proof, or because culture shifts, such that a new, more plausible, explanation 
becomes possible for the form of an artefact. 
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lt is surprising perhaps that we should find such a discussion on a conspiracy website. These 
correspondents, should they trouble themselves to reflect upon some of the discussions that 
have occupied the discourse of museum studies, would find their discussion to be a matter of 
vigorous academic debate there. Bearman (1992, p. 9) has suggested that museums reflect the 
impetus to 'collect and preserve artefacts from around the world .. .' as an extension of 
imperialist assumptions of the supremacy of Western civilisation and the logic of a 
scientifically constructed world. Until quite recently, museums made little effort to understand 
the artefacts they displayed, particularly when they emerged from cultures that were not 
Western. Those industrial design correspondents who argue rather vaguely about conspiracies 
to deceive echo these debates, but, while the subtle message contained within the choice of 
artefacts and their explanation have received much attention, the display of artefacts 
themselves as a means of containing a folk memory is accepted without question. Be it 
dinosaurs, equipment from the First and Second World Wars, old cars or ceramic pots, it is an 
accepted truism that the world can be understood by looking at its artefact traces. Those who 
design museum exhibitions recognise they must be conscious of their stance with respect to 
the arrangement and display of artefacts and the context of their placement.in relation to one 
another (see Barringer, 2002). Only careful and critical curation and skilful information design 
can contextualise artefacts on display. 86 
Over the years museums have changed a great deal. Today, while museums are 
diverse, as are their aims, it can safely be said that they are primarily in the business 
of dissemination of information rather than artefacts. The advantage to thinking in 
terms of information is that it validates the collection of intangibles ... as well as 
actual artefacts ... (Be arm an, 1992) 
The artefacts and animals collected from faraway lands were strange to behold when brought 
back into the Western world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Disconnected from 
their particular narratives, they appeared in many cases to be beyond comprehension. Buchli 
86 The Freakatoria (see Freakatorium, 2005) of the Victorian museum presented a field of wonderment, 
with collections of artefacts unalloyed by information- rather like the design picture books; they allowed 
viewers to wander at will and to delight in what they found in their own terms. Contemporary museums 
run the risk of the accusation that the informational context in which artefacts are placed constrains the 
imagination used in their interpretation (Greenblatt, 1g91). Information- as Foucault alerts us- comes 
complete with its own structures of power and its own hidden determinants. Drawing a comparison with 
how Derrida alerts us to textual analysis - if museums focus upon a single linear story, as in a thematic 
exhibition, care must be taken not to exclude from validity the personal resonances that visitors might 
hold. We must remain alert to the knowledge that the choice and prominence of a particular artefact 
displayed in a museum (or an industrial design history for that matter) and isolated from its temporal 
determinants tell us rather more about our own times than we sometimes care to admit. 
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(2002, p. 12) has described the exotic displays of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to 
be an attempt to 'mediate between two worlds, one known (Western) and one not known and 
Invisible (non-Western), that could be comprehended through these mediating artefacts we 
call material culture'. A significant discourse has emerged from this tradition of collecting and 
from the impetus to understand artefacts. The trajectory of this analysis has attempted to 
connect artefacts directly to the cultures from which they emerged. 'Material culture as we 
understand it is a direct consequence of the collecting traditions of the nineteenth century .. .' 
(Buchli, 2002, p. 16). Over the years material cultural analysis has developed a sophisticated 
tool kit that understands artefacts to be indicators of the culture of those who made them. 
Methods of material analysis, devised in part in reaction to uncritical and subvert imperialist 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century notions of display, have become firmly established in 
scholarship, to an extent that, arguably, they now shape almost every analysis to some 
extent.87 
The idea that the things that humans use everyday carry with them, in some codified form, the 
cultural narratives through which human lives are formed is accepted largely without 
challenge. This is reflected in industrial design analysis and is given impetus by 
Csikszentmihalyi's ideas of Material Possession Attachment (Csikszentmihalyi· and Roshber-
Halton, 1981). Schultz and Baker's review (2004) of material Possession attachment is often 
cited by designers claiming 'Goods have the property of indexicality, as they provide tangible, 
palpable proof of life events'. Belk (1991) describes goods as 'magical vessels' of meaning 
connecting us to 'deeper, less understood, and unarticulated aspects of life". lt seems 
reasonable enough then to suggest a methodical and forensic deconstruction of artefacts in 
history might be open to critical analysis and hence to reveal some impression of the 
mythological (Barthes, 1989) nature of human-technological relationships. In comparison to 
the relatively linear stories weaved by Pevsner and Banham, more recent sustaining narratives 
of industrial design are thematic. These texts tell a story predicated upon the idea that 
artefacts hold the potential to reveal some common thread running through culture. These 
texts suggest that artefacts can be read as a kind of obscure linguistic evidence. Selle 
suggested in 1973 that 'one can speak of a product language to the extent that design 
87 lt is arguable that many attempts at material and cultural analysis have such a degree of self-reference 
that they have become something of a dogma. 
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artefacts are not only carriers of function, but always carriers of information as well' (cited in 
Bnrdek, 2005). 88 
Artefacts, however, appear to be fixed in time and place and to be solid. They become 
museum worthy because their material form is enduring and can be preserved and isolated for 
posterity and put on display. This should not mean that they are a prerequisite for analysis in 
texts where their physical presence is not a necessity. However, in the majority of industrial 
design histories, the visual, material cultural analysis used as a means of analysing a social 
and technological history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is centred about the 
images of artefacts. The sustaining narratives of industrial design sometimes present unusual 
or spectacular artefacts without critical or informational insight, but for the most part design 
literatures present artefacts as the means to track some kind of historical trajectory. Artefacts 
are presented as if they can reveal, in some special and necessary way, something of the 
unfolding story of technological development. There are, however, many versions of the 
material cultural analysis of static and fully resolved artefacts. The process of humanisation 
may be encrypted in their shape and form, but any explicit analysis of its immaterial trajectory 
is absent from the text. There are no significant histories of the trajectory of the use of 
technology. 
4.2 Cultural networks and the deficit of reductivist methodologies 
Designers suppose that, if artefacts can be interrogated to examine how they might 
contain a cultural signification or might reflect the Zeitgeist of times past, then it seems 
reasonable enough to trade upon these cultural values and build them into the design 
of contemporary artefacts. 
The link between design and culture and the analysis of design as a cultural indicator is made 
explicit in Sparke's An Introduction to Design and Culture: 1900 to the Present (2000). Sparke 
moves away from the telling of the story of industrial development and draws a more direct 
88 The archaeologist retrieves artefacts from the ground and attempts to give them names. Artefacts, if 
they cannot be identified and named, or if they bear no reference to any device in contemporary use, can 
appear to be utterly bewildering when viewed with contemporary eyes. These artefacts, when they are first 
retrieved from the ground, appear to be intended in some way for human use, but are disconnected from, 
or obscured from traces of, the processes of human intervention that they embody. There is nothing 
necessarily inherent in the artefact to reveal its purpose, unless a corresponding reference remains at play 
in the times in which it is analysed. in archaeology an artefact can be studied and inference made from its 
form, but this process must remain somewhat conjectural. For example, the alignment of Stonehenge with 
the sun might seem to provide some insight, but it is widely accepted within archaeological scholarship 
that the imperative of Stonehenge can never be known for certain, and so theories of necropolis, grain 
store, astronomical calculator and temple can be found among the academic discourse surrounding 
Stonehenge, to say nothing of the many fringe theories. 
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focus upon the 'cultural concept called design visible in the context of consumption ... ' (p. 
179). Sparke lists in her bibliography a vast array of more recent texts placing emphasis upon 
material and cultural analysis. As Sparke herself puts it, 'much of the work in the areas of 
design history and material culture undertaken since the 1980s has adopted a cultural slant' 
(p. 254). 
an enormous body of theoretical work ... [from] cultural studies, sociology, 
consumption theory, anthropology, social psychology, literary studies and cultural 
geography- has had a dramatic impact upon the way in which work on the subjects 
of design and material culture has been undertaken. (Sparke, 2000, p. 255) 
Sparke recognises the growth of material cultural analysis through the 1980s and 1990s. 
'Many books deal with the relationship between consumer culture, material culture and 
modernity' (Sparke, 2000, p. 256). She provides a comprehensive bibliography for industrial 
designers seeking a sense of their history through cultural readings, and her work is likely to 
appear in any university school of industrial design reading list. The study of material culture 
is now a wide and established field, which is often recognised in industrial design as building 
upon Marxist ideas of capital commodity, and also Veblan's classic study (1899) of 
consumption among the leisure classes. Twentieth-century analysis is significant for a 
proliferation of attempts to reveal hidden power structures within culture, and industrial 
design has not proved immune to this drive. Woodham (1997) provides a relatively recent and 
scholarly account of industrial designers' intellectual interventions, infused with visual, 
material cultural analysis, reflecting a discernible shift towards cultural studies in more recent 
design narratives. In a chapter 'Pop to Post-Modernism: Changing Values', Woodham (1997, p. 
183) describes a 'discernible shift of emphasis from production towards consumption .. .'.A 
significant body of work has been undertaken in the industrial design community in recent 
years attempting to analyse hidden structures within human culture and society and to 
connect this in an industrial design context to the development of technological forms. Design 
theorists such as Buckley (1986) Hillman Chartrand (1990) and Boradkar (2006) have 
constructed a commodity discourse around industrial design and have called upon Adorno, 
Horkheimer, Marc use, Haug and other members of the 'Frankfurt Left' and also the French 
theorist Lefebvre (1991) in order to bring revisionist forms of Marxist analysis to industrial 
design. These theorists use the artefacts of industrial design to reveal evidence of power, 
politic, gender and patronage in cultures. 
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Reading material cultural analysis, one might think it quite plausible to acquire the material 
things needed to become whoever one wishes, detaching "oneself into another time and place, 
or to become part of an off-the-shelf, collective identity (Sudjic, 1985). Redhead (1999) 
suggests that 'the products that surround us provide an instant cultural history, a mirror in 
which our own preoccupations are vividly reflected' (p. 8): 'We design them. They reflect us' 
(p. 9). Redhead divides his history into five chapters: (i) Basics; a style for the 1990s, (ii) More; 
the proliferation of stuff, (iii) Control: the illusion of power, (iv) Identity: who do you think you 
are, and (vi) Crisis: the shape of uncertainty. lt could be said that Redhead presents a fairly 
bleak view of industrial design, reducing it to a kind of freak show, hopeless and shallow. 
However Redhead reflects the output of industrial design, his presentation is constructed 
entirely of artefacts, presented as reflections of rather obvious cultural determinants. Such a 
notion, of course, is not lost on designers or marketing departments. lt seems perfectly 
reasonable, then, for designers to reverse this process and to implicate artefacts with cultural 
meaning. In Woodham (1997), for example, a 1986 Dyson vacuum cleaner (p. 185) is 
compared with a 1957 range of Kitchen Machines from Braun (p. 155): 'Unlike the [Braun] 
kitchen appliances ... this design is redolent with imagery and associations.' This negates the 
imagery that the Braun product carries within its own times. Material analysis has provided 
what has appeared to industrial designers to be a productive mearis to understand how 
artefacts come to be as they appear in their histories. The interrogation of artefacts in such a 
manner as to reveal the culture that they contain has become an established practice in itself. 
Recent sustaining narratives of industrial design such as Woodward (1997) are similar in their 
analytical approach to more explicit explorations of material cultural analysis such as Miller 
(1987) or Buchli (2002). 
Outside technical conversations, the analysis provided by contemporary histories and material 
cultural texts provides a means for working and student industrial designers to theorise their 
practice. This was not always the case, however; for most of the twentieth century industrial 
designers had relied upon variations of what came to be called the 'doctrine functionalism' 
(Moles, 1967). This doctrine broadly held that the products of industrial design should be 
designed in a manner such that they were first and foremost functional without unnecessary 
form, and were expressive of their function. The dictum of 'Form Follows Function' (FFF) was 
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extracted from Sullivan's article of 1896, 'The Tall Office Building'. 89 Sullivan was influenced 
by Emerson's and Greenhough's Hegelian ideas of the metaphysical interpretation of 
architecture ((see particularly Lloyd Wright, in jones, 1961) and also (Menocal, 1981.)) 
Although Sullivan might be read as a kind of prescient chaos theory, the dictum 'form follows 
function' can be tracked through industrial design histories, so as to seem an entirely 
materialistic and utilitarian reduction. 'Form follows function' came to be described as 'an 
empty jingle' by Banham (19655, in part because it seemed as if the utilitarian reduction of 
so-called brutalist architectures singularly failed to account for the invisible and more 
metaphysical qualities necessary for the support of rich human lives. Because these buildings 
appeared to take no accent of a complexity other than their own necessity, they were almost 
entirely in utile and were subsequently demolished. At the end of the 1960s Moles recognised 
that functionalism must give way as a maxim in the face of the acceptance of cultural plurality 
and an emerging consumer culture that demanded individually styled products. The shift from 
function to meaning reflects a shift in industrial designers' perceptions of their practice from a 
necessarily unconsciousness of culture, to a more problematic and confusing awareness of 
their need to be conscious of the need to be self-consciously unconscious of culture. 
Industrial designers seem to be aware that they need to recognise that their artefacts have a 
consequence in culture but find their attempts to intervene directly in, or to anticipate, culture 
to be fraught with problems. 
This emerging culture had coincided with the proliferation of a number of new domestic, 
electronic artefacts. These new electronic artefacts could take their form without any particular 
aesthetic imperative that drew upon their function (Moles, 1967).90 Designers who steadfastly 
held to functionalist principles in the 1960s and 1970s found that electronics denied any 
sense of their functionality in the form of the product. 91 Holding to functionalist principles, 
89 
'Whether it be the sweeping eagle in his flight or the open apple-blossom, the toiling work-horse, the 
blithe swan, the branching oak, the winding stream at its base, the drifting clouds, over all the coursing 
sun, form ever follows function, and this is the law ... lt is the pervading law of all things organic and 
inorganic, of all things physical and metaphysical, of all things human and all things superhuman, of all 
true manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the soul, that life is recognizable in its expression, that 
form ever follows function' (Suilivan, 1896). 
90 There is little in the material presence of electronic technologies that avails itself of the functional 
aesthetic; take an electronic device apart and it is indistinguishable from any other electronic device. 
91 The materiality of 'eff-eff-eff as we came to know it through our teaching as student designers 
appeared to refer entirely to the material and visible qualities of technology. While Sullivan himself 
seemed to open the space for metaphysical engagement, 'eff-eff-eff appeared to industrial designers 
during the 1980s to present a kind of imperialist constraint. Some ·student industrial designers attempted 
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designers found themselves creating indistinguishable artefacts in almost identical black 
boxes, with perhaps a single illuminating diode to indicate activity. Moles and others had 
identified that the industrial design community sensed an emerging pressure to develop 
aesthetic difference for marketing and brand-identity purposes in the products they designed. 
lt appears to be an orthodoxy that artefacts are fixed, static and complete in themselves and 
present the resolved outcome of a process of humanisation that can be unpicked by means of 
material and cultural analysis. lt seems reasonable enough for industrial designers to ask 
whether they might perhaps reverse this process : to anticipate the cultural forces that come 
together in the formation of artefacts and to build them into their designs. Industrial 
designers have become highly skilled at extracting the resonances established artefacts carry 
with them, and then re-embedding their cultural resonance into the design of new products. 
Some of these attempts can be analysed so that they reveal some of the problems with 
material culture as a mode of analysis - for example, the new 'Mini' (Design: Frank 
Stephenson) manufactured and sold by BMW. 
The Mini old and new. 
The design team of the new Mini has successfully reconnected its product with the original 
Mini from some forty years previously. The cult car of the 1960s has been captured in the new 
design through the skilful application of resonant styling cues : 
The new Mini is ... instantly recognisable ... it retains the short stubby configuration 
of the first-generation car, although it is in fact a much larger vehicle ... The unique 
a radical breakout, a kind of Punk rebellion from its strictures and in keeping with the mood of the times; 
the phrase 'form follows fuck- all' became a clarion call of a generation of young designers who 
recognised that the packaging of electronics in identical black boxes - a consequence of modernist logic -
presented little future for industrial design. In retrospect, this might have been a mistake, founded in 
ignorance of Sullivan's true implication. 
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heritage of the Mini sees it pull off a remarkable double act, cutting across a large 
generation gap. Appeal[ing) to the young and the young at heart. Rebels with a cause, 
you might say. (2005: www.cartorque.co.za.) 
lt is quite possible, of course, that potential customers of the new Mini might be unfamiliar 
with the classic Mini. The design of the new Mini is not enough to sell it alone, and sales have 
been supported by a skilful marketing campaign that has built a mythology reconnecting the 
new car with its supposed forebear. 92 In the light of BMWs skilful advertising and marketing 
campaign, it is difficult to remain po-faced when confronted with the playfulness of the retro-
styling of the new BMW-Mini, and it is undoubtedly a popular and successful product as well 
as a hugely skilful manipulation of referent styling cues. The new product references the old 
product and has a functional similarity. The referent, however, is a fragile entity; it can become 
stretched over time to the extent that its narrative can be lost. This appears to be particularly 
problematic if applied to a product that has no functional connection to the culture it apes. A 
good example of a product that makes both of these mistakes is Nokia's 7260 series mobile 
telephone (Design: Frank Nuovo). 
Nokia 7260 (left) and 7700 (right) series mobile phones 
Nokia describe this artefact by suggesting it draws 'inspiration from the refinement and 
mystery of the golden age of glamour, and combined with old world elegance with 
modernity ... each phone is a pure reflection of the inspirational 20s ... a distinct twist of 
92 The 2003 remake (director F Gary Gray) of the 1969 film The Italian )ob (director P Collinson), 
coinciding with the launch of the new design, can arguably be understood as a device reconnecting the 
material culture of two generations of an artefact across time. lt is possible that the inferior nature of the 
new film played a large part in ensuring the cult status of the original film, thereby projecting the Mini it 
featured forward as an intact referent. 
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modern art deco' (Nokia, 200S). Old world elegance failed to strike any resonance in Nokia's 
youthful market and even a casual search could throw up many references to Nokia's weird, 
strange and bizarre designs. 
given the Finnish company's penchant for coming up with some pretty bizarre designs 
of late, it's no surprise that the new Nokia looks more like a fancy address book or a 
lady's compact than a communications device. (200S. www.star-techcentral.com) 
While artefacts can appear to tell us something of the times and situations in which they 
appeared, the reverse engineering of material culture is at the very least problematic and at 
worst confusing. Whereas the Mini builds upon some trace remaining of a cultural value, 
Nuovo's flirtation with the 1920s is fraught with problems. There simply is no referent to the 
1920s in the function of the mobile phone, and so its form can be compared only to quite 
incomparable products. As one contributor to a mobile phone design forum says: 'I just don't 
see the point in this "phone", if that's what it is. it's so novelty [sic) it's unbelievable, I'll be 
surprised if they sell even one of these. Nokia have really lost the plot this time' (Mobileburn, 
200S). While the material culture embodied in an artefact goes some way to explain it, there is 
clearly something important in the functionality of the referent: in this case the phone has no 
functional precedent in the 1920s to fit its trajectory. The function of the technology is 
disconnected from its own imposed cultural narrative; at the best it can appear to be a novelty, 
at the worst it simply seems like any other artefact dislocated from its context - like the Venus 
of Willendorf, for example. 
When Moles (1967) recognised there was a crisis in the doctrine of functionalism, there 
appeared to be nowhere for industrial design to turn except towards a new form of narrative 
design (see Dormer, 1990). The drive to create meaningful form for electronic technologies 
emerged particularly as a consensual doctrine in the industrial design community during the 
1980s as a methodology drawing heavily upon an interpretation of linguistic analysis. 
Described more fully in Krippendorf and Butter's 'The Semantics of Form' (Krippendorf and 
Butter, 1984) 'Design Semantics' was picked up as a paradigm by industrial designers (see, 
e.g., Philips's 'Design Strategy of Expressive Forms' (Kirchner, 1987, cited in Bnrdek, 200S). 
Dormer describes Krohn and Viemeister's competition-winning telephone answering machine, 
utilising 'a book format with the pages serving as switches for different functions' (Forme 
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Finlandia, 1987. Design: Lisa Krohn and Tucker Viemeister). This artefact is perhaps one of the 
best-known and most often cited examples of design semantics. Dormer compares the 
answering machine with kitsch from the 1950s; although careful to recognise the intellectual 
intent behind Krohn's design, he points to the manner in which the design is 'clear in its 
vocabulary and therefore will be understood by a lot of people very easily' (Dormer, 1990, p. 
28). The design of this answering machine relies upon a metaphor of page turning carried 
over from a pre-electronic paper telephone book. This is a materialisation of the immaterial 
electronic and plays with the idea that 'we live between two worlds: our physical environment 
and digital space' (Dunne, 1999, p. 123). Dunne, however, finds this form of narrative design 
problematic. This he claims is an example of 'the material equivalent of one liners. Once the 
viewer grasps the connection, there is little else to engage with' (Dunne, 1999, p. 124). Like 
the flag man walking in front of the motor car, making technology familiar can be shown to 
limit its potential; if referent design tells, or worse still demands, a mode of operation, it can 
trap us in its narrative structure. 
While the rise of semiotics in the 1960's was advantages [sicj in that it provided for 
the extension of linguistic research into other domains, any of which could be treated 
as a semiotic system, this extension took place at the expense of subordinating the 
artefact qualities of things to their word-like properties. (Miller, 1987) 
And, in any case, what happened to the telephone answering machine? A decade after Krohn's 
design proposal, the answering machine puffed into evanescence. The artefact 'answering 
machine' has now become a service adjunct to a contract and is lost to artefact archaeology. 
The semiotic resonance of the telephone book has become reduced to an icon on a mobile 
telephone. For many younger users we can guess that even the phonebook icon itself has no 
resonance in something they have ever used. 
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--- - --- --- - --------- ----
Telephone Answering Machine and phone directory, 1987. Design: Lisa Krohn and Tucker 
Viemeister 
This form of referent semiotics, when understood as an attempt to build upon the capacity for 
technologies to have a cultural and social value, must place emphasis upon the extraction of 
technology from culture as a material and visual snapshot, unless it attaches to it in an act of 
mimicry a mythological and synthetic history. Referent semiotics, attempting to ape this 
process, becomes a pastiche or simulacra of that which it mimics; more often than not it 
requires a massive investment in a supporting narrative that can carry cultural resonance 
across time. 
4.3 The strategic lacunae and impact of agency complexity and autopoiesis 
Artefacts are better understood as an emergent and temporary form of supercomplex 
forces. 
Time can play tricks and archaeologists must take care to note in precise terms the location of 
any artefact they uncover. Archaeologists know that they need to be absolutely certain of the 
precise chronological location of artefacts. When artefacts are presented as reified objects, 
subsequent cultural developments can inflect their own influence upon the analysis. For 
example, in Products of Our Time Redhead (1999) presents a set of photographic illustrations 
of Constantin Boym's Souvenirs for the End of the Century. These 'six pewter models of 
buildings of disaster' include the 'Una Bomber Shack' and the 'Chernobyl Power Plant' and 
significantly the 'Twin Towers of the World Trade Center'. Products of Our Time, it is worth 
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noting, was published in 2000, one year prior to the 9/11 airborne attacks but somewhat after 
the first, and now largely forgotten, attack upon the World Trade Center by means of an 
explosive device in an underground car park. The twin towers of the World Trade Center were 
perhaps intended by Boym as an icon of a global economic disaster, or a wry comment upon 
the institutions of corporate finance. Of course, subsequent events have projected the image 
of the twin towers into international significance, in a manner quite unforeseen by both 
Redhead and Boym and likely to be misread by future scholars. These objects may well one 
day find themselves in a museum of our times, entirely out of time with their chronology and 
presented as a memorial to the September 11 attack. The misreading of the image of the twin 
towers in this instance is unfortunate but hardly consequential. However, in his revised 1960 
introduction to Theory and Design in the First Machine Age, Ban ham (1955, p. 10) looks back 
upon what he terms to be the 'naivety' of the early twentieth-century technology pioneers. He 
enquires how one might reconcile the 'enthusiasm that stirred the futurists' with the 'creaking 
fabric-covered aircraft, enormous and complex radios or cart:..sprung automobiles' of those 
times and wonders how such archaic machines could have 'offered, the effortless conquest of 
time and space?' (Banham, 1960, p. 10) Banham's reflection upon technologies of earlier times 
and the 'na"ive' response of those who engaged with them is a moment of arrogance, born not 
necessarily of a personality flaw, but of a methodology of analysis, which cannot get to grips 
with the full complexity of its terms. 
Any picture may appear to present a final and fixed reality; however, more recent approaches 
to material cultural analysis, such as De Landa (2000), have argued that it is possible to 
understand artefacts as moments of apparent materiality and stillness in an otherwise fluid 
turmoil of dynamic forces. 93 Artefacts in this new kind of understanding are formed in 
moments of intense energy or slowly deposited over time and in the manner that strata are 
twisted and reformed, shattered and broken, worn down, erased and smoothed off over time 
by the cultural forces acting on them (see De Landa, 1997). This new knd of theorisation 
suggests that artefacts should not be accounted for out of their time to the exclusion of the 
forces that give rise to their emergence and subsequent development. Neither should we 
93 This will be discussed more fully later in this chapter and in the following chapter. 
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exclude artefacts from a recognition that they are in the process of becoming other 
subsequent forms. 94 
We must take care not to think of this forming and wearing-down in terms of a simple linear 
chronology. Although he is less prominent today, the popular science writer james Burke was 
at one time a familiar face on television. Burke's current project, the 'Knowledge Web',95 
extends the thesis of his popular science publications (Burke, 1985, 1995 and 1996). During 
the 1970s and early 1980s Burke developed a model of history that seemed to be quite at 
odds with the climate of the time. Burke is largely categorised today as a popular writer, but 
his methodology still has much to offer the scholar. If sustaining narratives of industrial 
design limit their scope of attention and in so doing limit the scope of imagination, then Burke 
alerts us to the connective nature and intellectually playful and creatively illuminating 
possibilities of history. For example, Burke extends his histories as far back in time as 
evidence will allow, and then through progressive steps arrives at a contemporary instance of 
a given technology.96 For example, we can compare the history of the computer, as it is told 
by Shurkin in Engines of the Mind(1996), with that of Burke. 
Shurkin (1996) opens his history with the 'invention' of counting and calculation and the 
particular need quickly to calculate the logarithm. His history then charts a trajectory that 
includes Pascal, Babbage and on to ENIAC and the desktop personal computer. This is a logical 
enough history; it seems to make good sense. There is logic to its focus on developments in 
the late twentieth century, a period in which the desktop computer proliferated. Shurkin 
94 Even in our own times, the realisation that much of the resonating rhetoric of cyberspace was 
constructed in an era of dial-up modems and computers, which by the standards of today might seem 
achingly slow, surely points to this problem. Technologies and the cognitive ideas they shape, and are 
shaped by, flow; they are not static and not readily analysed in isolation. The material manifestation of 
technologies is at best an inadequate means of exploring the excitement and promise of the age in which 
they appeared. Perhaps another illustration might lie in the disbelief of contemporary conspiracy theorists 
that the crude technology of the 1960s could propel a man to the moon and return him alive. 
95 The Knowledge Web (http://www.k-web.org) does not constrain the imagination of linear histories: it 
invites exploration and is described thus: 'The Knowledge Web today is an activity rather than a web site-
an expedition in time, space, and technology to map the interior landscape of human thought and 
experience. Thanks to the work of a team of dedicated volunteers, it will soon be an interactive space on 
the web where students, teachers, and other knowledge seekers can explore information in a highly 
interconnected, holistic way that allows for an almost infinite number of paths of exploration among 
people, places, things, and events' (Knowledge Web, 2006). 
96 One can guess that these 'connections' are constructed in reverse and in so when written as a narrative 
in chronological order the histories become intriguing stories with something of the resonance of a 
whodunit mystery as each step unfolds. Burke alerts us to the denouement as he opens his story, then-
rather in the style of an episode of 'Colombo' where the answer is known - the reader joins Burke in the 
unravelling of a complex story. 
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constructs a good history; it works as a narrative, building slowly and accelerating as we might 
expect into a tumble of developments in close chronology. Shurkin provides an authoritative 
reinforcement of the canonic history of computing and provides a good source of names and 
dates and a chronology of development that seems coherent. His history reinforces the notion 
we might hold of the computer as a calculating machine. Burke, on the other hand, does not 
focus upon computation and the switching of integers to arrive at complex mathematical 
solutions; his focus is upon prediction. Burke (1995, p. 117) opens his history with the 
development of astrology, focusing upon the potential of the computer to hold 'the future 
within it'. For Burke the power of computation lies in is ability to simulate in advance of reality. 
War games are played out in massive simulation; crashes and engineering tolerances are 
simulated; texts are simulated, re-simulated and then made real in the printing. Burke (199S) 
delights with stories of Arab astronomers (p. 114) and Christian adaptations of zodiacal 
systems (p. 119), unpacking the potentials and possibilities of prediction. The story resolves in 
the industrial era and through to the simulation and predictive softwares of production. In this 
way we come to understand the computer in a manner that opens it up to the imagination as a 
materialisation of an enduring aspect of human sensibility. 
Whereas Shurkin confirms our sense of development, Burke reminds us that any artefact has 
an almost infinite history of determining forces. While Burke may be a popular science 
historian, Galiagher and Greenblatt's Practicing New Historicism (2001) provides a more 
authoritative text In this field. Their approach, although oestensibly more scholarly than 
Burke's, is not that dissimilar. For example, Gallagher and Greenblatt draw upon ideas of 
transubstantiation, not something one might reasonably expect to find in a history of the 
potato, but entirely coherent in their analysis of 'The Potato and the Materialist Imagination'). 
Although scholarly, Gallagher and Greenblan are playful, and their histories are the richer for 
it.97 Histories such as those of Galiagher and Greenblatt and Burke invite speculative enquiry; 
they demonstrate how artefacts as they appear in a moment of history have emerged in 
consequence of the collusion of many other histories. Stafford (2001) presents a similarly 
playful and scholarly approach when she constructs histories through analogy. Stafford finds 
resonance with contemporary artefacts and technological conditions in deep histories that go 
97 Industrial design histories, however, appear to become ever more intense retellings of the same story-
industrialisation made manifest by its products as a reflection of the culture of their times. 
133 
far further than orthodox interpretations built around linear trajectories of technological 
development. Stafford values the interconnected, self-generating nature of history and the 
reoccurrence of thematic human imaginations that are independent of technological 
circumstances. She demonstrates, for example, that the art of connecting and the impetus to 
take multiple views, evident in contemporary immersive virtual reality, is evident throughout 
the history of art and not suddenly shifted into potentiality by the particular technological 
conditions afforded by the paraphernalia of virtual reality. 
Roe Smith and Marx argue in Does Technology Drive History (1994) that the success of a given 
technology is determined by the cultural forces that pull it into the imagination, and 
thenceforth into adoption and usefulness. 98 They demonstrate a gap between the initial 
development of a technology and its subsequent adoption into use. There is some evidence to 
suggest that attempts by marketing strategies to sell technologies fail if no cultural imperative 
exists. A good example of this is the seemingly endless attempts to sell mobile video by the 
ability to see 'Goals on Your Mobile' for example,the 24-7 Football service (24-7 Football, 
2007). At some point, perhaps, a tipping point 99 will be reached, and mobile video, or the 
urgent need to see goals, will become apparent, and the technology will be pulled Into use. 
Punt (2000) has identified a problem with deterministic models of technological development 
that construct a story of invention by 'great men' and then chart the supposed impact of the 
invention upon the world. Punt argues that the concept of spontaneous invention deludes. Roe 
Smith and Marx also suggest that technologies do not appear spontaneously as a consequence 
98 lt can appear self-evident that technologies play a part in the shaping of culture: 'What made our 
modern world7 Laws, politicians, kings and queens? Or the diesel, the computer, penicillin and the gun?' 
(Science Museum, 2005). For the most part the artefacts that appear in industrial design histories and in 
our museums are inert collections of metal and plastics brought together to act in some way that is useful. 
Artefacts, not being intelligent and sentient, have no active voice in human culture other than their 
reflection in human commentary. lt is an assumption often made, however, in popular conversation that 
technologies do have the potential to act in the world at their own behest. While few would intend this as a 
literal fact, it is not uncommon to read alarming and deterministic claims that the television set is to 
blame for almost every social ill, from tabloid claims of the destruction of children's eyesight to academic 
texts such as Merrin's, for example, which claims television to be "killing the art of symbolic exchange' 
(Merrin, 1999). Roe Smith and Marx (1994) alert us to the dangers of imagining in this way that 
technologies appear spontaneously as matters of invention and then intervene in human culture; their 
argument against technological determinism is founded in a rejection of the agency of technology and 
against the notion of victim-hood among passive consumers. 
•• The tipping point was outlined by Granovetter's 'threshold model of collective behaviour'. (Granovetter, 
1978). Granovetter suggests a technology becomes usefully drawn into culture when sufficient factors in 
the interaction come into play. Other terms such as the killer-app widely coined in software design, point 
to the manner in which usefulness is a key factor in the interactive process. In the conversation that goes 
around the killer-app, the spreadsheet is widely held to be the killer-app that made the desktop computer 
useful. There is no simple non-computational equivalent of the spreadsheet and its usefulness was such 
that it drew the PC onto the desk of many businesses. This is a rather simplistic model. lt will be argued 
later that models of the world such as Actor Network Theory illuminate the continuity of technologies in 
many forms. The spread sheet has a non-computational counterpart in "accounts clerks'. 
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of a flash of inspiration, but rather emerge as a consequence of a collective network of eo-
developers that are often not made visible in accounts of their trajectory. This is certainly not 
the case in sustaining narratives of industrial design where artefacts are posited frequently as 
evidence of the genius of individual designers. When Heskett describes Buckminster Fuller's 
design for the Dymaxion car, he recognises the forces of culture exerted upon it and cites the 
unwillingness of the public to accept its radical form. 'Fuller's sweeping reappraisal of both 
form and structure was too extreme for the American auto industry, however committed it was 
to a concept of mass production that depended upon judging the willingness of the public to 
accept innovation' (Heskett, 1980 p. 122). While stories of invention appearing again and 
again in popular histories and in industrial design histories can seem undeniable, their 
repetition consolidates the concept of spontaneous invention as a perfectly reasonable means 
of understanding technological development. In any case, instantaneous invention or design 
discounts the complexity of the placement of the inventor or designer in society. 100 
Artefacts are best understood, not as simple illustrations of cultures, but as the emergent 
consequence of an intensely complex interaction of determining forces, and they are best 
considered in terms of their use. For example, the artefact we call the 'wheeled suitcase' Is 
better understood as a functional answer to the problem of carrying heavy suitcases. This 
problem could be, rather naively, understood as wholly contained within the wheeled suitcase. 
The wheeled suitcase, however, relies upon the smooth flooring of the travel terminus, the 
emergence of air travel and its new terminus, and its effect upon train travel and the 
redevelopment of its rather more elderly terminus. The wheeled suitcase depends too upon 
the demise of the porter and the social democratisation of travel. There are histories and 
trajectories here of changing architectures, the development of new materials and new modes 
of travel, changes in social and economic imperatives and any number of other social, cultural, 
tectonic and functional forces. 
100 The late-medieval 'invention' of the printing press in Europe, for example, denies both the obvious 
nature of its function to transfer and replicate images that had existed for thousands of years prior to 
Guttenberg. If the press appeared in a moment of brilliance, how we might ask could the idea of printing 
not have occurred prior to this date? We leave prints in the soil when we walk, children intuitively print 
with their hands. Gutenberg's press as it appeared in 144 7 drew upon the many previous crafts and its 
extended heritage of prior development some several thousand years earlier in other parts of the world. In 
the logic of Roe-Smith and Marx, the press may have simply become the killer-app of a burgeoning 
popular literacy, part of a complex story in a period of social change after the Black Death and·in a 
changing intellectual climate of reformation. The determinist argues that the press brought literacy to the 
Western world. The argument against suggests that the irresistible demand for literacy made the press 
viable. 
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Trunki Suitcase. (Image: http:/ /www.disabledhands.com/trunki_kids.jpg) 
The industrial designer Ezio Manzini (1992), hinting at this complexity, has described the 
artefact as the 'materialisation of cultural contexts, of organisational forms, of technical 
systems, of economic interests and the will of projectionists and groups of designers, 
business people and the productive sectors' (cited in translation in Jimenez Narvaez, 2000, p. 
46). Manzini here suggests that the artefact is a somewhat, although not entirely, stable 
indication of otherwise subjective and fluid notions of the human condition, its institutions 
and the processes that go to form the cultures by which we can understand ourselves. The 
artefact then is only that part of a complex intersection of forces and functions that can be 
seen and held. lt has special status because of this, but to imagine that the artefact terminates 
at the apparent boundary of that which is visually and materially accountable is to exclude its 
full complexity. 
For the anthropologist Cell (1998), the understanding of artefacts resides in the placement of 
the observer who cannot separate his or her location in a cultural matrix from the analysis 
they construct. As the philosopher Derrida alerts us to the residence of meaning in a text, so 
Cell is among those who alert us to the necessity for a more subtle mode of analysis, which 
can engage with the distributed nature of determinants in a form. In a discussion of the form 
of Polynesian canoes, 101 Cell (1998, pp. 69-72) argues that the vessel as it appears in any 
moment is a static state of an emergent form. This emergent form is captured in that moment 
as a particular coincidence of any number of dynamic factors in which the designer or artist is 
but one vector; the canoe itself is in the continual process of becoming another form. The 
101 A popular reference in mid-twentieth-century anthropology. 
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process of humanisation, when understood in the light of Cell's insight, is not stable and 
resolved in the form of artefacts, but rather the artefact appears as a snapshot of an emergent 
and continual process. Like a snapshot, the artefact is merely the momentary solidification of 
a trajectory shaped by a distributed agency set in a complex and potentially infinite field of 
forces. 
Trobriand Island canoe 
The contemporary form of the canoe, sometimes constructed of fibreglass and powered by an 
outboard motor, is as much part of a continuing cultural history and not indicative of the 
erasure of one culture by another. Cell (1998) is concerned that simplistic modes of material 
analysis, such as those in industrial design histories, disconnect artefacts from the full 
complexity of the human agency they embody. 
This complexity is not always recognised by designers. Dormer (1990, p. 181) has suggested 
that one of the most important things a designer can do is symbolise community and reflect, 
both in the form and in the materials and processes used to shape the design ... to argue for 
the importance of ensuring familiarity in design - and of employing the moral imagination'. lt 
would be unrealistic to imagine that industrial designers can be familiar with the full 
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complexity of the culture into which their artefacts are thrust, but this in itself may not be a 
problem. Gell alerts us that attempts to identify imperialist interventions can themselves 
provide a means to exclude the subject of observation from the authority of its own 
developmental trajectory. The fibreglass canoe powered by an outboard motor is part of a 
trajectory that cannot be undone. Relating this to industrial design, Jimenez Narvaez (2000) 
suggests: 'Design's own knowledge is the result of this relationship between human beings 
and artefacts, foremost from the observation of the world and the multiple perceptions 
generated by this observation'. However, by presenting a picture of a somewhat focused 
intellectual endeavour, the stories contained within sustaining narratives of industrial design 
develop the notion that industrial design has maintained itself as a producer of material 
artefacts in a culture of Western manufacturing. Understandings of the complex interaction of 
forces is thus constrained to determining processes of manufacture and has become 
disconnected from the kinds of analysis that find artefacts to be an emergent solidification of 
complex social and cultural forces. 
When the artefact is tied to a history of production and consumption and is understood as a 
determining agent, it runs up against fluctuations in value perceptions of what constitutes a 
valid human cultural value. The problem, of course, is that one cannot be certain any more as 
to what constitutes this human value. Profound cultural, political and ethical problems emerge 
when humanity is tied to a particular set of cultural values, although of course attempts have 
been made by the United Nations to establish a basic set of human rights, and designers have 
made some attempt to tie their practice to these. 
An idea claiming all human beings are equal and free has evolved as basic human 
rights today, and design has been questioned whether it is able to build happiness or 
what is happiness in people's life. (Ekuan, 2003) 
One problem with this is that the role of 'champion of human rights' hardly sets design apart 
as an activity. Why should designers alone be responsible? Ekuan's call would be just as 
apposite were the word 'designer' replaced with 'sports', 'business' or any other discretely 
identified activity. 102 The Design Council also recognises this problem in its own definition: 
102 lt is arguable that this is a claim more suitable for all humankind, a problem so vast it would seem 
beyond the scope of design alone. Designers recognise that the world is a very complex place with lots of 
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One definition, aired by designer Richard 5eymour during the Design Council's Design 
in Business Week 2002, is 'making things better for people'. lt emphasises that design 
activity is focused first and foremost on human behaviour and quality of life, not 
factors like distributor preferences. But nurses or road sweepers could say they, too, 
'make things better for people'. (Design Council, 2006) 
Elsewhere Biirdek (2005) has suggested that an ideologically cemented concept of design is no 
longer plausible. Biirdek is one of many designers who give a voice to a sense that designers, 
as a key component in the profligate and largely unchecked development technology, might 
somehow carry with them some responsibility for the state of the human world. 103 With a 
rising awareness of ecological and social implications, the sense that industrial design has of 
its social, cultural and ethical responsibility in the world has grown considerably in recent 
years. There is a subtle implication that the role of the industrial designer has shifted towards 
that of an interventionist. 
We've allowed too long the idea that the world is 'out of control' - be it our cities, the 
economy, or technology. We've filled the world with complex systems and 
technologies that are indeed hard to understand, let alone shape or redirect. But we 
are people not ants. We have culture, and language, and the ability to understand and 
share knowledge about abstract phenomena. Ants don't have that. Neither do they 
have a tool, design, with which to shape them. We do. (Thackara, 2006, p. 225) 
Thackara's suggestion is that industrial design can modify culture and that designers must 
take responsibility for this. In many ways this view of design as a social intervention can be 
read as reaction to a perceived modernist imperative. Huxley's novel of 1932, Brave New World 
presents a dystopian model of a supposedly dehumanised future. In this view, inhumanity is 
people in it who want to be happy/fit/fulfilled, etc., and so it tries to organise things so that they are, 
while operating in whatever economic model pertains. Who would not share this ambition? 
103 The sense that industrial design has of its social, cultural and ethical responsibility in the world has 
grown considerably during the period in which this research was constructed. With the almost ubiquitous 
acceptance of global warming and the burgeoning potential of the "war on terror', the chatter in the 
industrial design community has reflected the many published and informal discussions with regard to the 
role of design in proliferating waste, energy consumption and international tension. Conversations within 
the industrial design community among those concerned with the idea and values of humanity have 
become more sophisticated in recent years, but are no closer to a resolved sense of what humanisation 
might mean. The intention of this thesis is not to add particularly to this debate, nor to undermine it, but 
rather to propose a new direction the conversation might take that connects future designers with their 
forebears. lt is hoped that by making this move industrial design might learn from its past experiences 
with technology. lt will be argued here that the process of humanising technology Is not a new concern 
but rather the intellectual impetus underpinning design. 
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tied to rigid social classification, the erasure of emotion and the replacement of cultural and 
intellectual pleasure by artificially mediated somatic and sensory pleasures. Humanity in Brave 
New World is tied to the intellect and to the richness and variety of culture and to the 
recognition of instability or fluidity. The implication of this rhetoric is that technology 
threatens to erase this instability and must therefore be resisted. The process of humanising 
technology then becomes an act of resistance. The immediate assumption of members of the 
industrial design community who resist technology might be to place themselves within a 
notion of human culture in order to stand in opposition to unrestrained technological 
development. 
In Hopi, the word Naqoyqatsi means life as war, and was adopted by Godfrey Reggio as the 
title of the third film in a documentary trilogy exploring the relationship between mankind, 
technology and nature. Reggio argued that it was not useful to understand humanity and 
technology as separate epistemic relations, but essential to understand technology as an 
essential facet of humanity. Only then, it is argued through the series, can humanity over the 
impact of technology upon the world. (That life should be a war will be shown to be an 
important construct in Western traditions.) There is a deliberate tautology here: technology, 
posited both as a human essence and as a force for ill in planetary terms, sets humanity up for 
war with itself - Naqoyqatsi. 
human beings do not use technology as a tool (the popular point-of-view), but rather 
we live technology as a way of life. Technology is the big force and like oxygen it is 
always there, a necessity that we cannot live without. Because its appetite is seemly 
infinite, it is consuming the finite world of nature. lt is in this sense that technology is 
NAQOYQATSI, a sanctioned aggression against the force of life itself- war life, a total-
war beyond the wars of the battlefield. (Naqoyqatsi, 2005) 
The logic of the Naqoyqatsi series is that human life can be sustained only through 
recognising this conflict and by finding a means to reconciliation and peace. In In the Bubble 
Thackara (2006) posits design as a potential orchestrating agent in this endeavour. Thackara 
argues that, by attempting to break problems down into logical and linear steps and then 
constructing a solution without regard to the complexity of their agency in the world, design 
.has driven a wedge into the human condition. Thackara invites a concern for 'lightness', 
'flow', 'space' and 'situation' as fields of complexity, returning design to its own more 
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'natural' instincts. He reflects back upon itself Van Doesburg's rather famous treatise (1923) 
on modernism as an organising agency, and then projects for a new age as a force that invites 
disorder. 104 Thackara cites the philosopher Castells (2000), who has described a way of 
thinking about the world as a series of flows. 'Flows are not just one element of social 
organisation, they are the expression of the processes dominating our economic, social and 
symbolic life' (Castells, 1996, p. 412, cited in Thakara, 2006, p. 212). If designers can no 
longer stand on the outside of culture, then they must accept that they are part of a complex 
and interactive system. 'Design is evolving from its position of relative insignificance within 
business (and the larger envelope of nature), to become the biggest project of all' (Mau, 2004, 
p. 16). Industrial design, of course ,is not unique in the ambition to make the world a better 
place, but it lacks many of the political and philosophical tools fully to enact its ambitions. 
Industrial design has not been noted particularly for its spiritual authority, nor for its political 
sophistication according to its historical trajectory. lt is responsible for the design of the 
things people use everyday in the construction of their lives. This is not always recognised in 
descriptions of itself. Mau, for example, has described design as an exercise in invisibility: 
in fact the secret ambition of design is to become invisible, to be taken up into 
culture, absorbed into the background. The highest order for design is to achieve 
ubiquity, to become banal. (Mau, 2004, p. 2) 
This appears to run almost entirely counter to the proud histories of industrial design and 
goes against the instinctive, historical representation of industrial design as a means of 
realising technology in the form of artefacts. 
Manuel De Landa, a biologist, takes a broad view of history and culture that runs counter to 
notions of the possibility of an orchestrated, overarching dynamic that designers might 
imagine. De Landa suggests that artefacts can be thought of as one might living systems to be 
momentary hardenings of processes of self-emergence. De Landa, of course, is allied to social 
and cultural analysis, 'account[ing) for this [society] systematically as an emergent property of 
104 From Blueprint and plan to sense and respond 
From high concept to deep context 
From top-down design to seeding edge effects 
From blank sheets of paper to smart recombination 
From science fiction to social fiction 
From designing for people to designing with us 
From design as project to design as service (Thakara, 2006. p.213) 
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some dynamical process' (De Landa, 2000, p. 270). However, to understand De Landa more 
fully, it is perhaps best to start from his biological view of the world. lt would be a mistake to 
imagine a flock of birds or a school of fish as being orchestrated (see Partridge, 1982) by 
some kind of dominant and leading animal, rather than the emergent consequence of an 
intense and complex interaction that can be simulated (see, for example, Reynolds, 2006): 
Each bird flies its own path but knows about all the other birds (e.g. their positions 
and velocities). From its own position, the other birds' positions and velocities and the 
collected information about the environment, each bird then 'computes' its next 
position. (Lorek and White, 1993, Abstract) 
De Landa is suspicious of accounts of society as extensions of individual behaviours and 
suggests that perceptions of culture as being open to orchestration are similarly delusional. 
However, while others such as Gallagher and Greenblatt (2001) and to some extent Burke 
(1985, 1995 and 1996) can be read so as to suggest to us that artefacts emerge from 
intensely variable, dynamic and complex determinants, 105 De Landa's approach is to find 
similarity in processes that give rise to other apparently organised biological and geological 
systems. This view is supported by research indicating that human institutions and cultural 
constructs appear to be open to the same methods of simulation as those that are used to 
understand flocking or schooling in animal behaviour (for example, Zhou and Zhou, 2004). For 
De Landa, history, in keeping with other planetary systems, is a non-linear story of self-
directing, (autopoietic) processes that gives rise to a 'living' entity we call cultural history. De 
Landa (2000) uses the term 'stuff' as a neutral term for the product of autopoietic processes 
(p. 259); these processes comprise 'information, ideas, memes, money and other "stuff"' (p. 
260). Rather than considering the 'stuff' of culture and institution from the top down to reveal 
some truth or other about the culture from which they emerged, De Landa invites a view of 
history whereby the complex interactions that give rise to design are recognised and 
accounted at their genesis. For De Landa the artefact, and its appearance in the present 
instant, emerge from many coincident consequences of complex interactions in human history 
and culture that suggest a condition of constant morphagenic flow. 
105 These will be considered more fully later in a discussion of attempts by design to reverse engineer 
cultural history. 
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De Landa uses a geological model of human history. Geology is shown to pervade human 
histories, not merely as a topographical and tectonic player in the development of 
geographical movements but also as a model of the flows of tangible energy and matter that 
shape history. De Landa suggests that less effable, but no less material, morphogenetic forces 
form human history and are solidified momentarily in 'stuff'. De Landa's allusion to geology 
reinforces the idea of how the stuff of history, emerging from processes of self-organisation, 
as life itself, connects human history to that of the planet as a single self-organising entity. De 
Landa (2000) suggests that self-organisation is not limited to living species: 
In the eyes of many human beings, life appears to be a unique and special 
phenomenon. There is of course some truth to this belief, since no other planet Is 
known to bear a rich and complex biosphere. However, this view betrays an 'organic 
chauvinism' that leads us to underestimate the vitality of the processes of self-
organisation in other spheres of reality. (De Landa. 2000. pp.l03-4) 
"Artefacts in De Landa's analysis are self-organising but momentary solidifications of flows, 
determined but always in the process of becoming something else. Artefacts are ground down 
and reconsolidated by the geological forces of culture, but cannot be reduced to give a picture 
of any moment without account being taken of the complexity of self-organisation in the 
system as a whole. Artefacts are part of the planet; they become something with it rather than 
merely operate as a superficial event upon it. The stuff of history- 'the source of every stable 
structure that we cherish and value (or, on the contrary, that oppresses or enslaves us) (De 
Landa, 2000, p. 261)- is considered to have arisen in consequence of flow and hardening in 
complex mixes, and is shown to be subject to continuous morphology and not usefully 
considered as a permanent tectonic. 
The term 'ecology' (from the Greek for 'household') is held to originate in its employ, as we 
might understand it today with Haeckel who saw ecology as a new science of relationships 
between species and also between species and the world. The ecology movement emerged 
partly in response to understandings of 'super-organisms' - that is, the recognition that 
some, most commonly insect, species appear to function as distributed units and not as one 
consolidated body. The superspecies alerted biology to the idea that species cannot 
necessarily be considered in terms of autonomy and posited the idea of interactive eco-
systems comprised of individual plants and animals acting together. While the idea of the 
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super-organism has not entirely gone away, particularly in respect of any colonies or beehives, 
for example, it is now generally understood and accepted that life can be understood as 
'communit[ies) of organisms and their physical environment interacting as an ecological unit.' 
(see Lincoln et al, 1998). Human ecology emerged as an independent discipline during the 
1980s (see, for example, Buttel, 1986) and is intellectually located somewhere between 
ecology and sociology. In the last quarter of the twentieth century the human ecologists, most 
famously Canton and Ounlap (1978), moved against the sociological explanation of human 
society and culture towards an understanding of the human as both a cultural and a biological 
construction, 'stating that nature matters means the material surroundings (including 
biophysical nature) are constant elements in the fabric of social life' (Lidskog, 2001, p. 17). 
Broadly speaking, human ecologists view our species, not as a phenomenon to be considered 
in isolation from other species, but as part of the planetary ecosystem. Some, such as Canton 
(one of those who moved against the sociological paradigm) use human ecology to explain 
geopolitical conflict and political change (see Canton 1982). De Landa is, of course, an 
example of this approach too. In human ecology, culture and its artefacts are understood to 
emerge from an ecological process that includes biology and geography and not merely from 
other prior cultural processes. 
When approaching the relation between ... the natural and social world, it is obvious 
that social life and human societies in a fundamental sense are dependent on 
processes in the natural world. 'There can be no social praxis without breathing' as 
Beck (Beck, 1996. p.SO) puts it. At the same time society is irreducible to (or emergent 
from) the processes studied by natural science. (Lidskog, 2001, p. 16) 
Human ecologists situate the human in the world; nevertheless they recognise that humans 
alone appear to be in the position to contemplate the consequences of their activity within the 
ecosystem. Human ecologists argue that the protection of the biosphere is not merely an 
ethical nicety but a necessary imperative given the dependence of both physiological and 
psychological aspects of human life upon the health of the planet as a single autopoieteic 
mechanism. Environmental ethics is an emerging branch of philosophy that attempts to make 
sense of the moral complexity of human relationships with the planet and with other species. 
Human ecology, together with environmental ethics, can be understood in terms of a radical 
departure from popular understandings of environmentalism. Environmental ethiticians argue 
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that orthodox environmentalism has become so commoditised as to be just another aspect of 
consumerist culture. 
The vast majority of Americans claim to be environmentalists while buying ever more 
SUVs, leaf-blowers, and uncountable plastic consumer goods ... a matter of buying 
Audubon memberships, Ansel Adams calendars, and 'biodegradable' plastic bags with 
one's Sierra Club credit card. (De Luca, 2005) 
De Luca describes an emerging tension in environmental ethics. He argues that the 
environmental movement must shift its focus away from activism and individualised reactive 
interventions to protect and preserve. Rather than commodifying the environment in this way 
and artefactualising it, De Luca (2005) argues that humanity must be placed in a holistic and 
ecosystemic picture that incorporates a synthetic approach to the connective and interactive 
role of the human as a species. 106 This view is extended by members of the deep ecology 
movement such as Daniel Botkin (1990) or Alan Drengson and Yuichi lnoue (1996). In the deep 
ecological thesis, the environment becomes another actor in a network of actors. As Wheeler 
(2005) puts it, 'one might be moved to claim that the ethical matters in question are 
exhaustively delineated by those moral relations existing between individual human beings, or 
between groups of human beings, in which the non-human natural environment figures'. The 
human cannot be extracted as an individual species from this complex interaction. 107 
Mechanistic thinking has been de-estabilished over the course of the twentieth century by the 
emergence of relativism, uncertainty, duality and chaos in physics (see Peat, 2002). This has 
necessitated an approach to analysis that can engage with complexity and eschews reduction 
106 We can guess, but not know it for certain of course, that a species other than our own has a concept of 
the environment. In human terms other species act individually in the ecosystem, they do not picture or 
understand themselves to be part of a complex interaction with other species but act from self interest. 
Environmental ethics takes as its starting point the concept that no species other than the human takes a 
view on the eco-system and considers its actions from an ethical perspective to consider its impact on the 
broader environment. Environmental ethics argues that this understanding must be at the heart of any 
ethical position. This view is somewhat at odds with more traditional views of environmentalism that start 
from the assumption that the non-human world has some status in its own right: 'then one might be 
moved to claim that ethical matters involving the environment are best cashed out in terms of the duties 
and responsibilities that human beings have .. .' (Wheeler, 2005). 
107 Mclaughlin (1993) has pointed to the political implications of an approach that suggests technologies 
can no longer be understood as an ethical impingement upon the natural world but part of its 
evolutionary trajectory. Deep ecology argues that humans bear responsibility for their actions in the 
ecosystem but only insomuch as humans have developed a wider ethical position in respect to themselves 
and to the world. 
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to incomplete assumptions. Contemporary environmental ethicists such as De Luca and 
Wheeler take the view of a growing number of scientists who call for an approach to analysis 
that deals with the whole rather than the parts alone. These scientists argue that linear and 
reductive modes of science are not sufficient to engage with complex questioning of the 
manner in which human beings understand themselves and the world, an inadequacy 
particularly evident in relation to the things humans make in order to interact in the world. 108 
The International Society for the Systems Sciences (ISSS) reflects a contemporary trend towards 
interconnected and interactive thought. 'ONE - WHOLE: The First International Electronic 
Seminar on Wholeness' in 2000 brought together members of the society in an online forum 
with the theme of inter-connectivity and oneness (see ISSS, 2000). Capra is among a number 
of exponents of an approach to understanding the world by combining the rigour of science 
with philosophy and spiritual approaches to systems analysis. In The Web of Life Capra (1996) 
argues that the tension within science resides in the fixation with attention to the parts in the 
context of the whole. This tension emerges when various attempts are made in science to 
analyse each in respect of the other. Capra argues that Humanist separations that reduce man 
to an entity in antagonistic relation to the world are identified as an inhibition to the 
development of a sustainable ecological apprehension of interconnectivity. 
My thesis has been that a theory of living systems consistent with the philosophical 
framework of deep ecology, including an appropriate mathematical language, and 
implying a non-mechanistic, post-Cartesian understanding of life, is now emerging. 
(Capra 1996) 
In Aristotelian logic, things appear through a process of self-realisation (Entelechy) or self-
completion and always in a condition of development. 'Matter and form are two sides of this 
process, separable only through abstraction' (Capra, 1996,, p. 18). Aristotelian modes of 
thought were 'destroyed' (Capra, 1996, p. 18) by the scientific logic of 'Cartesian Mechanism'; 
'in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the medieval worldview ... was replaced by that of 
the world as a machine, and the world machine became the dominant metaphor of the modern 
era' (Capra, 1996, p. 19). Capra describes the change in the study of life sciences, from 
108 Rather venerable modes of Aristotelian or preindustrial thinking valuing connectivity and sympathetic 
relationships appear to be gaining ground at the expense of more reductive models of thought. These 
models can be best summed up perhaps as Indicative as a move away from a mechanical model of the 
planet towards models that reflect Its biological nature. Synthetic analysis is one methodological outcome 
of this approach as to some extent is De Landa's argument for an autopoietic approach to analysis. 
146 
mechanistic and reductive analysis to the ecologiCal. Ten subsections outline movements in 
thought that describe the swing of a pendulum sometimes violent and at other times 
modulated (Capra, 1996, p. 17). Recalling Gregory Bateson (1972, 449): 'Do you ask what it's 
made of- earth, fire water etc? Or do you ask' What is its pattern? Capra (1996, p. 18) 
suggests that the tension between mechanistic reduction and the holistic is a replaying of 'the 
ancient dichotomy between substance (matter, structure, quantity) and form (pattern order, 
quality)'. 
Capra outlines a holistic approach to ecological thinking, which he describes as a paradigm 
shift away from the primacy of physics towards the life sciences. 'The Web of ·Life' is a call for 
a return to pre-scientific intuition, albeit with the added benefits of the scientific method. 
Capra argues for a form of synthetic analysis describing an approach to understanding that 
takes a view of the whole with attention paid to the reductive analysis of the nano. In a chapter 
entitled 'From the parts to the Whole' Capra (1996, pp. 17-35) argues that reduction, while a 
good method for understanding how things function, ultimately obscures a view of the true, 
connective, nature of things. Furthermore, because of the way the scientific method has come 
to dominate thinking, it is now imagined that it provides the only effective model by which .the 
world can be understood. 109 Zukav (1979, p. 65) for example: 
The next time you are awed by something, let the feeling flow freely through you and 
do not try to understand it. You will find that you do understand, but in a way you will 
not be able to put into words. You are perceiving intuitively through your right 
hemisphere. lt has not atrophied from lack of use, but our skill in listening to it has 
been dulled by three centuries of neglect. 
109 Capra's brief history of thinking suggests that there have been swings between reduaive mechanistic 
methods and holistic connective methods of thinking. The twentieth century has seen these swings of the 
pendulum (Capra uses this metaphor), begin to reduce in amplitude. Particularly in the light of the recently 
emerging realisation, born of quantum physics, that 'the world appears to be a complicated tissue of 
events, in which connections of different kinds alternate or overlap or combine and thereby determine the 
texture of the whole' (Heisenberg, 2000, p. 107), Capra tells a story of how Heisenberg, realising the 
monumental shift in understanding necessary, called his 1g71 autobiography 'The Part and the Whole' 
only to find it re-titled by his publishers as 'Physics and Beyond'. The publishers failed to comprehend the 
importance and significance ofthe original title (see Capra, 1996, p. 31). Berkson (1974) tells this story 
rather comprehensively. Charting the development of physics from Faraday to Einstein, Berkson describes 
the development of the particular form of science that pervaded twentieth-century physics, focusing upon 
the problems that lead to developing interpretations and a gradual shift towards field views of reality. 
Similarly, Peat (2002) tells a story of the collapse of the certainty of mechanistic science into the 
acceptance of holistic uncertainty as a principal of reality. Coincident with the early stage of development 
of a holistic physics, the Gestalt movement emerged in Germany in the early part of the twentieth century. 
Gestalt- literally 'organic form'- is a description of the form that life takes rather than the static form of 
objects. Gestalt arguments take the view that humanity can be best understood through the shape of its 
reasoning and not through a series of reductions. Many of the social and distributed models of humanity 
as well as the deep ecology movement can be understood to have emerged from within the Intellectual 
climate of the Gestalt movement. 
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An approach to thinking eschewing reduction (such as that of ecological logic) reveals how 
patterns and systems are played out at every level extending from the planetary whole to the 
individual activity of cellular components. The process of autopoiesis, for example, appears to 
be replicated at every scale from the planetary to the cellular in every facet of life. life, then, is 
an emergent condition that operates across many levels of analytical attention. Deep ecology 
suggests that human life must be understood in this frame as a transitional and holistic 
condition, evident across a range from the scale of planetary tectoncs scale to the cellular 
level. 
As a means of establishing some means of analysing this shifting form, De Landa (2000, p. 
264) employs the term 'meshworks'. In meshworks, relationships can be found but never 
isolated. Meshworks are not a particularly useful device, if they are imagined, as a designer 
might be inclined to do, as a material entity. A mesh of some material or other such as steel or 
plastic, although essentially flat, is contorted into shape, creating an impression of solid and 
indestructible lines of force tied in place and constrained. De Landa is a biologist; he imagines 
a more fibrous material that is a dynamic, continually metamorphosing, flowing infinite and 
dynamic set of relations - a contorting topological surface that has emerged through a 
process of chaotic growth rather than any directed human purpose: 
an autopoietic system is self-contained and cannot be described by using dimensions 
that define another space. When we refer to our interactions with a concrete 
autopoietic system, however, we project this system on the space of our 
manipulations and make a description of this projection. (Maturana and Varela, 1973, 
p. 89) 
Autopoiesis (for autopoiesis here, see Mingers, 1994, and also Livingston 2005) provides a 
vital and emergent model and a mode of thought that understands systems to be self-
emergent (as we see in the division of cells, or in the apparently chaotic shifting of stock 
exchanges) rather than imposed (that is, planned or intelligently designed). Industrial design, 
being a biological community, is then itself an emergent practice (see Capra, 2006). 110 Self-
110 Although we imagine other species not to have a culture like our own, they leave evidence of their 
presence and construct what might be mistaken for a kind of artefact endeavour. These artefacts too can 
be demonstrated to emerge largely in consequence of algorithmic determinations (81ass and Curevich, 
2003) arising from the autopoietic process (Dyke, 1988). An algorithm (at least in the sense it will be 
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organisation, it is suggested, is not unique to humanity; it is a pervasive condition of the 
planet. Hemelrijk (2005) illustrates the pervasive nature of autopoiesis in planetary systems 
and illustrates examples ranging from the complexities of biology and mathematics, animal 
and human behaviours, to its appearance in human systems that are thought of as being 
almost entirely designed and directed, such as democracy and language. Human design 
intervention is in this account part of a rather larger autopoietic system. Any design 
intervention then must be understood to be only part of a more complex story. 
employed here) is a simple mathematical underpinning of an event in the world. In autopoietic theories, 
biological algorithms interaa to determine super-complex, self-determining and chaotic processes. In 
human terms, algorithms often appear as events that obscure their mathematical foundation. Granovetter 
(1973) demonstrates how these rather slight moments in everyday life have a profound effea when acting 
in a larger system. However much of our lives may be determined by the autopoietic processes that 
underpin them, people do have what they take to be a degree.of self-determination and free-will. 'Human 
networks of activity, like many of the dynamical subsystems of an ecosystem, are not strialy space-time 
localized' (Bogh Andersen et al., 2000). Autopoiesis may suggest that algorithmic determinants shape 
human life. Blass and Gurevich (2003) have shown how the notion of an algorithm at the centre of 
everything is a misnomer. They demonstrate that algorithms themselves emerge from subsystems that are 
themselves complex, indeterminate and interaaive. When viewed in this light, the rather constrained and 
linear histories of industrial design can appear to be almost entirely out of step with an emerging 
intellectual climate of supercomplexity. 
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Chapter five 
Reconnecting the human and the technological: a 
speculative historiography 
5.1 Topological domains and 'Machine Age' 
A speculative hi~toriography showing how it could be imagined in terms of organic life 
in sympathy with broader intellectual understandings of the world. 
5.2 From landscape to ecology 
·A speculative historiography showing how it could be imagined in humanist terms as a 
techtonic landscape in sympathy with broader intellectual understandings of the world. 
5.3 From corporeallty to culture 
A speculative historiography showing how it could be imagined in terms of organic life 
in sympathy with broader intellectual understandings of the world. 
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5.1 Topological domains and 'Machine Age' 
A speculative historiography showing how it could be imagined in terms of organic life 
in sympathy with broader intellectual understandings of the world. 
The topological domain is used in this thesis to outline a conceptual spatial understanding of 
the world, which avoids the need to reduce concepts to essentialist isolation and to accept and 
recognise continuity without necessarily dealing with the infinite. In mathematics such a 
condition is expressed as: 
X= ... X ... 
lt can come as a surprise to discover that such variability can be accounted for and that a 
discrete field of mathematics has emerged to deal specifically with this problem. Domain 
theory (see Abramski et al., 1994) is a qualitative means of understanding the world. lt is used 
in mathematics as a means of dealing with degrees of complexity, often mirroring the ways in 
which people construct a natural conception of the world. We can, for example, talk about 'the 
world' as a broad concept without necessarily describing it in its near infinite complexity. 
When we talk about 'the world', however, we do not discount this complexity but rather put it 
to one side in order to build a functional concept. The idea of the topological domain, 
borrowed from biology, extends this to the understanding of spatial relations. lt is used here 
as a conceptual logic and is not intended to be a strictly applied logic. The topological domain 
connects this variation in terms to spatial logic. Without going too deep into the specifics of 
the topology in mathematics, it can be understood as a means of understanding how logic is 
tied to spatial conceptions, to scale and to location in a degree of play and extent. De Landa's 
logic has its intellectual foundation in the science of cellular biology, and the topological 
domains must be imagined in that respect as a semi-permeable cell, organism or ecosystem 
(Maturana and Varela, 1973). The topological domain is an analytical convenience of sorts that 
invites a closed analysis without losing sight of the openness of the extended complexity. No 
autopoetic system can be isolated from the rather larger system in which it is itself acting. 
Even cells that might appear to have a clearly defined topological domain are subject to 
osmosis. 
An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network. of 
processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) 
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through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize 
the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the 
machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by 
specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network. (Maturana and 
Varela, 1973, p. 78) 
A waterfall is a topological domain, a means of conveniently describing something that 
appears to have a clear formation in the world. The waterfall has a name because it appears to 
be something in the world, but on closer inspection there is no plausible way to define where 
the waterfall begins and ends; at what moment does river become waterfall, or water become 
mist, for example. We cannot operate in the world without some sense of the topological 
domain. But we cannot undertake proper analysis when we imagine these domains to be 
anything other than matters of convenience. lt is essential to remain aware that the topological 
domain is a largely notional border; it does not describe an actual reality. Within a toplological 
domain, it becomes possible to account for the many tiny interactions that take place within it; 
by understanding these interactions in a larger picture of interacting domains, a picture can be 
built of the larger complexity. This is a rather well-established tactic in science: a dust cloud 
can be understood to be not an entity in itself but the interaction of individual specks of dust; 
a waterfall can be understood as an interaction of individual atoms, molecules and ultimately 
droplets of water. Each of these droplets traces an individual path; billions of individual 
droplets interacting in complex ways create the waterfall. 
The philosophers Deleuze and Guattari 111 have attempted to find a means to account for the 
fluid reality of the apparently solid and material world. Their instinct is to take an approach to 
analysis that eschews 'conditions' or 'things'. Their analysis seeks 
not a scene, a place, or even a support upon which something comes to pass ... not 
space, nor is it in space; it is a matter that occupies space to a given degree - to the 
degree corresponding to the intensities produced. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) 
One way a designer might understand this could be to imagine that Deleuze and Guattari are 
discussing a table situated between two people. In their analysis, the intensity of the table 
111 1t is said that there is something in Deleuze and Guattari for everyone, but you have to know what you 
want to find. lt can seem as if Deleuze and Guattari's proposition of the 'Body without Organs' is open to 
a degree of variation so as to make it a plausible tool of almost any scholar. 
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fluxes between them depending upon the way it is used. The table is revealed subjectively as 
'a matter that occupies space to a given degree - to the degree corresponding to the 
intensities produced' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) 
A table for a meal perhaps where Its materiality is critical, is it big enough? Is it the 
right height? - Does it wobble? 
A table for a meeting perhaps, where it is less ~ritical, just something to rest papers, a 
laptop perhaps or ones feet. 
Perhaps the table is a nominal architectural plane occupying a void between two 
people talking, helping them feel at ease; a conceptual border perhaps. 
lt is possible then to take a view that industrial design should seek not to account for objects 
as solid signs to be encountered and negotiated, but to build a means· of understanding the 
world as a continuum of moments of intensity in human activity. The presentation of history 
through static and isolated artefacts provides a snapshot archive of history, but, like static 
skeletons, these artefacts lack the full texture of their place in the world. Artefacts appear out 
of their time and are excluded from most of the flows that give rise to their emergence and 
deny their subsequent development. Attempts to reconstruct the past in the present 
frequently fail, or demand the infrastructural support of a marketing campaign in order to re-
embed them into culture. Material cultural analysis, positing the human as a cultural 
construct, is an attempt to reduce the complexity. The upshot of this is that artefacts become 
reified and separated from their role in the formation of what it is to be human and to live 
among and use them. In the next chapter a number of modes of analysis will be examined that 
attempt to reintegrate artefacts into a construction of the human. If material cultural analysis 
separates and isolates the artefact, then these approaches to analysis can be understood to be 
integrative. Nevertheless, they are not without their problems. If artefacts are to be 
understood as intensities or topological domains, as mutable and unfixed, rather than 
resolved and bounded tectonics, then we must be sure of our terms. Where Deleuze and 
Guattari's idea of the fluxating intensity can perhaps be imagined from the outside as a kind 
of density, the topological domain must be imagined as a kind of porous but somehow 
bounded field of concern. De Landa borrows the term topological domains from the field of 
cognitive linguistics. In 1948 Jean Piaget and Barbel lnhelder demonstrated that concepts are 
constructed from simple spatial and topological terms (Piaget and lnhelder 1956). 
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Talmyb(1983) has argued that spatial understandings can be broadly tracked in a wide variety 
of human concepts as they are expressed in language. lt is now widely accepted in the field of 
cognitive linguistics that spatial relations 'correspond to elements of our neurocognitio.n' 
(Landau and jackendoff, 1993, paraphrased by Levinson and Meira, 2007). Topology is not 
always recognised when we talk about the world. Artefact mutability, while it might be 
considered in terms of shifts in topological attention, is often mistaken for tectonic 
transformations of materiality. 
In The Fourth Discontinuit}'(Mazlish (1993) argued that human understanding has developed 
such that it has gradually eliminated epstemic discontinuities. Mazlish picks up on a widely 
recognised view that Copernicus broke the intellectual discontinuity between understandings 
of the materiality of the world and the physicality of the Universe, Darwin; the intellectual 
discontinuity between mankind and other species, and Freud; the intellectual discontinuity 
between the rational and the irrational. Mazlish suggests that a fourth discontinuity remains to 
be breached: discontinuity between the understanding of the human and that of the machine. 
My first thesis is that humans are on the threshold of decisively breaking the 
discontinuity between themselves and machines ... they now perceive their evolution as 
inextricably interwoven with their use and development of tools ... (p. 6) 
Mazlish, however, anticipates that the breach of the fourth discontinuity will take place at a 
molecular level: 
the discontinuity is being bridged because humans now perceive that the same 
scientific concepts help explain the workings of themselves and their machines and 
that matter evolves - from the basic building blocks of hydrogen, turning into helium 
in the distant stars, then fusing into carbon nuclei and on up to iron, and then 
exploding into space, which has resulted in our solar system - developing on earth its 
intricate patterns into the structure of organic life, and now into the architecture of 
our thinking machines. (p. 6) 
Industrial design histories, -for example, Heskett's Industrial Design (1980) and Woodham's 
Twentieth Century Design (1997)- tend to read as a sucession of artefacts, while the 
intellectual process involved in their consolidation remains obscured. lt should not be implied 
that all sustaining narratives of industrial design display artefacts in chronology without 
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critical analysis. Nonetheless there is a palpable absence of any serious critical analysis of the 
design process as a means of humanising technology from outside the community, and as a 
consequence sustaining narratives of industrial design tend to be intra-historical. There is no 
extra-historical history of industrial design, except as insomuch as its products are played out 
In other human affairs. Philosophers of technology,- for example, Mumford (1963), Mitcharn 
(1994) and Armstrong (1998)- largely fail to include the. intellectual history of Industrial 
design in their accounts. it is understandable, then, that industrial designers should rely upon 
hegemonic forms of curatorial approach in their histories. However, judging by the lack of 
critical debate in this respect, the community appears to be unconcerned by any potential 
consequence of this mode of history telling. 112 
Many artefacts reoccur in sustaining narratives of industrial design. 113 However, given its 
domesticity and proliferation, the consistent absence of radio from the discussion of 
technology might appear surprising. Where radio does appear it does so through an artefact 
manifestation only at the extremes of its broadcast (the transmission tower) and reception (the 
domestic set). While some attention is paid In sustaining narratives of industrial design to the 
wooden sets of the inter-war period or to later transistor radios in some histories - in Heath, 
Heath and Lund jensen's 300 Years of Industrial Design (Heath, Heath and Lund Jensen, 2000), 
for example - there is no inclusion of wireless or radio technology whatsoever in an otherwise 
fairly comprehensive catalogue. Radio and other exemplars of the invisible nature of some 
phenomena have slipped from histories of industrial design. This may simply be because an 
attempt to illustrate the invisible would probably demand a wordy and textual chapter devoid 
of images in an otherwise image-driven text. However, the ontological and philosophical 
implications of terms such as radio-space, virtuality or the sense that people might be 
112 This is not to imply that a radical new history of industrial design is required. In any case, a future 
history of industrial design will most likely find it necessary to retain fellowship with the heritage of the 
community it addresses, and, given the hegemonic dominance of design histories, it will be a difficult task 
to avoid reference to the artefact. 
113 An encounter with images of the Crystal Palace, the Turbine Hall, a Parisian Metro entrance, the 
Barcelona Chair - or perhaps the De Stijl chair, the streamlined train, the spitfire, the great American 
automobile, the atom clock, the Braun razor, the Memphis jug, the Starke juicer, or the i-pod- should 
come as no surprise to the reader of an industrial design history. To have an artefaa included in this 
colleaion is perhaps a secret desire of many industrial designers. it is an Indication that one is recognised 
and inscribed into significance in history,- a reasonable enough claim; after all, these artefacts are what 
Industrial design is. However, the hegemonic nature of industrial design histories is revealed by some 
surprising absences from the list of artefaas one encounters. The American and Russian space race and 
its associated icons such as the Soyuz, the Saturn Five or the Shuttle are entirely absent from orthodox 
Industrial design histories. Exquisitely designed components such as pumps or engine housings are also 
absent,and medical produas are rarely mentioned and seldom ever displayed. Radio is. one such absent 
technology. 
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'immersed in technology' (Moser and Mcleod, 1995) or might dwell in a 'technological 
landscape' (Rogers, 1999) are similarly absent topics of discussion in sustaining narratives of 
industrial design. There is evidently something missing in the conception of industrial design. 
When the process of humanising technology can be resolved in an artefact, then there appears 
to be no problem in including it into history, although these narratives are often rather 
selective in the choice of exemplars. However, when the technology does not resolve in an 
artefact, then industrial design struggles, and often fails, to include the outcomes of the 
humanising process into its history. There are some attempts to engage with the broader 
social imperative of radio as a specific consequence of design. Heskett (1980), for example, 
includes the transistor radio as an indication of the drive towards miniaturisation and 
increasing portability. Conran (1996, pp. 224-5) includes a 5ony Mini-Disc Walkman as a 
signifier of travel, and the Classic Roberts radio to connote 'traditional design'. Rather 
intriguingly, both these examples are placed in a chapter that sets out to explore the notion of 
'time' as an industrial design concern. Not only is this chapter almost devoid of illustrations, 
an exception in an otherwise profusely illustrated book; it makes almost no attempt to engage 
with any sense of time as a subject of ontological complexity except to posit the artefact as an 
indication of a social condition - the portable radio for a culture on the move, for example. In 
the 1950s and 1960s there was some enthusiastic discussion of the idea that we might be 
entering a new 'space age' and that this age might come to define humanity in the same terms 
as the 'stone age' or the 'iron age'. This is, of course, a problematic and entirely artificial 
delineation of trajectory into discernible shifts. Historical ages are artificial and can delude the 
reader into imagining that trajectories - or morphagenic flows, for that matter- can be neatly 
subdivided into discrete moments when some condition or other prevailed. The shifts between 
historical ages have no meaning in their times but can perhaps point on reflection towards a 
sense that some intellectual Zeitgeist can be identified that is somehow no longer prevalent. 
Dividing the trajectory of human history into discrete ages seems to make sense as a means of 
delineating shifts in technological cultures (see, for example, Benjamin, 2003). There appears 
to be no particular agreement as to what defines, sequences or delineates a particular 
technological age other than that it seems to align to a general shift in the way in which 
t.echnologies are foregrounded in the imagination. The sustaining narratives have done much 
to encourage industrial designers to imagine their intellectual heritage divided into what they 
refer to as the 'machine ages'. The 'machine age' is an idea rooted in industrial designers' 
156 
culture, thanks in no small part to Banham's influential design history (1955). Like other 
historical ages, the machine age is, of course, an entirely artificial delineation. In a reflection 
of the general uncertainty, there Is no clear idea as to how these ages might be codified. Brose 
(2004), for example, talks of the machine age and uses it to define a period in history prior to 
and including the First World War. Nevertheless, the idea that industrial design might be 
described through a series of 'machine ages' is well established. This was Banham's premiss 
(1955), and it is repeated often and widely as a way of dividing up sustaining narratives of 
industrial design into discrete sections. Pawley's supposed 'sequel' to Banham, for example, is 
directed at a second machine age (Pawley, 1990). 
[Ban ham) ... introduced the notion of what constitutes a 'Machine Age' within the 
more general processes and periods of industrialisation and modernisation. The point 
that Banham was making is that the architecture and design of a period reflect and 
express - indeed, are formed by- the Machine Age in which they occur. And, to some 
extent, the design itself helps to define the period. Values and assumptions of the Age 
underpin our attitude to design and so it is to our advantage to analyse what it is that 
makes each Machine Age distinctive. Banham defined the characteristics of only the 
First and Second Machine Ages ... (Whitely, 2005) 
Banham's descriptions (1955) of the first and second machine ages were constructed 
retrospectively, sometime after the times they describe. This retrospective view of the machine 
age suggests that they can be understood as a means of coming to terms with paradigm shifts 
in the understandings of technological conditions. 5tiegler (1999) has suggested that it is the 
tool that invents the human, and Cooley (1987), for example, argued that technology goes 
some way to inform the culture of how people organise themselves. Where 5tiegler argued that 
the human invents itself by inventing the tool, Cooley suggested that technology shapes 
perception; reflecting upon the electronic media technologies that were emerging about him 
in the late 1960s, Cooley called for similarly networked and a contingent understanding of 
systems that eschewed top-down systemic organisation. lt is possible, then, that De Landa's 
biological analysis of the way in which we might understand material culture is another in a 
long trajectory of imaginings that place the latest science at the centre of their allusion. This 
might suggest that machine ages in sustaining narratives of industrial design mark out 
changes in the conception of what it is to be human as much as they may appear to describe 
changes In the material nature of technology. In the forward to Dunne's Hertzian Tales (1999, 
p. 2), Crampton-Smith reflects conversations going around that the first machine age is 
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characterised by particular 'heroic machines' in an age of 'monumental' technology. The 
monumental or heroic age is rather easily described in those terms, perhaps because lt is 
characterised by large technologies that are somehow adventurous and emergent, 'naive' 
machines such as beam engines, for example. This era maps somewhat onto what Mumford 
(1963, pp. 22-211) described as 'The Paleotechnic Phase' implying a form of technology that 
would subsequently resolve more fully Into the the awesome space of the machine halls of 
late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century machine culture. Banham's description (1955) of the 
second machine age is delineated by an era of domestic machines, which then emerges as a 
consequence of the massive production potentials of the first machine age disseminated into 
wider domestic life. The machines characterising this second age are the motor vehicles, 
fridges and washing machines that came to fill the homes of the Western world. 
While Ban ham's machine ages were reflective, there has in recent times been a tendency to 
anticipate machine ages. Banham himself anticipated the emergence of a third machine age. In 
'The Triumph of Software' Banham (1961, p. 136) suggested that an era of electronic and 
media technologies would became as much about systems as materials. 114 There continues to 
be some life still in the idea that industrial design history can be divided up in this manner. 
There is, however, some disagreement and no certain intellectual codification as to how we 
might describe contemporary times. Whitely (2001) and Michael (2002), for example, suggest 
the emergence of a fourth machine age in need of some new kind of theorisation. Brutton, it 
has been claimed, goes further and makes the claim for a fifth 'cyborg' machine age (see 
Whitely, 2001, p. 98). 115 Whitely suggests that this new machine age is to be an age of 
pervasive computing, characterised by a realisation on the part of humanity that it finds itself 
immersed in an environment of many dispersed and seemingly invisible technologies. This 
emerging machine age, it is suggested, is delineated by an invasive host of systemic 
technologies that appear to be ubiquitiously distributed. 
114 On closer inspection, this third machine age appears itself to be an accelerated microcosm of the 
broader development of technology, having its own paleotechnic phase during the time of the mechanical 
brains and the centralised computers of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s and its own domestic phase, during 
the time of simple consumer electronics. This age has accelerated to become an emerging era of 
connective and supposedly intelligent systems functioning as an increasingly invisible and pervasive 
substrate that is now supposed to delineate the fourth machine age. 
115 This reference, being uncited, may be anecdotal. 
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Picture being able to scatter hundreds of tiny sensors around a building to monitor 
temperature or humidity. Or deploying, like pixie dust, a network of minuscule, 
remote sensor chips to track enemy movements in a military operation. 'Smart dust' 
devices are tiny wireless micro-electromechanical sensors (MEMS) that can detect 
everything from light to vibrations. (Hoffmail, 2003) 
Before we proclaim another new emergent age of the biotechnological machine, we might 
reflect for a moment whether machine ages are truly delineated, determined even, by changes 
in the form of technology or whether some more subtle process of intellectual imagination 
might be at play. Some shift in scale and distribution appears to be built into the imagination 
of this new machine age. 'Ubiquitous computing has as its goal enhancing computer use by 
making many computers available throughout the physical environment, but making them 
effectively invisible to the user' (Weiser, 1993). This machine age is posited as presenting a 
paradigm shift in how understandings of human technology relationships will be formed: 
'some are calling it a new nature ... Nature has become technoculture' (Rogers, 1999, p. 9). In 
Moser and Mcleod (1995) this new machine age is imagined116 as a human-directed and 
active habitat, in which the active technologies are not necessarily discernible by the senses. 
This, of course, should include a range of rather more familiar technologies, such as broadcast 
radio. Broadcast radio, being some century old, is not normally associated with more 
emergent ubiquitous technologies. The chronological sequence in the development of 
technologies such as broadcast radio suggests that the machine ages should not imply the 
description of a chronological trajectory. This chronological slip is not reflected in histories of 
industrial design or of technology. The machine ages in sustaining narratives of industrial 
design are not periods defined by complete change in the practice of industrial design. The 
design and construction of heroic machines like the space shuttle or the oil rig, , for example, 
continue to this day. However, in sustaining narratives of industrial design the machine ages 
appear to delineate moments when it somehow becomes no longer viable to include certain 
forms of technology. A subsequent machine age then should not necessarily herald the end of 
industrial design as an active intervention in the humanisation of the technologies that 
provided a prior focus of attention, but rather as another imagining. If they mean anything, 
the machine ages in the trajectory of the narratives of industrial design can be understood 
broadly to define thematic understandings and evidence of a trigger of new intellectual styles. 
116 it will be argued that the idea of a human-directed and active habitat reiterates an interpretation from 
the dawn of the machine age. We might describe Maser and Mcleod (1995) as a reimagining. 
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The machine ages appear most coherent in histories when they are recognised as 
retrospective reflections of moments when prevailing epistemologies shifted industrial 
designers' understanding of their particular role in the world. If humanising technology Is at 
the core of the industrial design community's schematic understanding of its intellectual 
endeavour, then a new machine age could point to a moment where some new insight Is 
brought to bear upon the fluidity in the terms of what constitutes humanity in relationship to 
technology. 
The Second Machine Age was a kind of designer-Utopia and we recognise in it 
attitudes to design similar to those which we live amongst today, with design 
museums flourishing, and 'designer objects' as fashionable and sought-after as ever. 
This serves to remind us that Machine Ages contain continuities as well as differences: 
a new Machine Age does not signal the replacement of the previous one, but a 
displacement In that some new factor may occur which significantly changes the 
character of the Age and provides a new frame of reference, new expectations, almost 
a new consciousness. (Whiteley, 2005) 
If the industrial design community's intellectual process of humanising technology had 
developed in an even and linear manner, then it would be likely that the story of industrial 
design would be written as a continuum and not as a series of fractured machine ages. lt is 
possible, then, that the machine ages appear in sustaining narratives of industrial design 
because they represent moments of shock when industrial design found its intellectual 
location to be inappropriate in a given understanding of human technology relationships. 
Members of the industrial design community, it has been argued, imagine the trajectory of 
their history through artefacts. With each successive machine age, the artefact can be shown 
to be reimagined at a smaller scale and at a greater degree of distribution. The first machine 
age suggests an imagining of technology as artefacts at a scale and degree of distribution that 
has resonance with the monumental and is represented as a series of independent, one-off, 
constructions of very large and very heavy machines. 
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Artefact imagined in a topological domain at the scale of N1 and at a degree of distribution of 
Nl. 
If artefacts in sustaining narratives of industrial design are imagined at a notional monumental 
scale, we could call this a topological domain at the notional scale N to the power of one (N1) 
and at a notional degree of distribution of N to the power of one (N1). This topological domain 
is big: it understands and analyses technology in terms of large singular and monumental 
artefacts that are dense and massive and isolated. In the imagining of the second machine age 
the artefacts in sustaining narratives of industrial design (for example, Ban ham, 195 5) appear 
to be smaller, and more distributed. Artefacts of the second machine age can be understood 
in terms of a topological domain that allows for an analysis at something approximating the 
scale of N10 and at a degree of distribution of N10• 
Artefact imagined in a topological domain at the scale of N10 and at a degree of distribution of 
NlO. 
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For an imagination of the third machine age we can refer again to Banham, who projected this 
age in terms of the previous ages he had described (see Banham, 1961) as a proliferation of 
very many artefacts, imagined as part of a complex distribution and interacting system. 
Artefact imagined in a topological domain at the scale of N100 and at a degree of distribution 
of Nloo. 
If the emergence of a fourth machine age is imagined in terms of another topological domain, 
as, for example, in Whitely (2001) and Hoffman (2003), it is typified by a further acceleration 
towards distributed ubiquity. This machine age is posited as special, because it will be 
determined by the emergence of hundreds of millions of tiny machines. lt may also indicate 
that a further shift has occurred in broader intellectual imagination. 
Artefact imagined in a in a topological domain at the scale of N100000 and at a degree of 
distribution of N100000• 
If the DNA computation and other biotechnologies were to be considered as somehow 
determining yet another, fifth, machine age, then it would probably present artefacts that are 
as evanescent and almost infinitely distributed as atoms in the universe. 
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Artefact imagined in a in a topological domain at the potential scale of N00and at a degree of 
potential distribution of N00 • 
If a view of the machine ages is taken in terms of materiality, it is possible to understand how 
shifts in the scale of topological domains brings attention to history as it is consolidated in 
smaller and smaller material artefacts. The presentation of these artefacts shifts from the 
massive and noetically obvious, towards microscopic evanescence and eventual anoetic 
invisibility. In the trajectory technology also comes to be understood in increasingly 
ubiquitous terms. The materiality of technology becomes increasingly porous to life, 
increasingly interconnected and interdependent. With each successive machine age the 
artefact becomes less open to resolution through focused critical engagement that relies upon 
epistemic differentiation, and it becomes increasingly difficult, in simple material terms, to sift 
the technological apart from the human. This is a problem for industrial design, because, with 
each successive shift of the materiality of technology towards evanescence, there is less that 
can be used to represent the material quality of the technological artefact and to tie the 
artefact into noetic analysis. With each successive shift there is less differentiation between the 
human and the technological too, and so the process of noetic analysis becomes increasingly 
finite and complex. 
In orthodox readings of the sustaining narratives of industrial design the concern with the 
singular architecture of the monumental artefacts is accelerated in each subsequent machine 
age by attention to smaller more numerous artefacts. The attention to the monumental 
becomes distributed into a focus on the domestic artefact, although, of course, technologies 
at the monumental scale continue to be produced. In turn, the intellectual means of engaging 
with these proliferating domestic artefacts comes to be challenged by a third machine age 
characterised by electronic artefacts where the artefact appears to becomes smaller and more 
distributed still. In the fourth age, it has been suggested, this distribution and miniaturisation 
to the point of almost infinite evanescence becomes the focus of attention. lt may seem rather 
obvious that there is something in the nature of technological development that leads to its 
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diminishing material presence. This would appear to be the logic of the machine ages. 
Technology would seem to be taking an undeniable trajectory from the massive to the 
evanescent and from intense materiality to immateriality. Whitely (2005) takes this to imply 
that it is shifting materiality that determines and drives the intellectual shifts that describe 
each successive machine age. The materiality of technology seems to force industrial 
designers to rethink their understanding of the world and constantly reminds them of the 
inadequacy of their imagination. lt is quite possible, however, to take a view that increasingly 
complex understandlngs of the world invite closer topological analysis. This would seem to 
make sense; it would go some way to explain why technologies appear out of sequence in 
industrial design histories. They have slipped outside the topological domain of a prevailing 
analysis. 
For example, the electromagnetic geography of 'Hertzian space' (see Dunne, 1997) is now 
becoming a legitimate topic of design and cultural analysis and a creative space for design 
intervention. This emerging focus is significantly out of step, however, with technological 
development. 117 Hertzian space is not by any means a new phenomenon, but for most of the 
twentieth century it has been almost entirely ignored by industrial design. For some reason it 
would seem as if radio has become a viable focus of concern. Radio, for some reason, has 
become an important facet of the noetic world and is no longer peripheral and anoetic. Radio, 
at least in Dunne's terms, of course has done nothing whatsoever to drive this analysis. lt 
functions today just as it always has, but now we speak of Hertzian space in architectural and 
design terms as if it were a new phenomenon. In a material context the machine ages then 
might be read as a tracking of a series of moments of shock. In each track technologies 
appear to have moved closer to a condition of evanescence only because industrial design has 
found the means to materialise the artefact at a more finite degree that is coherent with 
prevailing attention of analysis in terms of the scale of topological domain. More importantly 
in this context, the machine ages could be understood to define eras when it becomes 
intellectually legitimate to consider changed degrees of materiality as a concern of industrial 
117 There is nothing to suggest any sense of disjuncture or shift within the design community from when 
Fessenden first sent his crackling message. Although the application of radio was immediately obvious, 
industrial design was at that point locked into a mode of analysis that understood human technology 
relations at a different degree of granularity. Radio, having no apparent form at that level of granular 
analysis, presented no problematic, and radio became occluded from consideration, except as it 
materialised in orthodox terms. 
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design. The response by the industrial design community to that shift in topological domain 
then comes to define a particular machine age. 
In the industrial design histories about which the community is consolidated, the ages of the 
machine are presented as describing a clearly discernible and apparent trajectory of 
technological artefacts that shift material form from the solid, dense and intensely perceptible 
towards dispersing evanescence, invisibility and ineffability. lt would be easy, although 
deterministic, to imagine that, as they come to terms with each successive artefact age, 
industrial designers have found it necessary to reimagine the world. But this would suggest 
that somehow technology has a life of its own and can determine human imagintion. Since 
industrial design sets out to humanise technology, it is possible that technology is 
represented in shifting material terms because there is some shift in the topological 
understanding of the process of humanising technology. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) point to 
a flux in materiality when the world is a lived experience. If this is extended into wider 
understandings of the world, then in industrial design terms it is possible that the process of 
humanisation might be subject to a similar flux. If it is tied to some intellectual coming-to-
terms with shifts in the topological understandings of the human and the technological, the 
process of humanisation might be subject to similar flux. This would provide a subtle means 
of finding some continuation in the trajectory of industrial design and would detach that 
process from the necessary need for a fixed noetic engagement. In the accounts of their own 
history, industrial designers might find that a series of shifts in the intellectual comprehension 
of the human and the technological in their community are mirrored in the way they represent 
artefacts. Each machine age would then present a further shift in the understanding of the 
materiality of technology constructed so as to account for the revised topological domain. This 
would appear to demand a form of inverted reading of sustaining narratives of industrial 
design. Designers would need to understand that technological artefacts appear only as 
complex as prevailing understandings of the human and the technological. In simple terms, 
whether they know it or not, the sophistication of their intellect and knowledge drives the 
manner in which industrial designers represent the artefacts they create. In order to look for 
evidence of this revised intellectual stance, it would be necessary to return to, and to re-
examine, the more established accounts of the trajectory of technological development. 
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In Giedion (1948), for example, the story of technology is described as a trajectory of human 
understandings and it attitudinal stance. Giedion ties the developing story of humanity to a 
more subtle story of human machine integration and the merging of human and machine 
values. 'We shall therefore open with the question: What happens when mechanisation meets 
an organic substance? And we shall close by inquiring into the attitude of our culture to itself 
(p. 6).The machine ages in sustaining narratives of industrial design would be likely to follow a 
similar trajectory. lt is possible to track in the machine ages a series of transformations in the 
understanding of human technology relations, from a detached notion of human nature as 
somehow transcendent from the world, to a dramatic inclusion of the artefact in the imagining 
of the human. 
5.2 From landscape to ecology 
A speculative historiography showing how it could be imagined in humanist terms as a 
techtonlc landscape in sympathy with broader intellectual understandings of the world. 
There is some evidence of design behaviour in the Paleolithic that has resonance in our own 
times. Technology does not appear to be a recent invention of human culture but would rather 
seem to be an eternal verity and intrinsic to intelligence as a contingent reaction to the 
environment. Reflections upon the directed, intellectual engagement with the form and 
meaning of technology reside in a much less extensive history. Despite their centrality to 
intelligence, the design and construction of technological forms (the mechanical arts) seem, at 
least in Western traditions, not to have been particularly worthy of scholarship. In classical 
literature the 'mechanical arts' are merely an unwelcome gift given by Mercury to his bride as 
something of an afterthought. Augustine found little to recommend in the study of the 
mechanical arts. If this is something closer to the nascence of the directed, intellectual 
consideration of technology, then it is inauspicious: 'among the other teachings to be found 
among the pagans ... including the theory of the useful mechanical arts, I consider nothing to 
be useful' (Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana:, see Walton, 2003). Technological development 
was left to a class of people who had for generations been forced to work. 
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The Seven Liberal Arts. (Arte de Prudencia, 2007) 
Perhaps it is no coincidence that many histories of directed intellectual consideration place the 
start of their narrative approximately with the end of the enslavement of African people and 
the emergence of steam engines. lt has been suggested (for example, by Sachs, 1933) that 
the industrial revolution was delayed by slavery. 118 While it may appear superficially as if there 
is some logic in this assumption, slavery actually made little impact upon English agriculture 
and manufacturing and could not have provided the impetus to the industrial revolution. lt is 
doubtful whether the ending of slavery was needed to enable the proliferation of machinery 
other than to signal a shift to a more egalitarian intellectual climate and the emergence of the 
intellectually brilliant but unscholarly engineer. As Giedion demonstrates, there was little 
strategic or philosophical interest in the development of technology among the educated elite, 
and there is no evidence that engineers such as Watt and his fellows had any wider intellectual 
concern other than to get things built and working. 
At the time when the physiocrats j. j. Rouseau and Adam Smith were at work, and the 
Encyclopedie, 1751-72, was slowly being brought forth volume by volume despite 
strong opposition, a few poor handicraftsmen of Lancashire, men of the lowest social 
118 Sachs suggests that inventors saw, with the Somerset case and the end of slavery in England, a 
massive potential to replace human energy with machines. 
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class, were devising apparatus for mechanical spinning and James Wan was 
completing the invention of a workable steam engine. (Giedion, 1948 p. 138) 
The world of the early industrial revolution was understood in terms of sublime scales (see, for 
example, Hope-Nicolson, 1959). Although at first few and far between, the technologies of the 
heroic or monumental age were imagined and presented by their builders as objects of 
wonder, an essential component of an age of revolution and romantic awe. In keeping with 
their times, technologies carry with them the imagination of the awesome; their footprint is 
massive; they obscure views, fill and transform landscapes. The scale by which they are 
intellectually analysed is also immense; in contemporary molecular terms, these technologies 
represent a dense collation of molecules held together in tight electron bonds in structures 
that can withstand enormous forces. In an age of molecular physics and microscopic 
technology we could picture these technologies, not as monuments, but as flows and bonded 
collations of energy. Of course, we do not do this in our histories of technology; we are more 
likely to understand them at the same scale and in the same granular terms in which they were 
first imagined. 
Given what we know of the intellectual climate of their times, the early developers of so-called 
monumental technologies did not picture themselves as subverting God.119 But they 
understood well enough how they were revolutionising man's relationship with the world. At 
the time of their development these technologies were imagined in humanist terms as a 
sublime nature, a reconstructed great techtonic mass, extrinsic to humanity and as belonging 
to the fabric of the world. The fruit of human intellect, when imagined in the same terms as 
the world itself, albeit tamed, intellectually ordered and self-contained, is likely to be 
represented as a new artefact landscape. Perhaps their massive architecture reflected much of 
classicism, not because the new machines aped architecture, but because in these artefact 
landscapes scholars found testament to the power of the intellect and rational logic and the 
realisation of a new techne breaking irrevocably the link between man and nature and 
liberating humanity from the shackles of the temporal rhythms of pre-scientific times. Artefact 
landscapes appear as a new kind of controlled nature. They are frequently represented in 
119 lt is arguable that this imagination was tied to a self-conscious taming of those forces that had in the 
Middle Ages been the domain of God. The developers ofthese machines had emerged from the same 
class as the medieval mechanical artists, but they came without the baggage of scholastic guilt. Watt and 
his fellows worked in a climate of self-conscious humanist vision, tempered by a more efficient non-
conformist theology. 
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terms of the landscape. Humans stand and admire them from a distance, as one might admire 
a picturesque view or some other natural phenomenon. 
'The ENGINE for raising water (with a power made) by FIRE.' 
1711 illustration of Newcome's mine engine. 
Reuleaux (1875) suggested that the machine tames 'the unrestrained power of natural forces, 
acting and reacting in limitless freedom'. Understood as a rational 'ordering' of 'disorder' 
then, the artefact landscape provides some evidence of how the first machine age was the 
product of the pre-scientific world. The artefact landscape extends a humanist conception of 
the world and is imagined in terms of how the intellect might finally tame and transform 
nature. Artefact landscapes are imagined as transformed and transformative landscapes -a 
human triumph over an ancient and antipathetic relationship. 120 Landscape artefacts, like the 
natural volcanic and seismic upheavals of the planet itself, left indelible imprints and rendered 
the earth inhospitable. Landscape artefacts, like other dynamic geological phenomena, 
120 Machines, of course, had one great advantage over the old and uncontrolled nature they replaced; 
machines did not demand the same rhythm of the seasons as the agrarian world. In place of the rhythm of 
old nature, the machine presented a controlled and predictable rhythm - as Heath and Boreham (1999, p. 
25) put it, 'the monotonous clatter of a boundless mill'. This new nature would prove to be faster, 
stronger, more even and relentless than the old irrational world. The new nature stripped energy from the 
supposed chaos of the old nature and spewed out the old nature back onto itself and out of place. The 
chemical waste products of this transformation did not support the life in the way the old nature had. lt 
produced a new sterile and lifeless place that was neither of the world nor alien to it . The gentle images of 
the machine in the agrarian world such as that of the illustration of Newcome's engine are replaced in 
imagination by the horror of life struggling to survive in the industrial city. 
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released the potential energy of the earth and rearranged geology. Landscape artefacts like 
other tectonic upheavals created piles of spoil and laid waste to fertile land. 
The imagination and presentation of the monumental machine deny interaction. These 
machines, imagined as awesome, are constructed such that people are kept at a distance. In 
keeping with the sense that the machine has a tectonic presence, people are represented as 
insignificant in the presence of the artefact landscape. These are not monuments but artefacts 
imagined as a topological domain that understands the process of humanising technology in 
terms of a wider landscape. Artefacts appear monumental in contemporary material cultural 
terms. There is no need at first to consider how artefact landscapes might relate to people in 
any way other than the people represented in a picturesque landscape; the interactional 
necessities of loading fuel into their fires might prove a concern were the task not so low on a 
register of skills as to be beyond the scope of intellectual consideration. Negotiated or 
avoided, as one might avoid a dangerous chasm or a volcanic vent, artefact landscapes 
required people of an insignificant social standing to work them. That they were killed was not 
a particular intellectual concern. An intellectual crisis began to emerge, as artefact landscapes 
began to proliferate. it became clear that a new imagination would be required if life were to 
continue in a landscape that was fast becoming widely poisonous. There is evidence of a 
palpable shift in the way that technologies are imagined. The final moments prior to a shift 
away from the topology of the artefact landscape are marked by pollution and squalor. The 
pollution and hostility to biology of the artefact landscape appeared to demand a new kind of 
species that might occupy the new nature. 
5.3 From corporeality to culture 
A speculative historiography showing how it could be imagined in terms of organic life 
in sympathy with broader intellectual understandings of the world. 
If technologies had hitherto been imagined in topological terms as a landscape that was 
human in conception, then, in this new imagining, technology would come to be imagined as 
the animals that occupied this humanly constructed landscape. The representations of the 
artefact, as singular and set in a landscape, are replaced by pictures of factories that, are 
themselves, set in the landscape. The inside of these factories are represented by architectural 
spaces full of much smaller artefacts. The artefact landscapes were contained within walls, but 
with smaller artefacts distributed around their architectural space, as animals in a stall. 
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Above: The factory in the landscape (engraving of the Eli Whitney 
Armoury Site by Van Slyke, c.1879). Below: Technological artefacts with 
workers distributed among them in architectural spaces arrayed as 
animals in a barn. 
just as the loom has existed for many centuries, we should remind ourselves that the great 
beam engines continued to operate despite this transformation in representation. What is 
postulated here is that technological form is continuous. Its representation, however, reflects 
a developing intellectual trajectory and a shifting topological field of focus. While the previous 
intellectual climate had imagined technology as a rationalisation of the antagonistic landscape 
machine and humans were largely considered in isolation of one another, anew intellectual 
position can be found in the representations of this time of technology as a hyper-efficient 
animalism. Technologies imagined as artefact animals are pictured on the scale of animals, in 
ranked stalls in buildings in the landscape. lmaginings of technology in terms of an artefact 
animal are realised in subtle assumptions that prevail even into our times. Consider, for 
example, the crude but powerful Oxen or Diesel engine pulling the heavy load without finesse 
or grace but with efficiency and torque, and compare the smoother, faster and more elegant 
horse or petrol engine powering the daily transport of the gentleman and lady. 
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Artefact animals were fed with fuel, They consumed their 'food' to produce the energy 
required for their relentless work and spewed and excreted their waste. 121 just as people had 
cared for their animals, so the engineers nurtured and cared for their engines. But these 
comparisons are perhaps merely superficial. In 1637 Descartes had described the animal as a 
machine 'made by the hands of God, incomparably better ordered and more admirable in its 
movements than any of those that can be invented by men' (cited in Rabinbach, 1990 p. 1). 
The artefact animals driving the industrial age, while perhaps more rudely constructed, could 
be thought of as super-biologies, outstripping the performance of even the most 
technologically reared and bred organism. The seemingly unrelenting rhythm of the seasons 
that directed organic life did not trouble the artefact animal. Its rhythm was relentless, 
unaffected by the seasons or by cycles of birth and death. Where the rhythm of the seasons 
had once determined supply and demand, now the wind and the rain were insignificant 
determinants in a wider economy of trade. Where animals had produced wool or milk, or 
young to be butchered, the artefact animals produced cloth or engineering parts. Animal 
husbandry required a subtle interaction and sympathy for the needs of the animal and drew 
the farmer into a harmonic sympathy with animal rhythms. Artefact animals ran to a different 
rhythm. Too powerful to be hindered by the weather, not regulated by the seasons or cycles 
of birth and death, or even day and night, these 'animals' could work relentlessly. 
121 This was not a new idea, and this is not a linear history. The point worth reiterating is that it can 
appear linear in an orthodox historical projection. 
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An idealised farmyard (above) and the 'farmyard' of the artefact animal (below). 
The rhythmic certainty of technology, imagined as an artefact animal, required a form of 
husbandry that was sympathetic to its needs. just as in traditional husbandry, the farmers of 
the artefact animal found it necessary to adapt to a rhythm. From the start these farmers were 
required to be as reliable, accurate, unfeeling and unemotional as the artefact animal under 
their charge. A new kind of farmer was required. These new farmers depended for their 
livelihood upon the walled landscape of the factory, and its particular skills and trades, just as 
their forebears had once depended on the farm set in an agrarian landscape. The emergence 
of the conception of technology as an animal within its own landscape shifted the imagination 
of the artefact itself towards the topological domain considered at a scale that had some 
resonance in the scale of the animal. When the farmer and the animal were intellectually 
conceptualised within the same landscape, the artefact could no longer be imagined as an 
isolated monument that was encountered and extrinsic to the body. As this imagination 
progressed, technology became represented in artefact animals with a smaller material 
footprint. The imagining of the artefact animal, contained in a factory farm, demands a special 
173 
kind of farmer who both understands his 'animals' and can live successfully within this new 
technological habitat. The farmer is as intimately braided into the process of this new kind of 
farm production as into the agrarian model of pre-industrialisation. 
After Darwin, it became necessary perhaps to understand humanity in similar terms to other 
species. This realisation had profound consequences for the intellectual climate of its times. lt 
is quite feasible to suggest that the theorisation of technology was in some way implicated 
into this shift. For example, animals shift in status from something given to humanity for their 
use and exploitation to something that is in some way insinuated into a more extensive 
natural kingdom (see Preece and Fraser, 2000). Where once landscapes were considered from 
a distance, this new imagining invited a more complex model. Following Darwin and the 
intellectual shift from landscape to a wider concept of the 'natural world', technological 
landscapes could not be imagined without the animals that populated them. If people can be 
imagined in terms similar to other animals, and can be understood to occupy the same natural 
landscape as the animals, then it is a small intellectual step to imagine that people could be 
rationalised along the same lines as the artefact landscape had rationalised nature. 
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Left: Thomas Nast cartoon, Harper's Weekly, 19 August 1871.122 Right Darwin's sketch of 
evolutionary theory in his 'First Notebook on Transmutation of Species' (Darwin, 1837) 
122 
"Victorian society was shocked by the publication in 1859 of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species and in 
1871 of his Descent of Man, both of which seemed to indicate that man was descended from the apes. 
Here the artist puts all the dismay into the mouth of the "defrauded" ape.• (Britannica 2007. Source: 
Encyclopaedia online: http://www.britannica.com 
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Armstrong (1998) has argued that during this period the human, which had provided the 
model of the machine, came in its turn to be modelled on the machine: 'it became increasingly 
possible in the nineteenth century to posit a general relation between bodies and machines in 
which the intentionality of making (the tool) is subsumed to a general logic' (Arm strong, 1998 
p. 81).This view, however, does not account for the initial rationalist attempt to construct a 
new nature. it Is possible, then, that it is the machine (or technology) that Is imagined in terms 
of developing understandings of the human. 123 Steiner (2002) has suggested that attempts to 
find a new human that was symbiotic with the machine set the ground for the later emergence 
of an intellectual focus upon the paradoxical problem that technologies are constructed by 
humans but are intellectually understood in dissimilar terms from the human. This human 
technology paradox, the so-called technicity paradigm, would come to be understood to be at 
the core of human 'dis-ease' in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (The technicity 
paradigm is explored more fully in a subsequent chapter.) Steiner (2002, p. 213) calls upon 
Heidegger's realisation that 'we live in an epoch of technicity. At the root of the epoch of 
technicity lies a belief in rationality as a solution to almost every problem'. 124 However, it is 
plausible to understand this era in wider terms that include as symptomatic the separation of 
the artefact landscape from human schema and, by extension, the separation of humanity 
from technology. 
it will be argued here that the human and the technological are an evolutionary ecological 
condition of the human species. Rather than the nineteenth century being seen as 
characterised by a more complex version of the artefact landscape (outside nature, such that 
any human who occupies that landscape must also be considered outside nature), the 
industrial age can be understood In terms of a more complex ecology. This ecology is 
bounded by the rationalist imagination, set in a landscape but separated from it by the walls 
of the factory, and the boundaries of the industrialised city. lt is possible to understand how: 
'Andrew Ure, to Marx's disgust, [could) describe the factory as a "vast automaton, composed 
of various mechanical and intellectual organs"' (Armstrong, 1998, p. 81). Though Ure may 
have been read by Marx as an attempt to demean the human to that of an organ, it may now 
123 We might think here of growing sophistication in understandings of artificial intelligence as it is driven 
by developing knowledge of human cognition. 
124 Steiner's argument suggests that this points to some deliberate anempt to control workers in an 
industrial setting. There is, of course, no evidence to suggest a widely orchestrated international 
conspiracy. 
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be read as an attempt to struggle towards the description of what we might now understand 
as an ecology. 
Ecologies are energy systems (see Odum, Odum and Frankel, 1977), and an artefact ecology 
can be imagined in similar terms. Rabinbach (1990), again repeating the orthodox 
understanding of technicity, argues that a nineteenth-century belief in energy as a motivating 
force of modernisation led to parallels being drawn with machines that employed energy to 
such great effect (Rabinbach, 1990 pp. 2-5). 125 In De la Mettrie's Man a Machine (1748) there 
is an opportunity to reimagine the human soma in vitalistic terms, as a location of energy 
conversion and transformation within a wider system. 
Nourishment keeps up the movement which fever excites. Without food, the soul 
pines away, goes mad, and dies exhausted. The soul is a taper whose light flares up 
the moment before it goes out. But nourish the body, pour into its veins life-giving 
juices and strong liquors, and then the soul grows strong like them ... Thus a hot 
drink sets into stormy movement the blood, which a cold drink would have calmed. 
(De La Mettrie, 1748) 
De La Mettrie can be interpreted as an attempt to connect the human with a wider ecology. 
However, this more vitalistic imagining was backgrounded in favour of interpretations of his 
treatise as a call for the rationalisation of the body. The orthodox argument suggests that 
attempts to understand and instrumentalise the body were brought about by economic 
imperatives, arising from a perception that workers appeared to be becoming increasingly 
languid. Reiterating the orthodox-view, Doray (1988) has suggested that a perception of the 
dissociated loss of the body from the component of mechanisation was one of the drivers of 
modernism. The worker, suggests Doray (1988, p. 79), 'suffer[s) from the divorce between 
that part of his body which has been instrumentalised and calibrated and the remainder of his 
living personality'. This perceived separation, symptomatic in a new artificial disease 
(neurasthenia), can be posited as the underlying motivation of the modernist movement. 
Neurasthenia, a condition perceived to afflict the inhabitants of industrialised society, became 
a focus of intense study by nineteenth-century science. 
125 Clarke and Dalrymple Henderson (2002) argue that information has come to replace energy in terms of 
representation of technology. 
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The patient is pale and thin, without strength or courage, and always sad and 
dejected. He sees everything from the worst side. He rarely smiles. He goes along with 
his head down, avoiding the looks of others, his eyes languid and dull. He hardly 
dares look people in the face when he speaks to them, and the vagueness of his look 
is as it were a sign of powerlessness, an avowal of his moral strength. He always has 
the gait of a tired man; he is always very sensitive to the cold and is clothed In the 
summer almost as in the winter; his speech is slow, broken and trailing. (Proust and 
Ballet, 1902, p. 3 2) 
Jean-Martin Charcot identified the condition as a product of the industrial age: 'a weakness of 
the will, or nervous system, that pathologically inhibited action' (see Rabinbach, 1990, p. 155). 
Perhaps one of the most widely known texts that engaged with neurasthenia was that of 
Adrian Proust. 126 Director of the French Ministry of Public Health. Rabinbach (1990, p. 157) 
suggests that Proust connected neurasthenia with the 'moral and intellectual pressures' of the 
age. Early twentieth-century modernism, then, would be driven by two apparently 
schizophrenic and divergent intellectual concerns: on the one hand, a move to bring the 
worker back into touch with his instrumentalised self, and, on the other hand, the drive to 
distance humanity from the corrosion and danger of the industrial condition. Jt is arguable 
that this paradox remains at the core of industrial design intellectual discourse, and it is 
perhaps no coincidence that it is at this intellectual juncture that most sustaining narratives of 
industrial design commence. 
The Great Exhibition of 1851 provides the place in history where the majority of sustaining 
narratives of industrial design commence. The orthodox material cultural response to this 
shift is to claim that the exhibition marks a moment described by a sudden surge in demand 
for domestic technologies, tied to an apocryphal rise in domestic income (see, for example, 
Flanders, 2004). There is little, if any, economic evidence to suggest a sudden and dramatic 
change in the financial situation at the moment of the Great Exhibition, nor a sudden and 
visible cultural concern with domestication. If there is no material change at this moment, 
then it is perhaps more plausible to look for a shift in the intellectual dynamic that has led to a 
shift in the imagining of technology. The late nineteenth century is often characterised as a 
period in which those such as Jones (1856), Eastlake (1968) or Dresser (1873), and of course 
Morris (1877), (All can be found in Gorman, 2003) fought an ultimately futile battle to 
126 The father of one of the most Jang uid writers. 
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maintain the values of the agrarian world and handcrafts in the face of industrialisation and 
machine conformity. Most members of the industrial design community are familiar with the 
story that these designers would ultimately lose the intellectual argument to those such as 
Van de Velde (1897) and Veblan (1899), who are posited as the progenitors of the later 
modernists such as lloyd Wright (1901) and, of course, Loos (1910) and who would drive 
ornamentation and the skill of the hand from the aesthetic of the modern. 
To me, and all the cultivated people, ornament does not increase the pleasures of life. 
If I want a piece of gingerbread I will choose one that is completely plain and not a 
piece that represents a baby in arms, or a horse-rider, a piece which is covered over 
and over with decorations. The man of the fifteenth century would not understand me. 
But modern people will. (Loos 1910) 
One orthodox reading of this battle is a story of how designers, tied to emerging concepts of 
economic and sociological theorisations, found a simple, and efficient, aesthetic suitable for 
mechanical production. In this reading, the intellectual force of lloyd Wright (1901) and 
Hoffmann and Moser (1905) swept away craft and craftiness and developed in its stead an 
efficient conformity of aesthetic that could be easily and efficiently reproduced. However, 
there is a more subtle ecological interpretation, missing from industrial design histories, that 
can be tied to a more subtle attempt to resolve the humanity-technology paradox. Where the 
preindustrial mechanical artist had struggled with greater ontological problems that tied the 
morality of his endeavour to the creation of the universe and to the substance of God, the 
designer of the artefact landscape, overcoming God, had sought to construct a humanistic 
model of nature that had eventually come to incorporate humanity into an inhuman condition. 
Then the shift in the representation of technology points to a reimagining that placed the 
individual human at the centre of the topological domain. 
In 1905 Hoffmann and Moser wrote: 'The boundless evil, caused by shoddy mass produced 
goods and by the uncritical imitation of earlier styles, is like a tidal wave sweeping across the 
world' {p. 62). On a simplistic level, this looks like a simple condemnation of the shoddy. 
However, their explicit condemnations of the evil of an aesthetic that harks back to another 
age can be understood as a rejection of an ontological model that is unsustainable if it is 
reproduced without the intellectual location that accompanied its production. In Hoffmann and 
Moser we can sense a shift from a humanist rejection of theological, scholastic underpinnings 
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of the imperative to form the technological artefact towards a new ecology that would place 
the human at the centre of things. However, the humanity-technology paradox prevailed. 
Hoffman and Moser, Lloyd Wright and the other designers could not accept technology as 
anything other than inhuman. In this new landscape the technology would henceforth be 
represented, not as an allegory of the universe, nor as a model of the world at large or of 
species upon it, but as an intimate prosthetic extension of humankind. 
In sustaining narratives of industrial design, this machine age may appear to be a moment 
when the domestication of technology becomes a primary focus of design. But it is also 
delineated in sustaining narratives of industrial design by a dramatic distribution and a 
similarly dramatic shift in the scale of topological domain. Technological artefacts appear 
smaller, with less impact than in previous imaginings. Technological artefacts appear to have a 
diminished material footprint in comparison to their predecessors. These artefacts, being 
imagined at a more intense topological degree, are quieter, and their pollution is dissipated 
into more granular collations in exhausts or, in the case of new electrical motor, as intense 
locations of heat and noise distributed along wires. While the pollution of these individual 
artefacts adds up, individually they account for rather little. The technological artefacts in 
sustaining narratives of industrial design appear to be smaller; they have a scale that appears 
to be oriented about the familiar scale of humans beings. 127 Attempts to resolve the 
neurological disorder of life at the pace of the industrialised world shifted intellectual 
attention towards a view of people as nervous machines of subtle complexity. The focus of 
attention on neurological disorder can be understood to have provided the impetus to a 
significant shift in intellectual attention towards a multiplicity of interpretative and intimate 
conceptions of individualised experience. lt Is also worth noting that the understanding of the 
human In terms of nervous energy and electrical impulses precede the emergence of electrical 
technologies. 
One untold story of the intellectual shift that brought about representations of technologies as 
limbs or extensions of the body is marked by a gradual retreat from the understanding of a 
new nature as a world in which the human might operate towards a realisation of the nature of 
127 We should be reminded here that this new imagining did not herald the end of large technologies, nor 
the machine shops of previous imaginings. lt is also worth reminding ourselves that plenty of artefacts at 
this scale had existed in previous times, but are not included, or represented, in histories with the same 
enthusiasm as the monumental machines or the industrial landscape. 
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humanity itself as an operative and active soma with agency. Technology came to be 
understood less as the world brought under control, but as a limb or extension of human 
reach. Arguably this interpretation holds intellectual precedence to this day. In Taming the 
Tiger Rybczynski (1985, p. 89) argues that 'these prostheses don't fit well, they rub us raw, or 
itch'. This is, of course, a reiteration of Freud, who wrote in Civilisation and its Discontents: 
With every tool man is perfecting his own organs, whether motor or sensory, or is 
removing the limits of their functioning. Motor power places gigantic forces at his 
disposal which, like his muscles he can employ in any direction, thanks to ships and 
aircraft neither water nor air can hinder his movement; by means of spectacles he 
corrects defects in the lens of his own eye; by means of the telescope he sees into the 
far distance. Man has become as it were a kind of prosthetic God. When he puts on all 
his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but these organs have not grown on him 
and they still give him much trouble at times. (Freud, 1961) 
Foster's Prosthetic Gods (2004) is a relatively recent publication that explicitly connects the 
modernist movement with what might be termed a neurological focus of attention. Foster 
charts the emergence of the individual as a 'proper subject' in a chapter with that name. This 
story is characterised by concerns to connect the health in the industrialised world with 
honesty and purity, in the sense of simplicity. Foster suggests that the early modernists allied 
moral degradation to falsehood. This is an epoch marked by a concern to identify psychiatric 
truthfulness, of a bringing-out of repressed and hidden truths and the catharsis of simplicity 
and honesty. lt is a widely held assumption In industrial design scholarship as a time of 
pragmatic, economic efficiency. When one considers the early twentieth century and the 
treatment of neurological disorder, one thinks, of course, of Freud. Civilisation and its 
Discontents was published In 1930, but one should not be mistaken in thinking that Freud's 
uncomfortable and prosthetic vision of mankind resided entirely in his imagination, nor that 
he would have the last word in this respect. Freud reiterates in essence the thesis of others 
such as Ernst Kapp (1877), who had suggested that tools had emerged as projections of 
human organs. Armstrong, citing Herf (1984), locates Kapp in an emergent German 
intellectual culture that 'set a pattern for subsequent [German) authors in placing technical 
advance in the realm of human anthropology .. .' (see Armstrong, 1998, p. 81). This should not 
be thought of as a chronological development, Paul made a similar argument in the late 
1960s: 
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The history of tools is a chronology of extension and articulation of human functions. 
Tools, originally conceived about two million years ago as crude adjuncts of the body to 
increase its power and efficacy, are passive participants in accomplishing work. (Paul, 
1997, p. 133) 
Sussman and Joseph have argued that evidence of the intellectual shift away from the 
humanist model towards a model of technology as prosthesis can be found in the writing of 
Dickens; 
In his comic and fantastic forms Dickens negotiates the limits, the boundaries, and the 
fusion of the human and the mechanical. Rather than accepting the Ruskinian 
opposition of the mechanical and the organic, he absorbed the reconstruction of the 
human in the machine age; the sense of the human machine splice formed and shaped 
his imagination. (Suss man and Jose ph, 2004, p. 626) 
Sussman and joseph extend the ideas explored in Clayton (2003), who finds in Victorian 
English literature a suite of ideas that resonate in contemporary culture. This reminder that 
much contemporary posthumanist and cyber-thought has its origins some century and half 
ago, and indeed in many cases merely echoes arguments made in those times, is pertinent, 
but it should be no surprise. Suss man and Jose ph, by exploring how some ideas that might 
appear to be quite contemporary are evident in Dickens's Dombey and Son, published some 
eighty years before Freud, 128 are part of an emerging intellectual attempt to reconnect the 
present with the past in less linear terms- see, for example, Hayles (1999) or Clarke and 
Dalrymple Henderson (2002). 
Nevertheless, Sussman and Jose ph go some way to illuminating a view of an intellectual 
climate, almost entirely invisible in industrial design histories, that appears to be a subtle, 
intellectual shift from the early humanist model of technology as an encapsulation of the 
world, towards more corporeal models. In Dombey and Son the character of Captain Cuttle 
has, in the way of literary sailors, a hook in replacement of an arm. This prosthesis both 
confines and liberates him. 
128 lt could be argued that Sussman and joseph stretch their analysis rather thinly at times- for example, 
when they draw extended conclusions from a rather conjectural Interpretation of a description of a 
character's teeth as being white as an indication that they were artificial. 
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Captain Cuttle. 
Sussman and Joseph (2004, p. 619) make a rather more subtle suggestion of prosthesis in the 
character of Mrs Skewson: 
The novel-long joke about Mrs Skewton, her Dickensian verbal tick, is that while she 
prattles on about the decline of the natural and the rise of the artificial in modern 
society, she herself epitomises elaborate artifice not only socially but even more, 
materially, given this Cleopatra's infinite variety of bundled devices, the pieces that are 
regularly falling apart [Chapter 13], but which come together in their daily reassemblage 
[sic]. Of course ... there is no significant boundary between the naturalised organic body 
and its artificial extensions, between say, original hair and a wig. 
Sussman and joseph (2004, p. 626) collate and associate Dickens with Babbage, and with Ada 
Lovelace, who saw the imagination of the 'Difference Engine' as a living being that makes 
decisions for itself. lt is significant, of course, that Dickens was a vociferous critic of life in 
industrialised society and the supposed dehumanised existence that the workers suffered. In 
Dickens, if Sussman and Joseph are correct, we can begin to find a form of emancipation that 
looks for a fulfilling life, not through the rejection of inhuman technology, but through 
prosthetic augmentation of the natural. Technology imagined as an artefact limb becomes 
imagined and represented in that topological domain and is represented in the company of, 
and in conjunction with, its organic counterparts. If this shift happened in consequence of a 
deterministic response to a change in the material ity of technology, as it is often supposed, 
then one would expect to f ind evidence of previous monumental forms finding their way into 
the scope of industrial design consideration. This does not happen. Instead we can find this 
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shift of intellectual focus expressed through a particular fetishisation of technological 
artefacts in a topological domain that has resonance with the scale of the human body. 129 
Foster (2004, p. 110) emphasises, on the one hand, the rise of a new model of classicism, 'A 
Return to Order' and the imagination of the artefact landscape that 'proffered the nostalgic 
fiction of an intact body .. .' standing outside it, and, on the other hand, a reiteration of the 
humanity-technology claim of a 'machinic reaction to the very mechanisation of the modern 
body for a new principle of physical being'. Foster attempts to find a new complete human in 
the twentieth century focused upon understandings of the human as something made vital by 
the action of electrical impulses flowing through the nerves and the emergence of the 
psychoanalytical model of the human. But the topological domain was now fixed about the 
particular scale of the human body as it appeared in social and cultural understandings. The 
social and cultural imagining of the artefact owes much to a number of intellectual shifts that 
occurred during the second half of the twentieth century. Industrial design imaginings of 
technology in forms of the culturally determined have become somewhat submerged among 
the plethora of material engaging with the social shaping, and cultural reading, of technology. 
The body has come to be included In this discussion too, and its discussion has become 
somewhat confused with forms of social analysis. lt is now difficult to discuss the human body 
without some reference to its meaning and value as a culturally and socially constructed 
object set at a particular material scale. See, for example, Brodwin's Biotechnology and Culture 
(2001) and also Scheper-Hughes and Wacquant's Commodifying Bodies (2002), in particular-
which opens by reassuring the reader that in contemporary theory the body 'is generally 
treated as a text or a trope or as a metaphor that is "good to think" with, [while) in the larger 
society and in the global economy "the body" is generally viewed and treated as an object, 
albeit a highly fetishised one, and as a "commodity" that can be bartered, sold or stolen .. .' (p. 
18). The emergence of socially constructed models of the human shifted the intellectual 
129 Prosthetic techniclty retained as its starting point the idea that technologies are essentially inhuman. 
Machines were imagined either as extraordinary extensions of the human body or as devices of torture 
that made life uncomfortable. Foster (2004, p. 109) finds this troublesome: 'After Mcluhan 1 will call this 
paradoxical view of technology as both extension and constriction of the body the double logic of 
prosthesis.' lt is arguable that the paradoxical logic in the intellectual climate forced designers into 
aligning themselves either side of this logic, allied with one side or other of an intellectual schism. On the 
one hand, there were those who resisted technology and sought some kind of pre-technological utopia. 
On the other side, there were those who sought some form of post-natural form of humanity. These two 
positions are told in industrial design histories as rather separate events. Frequently industrial design 
histories deal with one story or another, rarely both. If both are considered, they are frequently 
represented as part of a logical and linear development and, In their true emergence, as simultaneous, 
irresolvable logics. 
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ground towards the body as a fixed and bounded topological domain set within a scene of 
social, economic or cultural narratives. 
In more recent times humans have come to be imagined in social and cultural terms as 
collections of interacting groups working and playing together. In this climate designers have 
begun to understand technology in similar terms, as a constructed concept that extends way 
beyond the physicality to include, even in relatively pragmatic conversations, a concept of 
commodity as a metaphorically material construct. Industrial designers have found that terms 
such as materiality are no longer confined to hard materials such as wood, metal and plastics. 
See, for example, Herrmann et al. (1995) and the discussion of material flows in 
manufacturing where materials and commodities are both immaterial and material. To a 
degree the current machine age could be considered by a future generation as characterising a 
new machine age, itself characterised by a further acceleration of material dispersion and de-
densification. 
In the Third Machine Age, the emphasis shifts from 'hardware' to 'software': from 
things to situations and events, with design facilitating experience and environment. 
(Whiteley, 2005) 
In this new machine age, technologies, in keeping with the complexity of prevailing 
theorisation, are beginning to appear as tropes or as a means to understand social and 
cultural transformations. Society and culture must be read, and so imaginings of the human 
and the technological sidestep the prosthetic imagination of a previous age to become 
increasingly intimate and abstract constructions. Some sociologists, such as Latour (1998) and 
Law (see Callon and Law, 1995), have taken the metaphor further, to argue that social 
inventions carry many of the characteristics of materiality when they appear as institutions or 
as rigid codified constructions in the form of laws or social strictures. In engineering terms, 
this materiality is metaphorical or allegorical, except, as it has been argued here, as these 
social interactions are made material in artefacts, themselves fixed at a particular topological 
density. One reason for this shift can be tracked to the emergence in the late twentieth century 
of an intellectual resistance to much of the reductive nature of mid-century science. 
These understandings of the human as a reductive psychology could owe much to the 
emergence of a resistance to behaviourist studies of the human mind. Wundt's late-
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nineteenth-century experiments at Leipzig University and also American research, particularly 
that of William james (2004), could be argued to have established the form and scope of 
psychology as it is understood in contemporary terms. These early psychologists can be 
understood in the context of their emergence in a climate where the human had become 
modelled on somewhat mechanistic models. Early psychology established the idea that human 
behaviour could be regulated. 130 These researches developed somewhat independently from 
the German and Austrian psychoanalytical methodologies. Behaviourism was understood by its 
exponents as a means to predict human behaviour and had some profound influence upon the 
development of design methodology. Cross (2001), for example, has argued that design, as 
we understand it today, is rooted in the scientific understanding of human behaviour. Cross 
recalls Van Doesburg's call for a new spirit in art and design and links this directly to the 
development of behaviourist models. 
Our epoch is hostile to every subjective speculation in art, science, technology, etc. 
The new spirit, which already governs almost all modern life, is opposed to animal 
spontaneity, to nature's domination, to artistic flummery. In order to construct a new 
object we need a method, that is to say an objective system. (Van Doesburg, 1922) 
Others have suggested that behaviourism found application as a means to efficiency in various 
forms through its application in work system models. Behaviourism found a place in factories 
(see Hughes, 2004), and in offices through ideas of work efficiency and time and motion 
studies (see Gilbreth, in Price, 1990). Other Taylorist modes of scientific management were 
applied in advertising, marketing and market-led ideals of design aesthetics (see Kanigel, 
1999). Arguably the challenge to behaviourism and the re-establishment of models of the 
human as a construction of the social and the cultural began in earnest in the 1960s. One 
stimulus of this is perhaps the inadvertent impetus of the American psychologist Burrhus 
Skinner. Skinner (1991), who had developed the 'Operant Conditioning Chamber' in which 
animals gained rewards by responding to learned stimuli, has been identified with attempts to 
broaden the application of behaviourism, and most particularly his attempts to establish a 
model of semantic behaviourism. 131 
130 Pavlov is perhaps the best known today among researchers who established the field of 'classical 
conditioning', which suggested that an entirely predictable and instrumental model of human behaviour 
and action might be eventually discovered and conditioned. 
"' There is some suggestion that it was this text that moved Noam Chomsky to public disagreement. it 
has been suggested that Chomsky misunderstood the subtlety of Skinner's thesis. Nevertheless it is now 
widely held that Chomsky's criticisms of Skinner can at the very least be seen to encapsulate an 
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Operant Conditioning Chamber or Skinner Box. 
Skinner attempted to connect behaviourism to linguistic, mechanistic models of human 
understanding by suggesting that knowledge was externally acquired. For some, Skinner's 
work highlighted the reductive nature of the behaviourist model. Others, such as Chomsky 
had argued vociferously for a significantly more subtle coding of behaviour as a condition 
embodied in deep structures of socially innate behaviour, as a resistance to behaviourist 
models. 
it seems to me [to be an] appropriate form of social organisation for an advanced 
technological society, in which human beings do not have to be forced into the 
position of tools, of cogs in a machine. There is no longer any social necessity for 
human beings to be treated as mechanical elements in the productive process; that 
can be overcome, and we must overcome it, by a society of freedom and free 
association, in which the creative urge that I consider intrinsic to human nature will in 
fact be able to realise itself in whatever way it will .. . (See Chomsky, 2006) 
Chomsky can be understood in terms of the emergence of a resistance to behaviorism. His call 
for a social association has been widely adopted by designers. Technologies, although still 
seen and represented as extrinsic artefacts, are understood for their potential to inveigle their 
way into people's lives. Its domestication implies that technology has shifted in perception 
from that of a grand geographical entity or an animal, to something more intimate and 
culturally constructed. Human life no longer stands back from technology to admire it as a 
triumph of the intellect over the world, nor attempts to husband it by becoming symbiotic with 
it. Rather life begins to be understood to be a cultural construction, played out through 
intellectual move during the second half of the twentieth century, away from behaviourism and towards 
models of the human as a significantly more complex and embodied self- construction. 
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technology in the most intimate ways as an extension of the self. Designers have developed 
complex social and cultural flexibility in their models of technological intervention. Attempts 
to instrumentalise the human have continued to develop and can be found in recent attempts 
to reduce the human to a model in which all life is understood in rather deterministic terms as 
strings of code and predetermined genetic behaviours. Early psychodynamic models of the 
human, developed in response to a supposed neurasthenia, have developed from uncertain 
Freudian psychiatrical models, via behaviourism, into more contemporary developments in 
neuroscientific research. In the same terms, early models of the human rooted in the rhetoric 
of class-based models of taste and social behaviour have developed into more recent models 
of complex situated activity and actor network models. These developments have fed one 
another, transcended changes in politics, driven and responded to technological development 
and fed into wider conversation in the public consciousness as ideas that are now embedded 
in culture. Nonetheless, the human body remains a fluid construct, the subject of fashion and 
of much critical debate. 
The body occupies a location that is both continuous (we can, for example, recognise our 
ancestors) and yet discontinuous. Bodies change scale and shape, as environmental and 
cultural determinant forces act upon it in the imagination. Humans modify their bodies. 
Sometimes this modification is transitory, such as in the shaping of the hair, and sometimes 
the changes are permanent, as in staining with ink, or scarring, or the consequence of some 
repeated activity or injury- deliberate or otherwise. The human in history has been shaped 
and scaled by diet, by posture, by fashion and by socially constructed behaviours and 
postures. Through a history of the chair, Cranz has demonstrated that the body is conditioned 
by posture, although it is often viewed as a fixed entity. While we can recognise human bodies 
in history and empathise with those who lived in those times, it can be shown that ideas of 
what it is to be comfortable are not fixed and without history (see Cranz, 2000). 
Demonstrably, comfort, which might appear to be an entirely physiological condition, is 
shaped by culture too. 'A family in republican Rome would dine together in the following 
hierarchy: the father would be served recumbent on a couch, the mother would sit nearby on a 
chair, while the children would sit on stools (as they did at school) .. .' (Cranz, 2000, p. 15). 
The Visigoths, Cranz suggests, did not use furniture at all; they were most comfortable 
squatting and, despite the opportunity to adopt furniture from Roman culture, declined the 
prospect. The body is a political site, a fetishised, voyeuristic and sexualised minefield of 
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complex discussion and rhetoric. However, in industrial design analysis, the body tends to 
occupy a more stable position in discussion, where it is represented in a manner that is 
somewhat fixed and empirical and imagined in the same topological terms as the artefacts 
with which industrial design populates its narratives. 
lt has been argued here that the artefact provides only a snapshot of culture and is imagined 
in topological terms that have resonance with lmaginings of the human scale that brings it 
close to the scale of imagination. The body, though, is rather fixed in topological imagination. 
This inflects how it is imagined to operate in the world. For example, Verplank's description 
(2004) of design in an academic briefing as a process of creating artefacts for humans to 
'sens[e) and displaying information (to all our senses)' provides only a limited conception of 
how humans function. In Verplank's description, the noetic is prioritised over the anoetic. 
Verplant finds a problem with the 'ambient', background or peripheral information, which, 
Verplank suggests, is more likely to be fuzzy or emotional than precise or definitive. For 
Verplank the problematic ambient can be made less problematic by making it available for 
people in a form they can readily understand. 'Tangible interactions involve explicit contact 
with hands and bodies not remote sensing and inference' (Verplank, 2004). This is a human 
body, and its sensing apparatus is imagined by a designer from an artefact standpoint. The 
imagination of the world as a series of resolved artefacts at a fixed topology now pervades 
thinking, even in attempts to imagine design in a broader more sensual and experiential 
frame. For example, Andrea Branzi, attempting to understand the role of the senses in design, 
suggests: 
Sensoriality is a very important component of design, because human beings always 
establish a complex relation with the artefacts that surround them. A relation in which 
sensorial experience, tactile and olfactory experience, has as much importance as 
aesthetic and functional qualities. (cited in Burkhardt and Morozzi, 1997, p. 78) 
However, he returns immediately to a tactile, artefact imagining of sensuality: 
People like and choose artefacts for their weight, for their resemblance with other 
artefacts ... this kind of instinctive relationship that exists between man and man, 
man and artefact, is such that there will never exist sure-fire formulas for success in 
design. (cited in Burkhardt and Morozzi, 1997, p. 78) 
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Such a view depends upon an understanding .of the human body as something as tangible as 
the media with which it interacts. This is a very limited view of the human body's sensorial 
engagement with the world. The artefact body is most frequently presented and considered in 
contemporary analysis as an artefact; its consideration is intellectually located with theories of 
the material, and in cultural terms at a given, and fixed, degree of granularity. The physical 
body is stable and provides a fixed locus in the imaginary conception of the artefact. Because 
technologies are imagined in terms of prosthetic extensions of the body, it has seemed 
reasonable enough to take the ineffable and to shift it to a granular scale that is 
commensurate with the imagined granular scale of the body. 
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Chapter six 
Recovery towards autonomy: steps towards a fluid 
conception of human- technological relationships 
6.1 The opportunities that biotechnology offers to the conceptualisation of technology 
If artefacts are understood to be only as material as the complexity of their analysis, 
then it is possible to take a view that the biotechnology imperative is determined, not 
by the development of a new form of technology, but by an emergent intellectual 
understanding of the human as a molecular collusion. 
6.2 The imperative of valence: The material site of interaction 
The process of humanising technology can be understood in terms of a process in 
which valence is maintained between the intellectual logic of the world and its 
manifestation in the material artefact. 
6.3 Humanity and the enacted moment as a hybrid condition 
Actor-Network Theory: the materialisation of artefacts from the valence of hybrid social 
and cultural energies. Humanity can now no longer be considered as anything other 
than a hybrid condition. 
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6.1 The opponunities that biotechnology offers to the conceptualisation of technology 
If artefacts are understood to be only as material as the complexity of their analysis, 
then it is possible to take a view that the biotechnology imperative is determined, not 
by the development of a new form of technology, but by an emergent intellectual 
understanding of the human as a molecular collusion. 
lt has been argued here that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be understood in 
terms of an intellectual shift from the relative simple imagining of technology as a landscape, 
towards an increasingly complex understanding of technology as a prosthetic, inhuman 
extension of humanity. This period in the trajectory of human knowledge can be understood 
as an imagining that gradually de-densified, from a solid, extrinsic imagining of the human as 
one who observed the landscape towards a view of the world as more intimately involved in 
the human. This shift tracks in many ways the scientific shift from large masses and planetary 
movements towards the atomic research of the late nineteenth century and shifts in the 
physics of energy management, from rather simple thermodynamics to more complex and 
subtle electromagnetics. Similar shifts can be found in politics and the move from grandiose 
imaginings of heroic nationalism towards more focused concerns with subtle politics and 
diplomacy. This broad intellectual shift is reflected too in understandings of the function of 
the human body and the meaning of what it is to be human in terms of the natural world. The 
machine ages have been claimed as indications of a series of moves from the general to the 
specific and shifts in a process of realignment in understandings of the interaction between 
humanity and technology. With each move, technology in a given form was no longer viable as 
a focus of consideration if its understanding moved out of step with a prevailing topological 
domain that provided the focus of intellectual imagination. For example, in a domain focusing 
upon the body as a location of nervous energy, the imagination of the machine as a 
monument was necessarily replaced by an intellectual imagining of technology as a prosthetic 
extension of the human body. Accordingly, the scale of technology became imagined at the 
scale of the human body, rather than at a more global scale. 
These shifts, it has been argued, are visible in sustaining narratives of industrial design and 
are not chronologically connected or driven by the material manifestation of technology. 
Rather, this material manifestation is symptomatic of an intellectual shift. If the machine ages 
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are reflexive and it takes time for the shift in intellectual positions to gain sufficient 
momentum to impact on the design community, then there must be some point at which the 
intellectual.climate becomes irresistible to the design community and gains sufficient 
momentum in order to effect change. This delay may be caused, at least in part, by an 
established and historic distancing of industrial design from mainstream intellectual debate. 
This alienation suggests designers are likely to effect change within their own community only 
through the engagement with ideas in their own terms. We might think that a moment of 
intellectual shift refers to the moment of recognition, albeit in reflection, by the industrial 
design community that a topological domain change is required. lt is only in the moment of 
recognition that the intellectual climate has reached an impasse with a particular 
manifestation of artefacts that a crisis becomes apparent to those, including industrial 
designers, who are responsible for their realisation. This would suggest, then, that designers 
can only refocus their attention upon the material artefact when the intellectual climate 
becomes meaningful in their terms. If the sustaining narratives of industrial design reinforce 
the idea that industrial design is described through changes in the material manifestation of 
technology, then it is not surprising that designers might assume that changes in form should 
determine intellectual reactions. However, if this were the case, then most of the machine ages 
should, by all accounts, have begun somewhat earlier, with the emergence of the technologies 
that characterise them. If a new machine age is prescient, then there should be some evidence 
of a prior intellectual shift in the topological domain. lt is possible to suggest that 
biotechnology has become viable in consequence of a realigned focus at a more molecular 
scale. 
The logic of a molecular domain invites a new imagining of the human. As this new imagining 
embeds, it is likely, if the trajectory of history is maintained, to give rise to a shift in the 
intellectual imagining of technology and to a further de-densification of the analysis of 
materiality. In keeping with the intellectual terms of the molecule, the artefacts of this age will 
be minuscule and almost infinitely dispersed. The artefacts of a future machine age will 
insinuate themselves into the fabric of everything because they will mirror the intellectual 
imagining of the molecular. When we speak of atoms and molecules, the ordinary logic of the 
world in terms of simple lumps of matter is replaced by an intellectual climate demanding an 
analysis of distributed and coextensive fields. This age may reside some way in the future, but 
its intellectual foundations are already well established. Industrial design appears to be out of 
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step with the intellectual climate in which it finds itself, because it has not shifted its 
understanding of the artefact in line with developing intellectual understandings of the world. 
A molecular topology invite·s an understanding of the world at a degree of intense subtlety, 
such that it becomes almost impossible to imagine the human in terms of components rather 
than continuity. This suggests that, In this topological domain, the human cannot be isolated 
from the technological. One might choose to Imagine this interaction as a finer and finer 
sifting of grains and to retain an intellectual stance maintaining the human and the 
technological in separate epistemes. However, at the molecular level the sifting takes place at 
such a degree of finite resolution that it becomes no longer plausible to separate epistemes 
than it is possible in physics to identify discrete boundaries between matter. This is true of 
any physical analysis and is also likely to apply in any emerging intellectual cultural and social 
analysis. 
We are now crossing the fourth discontinuity. No longer do we have to choose 
between the living or the mechanical because that distinction is no longer meaningful. 
Indeed, the most meaningful discoveries in this coming century are bound to those 
that celebrate, explore, and exploit the unified quality of technology and life ... As we 
make our machines and institutions more complex, we have to make them more 
biological in order to manage them ... As we shape technology, it shapes us. We are 
connecting everything to everything, and so our entire culture is migrating to a 
'network culture' and a new network economics. (Kelly, 1995, ch6-g) 
Given the fluidity of understandings of technology and humanity, surveys of histories suggest 
that the key intellectual task of those who orchestrate artefacts, most recently industrial 
designers, appears to be the maintenance of some kind of material logic in this relationship, 
in order that daily life appears coherent. Through this process, the essential value of the 
industrial designer's intellect is to ensure that human values are maintained, in so much as 
lives are meaningfully lived out through technologies materialised to a degree commensurate 
with intellectual imaginings of the world. lt appears from a survey of histories that the 
machine ages are a reflective response by the industrial design community, which reimagines 
the artefact at a scale that maintains valence with prevailing topological domains. Given this 
trajectory, it is possible to anticipate that the focus of intellectual engagement with the 
biotechnological logic could manifest as a further shift. However, the comparative silence 
within the industrial design community indicates, either that this intellectual crisis has not yet 
occurred, and industrial designers are yet to comprehend the impact of a shift in the 
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intellectual climate, or that industrial designers are aware of the shift but are not well placed 
intellectually to engage with the scale and subtlety of the analysis necessary. 
The machine ages have demonstrated a consistent shift in the scale of intellectual 
understanding of the human and, by extension, human technology interaction towards 
increasingly finite and atomic resolution. Recent understandings have drawn attention towards 
understandings of the human as a complex and distributed social construction. Molecular 
logic appears, then, to demand a particular intellectual re-engagement. Industrial designers 
have demonstrated that they are able intellectually to engage with complex, distributed and 
social models of the human. If industrial designers can liberate their thinking from the 
constraints applied to their imagination by a narrative that enforces a trajectory of 
engagements with a particular form of materiality, then there is no reason to suggest they are 
not up to this task. Pehaps they will only be ready to engage with this when they turn their 
attention away from the deterministic idea that technological form drives the imagination. lt is 
extraordinary that they should make this assumption, given that they themselves carry such a 
degree of responsibility for the formal logic of the artefact in the first place. 
Limiting our discussion to the field of Industrial Design, we can note that, in the face 
of the presumed demateriallsation of the world, its transformation into a virtual reality 
becomes ever more involving and convincing. The sense of satisfaction is delegated to 
the image and the illusion of what is virtual rather than to the material and multi-
sensorial fruition of the physicality of things. What we perceive, however, is a distinct 
need for physicality, for recuperating a strong, sensorial quality. (Volsi, 2007) 
Perhaps one way to start a more productive conversation might be to consider how those who 
deal with the world at the atomic scale make sense of their reality. 
6.2 The imperative of valence: The material site of interaction 
The process of humanising technology can be understood in terms of a process in 
which valence is maintained between the intellectual logic of the world and its 
manifestation in the material artefact. 
In 1916 Gilbert N. Lewis published The Atom and the Molecule (Lewis, 1916), considered 
within the physics community to be the founding paper of a branch of physics called Valence 
Bond Theory (see Brown, 2006). Valence Bond Theory is, in essence, the scientific terminology 
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for the study, at the risk of huge reduction, of what makes atoms and molecules stick together 
and why some are prone to do this and others are not (see Murrel et al., 1978). 
Pippa Wilson's 132 images of the Atomium (Architect, And re Waterkeyn) and a familiar scientific 
demonstrational model of a molecule. 
Lewis developed the means of representing valence by lines and dots. In models we are 
familiar with from school, valence is represented by the mysterious sticks that hold the balls 
together and apart in atomic models, or the corridors in the Atomium. 133 There are no sticks, 
of course, in an atom or a molecule, but they are necessary in the models and in the building, 
because there is no other, efficient, means of holding the spheres in place. In physics, as it is 
currently interpreted, valence is understood in terms that are more complex and subtle than 
the structural and determinant forces that were imagined when the stick models were 
developed. 
132 See: http://pippawilson.blogspot.com/2006_12_0Larchive.html 
133 Lewis can be thought of as sitting somewhere between nineteenth-century mechanical models of 
bonding and later quantum models of wave bonding (see Murrel et al., 1978). 
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Quantum model. The shading indicates the 
probability of an electron in any position. 
Physicists, who talk in terms of quanta, understand the atom, not as a rigid form, as the 
models and the Atomium might suggest, but as a field of probabilities. The determining forces 
that enact valence are related to the probability of a particle being in any given point in space. 
This probability forms atoms in a particular configuration in any particular quantum reality. 
The representation of the probability field presents a very different conception of materiality in 
which complex and fuzzy relations of probability, rather than rigid structures, prevail. 
The designer Ben Fry (2004) is an information architect who builds 'visual representations of 
large bodies of information'. Fry produced 'Valence', a series of graphical representations of 
text sources as data that dynamically align words dependent upon their importance in a text 
and then join words together in order to form a kind of textual artefact. 
The premise is that the best way to understand a large body of information, whether 
it's a 200,000 word book, usage data from a web site, or financial transaction 
information between two multinational corporations, is to provide a feel for general 
trends and anomalies in the data, by providing a qualitative slice into how the 
information is structured. (Fry, 2004) 
Fry applies a kind of nominal determinant force to the importance of complex data sets in 
order to construct a form of visually represented artefact. Fry's artefacts are very subtle. 
Images of them do not transfer well to print and are perhaps best viewed on Fry's MIT website 
(see Fry, 2004). The nominal force is determined by any number of vectors: frequency of 
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occurrence, scale, and so on. Valence, then, is a determination that holds 'stuff' together. Fry 
demonstrates, in principle at least, how changes to the determinant construction can produce 
radically differing outcomes that appear to have a coherence of their own. The artefacts 
reproduced and used to drive the sustaining narratives of industrial design appear to be 
materiality suspended in time and space. The exact nature of valence is a matter of intense 
complexity and, being a probability, is subject to a significant degree of uncertainty. In 
physics, enormous intellectual and engineering efforts and a great deal of money have been 
spent on the concentrated attempts to discover and observe the fundamental interactions that 
underpin all phenomena. 134 Science suggests that the universe is, then, held together by an 
unimaginable, perhaps infinite, number of forces of infinite weakness. Anyone attempting to 
understand the forces holding culture together are likely, given quantum logic, to discover 
those forces to be similarly numerous and similarly weak. The isolation of these forces would 
seem likely to require an investment similar in scale to that employed by physics. Too many 
texts, however, claim one truth or another, when in reality almost any truth is possible, being 
only a matter of probability. De Landa, finding such a task too complex to be useful, sidesteps 
the need to think about what might actually construe the forces that make the 'stuff' of 
culture stick together, but takes a wider view and builds a picture of a self-emergent, 
autopoietic world. His argument is that culture bears a resonant similarity with the universal 
processes that give rise to life. That is life, of course, as a universal concept rather than as an 
evaluative social construct. 
In scientific terms, if valence is too strong, matter (in terms of how it appears to us at least) 
implodes and compacts. At an ultimate degree of strong valence, this compaction forms a 
black hole. If valence is weak, matter flies apart. At an ultimate degree of weak valence, the 
universe retreats to entropy. This valence is determined by energy. In physics it has been 
proposed that fundamental energy is produced by 'strings'. By analogy to cultural analysis, the 
only place one can look for energy is in the analysis applied by humans. This appears to be an 
inverse process where unsubtle analysis produces robust but unsubtle artefacts, and the 
products of subtle analysis are prone to the ephemeral. To illustrate this, traction engines are 
made of atoms and rely upon complex thermodynamic energetic transformations, but in 
134 These interactions are the 'Strong', Electromagnetic' and the 'Weak'. 'Gravity' is rather different to 
these interactions in that it is considerably weaker than the others. This weakness in turn has made it 
rather difficult to understand and despite much research the true nature of these determinant forces still 
eludes science. 
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industrial design history it is doubtful if we would speak of them in those terms. We might 
understand artefacts in energetic terms. The artefact 'plough' is a means to capture and 
redirect the forward momentum arising from the energy of the animal pulling it. The plough 
redirects this energy through angular momentum, into a determinant force sufficient to lift 
and turn soil. The soil itself has mass and density, and the plough must necessarily be 
constructed to have a greater density. Were the plough to have less density or insufficient 
mass, then it would itself be broken by the soil. 
Today we understand energy as the fundamental principle underpinning all matter; density 
and mass are products of particular energetic conditions. The energy necessary for the plough 
to resist the soil must be put into the system, and this happens in the blacksmith's shop or in 
the carpenter's workshop. The plough has energetic density where it needs to be dense; wood 
is shaped to make the energetic connections between the farmer and the land and the animal. 
lt is a mistake to talk about the plough as if it were an isolated entity, when it could be 
understood as a valent materialisation of physical and intellectual energy. The ploughman and 
the artefact are in effect a system that extends into flesh, wood, metal, soil and ultimately the 
infinite complexity of the universe. For example, we might consider the developing 
relationship between the cockpit, the control tower and the runway and an emergent history of 
automation and the social expectation of safety. 
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'The product' as a solely physical entity is an illusion of the mechanistic era which 
can no longer be sustained in an age preoccupied with information ... ' (Mitchell, 1988). 
This history might consider the runway as an artefact in itself and its developing history, from 
a simple designation of grassland, to becoming a surfaced strip and more latterly a 
sophisticated assemblage of interacting navigation and lighting technologies. 
6.3 Humanity and the enacted moment as a hybrid condition 
Actor-Network Theory: The materialisation of artefacts from the valence of hybrid social 
and cultural energies. Humanity can now no longer be considered as anything other 
than a hybrid condition. 
Sociology is one of the ways in which we can understand the forces that shape culture. In 
recent years there has been an intellectual move away from a view of human society and 
culture as somehow ordered and structured. In its place, a new view has emerged that 
reconnects humanity with other more universal systems of analysis that recognise systems 
that are emerging from supercomplex combinations of rather tiny effects. When analysed for 
subtle interactions, society and cultures are coming to be understood as comparable to 
swarming or flocking behaviour. Imagine that we might wish to understand rather than to 
admire the awesome spectacle of a swirling flock of starlings gathering in the autumn before 
migration. Broad analysis can recount only the overall dynamic of the flock; it can tell us little 
more than we can see with our own eyes. Broad analysis can account for the general behaviour 
of the flock, swirling around fixed geographies. These accounts can describe the scale of the 
flock but cannot predict its movement except in the most general terms. In physics the 
valence holding the fundamental particles of matter together is not a unidirectional force but 
is referred to as an 'interactional coupling' (see, for example, Griffiths, 1987). The notion of 
these interactions has provided some designers, particularly in the field of human computer 
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interaction, with a metaphorical and strategic means to develop strategies enabling useful and 
stable systems. David Pinelle and Carl Gutwin at 'The Interaction Lab. University of 
Saskatchewan' (see Saskatchewan HCI. 2006), for example, use the concept of interactional 
couplings employed by a social and work group as a means to design a system for mobile 
workers (Pinelle and Gutwin, 2003). Pinelle and Gutwin refer to Orton and Weick's notion of 
coupled systems as a social management tool (see Orton and Weick, 1990) and extend the 
concept into the field of Computer Supported Cooperative Work. In a section where he 
discusses the granularity of interactions, Gedenryd (1998, pp. 131-2) describes how people 
'check with the world' frequently and with varying degrees of interactional granularity. 135 In 
swarming or flocking behaviour this interactional force is referred to as chains of reaction: 
chains of reaction that bind us together as communities, ecosystems, societies, 
cultures. As we all strive to adapt to one another, only some self-consistent collective 
patterns are possible for the whole swarm. They are the patterns of emergent order 
and organization ... (Bogh-Andersen et al., 2000) 
Heidegger places the everyday engagement with technology at the centre of his analysis and 
reveals much of what an industrial designer might understand in a codified and productive, 
formal, philosophical analysis. Heidegger's writing is complex. His is the language of the 
philosopher and not of the designer. Nevertheless his concerns are intimately tied to those of 
design. Gorner (200S) has suggested that Heidegger wants to understand how technologies 
can be possible, 136 and this would seem to be something of the territory of the industrial 
designer. Gorner (2005) provides a particularly clear overview of Heidegger's enframed (see 
115 Gedenryd, concerned with understanding the intellectual process of designing, cites an example of an 
everyday instructional conversation in order to demonstrate how interaction or coupling becomes 
increasingly intense, subtle and complex as it focuses. This should not surprise us; our postal addresses 
mirror this intensity. The early instructions deal with artefacts of larger scale, shops, streets, phone boxes. 
As the Intensity and focus increase, the artefacts become smaller and smaller; a gate, a lock, a key. The 
geographic location and interaction space shrinks too, from large urban spaces down to intense 
interactions with small artefacts. The world is made up then of many interactions of varying and changing 
intensity. When we give directions to someone who is remote, we tend to be precise and linear. (1} Take 
the first left by the shop and then go right at the phone box and then left again into the gate. The person 
reading the instructions reacts to them; there is no interaction. However the same instructions in the 
context of a face-to -ace or verbal exchange via mobile phone are likely to be quite different. (1) Take the 
first left by the shop. (2) The sweet shop? (Person 2 has the opportunity to confirm Instructions) (1) Yes, 
then go right at the phone box, OK7 (Checks to see the instructions are understood) (2) OK (They confirm 
they understand) (1) Good, now go left into the gate. (2) What colour is the gate? (1) Black (2) Will it be 
locked (1) Oh yes, sorry. The key is under the flower pot. 
136 When confronted with a new project, an industrial designer must always enquire why an intervention Is 
necessary at all; why design something new when the world has previously got on well enough without it. 
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Heldegger, 1962) 137 understanding of the human in the world and the role of technology in 
the processes that give rise to 'being'. Heidegger is not concerned to suggest that other ways 
of understanding people are not valid, and there is much to connect sociological views of 
humanity with the rather individualised scrutiny he employs. This is particularly important 
when Heldegger considers technology. While other philosophers take moral or linguistic 
approaches to understand what it is to be human, Heidegger's heritage resides in attempts to 
look at what in essence it is to be a human in the world, and he implicates technology 
Intimately in this process. Heidegger distances the idea of being from the necessity to attach it 
to the world. His fundamental approach, employing the term Dasein, describes an entity that 
reflects upon, and understands, itself. Dasein is not necessarily human but a product of self-
awareness. 138 The relationship designers might have with Heidegger is not without its 
tensions. In 'The Question Concerning Technology' Heidegger moves away from a rather 
broader phenomenological investigation of being to place rather closer attention upon the 
meaning of technology in the process of being. Heidegger suggests that technologies are 
constructed in a manner such that they obscure the true essence of Dasein and that life in a 
de-technologised world would somehow prove more invigorating. Heidegger argues that the 
drive of modernism forced technology into a condition where it became ready for use but not 
active in cognition (bestanden). Heidegger proposes that this drive was a dehumanising 
activity because it deludedDasein into a false phenomenological perception of its true 
condition. This would seem to run counter to the success of industrial design In making the 
extraordinary ordinary, but it goes some way towards understanding the impetus behind 
social and cultural design. In this context the thrust driving industrial design to understand 
and orchestrate the cultural forces shaping the artefacts it produces can be understood as a 
response to critics of modernism who cite Heidegger's analysis of the erasure of narratives 
(indebtedness). Social design acts upon an assumption that it might be possible to create a 
richer experience of life by revealing some of the processes through which the 'stuff' of 
culture emerges. One example of this call is evident in McCullough's suggestion (2001) that 
137 This problem of possibility is particularly evident in Heidegger's 1927 Being and Time (see Heidegger, 
1962) and also, although somewhat differently, in his later lectures of 1956 'The Question Concerning 
Technology' (Heldegger, 1956). Between the two positions outlined in these lectures, Heidegger moved 
from a pure, phenomenological and philosophical analysis, which might have been rooted in almost any 
era, towards a more applied analysis of the emerging, technologised world of the second half of the 
twentieth century. The latter analysis is more complex and arguably more troubled. Heidegger's criticism 
of modernism in the former text is extended into the terrifying prospect of the nuclear era, and much of 
the earlier engagement with individualised being is lost. 
138 So Heidegger avoids being drawn into the increasingly debatable notion that humans alone, and not 
animals, possess self-awareness. 
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persistent conceptual models prevailing in the West stifle the means to deal with the 
environmental consequences of technological damage. Constructing an argument from a 
theological perspective, McCullough suggests that this understanding has emerged in 
consequence of late scholastic thought and in particular the emergence of scientific thought 
and the breaking from the Aristotelian logic of indebtedness. McCullough illustrates this by 
drawing upon Heidegger, with the example of a 'modern' central heating boiler compared to 
the wood stove, its 'pre-modern' counterpart. McCullough suggests that the wood stove 
draws upon its 'indebtedness' to the social and cultural systems that support it: 'the mother 
built the fire, the children kept the firebox filled, and the father cut the firewood, lt provided 
for the entire family a regular and bodily engagement with the rhythm of the seasons ... '. The 
central heating boiler, on the other hand, hides its indebtedness, hidden within a metal shell, 
which is usually hidden in the basement of the house and powered by a source of which we 
are oblivious. The furnace reveals itself by means of a small control unit; it hides that to which 
it is indebted. In the case of the boiler, this is the network of energy supply and production 
without which it could not exist. The wood stove - as McCullough reiterates - brings its causes 
into the open. The boiler is bestanden (Heidegger, 1953); that is, it can be thought of only as 
something ready for use. Heidegger suggests that a machine such as the boiler erases the 
essence of being in the world and replaces it with the conformity and precision of 'disposition' 
- that is, a habit. McCullough's argument is that contemporary technology has somehow cut 
people off from their engagement with the world by erasing the complexity of the interaction 
with the technology in question. We must ask where one might stop this process of recovering 
erasure, or whether it is possible at all. For every debt that is revealed another debt is revealed 
further back into evolution. The boiler erases the debts of the wood stove, which has itself 
erased the debts of the fire. 
What is often missed in this kind of discussion and in critiques of modernity is that 
technologies become bestanden, not by accident, but because they are designed and 
constructed that way. In the case of the boiler, a conscious intellectual decision is made to 
background the technology such that heat and comfort can be brought to the fore and the 
forces of cultural inclusion have drawn the boiler into usefulness because the grinding social 
process of gathering wood can be escaped. The wood stove is not some paragon of a 
picturesque ideal. That it erases the family engaged in the struggle to fight the cold in their 
home is not necessarily a bad thing. Arguably, that the struggle should have value could hint 
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at something more politically sinister. The indebted heritage of the wood stove is a story of 
the grinding labour of the peasant, and not of the aristocrat who wakes to find his fire ablaze, 
quietly self-cleaning and always bestanden. The socialist underpinning of the Bauhaus and 
early modernism can be seen to be at odds with Heidegger's developing political tendencies. 
The evidence from more recently published sustaining narratives of industrial design Is that 
the intellectual engagement with the ontology of the machine age is beginning to disappear 
from industrial design histories. Without this history, industrial design can appear as the 
lackey of industrialisation, modernism and a supposed malaevolent attempt to erase the art of 
lifes narratives. In that way the process of humanising technology is posited as a cultural 
restoration. The older histories such as Teague (1940) or Banham (1955) and more recently 
Wilson, Pilgrim, and Tashjian's more focused history (Wilson et al. 1986) demonstrate how the 
industrial designers of the early twentieth century realised that it would be both dishonest and 
uneconomic to do anything other than build an aesthetic of the age of the machine. This 
aesthetic cannot be understood as a mere stylistic surface decoration, but must rather be seen 
as an explicit attempt to find a form by which technology can draw upon a new sense of 
history and narrative contextual I sed in a progressive egalitarianism. Rather than aping a 
modality from an earlier age, where some historical and mystical narrative would be visible in 
the technology, the new machine age would find an entirely new aesthetic, built in the present 
and lived within the present. Adolf Loos (1910) thought decoration was a manifestation of the 
corruption of the humble in favour of the wealthy. 'My shoes are covered all over with 
ornaments, which result from notches and holes: work which the cobbler carried out and 
which he was not paid for'. Loos extends his argument in favour of simplicity. If a simple 
aesthetic style can be built, it will erase unnecessary ornamentation and thereby erase wasted 
labour. 'The Chinese carver works sixteen hours, the American labourer works eight hours. If I 
pay as much for a plain box as I would for an ornamented one, then the difference is in 
working hours' (Loos, 1910). The modern aesthetic, then, is imbued with the drive towards a 
poetic aesthetic of life in a new narrative of the machine age. To imply loss, as many do, is to 
run the risk of a retreat into nostalgia and some idealised condition where one imagines 
oneself in the rarefied world supported by the virtuous toil of others. 
Roe Smith and Marx (1994) alert us that technologies are drawn into use by some obvious 
advantage that they afford. Today many people have both options available to them. An open 
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fire may well act as a communal focus. A central heating boiler may erase this, but it opens 
space for other familial or community activities, one of which may be the occasional use of a 
wood stove. People are rather good at finding a balance that suits their lives. The ecstatic 
communion with nature in the process of gathering wood has become the ecstatic bringing of 
warmth to the body and the creative act of living out one's life without owing a debt to the 
cold. In a warm space, individual relationships and ecstatic happening can occur. 139 lt Is 
always possible, of course, to sell something by creating a fictional debt, as in the case of the 
new BMW Mini. Giedion (1948. pp. 188-201 examined the production of bread and points to 
the necessity of finding some value to promote other than the honesty and quality of its 
production.) lt has been argued here that the BMW Mini requires an explicit campaign to 
support its semiotic reference to the past. 
Industrial design has attempted to reveal indebtedness directly in the artefact itself. One way 
of understanding the doctrine of functionalism is as an explicit attempt to reveal the function 
and process to which mechanical technologies are indebted. In this logic, the boiler would, 
through some means, express its heat and the network to which it was indebted. With 
electronic artefacts this expression of indebteness necessarily shifted. In the example of 
Krohn's answering machine, cited above, then was an erroneous attempt to reveal both a 
previous technology and a social and cultural semiotic to which it was imagined the artefact 
was indebted. This was a mistake, because the machine Krohn designed had no real resonance 
In history; the device she designed was not a telephone book. Although it bore some 
superficial similarity, it had an entirely different human and social function. The boiler Is not a 
version of the wood stove. lt may bear some superficial simplicity, but its presence only as an 
insignificant ambience, makes it more akin to a device enabling a change in the weather. The 
ambient temperature is raised and the occupants of the room can get on with their lives, no 
richer and no poorer for the experience. The boiler is not humanised by connecting it back, 
out of bestanden, any more than one is dehumanised by a sudden turn to warmer weather. 
139 There may be some pleasure in gathering wood, but its necessity removes the opportunity for other 
acts of creativity. lt may be the case that central heating generates an unsustainable expectation of 
constant warmth, produces unsustainable quantities of carbon dioxide and has removed the narratives 
associated with warm clothing, cold rooms and families gathered around the stove. lt is another more 
political argument to suggest that the erasure of these narratives is problematical. lt is a political stance to 
suggest that a sustainable life is made possible only by the reintroduaion of narratives of suffering. This 
approach reverses engineers' design without heeding the forces shaping the design processes it analyses. 
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Sociologists have spent much of the second half of the twentieth century attempting to resolve 
the differing demands of their various methodologies. In recent years some sociologists, such 
as Latour and Callon, have criticised the impetus to account for the individual within a broader 
scope of structural analysis, which, they claim, characterised twentieth-century sociology. The 
work of Latour and Callon can be included among a number of recent moves in sociological 
thinking that look for connectivity rather than structural rigidity in relations. These new 
approaches look for networks of relations that can be cited simultaneously in both the 
individual and the wider social world as lived activities. Among these new approaches to 
sociology are a number of methodologies that are described as being 'material-semiotic' -
that is, they analyse both the material and the semiotic simultaneously in any given situation. 
One particular form of material-semiotic analysis, the so-called Actor-Network Theory or ANT 
( Latour, 2005; see Law and Hassard, 1999), can be understood as an attempt to resolve a 
perceptual separation in sociological thinking between the world as it is non-human (artefact, 
technology, and so on) and conceptual (institutions, organisations, events, and so on) (see 
Latour, 2005). Because ANT bases its analysis upon the use of artefacts in culture, it resides 
very close to the analytical territory of the industrial designer. ANT also tends to be 
constructed in a rather accessible language. 140 
M. Michael's Reconnecting Culture, Technology and Nature (2000) demands neither a 
specialist engagement nor a familiarity with the terminology and method of sociology. Michael 
uses everyday artefacts as a means to extract the social relations at play in the activities with 
which they are associated. Michael focuses his attention upon a number of 'mundane 
technologies' such as the walking boot or the TV remote control. He makes no reference to 
the deliberate design intent that is embodied in these artefacts but rather plays the story 
backwards, as is the nature of ANT, to reveal something of the many factors that go into 
processes of utilisation and evaluation. ANT, it could be argued, is weakened by a failure to 
include the added complexity of the designer's intervention in its analysis. On the other hand, 
this absence focuses attention upon the lived consequences of the designer's intellectual 
interventions from the perspective of the active agency of the life in question. This is a rather 
different approach from sustaining narratives of industrial design, which focus attention, 
140 Where others, such as Lemke (1995), are difficult to understand without a sophisticated language of 
the sociologist, Latour writes with particular clarity, and his apparent concern to be as prosaic as possible 
makes his writing both charming and insightful. 
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naturally enough, upon positivist actions within broader social conditions. Where sustaining 
narratives of industrial design look for the broader sweep of forces giving rise to a particular 
form, ANT reveals to the industrial designer something of the subtle complexity of the artefact 
in direct utilisation and ownership. ANT involves people in a way that is largely absent in 
designers' own histories. Because it is not an explicitly design-centred analysis, ANT makes 
no attempt to project ideas forward into uncertainty, and cannot provide a means or a plan for 
action. ANT merely reaffirms the place of the designer; it does not provide a template. There 
have been attempts to construct actor networks from the ground up. Margolin's The Politics of 
the Artificial (2002) suggests that designers have the necessary skills to reconstruct culture 
and society. 
In ANT's analysis artefacts are non-human retrievals of human activity. In 'Sociology of a 
Door' (Latour, 1992) Latour takes a simple everyday artefact and forensically examines it In 
order to reveal Its hidden sociology. Latour's technique is to look for the so-called missing 
masses in artefacts, a rather subtle pun referring both to the replaced human labours an 
artefact affords and also to the absent sociological structures that have supposedly plagued 
orthodox sociology. Masses, In terms of physics, it must be remembered, are determined by 
the valent energy of strings. If, in sociology, masses are held together by intellectual ties, 
then, as in physics and in keeping with chaotic sensibilities, it should be possible to focus 
attention upon the tiniest interactions and to find larger truths. 141 Granovetter's The Strength 
of Weak Ties (1973) suggests that, in a personal and social construct, the effect of 
acquaintances (weak ties) upon personal development is stronger than family (strong ties). 
While it is sometimes possible to track the strong ties that direct the formation of an artefact 
and are reiterated in industrial design histories, the weak ties are often lost to time. For Latour 
(1992) sociological behaviour is an emergent phenomenon: 
According to some physicists there Is not enough mass in the universe to balance the 
accounts that cosmologists make of it. They are looking everywhere for the 'missing 
mass' that could add up to the nice expected total. lt is the same with sociologists. 
They are constantly looking, somewhat desperately, for social links sturdy enough to 
141 De L.anda (2000) reflects a recent shift in biological and physical science from reduaivist and 
mechanistic approaches towards vitalistic and holistic considerations. Capra's The Web of Life (1996) for 
example, demonstrates the drift towards attempts to understand the infinite interconnected nature of 
everything." 
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tie all of us together or for moral laws that would be inflexible enough to make us 
behave properly. 
The door, argues Latour, is an invention allowing walls to be useful as anything other than as a 
grave or a prison. Latour argues that the hole, being an insufficient solution, can be modified 
by a door such that it makes viable the penetration of the space contained within the walls. 142 
The door makes the penetration of walls viable by eliminating the need to employ builders to 
rebuild the wall after each occasion the wall is penetrated. Of course, a large plank of wood 
would do this too, but it would require several rather burly people to move it on each 
occasion. The solidity of the plank of wood is made useful by the hinge (replacing the burly 
people), and so the elimination of workers to be replaced by a 'non-human' Is repeated. In 
ANT, non-humans are artefact conglomerations that act as the humans they replace. 
the hinge, which I will call a non-human. (Notice that I did not say 'inhuman' as so 
many bleeding hearts would do.) 143 ... As a more general descriptive rule, every time 
you want to know what a non-human does, simply imagine what other humans or 
other non-humans would have to do were this character not present. (Latour 1992) 
Latour gives equal weight to the artefact and the human and sees them both as players 
(actors) in a larger and more complex social interaction. For example, an institution, such as a 
business, exists as an interplay of (i) the complex interaction of its employees, (ii) the non-
humans (artefacts and networks) that enable it to function, (iii) the built architecture that 
bounds and directs its operation and (iv) the conceptual architecture of Its strategies. Actor-
Network Theory then connects humanity and technology together in an intimate interaction. 
Latour explicitly rejects the notion of technology as inhuman, but he cannot quite bring 
himself to accept that it is human. Instead, daily life is posited as a hybrid condition, a kind of 
compromise between humanity and technology. If technology is posited as non-human, it 
presents a problematic human-not-human paradox - a recursive circuit. 
142 Writing from the perspective of the design of information systems, Levinson (1998) attempts to 
reiterate Latour's analysis but lacks the rigour of ANT. He describes a window and curtains as a means of 
modulating Information. 
143 When Latour (1992) adds, as an aside, 'as so many bleeding hearts would do', he, of course, refers to 
contemporary writing that takes as Its crux Lyotard's scepticism of technoscience (1991). Many of these 
texts fear the death of some admirable humanity in the face of cold inhuman technoscience. Thackara's In 
the Bubble (2006) provides an example of this drawn from a writer of some stature in the industrial design 
community. Thac.kara finds In bioscience a new and terrifying enemy that must be resisted. 
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Actor-Network Theory has been the subject of considerable criticism, even from Latour 
himself. In the same manner in which a car company might recall a model, Latour (1999) has 
suggested that ANT could be modified to take more account of the fluidity of its terms, actor, 
network and theory. Ash more has demonstrated how ANT can be applied such that it can 
include rather unexpected actors in its network. In 'Behaviour Modification of a Catflap: A 
Contribution to the Sociology of Things' (Ashmore, 1993) the idea of the non-human is 
extended rather playfully to include a cat and its use of a catflap into an actor network. 
Ash more demonstrates how ANT can be extended almost Indefinitely as an ever-expanding 
network of actors. This criticism, of course, can serve to reinforce the notion of the artificiality 
of epistemic boundaries. Harraway (1994) has criticised the concept of the network, 
suggesting that it does not sufficiently account for the way in which relations are tied to one 
another. She has usefully suggested that the eat's cradle might provide a more appropriate 
model, as it provides a continuous connectivity between actors rather than connections and 
nodal points. More seriously, Star (1991) has suggested that studies of Actor-Network Theory 
have a tendency to explore rather obvious and established social generics and have tended, at 
least during the 1980s, to exclude minority groups or people who live lives that can be 
considered to be outside of expected or normalised social behaviour. Lee and Brown (1994) 
have reiterated some of these criticisms, suggesting that actor-network theorists have tended 
to position themselves outside and rather aloof from many of their studies and have tended to 
set up actors into relative notions of power and 'otherness'. Callon and Law (1995) have 
responded to some of the criticisms laid against Actor-Network Theory, particularly those that 
have accused it of normalising or centring behaviour into a single expectation of cultural 
norms. Law and Singleton (2000) have reiterated these arguments and have suggested that 
ANT should be considered as a series of performances in which life is played out, rather than 
as an analysis of social constructions. This defence turns the criticism of Button about. In 'The 
Curious Case of the Vanishing Technology' Button (1993) explored how Actor-Network Theory 
appears to include technologies rather arbitrarily into its analysis and calls into question the 
manner in which many accounts of ANT explore social processes rather than focusing upon 
the actions of individuals in technological situations. Law and Singleton (2000) have 
responded by highlighting the potentials of the analysis of performances as a means of 
understanding how life is lived. This would seem to be the strength of ANT rather than its 
weakness; performance, after all, Implies an energetic imperative driven by human motive. 
Criticisms of Actor-Network Theory orient about accusations that it is reductlve and post hoc 
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and provides, in essence, an incomplete analysis. However, these criticisms can be understood 
to reflect a realisation that closure is no longer a viable objective and that the provisional is 
better accepted as a reality of analysis. 
ANT makes it possible to understand how lives are played out. In their study of the United 
States Post Office's attempt to introduce a device to assist post delivery staff, the designers 
Engestrom and Escalante (1994) have used ANT to understand why technologies that might 
appear in a sociological analysis to be likely to succeed have failed when they are deployed. 
ANT has made it possible for Engestrom and Escalante to take a more subtle and unbounded 
view that accounts for interplay without seeking closure. This approach is broadly reflected in 
the arguments contained in this thesis. Some ideas may at first sight appear polemical, but 
can be understood as a version of the actor network that is designed to make it possible 
ultimately to identify a number of ideas that are paradigmatic of emerging directions in 
contemporary thought and useful in the industrial design context. That ANT is necessary at all 
is perhaps an indictment of the confusion in industrial design as it is played out in its 
histories. Sustaining narratives of industrial design reiterate and reinforce understandings of 
cultural theory that could be described as grandiose in that they attempt large-scale sweeps 
and are almost entirely disconnected from the anecdotal experiences of the subtle complexity 
of interactional valence. Understanding human culture to be a complex interaction of human 
and non-human actors reminds designers of what they already know, but have failed to give 
voice to in their own histories. This interaction is complex and subtle; life is lived as a 
multilayered, conceptual and tangible interaction of ideas and artefacts 144 that is not wholly 
described in a single artefact. 
ANT does not make a distinction between subjects and objects; it situates life as an interplay 
of human intent and the 'matter' of the world. ANT provides a rather better way of analysing 
culture than the intertextuallty of much contemporary analysis. lt confronts supercomplexity 
but takes an approach that is not so localised and focused as we might expect in semiotic 
analysis, for example. ANT gets around problems of the dynamic, shifting and autopoietic 
nature of culture by localising its attention into individual moments of life. Nevertheless, the 
144 1 make a cup of tea, for example, pouring boiling water while half listening to the music on the radio 
and thinking endlessly about this thesis. I cannot be said to be doing any one of these things in exclusion 
of any other. I undertake a unique process that somehow involves listening, tea making and thesis writing. 
The kettle perhaps stands as an icon of this activity, but it describes only a fraction of it. 
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implication is clear. Artefacts appear in culture at the interplay of the biological and the social. 
They are tied to humanity as an uncertain and fluid part of the species. This uncertain nature 
of technological agency can be found at the heart of industrial design's struggle to understand 
human-technological relationships. This struggle is particularly evident in respect of the ethics 
of 'good design'. 
Good design is a rather benign and banal topic of many design conversations. These 
conversations take a more grave turn in discussions of weaponry. For example, Hesken (1980, 
p. 195) cites a German fighter aircraft of the Second World War as an example of 'good 
design', feeling it necessary to declare that this quality can be judged, 'despite the policies for 
which it was used [which) were appalling in their goals and consequences'. Heskett struggles 
to detach a notion of good design from the necessity of ethical discussion. He suggests that, 
just because the German fighter kills, the 'criteria of judgement are not necessarily 
invalidated', when fighter aircraft are explicitly intended to kill. Hesken is alert to this. He 
recognises that 
'good design', however defined in terms specific to an artefact or mechanism, cannot 
automatically be associated with beneficial ethical or political ideals; such 
juxtapositions are frequent but do not constitute an equation. 
But this does little to clarify what constitutes good design, other than to suggest that it must 
be properly evaluated outside any socially and culturally constructed, ethical consideration. If 
this separation is uncertain in the case of the fighter aircraft, it becomes clearer when the 
object of killing is less overtly identifiable as a weapon of war. We might, for example, include 
the pen with which the authority for the Nazi death camps was signed, or the Schultz 
Calculating Engine put to such effective use in the organisation of the holocaust. The fighter is 
designed to kill; it does that well and has a kind of engineering beauty that makes for an 
uncomfortable evaluation of good design. 145 Anfield (1999) has undertaken a more forensic 
examination of the role of ethics in design and finds design histories to be predicated upon 
aesthetic considerations at the expense of other more complex concerns. Citing Forty's cry 
that 'the study of design and its history has suffered from a form of cultural lobotomy which 
has left design connected only to the eye and severed its connection to the brain and the 
145 This discomfort is perhaps most evident in a design analysis of the systemic architecture of I. C. 
Farben's mechanism of death in the final solution (see Bauman, 1991). 
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pocket' (Forty, 1986, p. 6), Attfleld attempts to refine an ethical motivation for 'utility design' 
immediately after the Second World War. Attfield's focus is upon the association of 'fitness for 
purpose' with beauty. Like Heskett, Attfleld struggles to reconcile this, for example, when 
reviewing Henry Strauss MP describing the beauty of the 8ren gun in a DIA lecture: 'the 
intrinsic grace of perfection that is found in an object which fulfils its purpose with precision 
and economy .. .' (Strauss, cited in Attfield, 1999, p. 234). Attfield (1999, p. 234) can only 
complain: 
That blindness which could separate the intended use of the object from Its economy 
and perceive it in terms of an abstract aesthetic could by the same logic have 
attributed beauty to the Nazi concentration camps designed to sort, separate and 
dispatch their victims with such efficiency. lt may seem unfair to pick on this 
particular instance to suggest that the concept of 'fitness for purpose' was in any way 
referring to the intended use of a weapon. 
This seems to be missing the point. Actor-Network Theory alerts us to the necessity of 
avoiding attempts to separate artefacts from their use. Attfield merely replaces one avoidance 
with another. Sterling (2005) argues that the gun itself can have no ethic: it is metal and 
Inanimate, but becomes an agent of death in operation (p. 75). Sterling recognises that 'it is 
mentally easier to divide humans and objects than to understand them as a comprehensive 
and interdependent system: people are alive, objects are inert, people can think, objects just 
lie there' (p. 8). Sterling sets out to find a means of drawing a line between 'a technoculture of 
objects and a technoculture of machines' (p. 9). 
In Shaping Things Sterling (2005) suggests that a problem with discussions separating 
artefacts from people is that it becomes necessary to place emphasis upon either the artefact 
(get rid of guns) or the people (let everyone own a gun) when it actually appears as if 
responsibility for the events resides in a complex network of responsibility. In this network 
artefacts are players but not necessarily proactive agents. 146 Sterling's histories are more 
146 Ethics can reside only in human thoughts and actions and in the foreseen consequence of those 
thoughts. An animal that kills is acting upon its instincts. lt carries no ethic. An animal set upon someone 
is another matter. The ethic is not transferred into the beast; it resides in the trainer. Animals, we 
imagine, have no concept of human concerns. Similarly the tendons, muscles and bones that construct the 
mechanism of the finger that pulls the trigger are not implicated in the intellectual process of killing. If 
morality can not be identified to reside singularly in the hand that pours the zyklon-b into the gas 
chamber, then perhaps the architect of the chamber, nor in any individual actor in the greater nightmare 
can be exonerated too. 
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playful than academic. His polemic appears to be Intended as a creative and provocative 
scholarship emphasising 'the interplay between objects and people (Sterling, 2005, p. 8) in a 
popular, although less rigorous and ultimately more confusing, retelling of ANT. Sterling's 
argument, like Latour's, boils down to an attempt to resolve the argument between the 
deterministic stance of the materialist, who locates agency in the artefact, and the ethical 
position of the sociologist, who discounts the artefact entirely. 147 Latour (1998 p. 6) argues: 
[the) dual mistake of the materialists and the sociologist is that they start with 
essences, either those of subjects or those of objects ... Either you give too much to 
the gun or too much to the gun-holder. Neither the subject nor the object, nor their 
goals are fixed forever. We have to shift our attention to this unknown X, this hybrid 
which can be truly said to act. 
Latour (2005, p. 179) approaches this problem by attributing the status of an actor to both 
'Which of them, the gun, or the citizen, is the actor in this situation? Someone else (a citizen 
gun, a gun-citizen) ... You are a different person with a gun in your hand.' lhde (2002, p. 94) 
has termed this 'phenomenological interactivity', placing analysis in the experience of 
individuals in order to build a bigger picture of culture and society. Both Latour and lhde 
suggest that understanding individual interactions can help construct a more complete picture 
of broader sociology without reducing it to its mere mechanical components. If human culture 
is compared to an emergent process such as flocking or swarming, then sustaining narratives 
of industrial design are revealed to speak only In general terms. When designers come to 
consider the humanisation of technology in the absence of this hybrid actor, they find 
themselves In a recursive circle and can be certain of nothing. lt is little surprise they find 
themselves tied up in such rhetorical knots as Heskett and Attfield. 
When the industrial design community speaks of humanising technology, it must do so today 
in the resonating echo of its nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century self. Industrial 
design, theorised in the face of the fear of mechanisation, and in consequence of its 
intellectual intervention in the mechanised and technological world in which we in the Western 
world dwell today, is so quotidian that we need to be reminded of its presence. 
147 
'Guns don't kill people, rappers dol' (Goldie Lookin' Chain, 2004). 
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The automobile, the freeway, the airplane, the cell phone, the air 
conditioner, the high-rise - all invented and developed first in the West, 
but fully adopted the world over - have achieved design nirvana. They are 
no longer considered unnatural. They are boring, even tedious. (Mau, 
2004, p. 1) 
Our lives are filled with the produas of an industrialised culture. 148 Although people cannot be 
typified, most of us in the West share a world that is a mixed reality of the machine aesthetic 
and the crafts; of modernity, pre-modernity and post-modernity. We have things about us 
made by machines to look like crafts, and craft made things construaed to look as if they 
were machine made. That machines would make things alone without the human hand was 
once shocking: 'In form of machinery, the implement of labour become automatic, things 
moving and working Independent of the workman' (Marx, 1867), but today it is an accepted 
facet of life. We do not share the urge of the early twentieth-century designers to find in our 
mechanical technology any particular urgency in the shaping of a transformation of the human 
spirit. The cars and machines, trains and aircraft, encountered are now merely an accepted 
part of life. Although they may excite us on occasion, they do not particularly shock, nor in the 
148 Let me for a moment contemplate my condition by briefly describing my situation. 1 am constructing 
this text using an Apple Powerbook. To my right, resting on the synthetic wooden desk, is my mobile 
phone, resting on an electronic diary and illuminated by the electric, halogen glow of a small black desk 
light. To my left are a flat screen, a keyboard and a mouse. A woollen hat is also close to hand - a 
consequence of an attempt to save oil by expending less heating energy in my study. Stacks of crisply 
printed books, a plastic beaker, a small aluminium fountain pen, an invoice from the garage where my car 
was recently serviced and bills from some service provider or other litter my space. A printer, of course, 
occupies a large part of this space, together with the piles of neatly cut A4 papers I have neatly stacked 
and ready for it. Several music compact discs liner the space; one of them is at work in my laptop. 
Something that sounds like Miles Davies - but cannot possible be anything other than a crisp 
verisimilitude- pervades the room. Adolf Loos (1910) and Christopher Dresser (1873) alike would be 
sceptical of my space, although there is much they would admire: Loos would surely delight in the way in 
which I have come to incorporate so many technologies into my study. He would be delighted to see that I 
have no curtains, just crisp, machined, slaned blinds to moderate the light and to conceal or reveal the 
room to the outside world. I have unadorned flat painted walls too - made incidentally in a factory and 
assembled on site to construct the study that extends what I consider to be an inconceivably small wood 
and stone cottage. The space we call the 'dining room' once housed an entire family. The cottage of 
course is complete with a wood stove in which Dresser, and we imagine Heidegger, would have delighted. 
My wood is delivered not collected by my children. They have no time for such narratives. Their free time 
is occupied by sport, sometimes outside with other human participants and at other times on screen with 
simulated computer opposition. The wood stove is unlit and the boiler hums gently in the utility room. 
Dresser would have shuddered perhaps to see the synthetic wood of my desk and would have mourned, 
perhaps, that no human hand had manufactured the crisply machined wooden blinds. But this is my world 
-the old and the new juxtaposed. I do not care to live in the stark modernity Loos or the later modernists 
might have imagined. I value the old and the decorative, but neither do I drench myself in it, as Dresser 
might have wished. I may not be typical, but my world seems to have some resonance with the world of 
my friends and my neighbours and the worlds I see on my television set. Occasionally 1 am given a glimpse 
of the world outside my world, of shanty towns and open sewers, and I am asked to donate money to turn 
that world into something like my own. What would Loos and Dresser make of my world? How would we -
could we- know? Dresser and Loos were part of a community of designers who found themselves in a 
technological world we can scarcely remember. They spoke in their time and in their industrial design 
community and not in the community of today. Were they active today, their voice perhaps, although we 
can never know, would be different. Were Loos and Dresser alive today and part of the industrial design 
community, would they hold the same views? Probably not. Their world would be our world. 
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everyday account do they challenge our conception of ourselves as human. The industrial 
designer might, with some justification, claim responsibility for this world. Designers have 
found ways to make even the most extraordinary technologies seem quotidian. An industrial 
designer might argue that designers' Intellectual endeavours to humanise technology have 
been so successful that it is now possible to feel complete, exhilarated even, when 
experiences are almost entirely mediated or enabled by technological means. We can find 
pleasure In the cold efficiency of mechanisation, just as we enjoy the supposedly warm-
hearted qualities of the hand made. 
The interplay of our lives with the technologies of mechanisation is a constructed 
orchestration of compromise. Industrial designers did not sweep everything away as the 
futurists might have had it, but neither did they sink into nostalgic sentimentality and 
resistance to technology nor hark back to a bygone agrarian age. Thanks In no small part to 
Industrial design, precision and simplicity have come to stand in turn for both quality and 
efficiency and the inefficient uncertainty of craft has come to stand for luxury and inadequacy 
In equal measure. For the most part these old dichotomies are gone, as Moholy-Nagy (1948, 
p. 79) put it: 'In our industrial age, the distinction between art and non-art, between manual 
and craftsmanship and mechanical technology is no longer an absolute one' (cited In Naylor, 
1985, p. 102). There was moment in industrial design history when Gropius demanded that 
his students should dress conventionally(Banham, 1955, p. 286). This event passed almost 
unnoticed but can stand to mark the end of the pioneering spirit of the early days of the 
machine age and the beginnings of a new era of commercial expediency. The days of 
experimentation and bold expressionist experiments were gone, and, in the minds of those 
creating a new kind of Bauhaus, had been consigned to history along with the 'old guard' such 
as Marcks, 'provincial expressionism' and the strident manifestos of the futurists (Ban ham, 
1955, p. 287). The challenge of the machine age was past and now design had to get on with 
the task of being commercially viable. Gropius and those of his students who supported the 
move left the old Bauhaus in Weimar behind and began again in Dessau the process of 
building a new style of design. This new style would in time become truly International, 
acceptable to both consumers and producers alike. This new design, whilst uncompromising 
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in its rigour, would carry with it the pleasure in the cold efficiency of mechanisation and would 
accept too the warm-hearted qualities of the hand made that we find in our world today. 149 
Van Doesburg, who at first opposed and then reluctantly accepted the new Bauhaus, had once 
proclaimed that the machine would become embodied in the aesthetic of the twentieth 
century, projecting the enlightenment forward into a socialist and mechanised age. He 
reiterated the conviction of the industrial designers of the early modern movement that a 
machine aesthetic would come to stand as a corollary with humanity as-a whole and could 
project humanity forward towards the distantly imagined twentieth century. This was a time, 
described by Armstrong (1988) as a period of 'prosthetic modernism' , or by Foster (2004) as 
a time of 'prosthetic godliness', characterised by writers, artists and designers of whom some, 
such as Jacob Mohr, Max Ernst, Gerald Lee, Ernst Kapp or Wyndham Lewis, are now occluded 
from Industrial design history. lt is arguable that many of these contributions to the 
intellectual engagement with the machine age have more to offer for an understanding of how 
industrial design came to be formed than the usual parade of craftsmen and women of the 
Belle tpoque that histories after Pevsner (1975) and previously Ban ham (1955) see fit to 
include In their accounts of that time. Where many of these crafts people stood as a resistant 
defence against the machine age, others, such as the artists Marineni (1909), 150 or Vertov 
(1929) for example, engaged with the potentials of a transformation in technological form and 
sought a new sense of humanity in it. Vertov and the other members of the 'Kinok' explored 
through their films -for example, Man with a Movie Camera (1929) - a new generative and 
phenomenological sense of being for the machine world and a new aesthetic sense. Brill 
(1989) has described Man with a Movie Camera as 'experimentation In the cinematic 
transmission of visual phenomena' and as an attempt at a new intellectual revolution, in 
response to the technological revolution, transferring romantic energy away from the symbols 
of nature towards a new technological construction of being. For Frank Lloyd Wright (1901), 
149 1f we take another look around ourselves, we will find it still, in the form of the computers, telephones, 
lights and plain unadorned surfaces of the international style. 
ISO 'We will sing of great crowds excited by work, by pleasure, and by riot; we will sing of the multi-
coloured, polyphonic tides of revolution in the modern capitals; we will sing of the vibrant nightly fervour 
of arsenals and shipyards blazing with violent electric moons; greedy railway stations that devour smoke-
plumed serpents; factories hung on clouds by crooked lines of their smoke; bridges that stride the rivers 
like giant gymnasts, flashing in the sun with a glitter of knives; adventurous steamers that sniff the 
horizon; deep-chested locomotives whose wheels paw the trac~ like the hooves of enormous steel horses 
bridled by tubing; and seem to cheer like an enthusiastic crowd ... ' (Marlnettl, A Futurist Manifesto, 1909) 
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the Machine 151 would offer the means to elevate humanity onto a plane beyond previous 
measure. This would be a new era when the Machine, 'its function ultimately to emancipate 
human expression', could deliver human emancipation from Lloyd Wright's perception of a 
kind of vice in which culture had become mired. The Machine would sweep away the art of the 
old, which Lloyd Wright claimed idolised a 'structured necessity' founded upon traditional and 
pre-industrial modes of production towards a new age of remote production. While never 
replicating the old crafts, the Machine, Lloyd Wright suggested, would come to render them 
obsolete with rationalism. 
The new will weave for the necessities of mankind, which his Machine will have 
mastered, a robe of ideality no less truthful, but more poetical, with a rational 
freedom made possible by the machine, beside which the art of old will be as the 
sweet, plaintive wail of the pipe to the outpouring of the full orchestra. lt will clothe 
Necessity with the living flesh of virile imagination, as the living flesh lends living 
grace to the hard and bony human skeleton. The new will pass from the possession of 
kings and classes to the every-day lives of all - from duration in point of time to 
immortality. 
Lloyd Wright was hesitant to condemn those who had opposed mechanisation, although he 
damned Morris with feint praise, claiming he 'did his best' in another, earlier age of engines 
and dark satanic fears of subjugation. For Lloyd Wright "this new machine art would find a way 
to reconcile humanity with 'machine precision' rather than the spiritual art ... " (Naylor, 1985, 
p. 102)152 and also to find a way to maintain some sense of humanity in the midst of 
industrialisation. In a stance bearing some comparison with those who feared the onset of 
industrialisation, Thakara (2006, p. 3) regards technological progress with some scepticism: 
telegraph, railway, electrification, radio, telephone, television, automobiles, air travel -
[have) always been accompanied by a spectacular package of promises. A certain 
151 Frank Lloyd Wright used capitals, to emphasise the emerging eminence ofthe machine. 
152 What would Wright and his fellows have made of contemporary sex toys. They certainly employ 
'machine precision' to strip sex of its 'spiritual art'. Sex toys offer many a mechanised, simple and intense 
onanism, an efficient route to orgasmic release without the necessity of uncertain and 'spiritual' although 
potentially 'unhygienic' encounters. Likewise, contemporary medications offer a efficient, mechanised 
route to emotional stability or to enhance the emotions, without the uncertain need to engage in a 
'spiritual' enterprise. Wright and his fellows, of course, were reminded of efficiency in the age of the 
machine by the advent of mechanised killing in the trenches of Flanders, when Marinetti's rhetoric was 
realised in extremis. Although many of the particular manifestations of the machines Marinetti found are 
consigned to history in the strident enthusiastic extremism of the Futurists, it is still possible to sense the 
excitement of a new technological paradigm and the sense that something radical was required. That we 
now accept the efficiency of the mechanical artefact and blend it with our own spiritual needs and feel no 
loss in the orgasmic interaction with technology is testament to a century of industrial design. 
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na'ivete Is excusable for the inventors of these early technologies: They had no way of 
knowing about the unforeseen consequences of their innovations. Today, we don't 
have that alibi. We know that new technologies have unexpected consequences. 
This betrays a kind of patronising belief that those who are there at the development of early 
technologies (by early we must presume Thackara means the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries and not the makers at Grlmes Graves) were naive, and pushed ahead with the 
development of technologies without heed of the future. This view disconnects technology 
from the forces that historicise its emergence and posits it again as a reified object, but it is 
also an abdication of the values that would seem to be embedded, however poorly worked out, 
in industrial design. If contemporary designers are not willing to embrace the challenge of 
another intellectual shift to a revised (molecular) topological domain with same the vigour as 
their forebears, then future will be left to the science research institutions, pharmecutical 
companies and public policy negotiations. The future then will, as Thakara (2006, p. 228) 
fears, be designed in popular science and the media and without the abiding intellect, 
experience and aesthetic sensibility of the designer. 153 In recent times, the evidence of 
sustaining narratives of Industrial design suggests that the process of making the 
_extraordinary quotidian has become confused by attempts to separate the human and the 
technological into discrete epistemes. This, in turn, has disconnected contemporary industrial 
design from its prescedence in histories prior to industrialisation, and, by positing it as the 
design of rather than in industry, histories make it difficult for designers to find continuity in 
technological conditions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the rhetoric of cyborg theory. 
lt is now widely understood by social theorists such as Latour, Serres (see particularly Serres, 
1982) and others such as Callon and Law (1995) that the human and the technological are 
Implicated In one another to such a degree that they are best considered In a single 
conversation. Artefacts, rather than being seen as reified and fully resolved entities, are better 
understood as momentary solidlfications of the human process of 'ordering and disordering 
complexity' (M. Michael, 2000, p. 22). In these terms the human and the technological 
distribute through one another and cannot be readily extracted, or sifted, into discrete 
153 There are some laboratory scientists who refer to themselves as "biodesigners' {see, for example, 
BioArizona, 2005, BioEden, 2005 and BioStanford, 2005). However, judging by their output and the 
autobiographical descriptions of their practice, they share neither the heritage nor the concerns of the 
industrial designer. 
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epistemes. Technology then appears not to have a meaning in itself other than when it is 
considered in the same terms as the human. Nevertheless, we are encouraged to talk of 
humans and technology as if they were somehow alien to one another. M. Michael (2000, pp. 
18-44) provides a review of a number of social and cultural theories in which the human is 
understood to be a distributed construct. Placing emphasis upon the human as a social and 
cultural construction, Michael (2000, p. 1) echoes much contemporary theorisation but 
recognises humans to be 'fabricated - in language, through discursive formations, in their 
various liaisons with technological and natural actors, across networks that are themselves 
heterogeneously comprised of humans and non-humans who are themselves so comprised' 
(Michael, 2000, p. 1). Chanrand (2004) tells this story of fabrication, rather succinctly, and it 
becomes clear that the human has been constructed in consequence of a rather long and 
complex philosophical history. 
Technology, on the other hand, is actually a surprisingly recent term. The OED locates its 
origin in the late nineteenth century and the collusion of art and science. For most of the 
twentieth century the focus of philosophical analysis (such as Mumford, 1967) has tended to 
emphasise the role of technology as a means for humanity to enact its will upon the world. 
Mitcham (1994, p. 247) provides a rather concise summation of some of the drifts of 
technology philosophy over the past century. Spengler (1932) and subsequently Ferre (1988) 
argued that technology has some evolutionary imperative as a means to enact some genomic 
instinct that drives a will to survive. Others, such as G. Grant (1969), reiterating the earlier 
thoughts of Zschimmer (1914) or Walker (1831), viewed technology as a means to escape the 
confines of existence and to find some greater freedom. Skolimowski (1966) posited an 
understanding of technology as a consequence of some evolutionary advantage In the human 
species to seek efficiency and to minimise effort, while Ortega has suggested that technology 
is a means to realise a self-concept in the individual (see Mitcham, 1994, p. 247). Polanyi 
(1962, p. 59) suggested that technologies are 'part of ourselves, the operating persons. We 
pour ourselves into them and assimilate them as parts of our own existence.' 
Technology has become intimately connected with considerations of production and 
consumption, and so it is perhaps not surprising that Marxist and sociological thought has 
come to dominate technology philosophy and woven it into a tangled complexity. Technology 
philosophy reminds Farmum (2006) of 
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hours spent cross-legged next to my grandfather untangling fishing line on the banks 
of one of the many lakes found on Colorado's Grand Mesa. Without a steady hand, the 
philosophical connections that bind Aristotle to Hegel to Lukacs to Heidegger to 
Marcuse to Feenberg might read as a tangled mass of knots that appear impossible to 
pull apart. Like a fishing line, sometimes when you pull out one knot others form and 
the whole process can become extremely frustrating and overwhelming. 
Throughout technology philosophy, an uncomfortable compromise is maintained. lt is evident 
that human life is constructed by technological means, and yet, somehow, technology is 
maintained as an antagonistic force acting upon the human. The prevailing implication is that 
technology is utilised as a means to enact the will while simultaneously alienating humanity 
from its true self. There is a joke cartoon that is popular on the Internet. lt intended to show 
(albeit in jest) the evolution of the human species, from a chimpanzee-like creature on the 
extreme left to contemporary man on the right. lt is clear that the third creature in this line 
has bipedality and is carrying a stone tool yet in evolutionary terms is evidentially almost, 
although not quite, human. The joke is, of course, that humanity is retreating to some kind of 
shrunken ape-like, although static, posture. 
Left: Internet cartoon, the 'De-evolution of man; right: Cro- Magnon (Wildercom.com, 2007). 
The joke, ruined by analysis, relies upon a number of assumptions. The most upright of all the 
figures in the cartoon is replicated in scientific representations; he carries a spear on his 
shoulder, masculine and proud. He is in command of his technology. 154 This creature, one 
154 He Is also very masculine, white and Europun, of course. lt would be foolish to take a cartoon too 
seriously were it not, as Harraway alert.s us, a view of humanity as essentially masculine and white that is 
also encoded into some anthroplogical representAtions. Harraway refers to this in Primate Visions (1989), 
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imagines, is intended to represent the apotheosis of humankind, a noble savage equipped 
with the weapons that give him, the hunter, mastery over the other species. Agrarian man is 
worn down with the burden of his labours and his concerns, mechanical man staggers grimly 
under the oppressive weight of his technology, and contemporary man is shrivelled and 
conditioned by the technology through which he thinks and looks out upon the world. 155 The 
humour, such as it is, resides in the truth we might sense of our condition and the reduction 
of our humanity to that of a victim. 
The French theological philosopher jean Brun has suggested that technology enacts the 
human urge to distribute. Brun (1992) is suspicious of ideas of technology as a component of 
an evolutionary imperative and trajectory. He holds out for an essential humanity that is made 
possible by the eo-evolutionary track of technology as an inseparable facet of the species. The 
human urge to technology, Brun argues, is an enaction of a deeply held transcendental and 
spiritual nature, enabling the escape from the distinctions that people sense between what 
they suppose to be their subjectivity and the objective stability of the world. This direction is 
acknowledged by Mitcham, who sees evidence of a shift in technology philosophy away from 
Ideas of the enaction of the will and the loss of true humanity towards a perception of some 
deeper drive. Technology 'grows out of [humanities') ontological aspiration to merge subject 
and object' (Mitcham, 1994, p. 246). However, from the evidence of the fossil record, 
archaeology, written histories and our own experience, human evolution can be understood in 
terms of a process of continual and multifaceted distribution. In geographical terms, humanity 
has come to occupy almost every part of the landscape. lt has penetrated the ocean and has 
begun to distribute itself beyond the planet into the wider universe. In intellectual terms, the 
history of humanity is of a distribution of shared ideas and cultures, or a distribution of 
decision making - for example, from centralised power to democratic and increasingly 
localised autonomy. Humans distribute themselves too. They leave deliberate traces. Marks 
left upon rocks distribute an individual consciousness across time; books do .this better; 
paintings, wax and digital recordings refine and accelerate this distribution. 
and this is picked up by M. Michael (2000, p. 31). The Eurocentric and masculine construction of human 
evolution Is in any case at odds with the intellectual stance of human ecology and with scientific evidence. 
155 Is this crouching man the last human In the drawing or does the computer represent the ultimate 
evolutionary paradigm, perhaps some kind of machine-human hybrid creature where, without a familiar 
body, machine and humanity become indistinguishable to such a degree that we might no longer 
recognise it as human. 
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A schematic drawing of the trajectory of human evolution might be better represented by an 
Image like the one presented above. This Image represents a trajectory in which the hybrid 
human has become an increasingly complex and distributed condition. While the social and 
cultural models of the human have become increasingly distributed and complex in their 
accounts, the manner of the theoretical construction of the physical human has, for the most 
part, remained fixed about an everyday perception of human form and has come out of 
valence with the scale and complexity of the topological subtlety of social and cultural 
analysis. Even the most complex social and cultural models are constructed about rather 
uncritical fixed and determined notions of human physical form. This may account for the 
attention that ANT's notion of hybridity is constructed about rather fixed and immutable 
artefacts. (A number of recent attempts to realise technology Into a form that is fixed about a 
perceived scale with resonance with the familiar and everyday body will be discussed later in 
this thesis in terms of a hysterical attempt to fix the trajectory of industrial design.) One 
upshot of this is that, while humanity and technology can now no longer be considered as 
anything other than a hybrid condition in social and cultural analysis, the same cannot be said 
of attempts to understand the complete picture of humanity as an evolutionary species in 
material terms. 
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Chapter seven 
Three problematic approaches to the distributed human and 
enaction 
7.1 Alienation 
Cyborg Theory: The process of humanisation as a process of the alienation of true 
humanity- making the ordinary traumatic. 
7.2 Techniclty 
Outlining the term technicity and its projection of the logic of human, Exploring the 
idea that technology is part of the ecology of the whole species. 
7.3 Embodied Interaction 
The body then cannot be discounted in any analysis of being in the world, and, more 
critically, it cannot be isolated from it either. The concept of embodied interaction 
extended into the context of design methodology. 
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7.1 Alienation 
Cyborg Theory: The process of humanisation as a process of the alienation of true 
humanity- making the ordinary traumatic. 
Cyborg (Gregory, 2006). 
There is no one cyborg we can speak of. There is the cyborg of literature and of the movies, a 
creature-machine of fantasy and fetish, and the cyborg of scholarly trope. The cyborg, then, 
can appear as metaphor and phylum by degrees across a range of interpretation mixing the 
engineering fantastic with sado-masochism, fetish (Fernbach, 2002), progressive feminism 
and straightforward sexism in somewhat equal measure. 156 In essence there are two scholarly 
approaches to the concept of the cyborg; in one the cyborg is founded in the fascination of the 
human body invaded and replaced by technological forms. As Gregory (2006) suggests, this is 
not necessarily an emergent condition: 
The Matrix, Terminator, the Borg-are these visions of the intimate interface between 
humans and technology merely science-fantasy? NO! Human- technology symbiants -
cybernetic organisms, cyborgs - are already among us. 
156 A serious debate with respect to the cyborg must cast aside the cyborg of Hollywood or of the fantasy 
magazine adorning so many adolescent bedroom walls; it is a projection, fully formed and without 
integers and evolution. In projected fantasy there is no development line between the relatively uncertain 
implants of today and the sophisticated assimilations of systems and manipulations of the body 
architecture of the terminator or robo-cop. 
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The athlete Oscar Pistorius (left) (see Keim, 2007) might beg 
to differ when it is suggested that we might be something 
other than human because of our dental filling, our 
decorative piercing, our plastic heart valve or for that matter 
our shoes. There are those who take an initial proposition 
of Clynes and Kline (1961) and project a trajectory step by 
step towards some ultimate post-human, robe-sapiens-
sapiens future (see, for example, Menzel and D'Aiuisio, 
2000). Many of these projections appear fully formed 
without the inconvenience of incremental development. One 
consequence is that the moment when the f inal trace of 
humanity is erased in the speculative trajectory towards the 
new, post- human species is absent. This moment is missing in texts such as that of Menzel 
and D'Aiuisio, perhaps because it threatens to plunge an otherwise invigorating and exciting 
fantasy into the philosophical complexity of the other cyborg debate. This other, more-subtle 
and academic, discussion of the cyborg explores a claim of ourselves as a condition formed 
and shaped by technology. Harraway (1991) indicates that this is an incremental progression 
too and an emergent condition of lost humanity. She gives it a temporal location: 
By the late twentieth century, our time, a mYthic time, we are all chimeras, theorized 
and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. 157 (p150) 
When she positions the cyborg as a 'late-twentieth-century' condition Harraway (1991) 
implies that by some means the essential human condition has become somehow subverted 
from its true nature. This subversion is implicit in the engagement of human nature with an 
extrinsic engagement with the technological world in which it finds itself. While, on the other 
hand, this cyborg connects humanity and technology as a single architectural construct, its 
analysis proposes a condition that both belies the extent and range of technology throughout 
human history and, through its connection with the late twentieth century, condemns the 
157 Harraway continues: 'The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a condensed 
image of both Imagination and material reality, the two joined centres structuring any possibility of 
historical transformation. In the traditions of "Western• science and politics- the tradition of racist, male-
domi~nt capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition of the appropriation of nature as resource for 
the productions of culture; the tradition of reproduction of the self from the reflections of the other - the 
relation between organism and machine has been a border war. The stakes in the border war have been 
the territories of production, reproduction, and imagination.' 
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machine-age world as some kind of dislocation from a supposed nature. The concept of the 
cyborg connects selfhood to a distributed technological architecture and extends this notion 
to suggest an ontology in which humanity and technology are inextricably coextensive, 
thereby recasting the human condition. If it is true that life has become an emergent 
condition, lived through technological means, then to some extent industrial design and its 
Intellectual impetus to humanise technology must be implicated in the construction of the 
supposed 'cyborg ontology'. 
H. R. Ciger, Birth Machine (1967). 
lt is arguable that the cyborg is merely a voice in the hybrid debate representing just another 
archaeologically unpicking of much of the hidden intellect of the designers of the machine 
age. The work of H. R. Ciger (see Ciger, 1993) is perhaps the most obscure of the popular 
protagonists of the cyborg mythology. The Birth Machine (1967), an image of a technological 
firing of the cyborg into life, reveals a rather subtle recognition of how humanity and 
technology flow one into the other and distribute. Speyrer (2006) suggests that, from a deep 
psychological perspective, the birth machine emerges from Ciger' s recognition of his own 
traumatic technology-assisted birth. The suggestion here is that there is trauma in birth 
through technological means, and by extension that almost every facet of life (the preparation 
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of food or daily transportation, for example) is likely to be a source of cyborg trauma. 158 
Harraway (1991) writes of humanity becoming cyborg and of this process being progressive, 
such that 'by the late twentieth century .. .' we found ourselves in a condition. This tiny but 
significant phraseology may be merely a rhetorical flourish, but it has profound implications 
for the process of humanising technology. If we have become cyborg, then by implication 
something has changed in the human condition. Technology has changed the nature of 
humanity, and we are now no longer human. If we are cyborgs, the logic extends, then our 
notion of what it is to be human has been jaded by a subjective view of the world, which we, in 
the Western world at least, see with cyborg eyes, sense with cyborg senses, and think about 
with cyborg minds. The logic of the cyborg makes it highly problematic then to separate the 
human from the technological condition in which the human Is seen to operate and to take an 
objective and external view of things. 
ANT makes it clear that 'the intermixing of the human and the non-human is intrinsic to 
human society ... (M. Michael, 2000, p. 21). Latour (1992 p. 110) sets out chains of interaction 
and suggests that humans and non-humans can never be considered to be hetrogenerous. 
The proponents of ANT have long argued that humans and technological non-humans 
are thoroughly interwoven •... take away the technologies - telephone, fax machine, 
computer, but also desk, chair, light - from a manager and they can no longer 
function in that role. To be human thus is a hybrid. (Michael, 2002 p. 25) 
In the diminishing prospect of finding a group of humans naked and unequipped in the 
wilderness, there is almost no understanding of the world in which the human is not 
implicated in some way with a technological architecture. lt is simply not plausible to extract 
the human from the world of the technological. 
We are cyborgs and have been for millennia. Cognitive integration with technology, 
extended cognition, our cyborg nature, is arguably what sets us apart from other 
terrestrial creatures. (Gregory, 2006) 
1 From this it becomes possible to see just how much recent cyborg theorisation has set out to alert us to 
the trauma of technology in our everyday lives - a trauma we had perhaps not recognised and had better 
be alert to. lt is always useful when one is told one is traumatised! 
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Other species may generate nests and such or collect about them manu ports, but only homo-
sapiens-sapiens has technology that sometimes hardens to enable particular human 
engagements with the world. The search for an elusive something that is unique about the 
human species and that ties it to this idea of technology has troubled human kind for 
millennia. In classical Greek mythology there is a quite well-known story of the dawn of 
humanity. Together with his brother Prometheus, the Titan Epimetheus was given the task of 
giving positive attributes to every species. By the time he got to humanity he had nothing left 
and in consequence it became necessary for his brother to furnish humanity with 
technology. 159 There are, of course, many aspects of contemporary Western understandings of 
the world that owe much to the thinking that evolved in Classical times. Classical logic is 
. useful in many ways: not least it helps us to understand some of the terminology 
underpinning much later thought, as well as shedding light upon our own ideas. Myths can be 
constructed in their time to describe a particular intellectual position. These myths become 
familiar because they seem to fit a prevailing view that might hold in a particular intellectual 
climate. The story of the titans implicates technology as a negative essence, and any attempt 
to counter this stance will have the weight of philosophy against it. 
7.2 Technlcity 
Outlining the term technicity and its projection of the logic of human, Exploring the 
idea that technology is part of the ecology of the whole species. 
In 'Milieu et techniques' the paleoanthropologist Andre Leroi-Gourhan (1945) outlined a 
general theory of humanity as a species conditioned by technicity (see Stiegler, 1989). The 
term 'technicity', perhaps because it remains so close to intense philosophical analysis, has 
not yet been distilled into a concise concept. lt is surprisingly rare in everyday language 160 and 
is also absent from industrial design analysis. Vallenilla's Foundation of Meta-Technics (2004) 
is typical of attempts to outline the concept of technicity more completely but demands 
familiarity with the complex tools of philosophy. Technicity remains at the centre of an intense 
philosophical debate and can be understood, in broad terms, to be both an essential trait of 
being human and (as the thrust of much contemporary analysis suggests) the cause of human 
159 Prometheus gave the knowledge of fire to mankind, having stolen it from Zeus. The myth suggests 
that the gift of the knowledge of the technological manipulation of the world gave human kind its power 
to enact its own will. That the story is familiar perhaps reflects the prominence of this philosophical stance 
over the course of the industrialisation of the West. After all, there is much political leverage in the 
projection of the concept of power through technologisation. 
160 The term 'technicity' does not even manage a Wikipedia entry. 
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alienation from itself. Stiegler's Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus ( 1998) focuses 
attention upon the emergence of humanity as a technological species. Steigler argues that the 
philosophers (Heidegger in particular) pay insufficient attention to the story of Epimetheus' 
neglect. While accepting the negative antagonism of technology as a given, Stiegler (1998 
argues that technology can be considered in terms of an evolutionary ecology as a means to 'a 
new age of the spirit, a renewal of the life of the spirit'. While "the classic model of industrial 
society seems obsolete, this goal must be the ground for a political economy and industrial 
mind - which should also be an industrial ecology of the mind" (Arslndustrialis, 2007). Ansell 
Pearson (1997), while accepting the notion of complex and distributed relations of the human, 
technology and society, cannot quite accept the coextensive nature of technology and 
humanity. For Ansell Pearson (1997 p. 123), technology is a human prosthesis, a softer 
version of the inhuman: 'originary technicity: technology is a constuitive prosthesis of the 
human animal, a dangerous supplement that enjoys an originary status.' De Kerckhove (1997) 
argues that technology must always remain 'a prosthesis', creating a revised and mutable 
sense of the self. Derrlda and others positing technology as an inhuman counterpoint to 
humanity are forced, however, to accept that technology is tied intimately to human evolution. 
The concept of 'original technicity' can be understood as a somewhat begrudging acceptance 
of the challenge to alterity. The concept of original technicity suggests that technology 
alienates humanity from itself. If we accept, however, that technology is at least eo-
evolutionary with the species, then we must face the logical conclusion that humanity can have 
never truly known itself. 
Beardsworth (1998) has argued for the extraction of technicity from the realms of metaphysics 
and 'continental philosophical thought's various articulations of the "other" of metaphysics in 
relation to the problematic .. .'. However, the continental philosophy to which Beardsworth 
refers reappears as key texts in many attempts to engage with the concept of technicity (for 
example, Derrida, 1998, and Stiegler, 2001) Beardsworth suggests that an ethical approach to 
development can be found by appreciating how technology can be understood as an excess, 
and not as an other. 161 Beardsworth returns technicity to humanity as an essential, but largely 
161 A rhetorical stance, particularly in philosophy, that accepts something as originary and yet 
supplementary is extraordinary; it would seem to run counter to everything that evolutionary studies 
might tell us and posits humanity as some special case. lt is arguable that much of the tortured 
consideration of technicity in contemporary philosophy is a sophistic attempt at self-justification, when 
actually technicity might point to a problem with the grounds upon which philosophies of alterity are 
constructed. 
228 
problematic, trait of the species. When interviewed and talking about drugs, Derrida (1993, p. 
15) did appear willing to accept that alterity was problematic: 'The natural, originary body 
does not exist: technology has not simply added itself, from outside or after the fact, as a 
foreign body. Certainly, this foreign or dangerous supplement is "originarily" at work .. .' 
(Derrida, 1993, p. 15). Mackenzie provides arguably one of the more useful additions to the 
growing number of considerations of technicity and its extraction from metaphysics. 
Mackenzie's Transduaions (2002) focuses particularly upon velocity and time, placing 
technicity at the centre of his thesis. However, he too struggles to resolve the conflicting 
alterity of contemporary analysis with the nagging question of originality. Mackenzie accepts, 
drawing on Latour, that technology cannot be extracted from humanity (Mackenzie, 2002. p. 
7) and is critical of Heidegger, (Mackenzie, 2002, p. 9), but presents another attempt to 
understand again how technology changes the essential qualities of being. 
In Plato's Symposium (for a good translation see Gill, 2003) the conversation turns to the 
manner in which mortals seek immortality. The story is told, by Socrates, of a conversation 
with a woman of Mantinea called Diotima in which she describes her theory of the nature of 
love and knowledge. Socrates recalls this conversation and retells it to his fellows in the 
symposium. "Love" declares Diotima, • is a great spirit, Socrates. Everything classed as a spirit 
falls between god and human." (Plato, 2003. 201d-e p.38) Spirits suggests Diotima, are 
intermediaries, • ... they fill the gap between [man and the Gods) and enable the universe to 
form an interconnected whole." (Gill, 2003. 201d-e p.39) Someone who is unable to 
communicate with these spirits and has wisdom in other areas of expertise and 
craftsmanship ... [is) ... merely a mechanic" Diotima's theories place love at the centre of 
everything. Diotima's idea of love has been the subject of much scholarly debate but Gill 
suggests that it refers to some innate drive. (See Gill, 2003. p xxvii-xxxv) Gill understands this 
to be "the intense, emotional and (in some sense) 'erotic' drive that typically arises within 
interpersonal relationships." (Gill, 2003. p xxxv) This drive might also be understood to 
emerge as a human form of the genetic drive to reproduce in species. While other species 
share the drive to survive and reproduce, human intelligence, perhaps uniquely, seeks to 
reproduce not only in body but also in mind. "Reproduction provides the means through which 
mortal creatures can gain the immortality which is not otherwise available to them, and this is 
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the underlying motive of sexual desire." (Gill's introduction to Plato, 2003. p xxxi) Sometimes 
mistakenly interpreted to mean the process of production and creation, or craft, the Greek 
term poiesis is perhaps best understood as this creative enaction (Bruner, 1966) of being in 
the world. 
For the Greeks, the bringing into being of beauty defined the particular poiesis (love) that was 
characteristic of humanity. The bringing into being of another life, the attainment of heroic 
virtue and knowledge, are that for which mortals must strive (See Gill, 2003. 201a-212e p.36-
50). Poeisis, then, describes a kind of ecstatic realisation of being in the world and can be 
understood as a rather superannuated concept of enacted cognition. 
Following the groundbreaking work of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), my 
understanding of spiritual knowing embraces an enactive paradigm of cognition: 
Spiritual knowing is not a mental representation of pregiven, independent spiritual 
objects, but an enaction, the bringing forth of a world or domain of distinctions eo-
created by the different elements involved in the participatory event .... a dynamic and 
indeterminate spiritual power of inexhaustible creativity. (Ferrer, 2005) 
Although sometimes considered to be similar to poiesis, praxis has been interpreted as the 
realisation of theory towards an end. There is a subtle yet significant difference between a 
knowing and applied realisation of an intellectual process and an ecstatic enaction of being in 
the world. Praxis is a human trait and the consequence of a human intellectual process. lt has 
individualised intention, as, for example, in Cieszkowski's Philosophy of Action (see Me le, 
1997), and implications for political power, as in Marx's rather famous and oft-quoted 
assertion that 'Knowledge is Power' (Marx and Engels, 1988, p. 121). Poiesis, on the other 
hand, is a more fundamental condition of being and is not necessarily known or enacted 
through the will. 
Heidegger describes poiesis as 'the blooming of the blossom, the coming-out of a butterfly 
from a cocoon, the plummeting of a waterfall when the snow begins to melt' (McCullough, 
2001). 162 The realisation of poiesis is not always easy. Human beings, lacking the supernatural 
162 Other species have their own particular ways of enacting in the world, "The (Osprey] in the Atlantic 
storm would be for the Greeks a poiesls-a-veritable production.• (Christian and Grant, 1996. p.410) An 
Osprey seen through human eyes is understood through the singular and awesome ease with which it 
hunts and commands flight. In the terms of ancient Greece philosophy life Is played out through a 
constant flow of poiesls realised. We can of course not be certain that our interpretation of the realisation 
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powers of the gods or the ineffable nature of the spirits, have ambitions of poiesis that go far 
beyond their biological characteristics. That mankind is forced to enact poiesis through the 
technic gift of the titans, which is considered something of a burden, resonates down the 
ages. Johnson (2006) has argued that praxis and poiesis differ only in their depth of 
engagement with reality. Johnson argues that praxis produces relatively simple 'codifiable 
objects', whereas poiesis produces objects of intense uncertainty and complexity. johnson 
calls upon Heidegger's claim of poiesis as belonging to the artists and praxis to the craftsman. 
This view does seem to tally with the Greek conception but may have more to do with an echo 
of the dismissal of the intellectual worthiness of the mechanical artists and the conception of 
the crafts as a matter of skill and not intellect. 163 The impression we are left with is that, in 
ancient Greece, higher idealised life and the finer ambition of poiesis were confined to the 
realm of the episteme, that place of pure intellectual endeavour that was both a conceptual 
and a geographical place. If the philosophers occupied the episteme, then everyday life was 
played out in the agra. While also an intellectual and social place, the agra was concerned with 
matters of day-to-day life.164 Poiesis for the ancient Greeks was a rather high ideal and easy 
to understand in terms of sculpture, painting, poetry or drama. The concept of poiesis in 
terms of the higher arts and not in terms of the products of the agra is inculcated in Western 
culture. The relationship of poiesls and techne must be extracted from social prejudice with 
some care (see Dorta, 1973). lt may well be that part of the glory of the Symposium is that it 
can be read to suit the intellectual flavour of the reader and his or her time, but it does appear 
as if later analysis has little to do with the fundamental life-sciences notion of a condition that 
Diotima seems to describes in the Symposium. Humans are worthy of special consideration, 
of the Osprey's poiesis is that shared by the Osprey. We can be more certain about what poiesis might 
mean in human terms. 
163 An industrial designer might argue, as this thesis has, that they are conditioned to their lowly status. 
164 lt has been argued here (see Section 1.3) that the industrial design community is located, in 
scholarship, firmly In the doxaical agra. Down in the doxa of everyday life, those who constructed the 
artefacts of the ancient world may well have been slaves or of lowly status, but, from industrial design's 
intellectual standpoint, a ploughed field, the harvest, the movement of goods or the death of an enemy 
are arguably as much an act of poiesls as any supposed higher ideal. Everyday life Is a process of 
continual collusion of praxis, technl and poiesis (Smith, 2003). In the socially fluid world of the industrial 
designer, this collusion is no longer something that is necessarily confined to the rarefied world of the 
eplsteme. Take an activity such as ploughing, for example. The plough may have appeared to the 
eplsteme to be doxaical, merely mechanic and without poiesis. Clearly the plough is a consequence of 
praxis and craft. The activity of ploughing is essentially an anticipation of a fresh crop by realising the 
necessary conditions for planting. Tried for the first time, ploughing is a particular application of the 
theoretical knowledge of agriculture, applied through a practical endeavour. Over time, ploughing itself 
becomes recorded as an addition to praxis by shaping the theoretical process, and itself becomes the 
subject of its own theorisations. The plough is a theoretical intervention in the land, itself a theoretical 
readiness for the application of seed, itself a theoretical potential to become plant, and so it can be 
extended. 
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even in an ecological construct, because the self-conscious realisation of being, through 
techne, is, at least as humans understand it, a uniquely human condition. Other species may 
appear to intervene in the ecosystem in a way that bears some comparison to our use of tools, 
but other species do not employ techne in quite the manner that humans do in order to enact 
their particular realisation in the world. 
lt was recognised sometime before Darwin that humanity might be considered in similar terms 
to other species. 'I think Or Franklin's definition of Man a good one; "a tool making animal"' 
Oames Boswell; see Schick and Toth, 1994 p. 16). Mankind is not unique in this respect: in 
1975 Edward Wilson published what remains a significantly complete and comprehensive list 
of non-human species that appear to utilise tools as part of their phylogeny (see Wilson, 
2000). 165 Consideration of the human as one species among many in the ecosystem that can 
be demonstrated to employ a component of the world in this manner makes it difficult to 
separate the species from techne. Philosophy and ancient logic aside, the idea that technology 
is somehow inhuman is problematic in two accounts. In the first instance technology appears 
to be evident in some degree in other species, and, secondly, technology even as we 
understand it in the human context166 appears to predate our species in our own phylogeny 
(see Relethford, 2002). Arguably some form of techne is not unique to the human but can be 
considered to begin in species prior to the emergence of homosapiens-sapiens-sapiens. 'The 
history of tools is a chronology of extension and articulation of human functions'. Tools, 
'originally conceived about two million years ago as crude adjuncts of the body to increase its 
power and efficacy, are passive participants in accomplishing work' (D. Paul, 1987, p. 
133).This phylogeny of the human begins before humanity in a progenitor Homo Hablis 167 
that used tools with a degree of sophistication and distribution that might be compared to 
that of the modern chimpanzee. While it is possible that this similarity might suggest 
technology to be an emergent dynamic in an evolutionary trajectory, there is no evidence to 
support this. However, the eo-evolution of technology in phylum other than our own points to 
165 Phylogeny: evolutionary history. 
166 We can use the term techne here to define particularly sophisticated tool use, as we might understand 
it in the human context. 
167 
'The first glimmerings of the dawn of human technology can now be traced back to approximately 2.5 
million years ago In Africa. At a superficial glance, these signs are not all that impressive; a few lumps and 
fragments of broken stone, often found with fossil bones and teeth of extinCt forms of animals that lived 
during this time ... These shattered rocks bear witness to a new behaviour pattern among early hominids, 
the percussive flaking of rock, a behaviour that was to have profound consequences' (Schick and Toth, 
1994, p. 18). 
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the wider evolutionary nature of technology and not to its origination as a unique 
consequence of human intelligence. 
Homo Hablis (National Geographic, 2007; see http: //donsmaps.com/dmanisi.html). 
Andre Leroi-Gourhan suggested that tool use is a so-called Universal Tendency, an 
evolutionary phenomenon of the human species independent of culture. 168 Today there is a 
widely accepted idea that technology 'is inseperable from being human. Devices and machines 
are not things wout there" that invade life. We are intimate with them from birth, as were our 
ancestors for hundreds of generations' (Nye, 2006, p. ix). 
The similarity between humanity and other species does not end with the physical 
manipulation of the world. Other species' patterns of behaviour appear to mirror human 
cultural interactions with technology. Chimpanzees have been observed to manufacture tools 
and to construct a form of culture about their use.169 If chimpanzee behaviour can be 
understood to mirror that of our early ancestors (Homo Hablis), then: 
This is not just a biological story. Human evolution concerns not just physical change, 
but also behavioural transformations. Changes in our biology are perhaps easier to 
see ... Changes in our behaviour, however, even if many are strongly linked to our 
biology, are less easily visible but equally important. (Schick and Toth, 1994, p.17) 
168 For Leroi-Gourhan the emergence of bipedality was critical to the evolutionary potential of technology. 
Bipedality, of course, predates homosapiens-sapiens by some millennia, and so humanity emerges with 
technology in place, and, if we accept this history, then technology is tied to the human condition as an 
evolutionary imperative. 
169 Schick and Toth (1994, p. 58) recall how the comedian jay Leno once joked that 'if Chimpanzees were 
really like humans they would just borrow tools and not return them!' His joke has, it has turned out, 
proved to be prescient. Where particular rocks are scarce, chimpanzees sort out questions of 'ownership' 
and the 'authority' of use through complex social strategies. 
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Schick and Toth (1994) are concerned to emphasise the connection between tool use, 
technology and culture. Technology, they argue, is an emergent cultural condition and not 
necessarily human, which 
refer[s] to the system of rules and procedures prescribing how tools are made and 
used. In a broader sense, [technology] can be used for the systems of tool-related 
behaviour of non human species as well. To have technology per se, there should be 
some agreed-upon ways of doing things in a social group - that is, there should be 
some learned, cultural aspect to the tool use or artefact manufacture. (Schick and 
Toth, 1994, p. 49) 
Techne then appears to be a conditional phenomenon that emerges as a consequence of some 
component of intelligence and culture. If humans are to be considered a technological species, 
this must be taken to imply a species for whom technology is part of the genomic distinction 
and the evolutionary niche. If the concept of poiesis sets in train a line of thinking that 
understands life as a continual realisation of being, then for the human species this realisation 
is enacted through its own evolutionary imperative and techne becomes an essential 
component of the ecological construct. In the following chapter this idea is extended, and it is 
argued that technology can be understood to be a problematic obscuration of true humanity 
only if one rejects the notion of technology as the soma. This is not an artificial extension of 
the soma, as some would argue, but rather evidence of a distributing soma, made possible by 
the evolutionary ·trait of intelligence. 
One way for designers to understand poiesis is to find a way to mainain its status as an 
enaction in the world, but to strip it of social status. Poiesis, as Doitima describes it, seems to 
be a fundamental evolutionary consequence of the particular intelligence of the species. 
Poiesis then can be considered as an enaction of our particular form of being. Poiesis in Greek 
terms is a mysterious spirit of creativity and is arguably among the most problematic of 
classical conceptions. lt is difficult to grasp intellectually, because polesis may be a product of 
our individual somatic systems and so deeply embedded in our conscious being that its 
consideration is a reflection of itself and beyond simplistic reduction. Freud's Project for a 
Scientific Psychology outlines the notion of cathexis (see Freud 1895). Cathexis is a somatic 
energy, the psychological excitement, panic or arousal that people experience in certain 
urgent, dangerous, sexual and creative activities. One way of understanding cathexis is as the 
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biological response to enacted poiesis. One reason for the cathexlc excitement of poiesis to 
be occluded in the formal and historical considerations of the mechanical world is that several 
millennia of Western philosophy have left us with no meaningful context for talking about the 
products of the agra as an arousing form of poetic love. Ploughing, for example, might be 
assumed an entirely mechanical act. Without crops the ancient farmer and his family would 
starve; ploughing, it is easy to assume, is an act of the will to survive. This is a pessimistic 
interpretation. There is pride in the craft of the farmer, and there is art in the ploughed field. 
'We consider the art of ploughing to be highly important and a tradition to be actively 
encouraged if it is to survive' (Maclver, 2007). For the farmer this art is a vital and essential 
component in his being; the plough enables the farmer to enact this poiesis. While it may 
appear self-evident to contemporary designers that humanity and technology are 
heterogeneous, this must now be be understood to be determined by a fixed topological 
understanding. Though this enacted poiesis is ahistorlcal, there are any number of anecdotal 
accounts of human-technological relationships that can be called upon for evidence of a 
wider, more subtle engagement when technology and humanity appear to function as a 
continuity. 
In a documentary film detailing the testing of a Mclaren Formula One car, the racing driver 
Ayrton Senna comes into the pits and informs his mechanics that there is a·problem with the 
engine. Senna (1991) describes how he can feel the engine fail inside himself. To the bemused 
incredulity of his mechanics, Senna suggests that he feels a particular friction. The engineers 
run diagnostic tests. They can detect nothing wrong with the engine, and send Senna out to 
drive again. The video narrative suggests that during a subsequent engine strip-down it was 
found that a piston ring had indeed broken. Racing engines fail often enough, and there is 
every chance of coincidence that would seem to point to a rational explanation; after all, it 
would seem occult in design terms to suggest that a driver could truly fee/the pain of a failing 
engine. lt was sometimes claimed by fighter pilots in the Second World War that they did not 
simply climb into a Spitfire; they wore it as a form of clothing (see, for example, Spitfire, 
1998). Bond (1932) studied pilots and found that 'they commonly speak of the plane as if it 
were an extension of their own bodies' (see Bond, 1952, cited in Murphy and White, 1995, p. 
32). These pilots may simply be describing the close-fitting nature of the cockpit or the 
struggle to clamber into its constrained space. A contemporary pilot feels rather more 
comfortable when she describes her experience of flight as a state of being in which she 
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senses herself as a singular entity: 'you are flying using your brain and body but not your 
emotions, it is a single thing, you are a flying machine, you should be part of it' (Turkish 
Female Jet Fighter Pilot, 2006). Barthes found this condition to be problematic. Barthes's 'jet 
man' was dehumanised, having been stripped of his cultural persona. The jet man for Barthes 
(2000, pp. 71-7) 'knows no culture in adventure or destiny, but only a condition'. The jet man 
has no heroic humanity; he is one and the same as the jet. Whereas the contemporary fighter 
pilot, neurologically mapped into her cockpit with its vision tracking and advanced 
anticipatory computer systems, may feel some sense of herself as being directly connected to 
the aircraft, the Spitfire pilots' description of wearing their craft may point to the mechanical 
nature of their interaction. To describe oneself as being at one with the Spitfire might be to 
admit to an occult experience. This experience might be thought occult or a 'forbidden 
sensuality', because it refers to a largely unaccounted for and ahistorical description and 
projection of human-technological relations that appears to be confined to anecdotal 
accounts. 
The rather famous poem 'High Flight' by Gillespie Magee, describing the ecstasy of the fighter 
pilot, betrays a delight in the potentiality of human consciousness to merge organic and 
inorganic and to call upon a soma that is not bounded or described by its organic or inorganic 
nature. Magee's poem is interesting because throughout it refers only to the ecstasy of flight 
as an act of consciousness, not of engineering, making only one brief reference to 'my eager 
craft'. The Spitfire is at best a liminal experience. The poem is joyous. lt describes a human 
soaring, not the process of flying a machine. 
Oh I I have slipped the 8Urly bonds of earth 
And danced the skies OD laushter-silvered 'IVinp; 
Sunwanl rve climbod, IIJid joined the tumbliDg mirth 
Of BUD~Iit clouds - IIJid done a hiUidred things 
You have Dot dreamed of- wheeled IIJid soared IIJid BWIIII8 
High iD the sunlit sikmce. Hov'ring there 
I've chased the shouting wiDd alon& IIJid fhms 
My eager craft through foodess halls of air. 
Up, up the loDg delirious, blli11iDg blue, 
I've topped the windswept heiahiB with easy sraco 
Where never Jart. or even easJe flew 
And. while with silent lifting mind I've trod 
The hl8h untresspassod BIIDC1ity of space, 
Pllt out my hiiJid IIJid touched the face of Ood. 
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(Gillespie Magee, 'High Flight'. 1941) 
In the Zone (Murphy and White, 1995)170 is a wide-ranging collection of transcripted 
anecdotes of so-called 'Transcendent Experiences in Sports'. These experiences, it seems, are 
not understood to fit with orthodox science and are often described as being mystical - a 
notion reinforced on the cover description of the text: 'remarkable and mystical things happen 
to people during sports .. .' (Murphy and White 1995. Jacket copy). In a chapter called 'Mystical 
Sensations' a motorcycle rider describes the experience of riding at considerable speed: 'you 
feel a calmness throughout your body, even though you know intellectually that you're right 
on the brink of disaster' (Murphy and White, 1995, p. 11). We know this sensation from 
personal experience, when we have perhaps hit a tennis ball cleanly, or struck a golf ball so 
that it flies straight and far. Murphy describes these experiences and points to how people 
describe this in a rather taciturn manner. Many of the interviewees, apparently embarrassed to 
admit a sensuality that appears to diminish their sense of themselves located about their 
bodies, describe their experience as if it had not really happened, but had simply felt as if it 
had. 
Deleuze has described the 'machinic becoming'. A machinic becoming is a condition of being 
where the distinction of the human and technology becomes superseded: 
[a bicycle) obviously has no 'end' or intention. lt only works when it is connected with 
another 'machine' such as the human body; and the production of these two machines 
can only be achieved through connection. The human body becomes a cyclist in 
connecting with the machine; the cycle becomes a vehicle. (Colebrook, 2002, p. 56) 
In Ways of the HandDavid Sudnow (1978) describes 'the organization of improvised conduct' 
in the experience and technique of jazz piano. In the preface (p. xi) Sudnow describes with 
incredulity the experience of watching his hands at work. 'If I watch my hands on a typewriter, 
I don't recognise their movements. I am startled by the looks of my hands while typing ... lt's 
like witnessing an interior part of my body going through some business.' Sudnow describes 
in some depth the process of learning to become a jazz pianist from his earliest moments 
170 This text, published by Arkana, is consigned among other 'new age' and "spiritual' titles. Murphy is the 
eo-founder of the Esalen Institute, and the book is couched in somewhat esoteric terms. lt tends to find 
mysticism and to avoid scientific explanation. 
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when he 'knew how to place his fingers properly, how to engage in some manoeuvre once it 
was pointed out to me ... (p. 1) until the time when his hands could fly about the keyboard and 
he could 'sit down at the piano, gain an initial orientation with the merest touch "anywhere" on 
the field, then reach out and bring my finger precisely into the spot "two feet" off to my left, 
where a half inch off is a mistake, come back "seventeen inches" and hit another one, and go 
down "twenty three inches" and get there at a fast clip' (p. 13).171 When Sudnow attempts to 
copy the movements of other pianists in order to attain their sound, he finds that the 
connection is not simply a matter of mechanical similarity. The posture and movement of the 
pianist seem to bear little relation to their sound. 
At live performances I had watched the very improvisational players whose records 
had served as my models, but their body idioms in no way seemed connected in detail 
to the nature of their melodies ... [One) sat tightly hunched over the piano, playing 
furiously fast, but assuming that posture seemed to have no intrinsic relationship to 
getting my jazz to happen as his did. (p. 82) 
Sudnow finds, however, that he can observe these musicians and then somehow his body 
finds its own shape; he can now make something closer to their own articular jazz. Sudnow 
describes a singular experience that is not described by physics or physiology alone. He 
suggests that no measurable account for the connection between human (musician) and 
machine (piano) is possible. In Sudnow's account, while there is no measurable account 
between the body and the music, there is nonetheless an unaccountable mystical connection. 
Counter to Murphy's hypothesis, however, it is doubtful that this connection is some strange 
ethereal gift of the muse, beyond the rationality of science.172 There are many examples when 
171 1 watch my own children with their Playstation. The Playstation is not my child. 1 have no emotional 
attachment to it. When it breaks, the loss my children feel is not that of mourning; it is more of frustration 
and impatience while they wait for its repair or replacement. And yet in that moment when they are 
engaged in its play there is no meaningful seperation between the systems that drive their bodies and the 
systems driving the Playstation. Their fingers flash about the controllers, their bodies swerve and bend 
with the information they take from the screen and absorb into their cognition. 
172 There Is a branch of therapy called 'Esoteric Anatomy'. The most complete reference to this form of 
alternative medicine is Esoteric Anatomy: The Body as Consciousness by Bruce Burger (1998). In this 
comprehensive account of the practice, there is much that Is tangential, much that appears highly 
unscientific, conjectural and founded in faith rather than evidence. Nevertheless, this is an Intriguing 
book. it blends history with science with mythology and belief. If one is prepared not to take it entirely at 
face value but to understand it as shaping a way of understanding the body, it begins to make sense of 
where science might look to understand the phenomena. 'The Three Principals' and the 'Three Axes of the 
Body' describe attempts emanating from Eastern philosophy to understand how energy is dissipated and 
directed about the body (Burger, 1998, p. 221). The flow of energy through, within and without the body 
is an important consideration in Eastern philosophy. 'Oriental Wisdom' is not something that appears to 
feature explicitly in the Western scientific tradition, at least not in the way that industrial design 
encounters orthodox science. That these ideas might or might not come to be proven as science or myth 
is not a concern here. lt is that a consideration such as Murphy's should be consigned to the fringe of 
science that should surprise us. 
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people appear to be In some way coextensive with technology, located firmly in the esoteric or 
considered so occult as to appear beyond rational conversation. The Ouija Board and the 
diving rod are examples of devices in which it is claimed the body becomes connected with 
some supposed externalised spirit or energetic force. Their use is explicitly paranormal; their 
discussion in rational conversation runs the risk of consigning the speaker to the fringe. In 
The Illusion of Conscious Will, Wegner (2002) describes a number of scientific 'explanations' 
of these phenomena. These explanations focus upon the nonconscious 173 function of the 
soma. Wegner suggests that the function of the soma cannot be entirely understood to be 
accountable in consciousness. Wegner (pp. 43-5) cites the work of the neurophysicist 
Benjamin Libet and colleagues and their experiments to test the timing between the 
commencement of somatic activity and the subsequent conscious willing of the movement. 
Wegner suggests that Llbet's research presents a challenge to ideas we might have of 
somehow being in charge of our bodies and by extension of our free will. Wegner suggests 
that this unconscious functioning of the body may go some way to explain some of the occult 
experiences described above. 174 That a facet of life that is common to us all should be 
considered to be on the fringe of conversation Is extraordinary. The piano in the process of 
making jazz does not diminish the humanity of the pianist; rather the piano and the pianist 
come together through a flowing of energies and intentions as an expression of humanity. We 
can find moments when people describe how any boundary between themselves and 
technology becomes meaningless. This·does not necessarily imply a loss of humanity. indeed 
the poetry of Magee implies quite the opposite: flight becomes a heightened moment of 
human ecstasy. A history of these experiences of being is largely absent from industrial 
design, and yet arguably this would seem to be a moment of supreme humanisation. However, 
the intellectual foundation of the process of humanising technology appears to imply quite the 
reverse. To remind ourselves: 
The boundary between humanity and machine is becoming progressively more 
blurred, and there are many willing to defend this development, regarding it as where 
173 The nonconscious should not be confused with the unconscious, as a Freudian might understand it. 
The nonconscious refers to the functions of the soma that operate beyond human sensuality. 
174 Research has confirmed a gap of some fraction of a second between the badly's preparation for 
movement and the subsequent conscious decision to make an action. 
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our future lies. At stake this debate is our very conception of what it means to be 
human. (Sim, 2001, jacket copy) 
lt can appear natural in industrial design to engage in processes of analysis placing emphasis 
upon the resolution of difference, and so it becomes possible for terms such as 'interface' or 
'interaction', prioritising modes of analysis reinforcing and then resolving differences between 
humanity and technology, to be accepted without question. 'Knowledge of the human body's 
structure, functions, size and strength is included in the first part of the course. In the second 
part, the human method of understanding, interpreting and dealing with information is 
studied. Students examine the boundaries between human and object' (UMEA, 2006). Thinking 
back to Deleuze's concept of machinic becoming, from the descriptions of the practice of 
industrial design history, it might seem as if designers intellect has been concerned only with 
the bicycle, its form and cultural value. The machinic becoming might, however, alert 
industrial designers to the realisation that Deleuze describes something that they know 
already and perhaps take for granted, but appear to have lost from their discourse and their 
history. 
7.3 Embodied interaction 
The body then cannot be discounted in any analysis of being in the world, and, more 
critically, it cannot be isolated from it either. The concept of embodied interaction 
extended into the context of design methodology. 
'The human body is a machine which winds its own springs. lt is the living image of perpetual 
movement' 
(De la Mettrie, 1748). 
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Julien Offray De la Mettrie's Man a Machine (1748) is sometimes cited as an example of how 
science reduces the essence of humanity to that of a mere machine (see Cohen Rosenfield, 
1940). While it may appear superficially175 to make that claim, in Man a Machine De la Mettrie 
actually made a far more subtle proposition for the condition and experience of being alive to 
emerge from the enacted condition of being in the world. Far from suggesting that mankind 
was a zombified product of the mechanism of the body, De la Mettrie argued that the world is 
a product of human interpretation, which is itself conditioned by the world. In his own terms 
De la Mettrie was clear that humans had evolved to be in the world, and proposed, rather 
unpopularly in his time, that humanity was naturally inseparable from the world as a being of 
nature. 
Man's pre-eminent advantage is his organism. In vain all writers of books on morals 
fail to regard as praiseworthy those qualities that come by nature, esteeming only the 
talents gained by dint of reflection and industry. For whence come, I ask, skill, 
learning, and virtue, if not from a disposition that makes us fit to become skill-full, 
wise, and virtuous? And whence again, comes this disposition, if not from nature? 
Only through nature, do we have any good qualities; to her we owe all that we are. (De 
La Mettrie, 1748) 
De la Mettrie argues that while the corpus is a form of machine, the human is more than the 
sum of its mechanistic parts. De la Mettrie argued that while the body and the soul 176 can be 
understood in isolation, no true picture of the human could be built unless they are 
considered as one whole. De la Mettrie returns our attention to energy; he suggested that it Is 
the food necessary for the machine that can influence the soul, and courage or stupidity 
though considered to be essentially a matter of the soul and the domain of the philosopher, it 
could not be separated from the somatic influence: 
Nourishment keeps up the movement which fever excites. Without food, the soul 
pines away, goes mad, and dies exhausted. The soul is a taper whose light flares up 
the moment before it goes out. But nourish the body, pour into its veins life-giving 
juices and strong liquors, and then the soul grows strong like them, as if arming itself 
with a proud courage, and the soldier whom water would have made to flee, grows 
bold and runs joyously to death to the sound of drums. Thus a hot drink sets into 
175 Especially if one isolates this particular phrase from the entire text, as is frequently the case. 
176 Instead of soul, we might say self, mind or consciousness. 
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stormy movement the blood which a cold drink would have calmed. (De La Mettrle, 
1748) 
For De la Mettrie it was impossible to reduce mankind to understand him. One can understand 
something of his nature and behaviour and something of his functioning but can never reduce 
him as one might a machine of his making. 
Man Is so complicated a machine that it is impossible to get a clear idea of the machine 
beforehand, and hence impossible to define it. For this reason, all the investigations 
have been vain, which the greatest philosophers have made a priori, that is to say, in so 
far as they use, as it were, the wings of the spirit. Thus it is only a posteriori or by trying 
to disentangle the soul from the organs of the body, so to speak, that one can reach the 
highest probability concerning man's own nature, even though one can not discover 
with certainty what his nature is. (De La Mettrie, 1748) 
In recent times there have been attempts to bring the intellectual impetus of cognitive science 
together with phenomenological philosophy. This is particularly evident in the work of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (2003) and to some extent in the earlier post-Hegelian ideas of Heidegger and 
Husserl. These philosophies deal with the 'embodied' experience of being in the world, rather 
than the constructed cultural conceptions humans build about themselves. 
There are strong indications that among the loose federation of sciences dealing with 
knowledge, and cognition - the cognitive sciences - there is a slowly growing 
conviction that [the Cartesian picture of formal, logical, well-defined units of 
knowledge) is upside down, that a radical paradigmatic or epistemological shift is 
rapidly developing. At the very center of this emerging view is the belief that the 
proper units of knowledge are primary concrete, embodied, incorporated, lived. 
(Varela, 1992) 
Neuro-psychlogists such as BermOdez et al, (1995), for example, have argued for some time 
that the body is the foundation of the sense of the self. In recent years, the works such as 
Lakoff and John son, Philosophy in the Flesh (1999) and also Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 
The Embodied Mind(1999) have laid out an embodied approach to cognitive studies that 
attempts to understand what it means to be human in everyday, lived experience. 
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If we examine the current situation today, with the exception of a few largely 
academic discussions cognitive science has virtually nothing to say about what it 
means to be human in everyday, lived situations. (Varela et al., 1999, p. xv) 
Embodied approaches to understanding human cognition mark in some respects the 
intellectual drift toward connective, rather than reductive, thought. Emerging from what might 
be termed an orthodox scientific methodology, embodied understandings of cognition 
attempt to bring rigour to the subjectivity of lived experiences. 
On the other hand, those human traditions that have focused on the analysis, 
understanding, and possibilities for transformation of ordinary life need to be 
presented in a context that makes them available to·science. (Varela et al., 1999, p. 
XV) 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch's The Embodied Mind can be understood as an attempt to 
reconnect separations of mind, body and world and to bring these hitherto separate epistemes 
into one conversation. By understanding that the human experience of being (mindfulness) is 
inseparable from the physicality of the reality in which it is situated, an alternative Is posited 
to representational models of cognition in which the world is understood as filtered through 
senses, rather as one might experience a gigantic and immersive picture show. Varela and his 
co-authors offer 'embodied' models where the world is 'enacted' through series of complex 
'structural couplings' - that is, many177 tiny connections of sense, experience, imagination, 
memory, knowledge and other somatic systems, interacting to form a meshwork of 
impressions of being in the world. If representational models suppose a fixed world that is 
experienced, then the world in embodied thinking is entirely constructed. Varela's concept of 
'structural coupling' reflects, although differs from, Gibson's earlier model (1979), which, 
while similar in its rejection of representation, relied upon a largely visual model of the world, 
albeit one determined by species and habitat. In short, where Gibson recognises that the 
experience of the world is determined by the way In which a species is independently evolved 
in it, Varela and colleagues describe an 'enacted' concept that distributes the world into the 
species, and the species into the world. The world is then a lived experience enacted in 
somatic functions, and so humans must learn to be In the world. While some aspects of that 
world are constructed for some humans by others, this does not mean that these aspects 
177 How many billions of connections? lt appears doubtful a number could be put to this with any degree 
of accuracy. · 
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necessarily contain any truth about the world. Dennett (1993, pp. 206-7) sets out a neat and 
concise review of Varela's 'enactivist' approach in the context of previous purely 'cognltivist' 
approaches to cognition. 
Question 1: What is cognition? 
Cognitivist Answer: Information processing as symbolic computation-rule-based 
manipulation of symbols. 
Enactivist Answer: Enaction. A history of structural coupling that brings forth a world. 
Question 2: How does it work? 
Cognitivist Answer: Through any device that can support and manipulate discrete 
functional elements; the symbols. The system interacts only with the form of the 
symbols (their physical attributes), not their meaning. 
Enactivist Answer: Through a network consisting of multiple levels of interconnected, 
sensorimotor subnetworks. 
Question 3: How do I know when a cognitive system is functioning adequately? 
Cognitlvist Answer: When the symbols appropriately represent some aspect of the real 
world, and the information processing leads to a successful solution to the 
problem given to the system. 
Enactivist Answer: When it becomes part of an ongoing existing world (as the young of 
every species do) or shapes a new one (as happens in evolutionary history) 
This has profound consequences for the way in which we might understand industrial design's 
process of humanising technology. Taking each question in turn and looking at implications 
for design in the 'cognitivist' and 'enactivist' answers to each question it becomes possible to 
see how enacted or embodied approaches to cognition place a rather different emphasis upon 
the realisation of the self as a constructed (cognitivist) entity in seperation to technology or a 
self-enacted construct formed through complex coupling in which technology is understood 
to be coextensive with the soma. Perhaps the easiest way to emphasise the difference in these 
approaches might be to consider the act of speaking. A cognitivist approach might focus upon 
the meaning and construction of the words. How has a vocabulary been learned; what is the 
value of the words used; how are the words used differently in cultures and in changing 
contexts, for example. An enactivist approach might study the processes whereby the words 
are formed nonconsciously by the tongue in the palette; how this process is learned as a child; 
how words are assembled in the mind prior to their vocalisation and how in conversation their 
delivery is nuanced, seemingly without any thought being given to the process on the part of 
the speaker. The en activist approach places the somatic system at the centre of the process. 
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Assuming the speaker does not speak from a predetermined script, many systems are at play 
in the formation of the conversation. 178 In design terms: 
Question 1: What does design do when it humanises technology? 
Cognltivist Implication: Design manipulates symbolic images by which people read the 
world so that they can make sense of and give value to technologies (semiotics). 
Enactlvist Implication: Design enables people to enact in the world by enabling 
potentiality of whole human. as a distributed soma (Holsomatic) 
Question 2: How does design work? 
Cognltlvist Implication: Designers create the means to project simple or multiple and 
complex symbolic meanings. These symbols are primarily experienced by people in 
reference to a codified cultural understanding of referents. 
Enactlvist Implication: Designers intervene in the complex processes by which people 
form an experience of their world. Their task Is to enable people to experience the 
world 'naturally' without necessarily needing to attach meaning to indvidualised 
Interactions. 
Question 3: How do I know when design is functioning adequately? 
Cognitivist Implication: When people understand the symbols they encounter and 
react appropriately. 179 
Enactivlst lmpl.ication: When people incorporate the designed world seamlessly as part 
of their experience of being. 180 
Dourish (2001) takes the concept of embodiment into the context of design. His primary 
concern Is with the design of digital computer systems and artefacts. In Where the Action Is 
(2001) Dourish presents a model of 'embodied interaction' in seven chapters. 'A History of 
178 While the cognitivist searches for, and attempts to analyse, the supercomplex forces that construct the 
conversation, the enactivist understands conversation to be more akin to an autopoietic or emergent 
process. 
179 For example when people drive and see an oil light they understand this means they must stop the 
engine because they understand the value of the oil symbol in the context of the engine's function. 
180 For example, in Magee's 'High Flight' where the artefact is sublimated to the lived experience and 
becomes anoetic. We have some sense of this when we find we have driven safely down a motorway for 
some miles, without being aware that we have been driving. 
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Interaction' (pp. 1-23) presents a neat synopsis of the entire book. lt opens with a 
straightforward story of how computers have been operated, moving through electrical 
switching, symbolic programming, graphical user interfaces (GUis), to tangible and social 
computing, via Xerox Pare and Macintosh. The chapter concludes with an outline of Dourish's 
industrial design and artefact-oriented version of embodied interaction. Dourish draws heavily 
upon a number of the key figures In phenomenology he identifies as important to the 
development of embodied interaction: Husserl's phenomenology (1859-1938); Heidegger's 
hermeneutic phenomenology (1889-1976); Shultz's phenomenology of the social world 
(1899-1959) and Merleau-Pontv's phenomenology of perception (1962), for example. lt 
appears that, in his choice of phenomenologist, Dourish is intent on positing embodied 
interaction as a methodology that resists genealogy in structuralist or cultural-theoretical 
method and thereby eschews the orthodox history of design, while accepting the trajectory of 
artefacts that the sustaining narratives project. He starts from his summation of embodied 
phenomena as 'those, which by their very nature occur in real time and real space'. Dourish 
(2001) proposes that: 
Embodiment is the property of our engagement with the world that allows us to make 
it meaningful. (p. 126) 
He then locates his interpretation of embodiment in the physical. In a section entitled 'Getting 
in Touch' (pp. 25-53) Dourish locates industrial design in phenomenology by arguing that the 
physical experience of being-in-the-world cannot be separated from the 'reality of our bodys 
presence in the world' (p. 18), hence: 
Embodied Interaction is the creation, manipulation, and sharing of meaning through 
engaged interaction with artefacts. (p. 126) 
Reflecting on industrial design history as it is written, Dourish suggests that the design of 
human technology Interaction has shifted from a focus entirely in the machine foundation in 
protocols (switches, dials, etc.) towards tangible models of interaction that are distributed and 
intuitive. Examples are posited of digital systems that 'lend themselves naturally' (Dourish, 
2001, p. 42, citing Gaver, 1991); these are interactions where people appear not to have to 
think to act. Dourish Is rather uncritical in his concept of an action; he does not explore the 
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difference between natural or tacit actions. 181 In 'Social Computing' (Dourish, 2001, pp. SS-
97) Dourish outlines a concept of social computing and, reflecting the thinking that prevails in 
the industrial design community, argues that sociological approaches should underpin 
interaction methodologies. 182 Dourish describes how, after Suchman (1987), Interaction can be 
understood as an activity system. In other words we have ways of behaving when we are 
engaged In activities that interaction designers would be wise to build upon. In 'Selng-in-the-
World: Embodied Interaction' (Dourish, 2001, pp. 99-126) Dourish suggests that tangible 
interaction and social interaction have much to offer one another, arguing that both aim to 
'smooth interaction by exploiting a sense of familiarity with the everyday world' (p. 99). He 
calls upon the concept of metaphorical interaction (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).Dourish, 
however, proposes that a collision of ideas of sltuatedness with ethnomethodological 
approaches will bring individual experience into the social frame. it is arguable that individual 
members of the industrial design community's adoption of embodiment as a socially 
conditioned situation takes it some way from Varela's concept of the 'structural coupling'. 
Dourish seems to be on the brink of a profound move, towards a distributed view of cognition 
and the soma, but then steps back, returning the design discourse into a more familiar forum. 
Arguably, then, rather than transforming the discourse, Dourish entrenches it in its 
methodology of analysis. A design methodology that calls for familiarity as its guiding 
principle is likely to find it difficult to progress, especially when the interaction is anoetic. 
That any Industrial design thesis should find itself attempting an extraction from socially and 
culturally constructed models is indicative perhaps of the degree to which those models have 
come to pervade the intellectual imagination of these times. Berger and Luckmann's The Social 
Construction of Techno/ogy(197S) is considered an important text, if only because it has been 
reinforced by such a significant body of scholarship during the last decade of the twentieth 
century and the opening years of the twenty-first century, attempting understandings of 
technology as a social construction (see, for example, Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1989, and, 
more recently, MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999). That technology might emerge as a 
181 For example, there is no attempt to explore the somatic differentiation among supposedly natural 
actions like grasping with which we appear to be born; learned but apparently natural actions such as 
walking or talking; and the more specialist anoetic, but no less embodied actions, such as successfully 
wielding a tennis racquet. 
182 Social computing, as Oourish interprets it, interaction is reduced to activities and goals, a methodology 
that started out in computer science as a series of somewhat simplistic empirical studies and that, more 
recently, particularly after Suchman (19Sn, have taken a situated ethnomethodological (Garfinkle, 196n 
approach. In social computing, Interactions are learned and enculturated. 
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consequence of social forces has proved to be an accessible idea for designers. The 
enthusiastic engagement by the design community with social models of human-technological 
interaction has been necessitated by accelerated complexity in technic understandings of 
human-technological interaction to a degree of granularity that makes it difficult, if one 
assumes an epistemic difference between humanity and technology, to sift what is human 
from what is not. Designers have responded by constructing models of the design process 
that are themselves more granular, more fluid and less codified and mechanical than they 
might have once imagined (see, for example, Gedenryd's attempt (1998) to construct an 
intense granular and interactional non-linear design process). The emergence of socially 
constructed models of the human have shifted the intellectual imagining away from the 
human as a somatic architecture and a location of the ego, towards the body as a constructed 
and bounded locale to read In a social and networked model of humanity as a larger ethical 
construction. In this intellectual climate, humans are best not understood singularly but as 
collections of interacting groups and individuals, working and playing together. In this climate, 
designers began to understand technology as a similarly constructed concept that extends 
way beyond the physkality of materiality to include, even in relatively pragmatic 
conversations, a concept of commodity as a metaphorically material construct. 
When designers construct new ideas, they do so with reference to history and established 
precedents. SchOn and Schon (1991) described that process of conceptualisation as a kind of 
circulatory motion in which new ideas refer to the discourse they understand to be part of 
their genealogy. The implication here is that, in the context of their community, industrial 
designers are likely to interpret their history and discourse in terms of the community they 
understand and have embodied through the networks they have established with the places 
they have been trained or employed. Given that the industrial design community must draw 
upon Its own histories in order to gain a sense of its precedence, it is not surprising that 
designers should gain a view of themselves as an intellectual intervention in the production of 
technological artefacts. 
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Chapter eight 
Dissolving the problem in the recovered voice: strategies for 
the management of fluidity 
8.1 Granularity; a changed view of reality and not a changed reality 
Scale and extent are linked to the granular sophistication In the conceptual and 
technical models held. 
8.2 Anefactuallslng the body 
joe and josephine: The human body is understood by industrial design to be a resolved 
and material artefact, thus providing a form of hysterical continuity for industrial 
designers in the face of earlier, similarly hysterical attempts to understand the 
implications of holsomatic human. 
8.3 Designing with the 'Body without Organs' 
In order for industrial designers to find a way to engage with the anoetic, it will be 
necessary for them to find the means to artefactualise the enaction of the hybrid-human 
at a subtle degree of granular complexity. Such a granular logic will demand an 
understanding of the holsomatic human at a granular degree of complexity. At this 
scale and complexity it will become clear that no meaningful closure of the human is 
possible. 
8.4 Design Scenario 
Joey's ordinary life 
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8.1 Granularity; a changed view of reality and not a changed reality 
Scale and extent are linked to the granular sophistication in the conceptual and 
technical models held. 
In a short webcast on the 'Designinginteractions' (sic) web resource (see 
Designinginteractions, 2006) Durrell Bishop uses the example of coins and banknotes as 
'abstract representations of value, and suggests that physical tags can be designed to 
represent any abstract item '. Bishop's frequently cited telephone answering machine (see 
Bishop, 2005) has no history to call upon other than the culturally constructed artefact. The 
answering machine draws upon a social networking model and creates an imagined scenario. 
Bishop then instigates183 the materialisation of this scenario into an artefact. Briefly the device 
is imagined for a group of friends sharing a house, lll-4 its conceit being that it mixes real social 
and readily understood actions with the efficiency of electronic systems. 
Durrell Bishop's Answering Machine. 
The problem, of course, with Bishop' s device is that it relies upon a particular, and very 
limited, social condition and, as with the previously cited answering machine of Krohn and 
Viemeister, appears to be presented as a resistance to the emergence of the mobile telephone 
and its associated, systematised personal voice mail system. There appears to be some drive 
to materialise an artefact, whereas the answerphone now functions rather successfully as an 
113 
'Forces' may be too strong a term to describe Bishop's intervention, although it can seem that way. 
114 The flat shared by friends is a social scenario close, of course, to the imagination of a Western design 
student, although the system could perhaps be applied to an office or family. When a caller leaves a 
message on the answering machine, it is held in the electronic memory but tagged to a small marble-like 
key. These keys are ejected from the machine, travel down a runway and collect in a pool moulded into 
the machine. When a member of the house/family/office arrives at the machine, he or she can listen to 
the message by picking up a key and placing it in a hollow; the message is played. If the message is for 
that person, he or she can then wipe the key by depositing it back into the answering machine. Should the 
message be for someone else, he or she can place the key in an appropriate saucer, pot or place such that 
the person for whom the message is intended can listen at his or her own convenience. 
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entirely immaterial device. During the mid- to late 1990s the world of tangible computing 
research particularly drew upon some of the pioneering research at the Royal College of Art in 
London. The research was characterised by experiments with the materialisation of data into 
solid (tangible) icons. This research was typical of a number of attempts to project the 
trajectory of industrial design history into an engagement with the supposedly immaterial 
nature of data, by replacing virtual information with solid matter. This matter was brought 
together into artefaas modelled at a scale with which designers are familiar from the 
narratives, which sustain their community. These artefacts, it was suggested, would act as 
material place holders for informational events or as physical nodes for systems that appeared 
in these terms to be immaterial. Durrell Bishop's 1994 design for an answerphone (see, for 
example, Shaer et al, 2004), Natalie Jeremljenko's 'Live Wire' (Weiser and Brown, 1996) and 
Rob Strong's 'Feather, Scent and Shaker' (Strong and Gaver, 1996), for example, are often 
cited, both within and outside the industrial design community, as examples of this research. 
The material modes of historicisation underpinning industrial design analysis are, however, 
tied to a particular conception of materiality. 
a knowledge of scale gives us the perspective to see all things in terms of relative size. 
it gives us a sense of place in the universe and expands our thinking in non-linear ways. 
(Eames and Eames, 2005) 
In 1977, the industrial designers Charles and Ray Eames produced the film Powers of Ten 
(Eames and Eames, 1977). Starting with a 1 metre square filled by the image of a couple in a 
park, the film zooms outwards at factors of 10 to the universal scale and then inwards at the 
same faaorial to the atomic scale. Powers of Ten shifts understanding of the world through 
scales, revealing the earth as a microcosmic dot in the vastness of the universe. The human 
body is revealed to be a universe of its own, filled with atomic particles. At the atomic scale, 
the universe and all that is in it can be considered to be one continuous body of forces. The 
Eames film does little to enable this understanding; it eschews continuum and projects a 
series of discrete topological domains. 185 
••• One of the problems with Powers of Ten is that, while it rather poetically reveals the relative scale of 
things, the film tends to lock these views into discrete taxonomies that are somehow isolated from one 
another. When looking at the universe, one sees and is encouraged to think of planets and stars and other 
gigantic bodies. That the universe is a vast collation of atoms becomes somewhat lost. Similarly In the 
perspective of the nano, cells are projected in isolation and the molecular and atomic nature of. the human 
body is projected as being somehow contained within itself. The human-centric concept of the universe, 
where the human body and scale of understanding are the null point of view, is reiterated In the Eames's 
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Eames, Powers of Ten (Eames and Eames, 1977) 
Pepperell (2003; see also Pepperell and Punt 2001 has sought to develop an extensionist 
mode of creative philosophy, finding no distinction in objects or between the mind, body and 
world. Pepperell (2003, p. 35) defines extensionism thus: 
Rather than regarding identifiable objects of the world as coherent and discrete, 
Extensionism holds that all objects and events extend indefinitely through time and 
space. However, we normally acknowledge only a fractional part of the real extent of 
any object because of constraints inherent in our perceptual apparatus ... 
An extenslonist schema holds that no useful border can be found in objects or phenomena in 
so much as all 'objects' and 'properties' are considered formed as universal states of energy, 
evident as excitation or density. As such, this philosophy reflects that which we know to be 
the case from science. The radical shift in twentieth-century physics came with the 
demonstration that space and time can be considered as human conceptions without universal 
foundation. More recent Quantum logic has demonstrated that it is not even truly possible to 
observe anything with certainty. An extensionist philosophy suggests that such knowledge 
accepted as a facet of physics should be extended into more philosophical Interpretations of 
film. lt is not surprising, of course, that we understand the universe in relation to ourselves, but it a fallacy 
to imagine that the neatly contained borders we understand are reflections of reality. 
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being. That artefacts, like any other supposedly solid lump of matter in the imagination, 
should owe something to the perceived scale of the body is, of course, no surprise. And it 
should not be a surprise either to discover that humans have tended to construct the world 
about them in their own terms and bound about with their own terms of reference. Tis should 
not Imply that 'matter' as humans understand it is a universal truism (see Davis and Gribben, 
1992). 
The topological domain defines a field of analysis. Some means is required of ensuring that 
topological domains are considered in terms that have some coherence in their terms. We can 
speak of a waterfall, for example, in terms of fluid dynamics and the path of any individual 
droplet or even molecule of water. We can also usefully talk of a waterfall in terms of its 
cultural resonance; we might give it a name- Niagara Falls, for example. But these are rather 
different, although entirely appropriate, conversations. They both provide fulsome 
descriptions of the waterfall but are not entirely coherent in each others' terms. We are, of 
course, used to talking about waterfalls in these terms. The problem we negotiate throughout 
our lives is how we determine which conversation might be appropriate at any given moment. 
In conversations we do this by negotiation. We construct institutions to frame our 
conversations. A conversation in a journal of fluid dynamics might possibly include a treatise 
on the romantic qualities of Niagara, but it is unlikely the journal's readers would consider it 
an appropriate scientific analysis. On the other hand, an overtly finite degree of analysis is 
hardly likely to lend itself to poetry- for example, the rather famous letter from Charles 
Babbage to Alfred Lord Tennyson: 
Sir: In your otherwise beautiful poem 'The Vision of Sin' there is a verse which reads: 
'Every moment dies a man, every moment one is born'. lt must be manifest that if this 
were true the population of the world would be at a standstill. I would suggest that in 
the next edition of your poem you have it read: 'Every moment dies a man, every 
moment one and one sixteenth is born. The actual figure is so long I cannot get it 
onto a line, but I believe the figure one and one sixteenth will be sufficiently accurate 
for poetry. (Paraphrase of a letter from Charles Babbage to Alfred Lord Tennyson.' 
(See ABC, 2002)) 
Babbage has been accused of being a pedant, but in his terms he was liberal with his figure 
and of course he was literally correct. In terms of the analysis of the topological domain, 
however, the difference in terminology is critical; one has to be certain of the coherence in 
253 
terms. In data analysis it is recognised, of course, that the degree of inspection applied can 
determine widely varying outcomes. However, there is much to be gained by understanding 
how different degrees of analysis might relate to one another. To this end the mathematical 
science of 'extent analysis' has become a useful tool in the analysis of widely variant data 
fields (see Lisper and Collard, 1994). In the field of Biogeography it has become increasingly 
viable and necessary in recent years to undertake an analysis that brings fields of scientific 
study together. The correlation of the fields of analysis applied cannot necessarily be 
compared in everyday terms and are better understood in terms of spatial distributions - see, 
for example, Bickford and Laffan's study (2006) of plant diversity and health in terms of 
climate distributions. In studies of biology and ecology it is accepted that it is necessary to 
undertake a multi-extent analysis in order to build a functional picture of ecosystems that 
include species at widely differing scales, distribution and functional complexity. 
Many spatially complex environments are fractal, and consumers in these 
environments face scale-dependent trade-offs between encountering high densities 
of small resource patches versus low densities of large resource patches. (Ritchie, 
1998) 
Ritchie (1998) undertakes an analysis of species and finds evidence to suggest that the scale 
of species is linked, perhaps unsurprisingly, to the scale of the resources available to them. 
Ritchie, however, demonstrates that this relationship is a matter of fractal maths and fits with 
previous attempts to explain distributions in terms of consumer-led explanations. Ritchie 
looks for fractal repetition and describes this in terms of dimensionality. He demonstrates 
that, in broad terms, the spread of species within an ecosystem is coherent with itself at many 
degrees of resolution and that the distribution of species is determined by their scale in 
proportion to the scale of the domain under analysis. 186 Industrial designers, however, when 
they are attempting to analyse the process of humanising technology do not work with 
coherent fields of analysis. 
186 
'The model predias that, for a given density of resources, landscapes with greater extent and fraaal 
dimension and that contain patchy (low fractal dimension) resources favour large foraging scales and 
specialization on a small proportion of resource patches. Fragmented (low fractal dimension) landscapes 
of small extent with dispersed (high fraaal dimension) resources favour smaller foraging scales and 
generalists that use a large proportion of available resource patches ... This study thus places optimal 
foraging theory in a spatial contex t ... ' (Ritchie, 1998). 
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In fluid mechanics the 'Reynolds number' (See 0. Reynolds, 1883) is a simple way of 
describing the difference we might experience moving through water or swimming through 
water. The Reynolds number is calculated as a ration of viscosity to the inertial forces applied 
to the moving object. In Why Size Matters the biologist John Bonner (2006) uses the example 
of the difference evident in whales and bacteria swimming in water. Bacteria live in a world of 
low Reynolds numbers; in comparison, the whale's world is one of high Reynolds numbers. 
Even though the viscosity of water is a constant in both cases, the whale's mass and size give 
it a far greater momentum than bacteria. The world of bacteria is very different from that of 
the whale and yet in human terms they appear to occupy identical media or space. 
Re= fii?./L 
JWa/L2 
pv.L v.L Inertial forces 
=--=--= 
J.' 11 Viscous forces 
-The Reynolds formula. 
The difference between our world, the world of the whale and that of the bacteria is a matter 
of viscosity or density. Bonner demonstrates how the scale of species, their body typology and 
velocity of functioning are inextricably linked. Bonner demonstrates how the scale of species is 
directly linked to their velocity, their metabolic rate, intelligence, mass, structure and 
complexity. Species may appear to occupy the same world, but their engagement with it 
depends critically upon their scale. People have taken centuries to develop sophisticated ways 
of understanding the world that has some equilibrium with their understandings of their own 
densities. People have called this world the 'material'. That which appears to be anything other 
than material has proved to be much more problematic to explain in human terms. Fixations 
with the nature and problematic presented by supposedly ineffable phenomena such as the 
rainbow, spirits, pneumena, 187 vapours, miasmas, will-o-the-wisp or apparitions, for 
example, have come and gone. Some of these phenomena have maintained their status as 
being beyond understanding, but others have been included in the canon of science to 
become understood as refractions (Newton, for example, stripped the rainbow of its theology), 
gasses, electrostatics or mirages. 
187 The ancient Greeks had a term pneuma, which cannot easily be translated today except perhaps as soul 
or spirit or even breath: "an underlying essence or life force which ran through all things and animated or 
illuminated them with Mind' (Ross, 199n. 
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God's mystery reduced to the spectrum. 
Just as some terminologies have passed into history, other new terminologies, tied to more 
contemporary experiences, have emerged (for example, the virtual) but have proved no less 
elusive than the imaginations of the past. One of the ways in which people have come to 
include the ineffable into their existing understandings of material existence has been to 
extend their understanding of the complexity of the world. 
Phenomena, which can appear to be beyond rational explanation or to rupture existing states 
of reality, do so only inasmuch as people are unable to accommodate them in their existing 
taxonomies. If reduction to taxonomy and differentiation is eschewed, phenomena can then 
be interpreted at a level of understanding that is more finite and complete in its own terms of 
reference.188 For example, in the Eames's Powers of Ten, focus at each 'power' is placed upon 
a single, scaled, unit of attention; from the atomic, and ultimately to the universal, each scale 
appears as a discrete whole of its own and is disconnected from the other scales such that we 
see the cell, the body, the city and the solar system as self-contained entities. The Eames 
reveal their industrial design instincts in the production of the film. This is a film of artefacts, 
differently scaled, but nevertheless projected as entities that are coherent in their own terms. 
The Eames demonstrate that the artefactal world with which humans are familiar occupies but 
one scale of imagination. If a complete and connected universe is of such complexity and 
scope to be beyond human conception, then the Eames demonstrate how, by shifting attention 
across a number of scales, a more complete picture can emerge. They demonstrate how, as 
188 The rainbow, for example, can be understood as the action of particles of moisture on light. lt can be 
more thoroughly understood as the deflection of photons by the more dense electromagnetic fields of 
collated water molecules. 
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designers, they can understand and cope with complexity and fluidity, by modifying their 
analysis appropriately to deal with larger, or smaller, units and then to analyse the interaction 
between these units of attention. This approach can be broadly described as a granular 
approach to analysis. 
The essential concept of granularity is rather easy to understand. If boulders on a beach are an 
example of course grains, then pebbles represent a finer degree of granularity and grains of 
sand a finer degree again. Boulders, pebbles and grains reveal a surprising coherence in their 
form when they are viewed in scalar comparison. Without some other indication or analytical 
aid it is often difficult to tell an image of one from another. 
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lt is a well-established concept of chaos theory that forms are repeated across degrees of 
granularity. There is similarity at differing degrees of inspection. For example, the shape of an 
individual rock pool frequently mirrors in miniature the stretch of coast where it is found, and 
the stretch of coast in mirrors the larger geographical outlines of the land masses it borders 
(see Green, 1995). 
Rock pool (left) coastline (right) 
Similarity can be found in many occurrences. The illustration below could be of many, many 
things: a tree, a river delta, a data system, a family tree, a management system, a vascular 
system, a conceptual plan of animal phylum or a goods distribution system, for example. 
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In the field of information management, granularity is a term that is employed to refer to ' .the 
degree of detail or precision contained in data' (Veryard, 2005). In this context granularity can 
be applied across several dimensions, time and space. In physics, granularity refers both to 
the scale of material under analysis and to the degree to which concepts are understood. In 
computation, granularity can refer to the size of data outputs and the degree to which a 
system communicates data. Granularity in financial conversation can mean the degree of risk 
associated with stocks; where talk is of 'perfect granularity', that is the perfect balance 
between risk and return (see Basel, 2006). The ultimate end of granularity in information 
systems analysis is referred to as atomic data - that is, the point at which data may no longer 
be broken down into smaller and useful constituents. Fodor (2007, pp. 9- 10) points to the 
technique in science of explaining laws of nature by referring to the constituent laws that are 
basic to them: 
So, roughly, the laws about molecules explain the laws about liquidity; and the laws 
about atoms explain the laws about molecules ... and so on down, but not so on down 
for ever. Eventually, we get down to laws about whatever the smallest things are (or, 
perhaps, to laws about the fundamental structure of space time); and there we simply 
stop. 
Fodor argues that much of the search for fundamental truth in science can be understood as a 
seemingly endless search for smaller and smaller detail. Successive generations of scientist, he 
suggests, proclaim that they have reached the ultimate truth until another generation breaks 
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that into still more finite entities. Increased knowledge then leads to increasingly granular 
understandings of the whole. Granularity is not merely a rhetorical trope; it has a profound 
Impact upon the way in which humans interact in the world, and has profound resonance in 
the designed world. For example, we can take two examples of an industrial design solution to 
high-specification car racing: an 'Auto Union' from before the Second World War and an 
almost contemporary 'Mclaren MP4-21'. Both of these racing cars were considered In their 
times to be at the pinnacle of sporting potential and technological knowledge, particularly in 
the field of aerodynamics. The Auto Union was designed by those who had learned, largely by 
trial and error, in the early aircraft industry and demonstrated, in its time, evidence of an 
advanced knowledge of aerodynamics. lt still bears some comparison with the contemporary 
knowledge of aerodynamics demonstrated in the Mclaren. This car, in keeping with its times, 
is significantly more advanced than what seems in comparison to be the informed speculation 
of the Auto Union. Given the highly commercial and competitive climate of contemporary 
Formula One racing, it comes as little surprise to learn that a contemporary racing car is rather 
dispassionately designed and managed by a distributed cognition of dedicated and 
scientifically trained advanced engineering graduates working with the aid of simulation 
technologies and a computer-controlled wind tunnel equipped with sophisticated measuring 
and simulation equipment. 
If these varying degrees of knowledge of aerodynamics are considered in terms of granularity, 
several things become apparent. The Auto Union is largely solid; its bodywork is smooth but 
coherent as a single mass. The contemporary Formula One car does not look like this. Its 
bodywork is fractured and distributed; the rear of the Mclaren appears to be shattered, as if it 
were tearing off from the body of the car. The ambition of aerodynamics, of course, is to 
handle the flow of air either to provide as little resistance to it or to handle it to the dynamic 
advantage of the car. The dynamic advantage is exploited in order to force the car onto the 
road, for example, or to create a vortex of highly complex air at the cost of a following car. 
The Mclaren demonstrates a significant degree of sophistication in this respect; the detailing 
in comparison with the Auto Union is intensely finite. Tiny wing lets on the Mclaren control the 
flow of air; the Auto Union merely allows its flow. In terms of aerodynamics, the Mclaren is as 
complicated as the knowledge of aerodynamics that underpins Its design 
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Auto Union Type C Racing Car, 1934. 
Mclaren MP4-21 Formula One racing car. 2006. 
When the Mclaren is considered as a functional object penetrating the air, the bodywork is 
coherent with the complexity of the air it encounters. The bodywork on the nose of the car is 
smooth and simple; it is not dissimilar to the Auto Union. The air encountered here is simple; 
it is probably relatively static. In terms of granularity it can be considered (at least in this 
example) as a single body of air. As the air flow across the body of the car is disturbed by the 
volume of the car and the necessary mechanical components of the suspension, the driver 
space, air inlets, brake ducts, radio aerials and rotating wheels, it becomes increasingly 
complex. The Auto Union reflects the complete absence of knowledge of this complexity. The 
Mclaren engages with the complexity of the airflow and the bodywork is designed to match 
that complexity in its terms. The front of the Mclaren is designed with still air in mind. Should 
the car encounter the complexity of the air in the vortex of another car, then the aerodynamic 
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complexity overpowers the rather more simple front end of the Mclaren. 189 Year on year, 
regulations allowing, this complexity increases and bodywork detailing and the winglets 
become smaller and smaller. Given the current trajectory, it is quite possible to imagine that 
air will eventually be handled at a molecular level. 190 
Rear and side winglets and ground effect diffuser. Note the tiny serrated edge on the floor 
diffuser, the purpose of which Is purposely to trim the air to meet the grooves of the tyres. 
In granularity there are some common threads: granularity implies that manifest complexity 
and uncertainty are a consequence of a particular degree of inspection. Granularity implies 
that there are many views possible of a particular condition or phenomena and that the 
complexity of understanding of that condition or phenomena is dependent upon the degree to 
which it is inspected. 191 
189 This is, of course, the cause of the problems Formula One racing has with the lack of the spectacle 
provided by overtaking. 
190 There are, even today, anecdotal rumours among the Formula One fraternity of the development of 
specialist aerodynamic and structured paints for just such an opportunity for advantage. 
191 This works with racing cars as well as with pebbles and sand, rocks and land masses, stock and 
shares, computer systems and, as it has been argued, complex systems such as gas clouds and flocks of 
birds. 
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As the relationship between humanity and technology is coming to be understood in a highly 
complex way, then the notion of the human and of technology, rather than being fluid, must 
be understood to be open to analysis at any number of degrees of granularity. In industrial 
design histories, technologies appear to demonstrate a striking similarity in form. The 
technological objects on display, contained within a very limited range of scale, demonstrate 
similar clarity of outline; they are of similar density. These technological objects are shown in 
a way that obscures the full complexity of their place in culture and the full complexity of their 
interaction. In racing-car terms, the apparent degree of complexity on display is out of step 
with the complexity of the 'intellectual air' they inhabit. Objects in industrial design are 
represented in a way that was designed to travel through the smoother metaphorical air of a 
far simpler logic. The Auto Union is designed to punch through the air. lt does this by the 
force of Its engine and by an attempt, as best it can, to minimise the resistance to the air. lt 
could be argued that the Auto Union represents an early stage in development where it was 
realised that the best way to get a vehicle through the air was not simply to multiply the force 
against it, as earlier racing cars might have done, but to compromise with it. While the Auto 
Union must be forced through the air, its relatively unsophisticated aerodynamics allows a 
relatively easy passage around it; the bodywork works with the air to a degree. In the Mclaren 
the bodywork and the air interact at an intensely finite resolution. The air passing across the 
surface of the Mclaren works for, rather than against, the efficiency of the car. 192 
192 Without its aerodynamic effect upon the air, the car could not transfer its torque to the road and would 
simply fly off the track as soon as an attempt was made to change direction. 
262 
The Mclaren is complex because the understanding of aerodynamics is similarly complex; the 
form of the Mclaren Is coherent with the complexity of that understanding. Industrial design 
is now situated in an 'intellectual air' that is understood to be more complex than its 
projection and analysis technology as artefacts can allow. While designers now understand 
that artefacts are situated in, and emerge from, a complex dynamic meshwork of forces, their 
historical projections of the trajectory of the process of humanising technology cannot reflect 
that complexity. Sustaining narratives of industrial design project a limited trajectory of a 
particular form of technological artefact. 
lt is arguable, then, that designers have come to understand the human in artefact terms at a 
similar scale to the technological artefacts their histories project. The interaction of humans 
and technology as heterogeneous entities has appeared coherent when imagined at that scale 
as an interaction of material artefacts. When humans are considered as social and cultural 
constructions, they are considered at a degree of significantly greater complexity. In this 
analysis it becomes difficult not to think of humanity and technology in the same terms, and 
to be human has come to be considered a hybrid condition. This need not, however, be 
confined to the social and cultural model of the human. 
A moment of active technicity- for example, such as using a cup to drink - may appear to be 
resolved because at first sight the cup must have a certain scale and granularity, otherwise it 
cannot function to hold water. But the logic of accelerated complexity and increased 
granularity holds. Cups are no longer made of lead, or for that matter the plastics they once 
were, because the complexity of their technicity has accelerated to include the analysis of the 
migration of the atoms of these cups into the water and thence into the human body. As cells 
and atoms are placed at the centre of our conception of the world, it follows that the instinct 
will be to focus our attention upon this degree of granularity in wider theorisation. A plastic 
cup may appear In an industrial design history as a resolved object, but the designer intent to 
put a particular design of cup into production must now consider it at the molecular level. 
Contemporary designers now think in terms of how materials might decay over time or be 
recycled. Where once the cup might have begun and ended at a suitable shape and material 
for function, the cup is now understood by industrial designers to extend into a degree of 
granularity that posits it as a focus of an interconnected complexity. The conversation has 
shifted away from the simplicity of the cup towards the migration potential of phthalate 
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plasticizers (see, for example, BRPIA, 1998). Industrial design histories can only represent this 
complexity in a single consolidated cup that lacks the dynamic granularity necessary for its 
analysis. lt is perhaps viable, then, that the designers of the future might graduate from 
emerging training institutions such as the Centre for Molecular Organisation and Assembly in 
Cells at the University of Warwick (See MOAC, 2007). These 'designers', however, do not yet 
benefit from the experience of twentieth-century industrial design's intellectual heritage. 
The cup, we are now aware, is a container of the chaos of the determinant forces and 
interactional couplings that go about it. When considered as a focus of complex determinant 
forces, the cup is revealed as an unstable concept. 193 lt might seem, too, that the cup is fixed 
across time as a realisation of technicity. Of course, in one respect this is the case. Cups 
contain liquid. They must have a certain physical characteristic in order to facilitate their 
purpose. At first sight and notwithstanding the chemical analysis described above, the cup 
seems to have a largely stable physical manifestation across history. When the full meshwork 
of determinant forces that go about the cup are included in its history, the artefact, the cup, 
becomes an increasingly unstable concept. We can see this in a trajectory of cups as valued 
commodities. The plastic vending-machine cup is used and then immediately thrown away or 
recycled. The plastic vending- machine cup is momentarily owned. lt has almost no referent in 
Vorhanden and is instead almost entirely Zuhanden. lt is picked and used in a manner almost 
that is entirely anoetic. The plastic vending- machine cup is lighter and uses less material in its 
construction than any of its ancestors. lt just brings water to the mouth, a momentary 
coupling stripped almost entirely of its complexity in a manner that has closer historical 
193 This view holds true when the cup is considered as a totality of the complexity of its physical 
characteristics, as a particular collection of electromagnetic determinant forces and a coming- together of 
fundamental particles. 
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resonance with the cupped hand than with the chalice, the porcelain cup or the earthenware 
beaker. 
Attempts to understand this developing transformation are almost always confined to an 
analysis of the determinant forces that drive the production and consumption of the cup, and 
it would be easy at this stage to assume the plastic cup to be the latest incarnation of this long 
history and to claim that it indicates some transformation in the social history of drinking. 
This might well be insightful and might tell some truth in itself. But this alternative reading 
alerts us to the potential for industrial designers readily to engage with prevailing intellectual 
shifts, even if they are not necessarily aware that they are making such a move. The process of 
humanising technology then should not imply that technology is changed to make it more 
human, but rather that technology Is understood in a coherent manner with the degree of 
Inspection and analysis that is applied to the technical understanding of the human in any 
given intellectual climate. Humanising technology can be understood as a process where 
coherence is maintained between prevailing degrees of granularity applied across an 
unbounded technical interaction and not merely set in an entirely cultural and social frame. 
8.2 Anefactuallslng the body 
Joe and josephine: The human body is understood by industrial design to be a resolved 
and material artefact, thus providing a form of hysterical continuity for industrial 
designers in the face of earlier, similarly hysterical attempts to understand the 
implications of the holsomatic human. 
Perhaps the two greatest and most familiar members of the industrial design community are 
joe and Josephine, introduced to the community and to the wider world by Henry Dreyfuss. 
Although industrial designers may not know their names, they are familiar with every 
dimension of joe and josephine's naked bodies. They are the archetypal humans that they use 
in the design of the material world. 
joe and josephine are austere line drawings ... [they] are not very romantic-looking, 
they remind us that everything we design is used by people, and that people come in 
many shapes and sizes and have varying physical attributes. (Dreyfuss, 2003, p. 26) 
joe and josephine are drawn with hard outlines, demarcating the edges and borders of their 
bodies. A number of movable versions of their bodies were made, which designers could draw 
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around in order to fit the human bodies they represented into the cars, aircraft seats or 
domestic setting they were constructing. Over time a number of additional joes and 
Josephines emerged, fatter, thinner, older or disabled, to meet the empirical and physical 
demands of a diverse population. But this remains a contentious area, because Joe and 
josephine are representations of a mean. 
The way they created Joe and josephlne was to make thousands of measurements of 
Americans and then simply come up with an average figure for everything from size to 
reach, strength to agility. At the time this was a great leap forward - actually 
designing objects around people was a novelty, with most machines designed by 
engineers more interested in what was easy to make rather than what was easy to use. 
But the process of designing for the middle, the average person, has driven mass 
marketing and mass consumerism ever since. (Miller et al., 2004) 
joe and josephine were instrumental reductions of data and provided a strategic device by 
which Dreyfuss could construct a logic for design. joe and Jose phi ne were not entirely 
objective. Dreyfuss (2003, p. 27) describes them as having 'numerous allergies, inhibitions 
and obsessions'. While the anthropometric data that surrounded them provided an ostensibly 
empirical suite, Joe and Jose phi ne remain subjective strategies too. They 'react strongly to 
touch that Is not comfortable or unnatural; they are disturbed by glaring or insufficient light 
and by offensive colouring; they are sensitive to noise, and they shrink from disagreeable 
odour' Dreyfuss provides no empirical data in this respect, nor any real attempt to think about 
the implications of class and culture in such 'inhibitions and obsessions'. 
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A typical 'Joe and Josephine' type reference drawing. 
There is a line in Dreyfuss's description (2003, p. 42) that demonstrates his awareness of the 
uncertainty of the human: ' it is apparent that the industrial designer's task is twofold - to fit a 
client's wares to Joe and josephine's anatomies' , and to explore their psychology and try to 
lessen the mental strains of what Dreyfuss refers to as a 'pressure age'. Dreyfuss makes a 
tentative foray into the territory of life lived in the pressure age when he concludes by 
suggesting new problems to be 'emerging on the horizon'. 
Travellers in jet transports, where the speed is greater than the sound of the engine, 
say the quiet disturbs them. Accustomed to the interminable drone, they find they 
become uneasy at the sensation of floating noiselessly, vibrationlessly, through space. 
(p. 43)194 
Joe and Josephine represent a model of how a potentially uncertain entity, such as the human 
body, can be made to fit into a defined system. joe and josephine stand as representatives of 
their time and as a model of humanity that remains useful. While even their critics recognise 
their value, Joe and Josephine have come to be seen as somewhat problematic. Myerson voices 
his critique in part because joe and Josephine fix a normative model of humanity in the minds 
194 Dreyfuss has no means whatsoever of accounting for this strange experience of flight; perhaps after 
fifty years it is time for industrial design to understand this mystery and to reconnect the relationships 
between the mechanical body and the psychology of being-in-the-technological-world. 
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of designers. This reiterates the claim made here that artefacts reinforce a normative model of 
materiality in the industrial design community. Joe and Josephine present a model that rather 
poorly represents the broad physiological spectrum of humanity. Joe and Josephine are rather 
poor at representing the scope of the disability and inclusive design community, for example. 
We recognise today the political implications of Joe and Josephine's narrow physiology. 
Joe and Josephine cannot describe the human in full, and, of course, Dreyfuss himself points 
towards a view of humanity that is beyond the simple inscription of their 'austere line 
drawings'. Their carefully outlined bodies thrust attention onto the visible aspects of 
physiology. They can convey nothing of the social and cultural nature of humanity nor 
communicate anything of Dreyfuss's instincts when he talks (2003 p. 27) of the psychological 
discomfort in reference to their 'allergies' 
The artefact model of human technology interaction. The design solution accounts only for the 
physical material interaction aspects. 
Joe and Josephine could be thought of as a form of hysterical reaction on the part of industrial 
designers maintaining the sense that, while all about it swirls in fluid uncertainty, the human 
in physical terms as a body has remained stable. This stable model of the human body, 
however, is constrained by a view of it as bounded, outlined and limited architecturally in 
space, with an inside and an outside. This model is dualistic, being both located in physical 
dimensionality and having an entirely unaccounted mental dimension. Set in an emerging 
intellectual climate that appears to be increasingly familiar with a discussion of the human 
body at a genetic scale, the model of humanity presented to designers by Joe and Josephine 
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becomes identified as being set as a particular, albeit everyday and easily understandable, 
scale. Acting, it might seem, on the suggestion of Paul Klee's Creative Credo for example, 
(1920), that art 'does not reproduce the visible; rather, it makes visible.' Tony Dunne and 
Fiona Raby create prototypes that demonstrate a degree of serendipity, inviting conversation 
rather than functional or commercial application. Dunne's Ph.D. thesis (1997) and his 
subsequent practice with Raby develop a form of 'critical design' 195 that explicitly attempts to 
make 'the invisible visible' (see Dunne and Raby, 2001, prologue). In Hertzian Tales Dunne 
(1999) describes a number of devices that illuminate the invisible world by transforming its 
supposedly insensible nature into sensible experience. Dunne's concern may appear to be an 
attempt to engage critically with the extent to which electronic artefacts extend beyond their 
materiality as data or energy, but he is constrained by his heritage. The concern to remain 
within the terms of orthodox design has led Dunne and Raby to feel it necessary to describe 
their outputs in terms that repeat the hegemony of the material artefact. Dunne, for example, 
has designed a number of items of furniture and artefacts for 'electrosensitives', highlighting 
or excluding the 'leaky' qualities of electronics and the pervasive qualities of so-called 
Hertzian (that is, electromagnetic radiation) technology (see Dunne and Raby, 2001). Perhaps 
acting in response to their perception of the confusing nature of the immaterial, Dunne and 
Raby are intent to highlight the blithe potential of the extensive nature of electronic products. 
'Artefacts dematerialise not only into software in response to miniturisation and replacement 
by services, but literally dematerialise into radiation' (Dunne and Raby, 2001, p. 127). 
This table reminds you that electronic artefacts extend beyond their visible limits. The 
25 compasses set into its surface twitch and spin when artefacts like mobile phones 
or laptop computers are placed on it. The twitching needles can be interpreted as 
being either sinister or charming, depending on the viewer's state of mind. When we 
designed the compass table, we wondered if a neat-freak might try to make all the 
needles line up, ignoring the architectural space of the room in favour of the Earth's 
magnetic field. (Dunne and Raby, 2001, p. 128) 
When Dunne (1999, p. 62) suggests that 'all electronic products are hybrids of radiation and 
matter', he reiterates the industrial designer C. Thomas Mitchell (1998, p. 213), who 
suggested: ' "The product" as a solely physical entity is an illusion of the mechanistic era 
195 Critical design is an attempt to take a 'critical stance towards mainstream product design. While [those 
who engage in critical design) seem to keep their distance from the commercial design world, they use Its 
mechanisms to ask questions about their own discipline, technology and society" (see 
http://www .worldchangi ng .com 1 archives /006344. htm 1). 
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which can no longer be sustained in an age preoccupied with information .. .'.However, 
whereas Mitchell (1988, p. 214) suggested that, in place of the solid product, there should 
emerge a means to facilitate 'a continuous and non-instrumental thought process, a creative 
act', Dun ne and Raby can be read as an attempt to find a means of continuing the orthodox 
trajectory of industrial design. Dun ne and Raby provide a kind of reflective indexicality for an 
unindexable world; they delight in the aesthetic potential of the invisible but their reference is 
explicitly to the material world; their 'designs noir' respond to the serendipity of 
electromagnetism to create enhanced material experiences of the invisible. 'Materialising 
unusual values in products is one way that design can be a very powerful form of social 
critique' (Dunne and Raby, 2001, p. 63). Dunne and Raby's work transcends the usual 
reductive terminology that is so frequently applied to new forms of design. Their attempts to 
realise the invisible in material artefacts can be compared in some respects to Krohn's 
attempts to realise the dematerialised telephone book by Lisa Krohn and Tucker Viemeister 
referred to here. If Krohn's answerphone with the formalistic allusion to the telephone book is 
an attempt to resolve the invisible functionality of electronics through cultural reference and 
to bring the metaphorical into material form, then Dunne and Raby can be read as an attempt 
to realise invisible and immaterial functionality through material form. Whereas Krohn relies 
upon a semiotic referent (which becomes lost over time), Dunne creates a new material 
cultural form. Dunne does not rely upon allusions to a prior cultural referent; he presents new 
forms, although they rely upon some degree of familiarity: they are tables, chairs or crutches, 
for example. 196 In sustaining narratives of industrial design, the intellectual endeavour in the 
development of technologies is made concrete in artefacts. Dun ne and Raby can be included in 
this trajectory because their materialisation of the invisible reinforces schematic assumptions 
in which complexity is materialised into an artefact as a resolved projection of the culturally 
constructed human. The human in Dun ne and Raby's analysis is not entirely a cultural 
construction, but it draws implicitly upon the model presented by joe and josephne. There is 
no model so well established in industrial design of the human body as that of joe and 
josephine, set at a supposed scale of materiality, but it is only one model, not a truth in itself. 
joe and josephine present one model, fixed In one topological domain that appears to be 
almost entirely out of valence with molecular analysis. 
196 One criticism that might be levelled at Dun ne and Raby is that the objects they produce are almost 
entirely unnecessary other than as whimsical novelties. They are critical designs, of course, but present 
forms that could be regarded as toys for people who have the financial capacity to engage with the world 
in this way. 
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In 'Virtual Reality and the Tea Ceremony' Helm (1998) argues that the ceremony (rooted in this 
example in Buddhist tradition) is a technology for affirming nature, 'employ[ing] highly 
artificial means to return humans to a deeper intimacy with nature' (p. 163). Helm argues that 
the tea ceremony is a sophisticated technological intervention In the process by which the 
absent becomes immanent. Helm, however, can only imagine the human to be a fixed place of 
cognition. This is most evident when Helm describes the computer as a shrine, a place to 
enter a virtual world In which the body is largely redundant. This is a reoccurring theme in 
many engagements with virtuality. Towards the conclusion of a 1993 interview of Paul Vlrillo 
by Andreas Ruby (Ruby and Virilio, 1998) the discussion turns to the disparity between the 
world as it is perceived as 'relative' to mechanical experience and the 'absolute speed' of 
electronics. Ruby refers to the research of james Gibson citing his studies into dive-bomber 
pilots. Gibson's research (1950) is discussed as if it contradicted notions of space as a 
continuous occupation and instead posited the idea of perception as a sequence of 
discontinuous vistas. Virilio affirms this by linking the somatic need to blink with the 
perception of sequence. 
There is a sequentialisation [sicj taking place even in our gaze: twinkling with the 
eyes. If you cannot twinkle197 you get mentally ill. Taking off the eyelids was a 
notorious torture in the old Chinese Empire. (Ruby and Virilio, 1998, p. 186) 
Gibson's research serves Ruby and Virillo's conversation rather well and illuminates the 
potential for the role of the body in the formation of human experiences of space, time and 
place. The conversation, however, is based upon a view of a neuroscientific study from half a 
century ago it. lt reduces the complex role of somatic systems to a reinforcement of the claim 
of perception as a series of sequential images. In Polar Inertia (Virilio, 2000) the body is 
similarly reduced to a static hub, a Husserlian 'zero' into which the world arrives and is 
processed through cognition. Virilio here refers to Husserl's attempts (1991, p. 315) to 
identify a 'zero-point orientation', which Husserl proposed would represent the point of 
origination of all experience, the point from which all accounting starts. Virilio sets the body 
up as something of a shell, a repository of information, opening space for a perceptual 
inhabitation of the external world. Virilio (2000, p. 125), extending a cyberspatial view of 
197 (Sic) Twinkle is, 1 think, a mistranslation of 'blink'. 
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electronic mediation as a vista, claims that we no longer occupy space as Kant has led us to 
believe; we now witness it. This is an antiquated and limited notion of cognition tied about a 
notion of materiality to which the body seems bound. After all, William Gibson (199S) told us 
that, in cyberspace, 'the physical body [is] left abandoned, discarded and obsolete'. This 
points to an understanding of the body itself as a resolved and bounded artefact. 
The enactivistic theories Dourish calls upon towards the conclusion of his argument broadly 
suggest that our understandings of the world are embodied in our social and cultural history. 
So, while ostensibly making an enactivist claim for the vitality of the body, by calling upon a 
cultural cognitive model of interaction Dourish diminishes the role of the soma. lt is worth 
investigating why Dourish might be reluctant to make this move. lt is arguable that Dourish 
reflects the politically conflicting attempts to resolve life in the industrialised society that 
shaped the intellectual thrust of the early to mid-twentieth century, which can be very broadly 
understood as a battle between 'a primarily Marxist project to overcome technological self-
alienation dialectically and a potentially fascist desire to elevate this self-alienation into an 
· absolute value of its own' (Foster, 2004, p. 114). There is, of course, much scholarship on 
both sides of this debate, but few attempt to connect the argument to more contemporary 
concerns. Foster (2004) provides a concise and scholarly account of attempts to connect this 
time with a new sense of corporeality. Morus (2002) and A. Mackenzie (2002) make some 
mention of this intellectual period in their analyses, too. Whereas Morus looks to that time as a 
nascence of cyborg theory, Mackenzie looks to it as a formative ideology that underpins the 
later poststructural thinking in more recent Deleuzian arguments. The enactivist argument 
that Dourish makes bears some comparison with the argument made for the 'new ego' by 
Percy Wyndam Lewis and the Vorticist movement. The Vorticists can be understood as a rather 
British compromise, neither Marxist nor fascist. The Vorticist movement presents a deliberate 
attempt at alienation sometimes associated with some rather intellectually illiberal ideas. One 
way of understanding Wyndham Lewis is as a form of 'essential humanist'. Like other 
humanists, Wyndham Lewis accepts, and welcomes, the idea that humans are antagonistically 
situated in nature. His short, somewhat tongue-in-cheek poem 'BLESS the HAIRDRESSER', 
published in 1914 in the Vorticist magazine Blast, provides some evidence of this. 
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IUSS t~~e UIRDRESSER 
Ho iLta&l& Mat1IU Ralwe fw a small lea. 
lluwlr he ploughs hods fw d•jwnce, 
Swws chtDs ami lips fw three peDce. 
He ma\w systemath nnrnenwy IRII' 011 tile 
(Blast 1. published in 1914) 
'BLESS the HAIRDRESSER' is playful of course, but there is some significance in Lewis's 
association of the neurologically inert soma with the extrinsic wilderness of nature. Foster 
paints Marlnetti and the futurists and Lewis and the Vorticist movement in similar political 
colours. This Is not entirely fair. Where Marineni and the Futurists had glorified In the ultimate 
cleansing of the sensibility of humanity in the face of a new machinic existence, 198 Wyndham 
Lewis can be understood to be searching for something rather more subtle. For Wyndham 
Lewis, the human still exists but the corporeal materiali~ation of the body is a site of 
transformation. For Wyndham Lewls (1914), humanity transcends the 'actual human body': 
198 MANIFESTO OF FUTURISM: F. Marinetti, 1909. 1. We want to sing the love of danger, the habit of 
energy and rashness. 2. The essential elements of our poetry will be courage, audacity and revolt. 3. 
literature has up to now magnified pensive immobility, ecstasy and slumber. We want to exalt movements 
of aggression, feverish sleeplessness, the double march, the perilous leap, the slap and the blow with the 
fist. 4. We declare that the splendour of the world has been enriched by a new beauty: the beauty of 
speed. A racing automobile with its bonnet adorned with great tubes like serpents with explosive breath 
..• a roaring motor car which seems to run on machine-gun fire, is more beautiful than the Victory of 
Samothrace. 5. We want to sing the man at the wheel, the ideal axis of which crosses the earth, itself 
hurled along its orbit. 6. The poet must spend himself with warmth, glamour and prodigality to increase 
the enthusiastic fervour of the primordial elements. 7. Beauty exists only in struggle. There is no 
masterpiece that has not an aggressive character. Poetry must be a violent assault on the forces of the 
unknown, to force them to bow before man. 8. We are on the extreme promontory of the centuries! What 
Is the use of looking behind at the moment when we must open the mysterious shutters of the 
Impossible? nme and Space died yesterday. We are already living In the absolute, since we have already 
created eternal, omnipresent speed. 9. We want to glorify war- the only cure for the world- militarism, 
patriotism, the destructive gesture of the anarchists, the beautiful ideas which kill, and contempt for 
woman. 10. We want to demolish museums and libraries, fight morality, feminism and all opportunist and 
utilitarian cowardice. 11. We will sing of the great crowds agitated by work, pleasure and revolt: the multi-
coloured and polyphonic surf of revolutions in modern capitals: the nocturnal vibration of the arsenals 
and the workshops beneath their violent electric moons: the gluttonous railway stations devouring 
smoking serpents: factories suspended from the clouds by the thread of their smoke: bridges with the 
leap of gymnasts flung across the diabolic cutlery of sunny rivers: adventurous steamers sniffing the 
horizon: great-breasted locomotives, puffing on the rails like enormous steel horses with long tubes for 
bridle, and the gliding flight of aeroplanes whose propeller sounds like the flapping of a flag and the 
applause of enthusiastic crowds. 
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The human form still runs, like a wave, through the texture or body of existence, and 
therefore art. But just as the old form of egotism is no longer fit for such conditions 
as now prevail, so the isolated human figure of most ancient Art is an anachronism. 
THE ACTUAL HUMAN BODY BECOMES OF LESS IMPORTANCE EVERY DAY. it now, 
literally, EXISTS much less. 
Vorticism is widely understood to have emerged from the trajectory of British art, but stands 
in opposition to many of their contemporaries and to tradition. 199 Wyndham Lewis shared the 
Futurist sensibility in that he found in the machine age a beauty and excitement that most of 
those about him seemed intent either to ignore or to resist. In Project for a Scientific 
Psychology(see Freud, 2006) Freud had suggest that the ego is shocked by sudden shifts in 
the mechanisms by which it is bound and unbound from the body. The problem with life in 
industrialised society, Freud suggested, is that it is subject to continuous shock. Resistance to 
this shock merely numbs the ego, leading it to atrophy. Marlnetti (1909) argued that 
technology had the potential to enable a new body 'endowed with surprising organs: organs 
adapted to the needs of a world of ceaseless shocks'. Marinetti foresaw humanity dissolving in 
this new age to become a new machinic reality. Where those artists and designers who allied 
themselves to the Futurists argued to overcome the stagnation of resistance to technological 
development that they detected in Marxist dialectic (or worse still the stagnation of bourgeois 
decoration), the Vorticists understood the intellectual concept of the ego as residing in the 
centre of a vortex of being. Wyndham Lewis was opposed to the erasure of humanity. He 
foresaw the human at the centre of an unbound being with an energised technological soma 
swirling around hisl00 ego. This being would extend the human further and further into the 
universe, but always remaining centred on an essentially consolidated ego, bound in some 
fluid manner to the material body. Resistance to technology was understood as 'a vampire 
sucking the town's heart and as a gloomy circus. lt stirs sentimental, nostalgic feelings which 
stifle the new generation' (Blast, 2006). The new ego would be a new sense of being that could 
thrive within a new machinic nature and can be understood as a nascent attempt to 
199 In contemporary terms, Wyndham Lewis had been a Graphic Designer and a somewhat junior partner 
in a design agency, 'Omega Workshops', which he left somewhat acrimoniously to form his own studio, 
The Rebel Art Centre, which stood against the supposedly traditional and decorative values of Omega. The 
Omega Workshops was formed by the artist and critic Roger Fry and can be considered as part of the 
Bloomsbury set, designing many of their outputs and creating the aesthetic that typified Omega. 
200 Both Marinetti and Lewis were misogynistic and found the new condition to be essentially masculine, 
although Marinetti was more explicit in his hatred of women. 
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understand life as something that was embodied and enaaed outwards, rather than resolved 
outside the body and transmitted to it via the senses. While Wyndham Lewis accepted the 
humanist notion of the separation of being from the world, he nonetheless set the ground for 
the understanding of the human as a construction of an embodied interaaion.201 Both 
Wyndham Lewis and Marlnetti sought to extend the somatic potential of the body beyond its 
physical border and to unbind the ego from it. Marinetti (19109 saw in this unbinding a 
glorious destrualon: 'Art is the need to destroy and scatter oneself.' The body had no 
meaning for either Marinetti and Wyndham Lewis. For Marinetti this was an optimistic sign of 
transcendence from the vileness of the biological organism. For Wyndham Lewis the loss of 
the evolutionary body pointed to an lnhumanism that must be resisted. Foster suggests that 
Wyndham Lewis sought to retain his humanity in the new reality of the machine age. Like 
Dourish, this preservation resides In the proteaion of the self: 'lt's myself I want to conserve' 
(Wyndham Lewis, cited in Foster, 2004, p. 118). 
There are several ways in which the failure of both Marinetti's futurist interpretation and 
Wyndham Lewis's manifestos can be accounted for. Of course, other political circumstances 
diverted attention from their logic, and the horrific realities of total warfare rendered much of 
the posturing untenable. The futurist manifesto and the new Ego can also be understood to be 
a hysterical over-reaction. This hysteria is evident in industrial design too. On occasions, in 
the ideas of both Marinetti and Wyndham Lewis, the hysteria is played out in terms that have 
some broader resonance. In industrial design we can on occasion find an essential delight in 
mechanism - a truth to functionality and a stripped-down elemental minimalism. The form of 
the technological artefaa during this phase takes on a primordial somatic quality that 
transcends all but the aesthetic rhetoric of decoration. These are elegant, beautiful but 
essentially functionalist comings-together of matter. Breuer (2005) spoke of his design for the 
Wassily chair, designed first in 1925, as 'my most extreme work ... the least artistic, the most 
logical, the least "cozy" and the most mechanical'. 
201 That the age of the machine should in some way impact upon the nervous system was well established 
and for some the nervous system provided the model for how one might understand the new nature. The 
American writer Nathaniel Hawthorne (1851) wrote that 'it is a fact that by means of electricity, the world 
of matter has become a great nerve, vibrating thousands of miles in a breathless point of time. Rather, the 
rough globe is a vast head, a brain, instinct with intelligence.' Freud's psychoanalytic method emerged 
from the European neurological research of the late nineteenth century. Freud's Ideas of the excitation of 
the nervous. system cathexis were set down in 1895 in Project for a Scientific Psychology Freud (2006) 
placed the energetic excitation of the body at the centre of his thesis. At the risk of huge reduction, Freud 
suggested that the ego, the essential residence of being, was held complete by states. of neurological 
condition, binding (Bindung) and unbinding (Entbindung) itself from controlling forces. These forces are 
applied both from within the body and from outside it as sensory or mechanical lnt.erventlons. 
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Breuer, Wassily Chair. 
Although Marinetti would perhaps have found a weakness in the organism in the need to sit, 
this chair would surely have pleased him more than its decorative contemporaries. The organic 
body is suspended in space devoid of any apparent means, and the chair acts as a component 
of the skeleton, transmitting the weight of the human to the floor devoid of aesthetic, 
unbinding the ego from the necessity to situate the chair in any stagnant bourgeois 
association with decorative arts. This chair is a machine for sitting; it enables - what will much 
later come to be called, by Deleuze, a 'pure machinic becoming', a pure means to enact rest in 
the soma. 
In the intellectual clamour following the Second World War and the fall of fascism as a viable 
philosophy, it became distinctly problematic to refer to its apologists in anything but the most 
distrustful terms. Heidegger's problematic association with Nazism (see Sluga, 1993) could be 
argued to have distanced his phenomenology from the intellectual mainstream, and similarly 
Marinetti' s explicit and enthusiastic association with the Fascism consigned Futurism to a 
historical siding, appearing in sustaining narratives of industrial design as something of a 
footnote. The intellectual voice of the Futurists and their battle with ego has become lost from 
industrial design. 202 Marinetti constructed Futurism without the foresight of the extermination 
camps. His writing is undoubtably strident; its terminology was aggressive and often rather 
202 Even here in this thesis and in my apparent enthusiasm for the new ego I have found myself 
questioning my own politics. In speaking about the thesis, I sense a diffident hesitation, lest my argument 
becomes somehow associated with the extreme right and is imagined as reinvigoration of the Fascist 
ethic. 
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brutal in its apparent loathing of the feminine traits he deplored, but it is perhaps a mistake to 
dismiss his voice as that of a madman. Marinetti can be read as a voice of liberation and 
emancipation and a call for a new enacted life. In any case, Wyndham Lewls should not be 
counted among the Fascists. Munton (1997) has argued that Foster does not make this clear 
enough in his text and that it is wrong to collude Wyndam Lewis with the Futurists' movement. 
lt is possible to suggest, then, that the ultimate defeat of Fascist Europe took with it, along 
with many million lives, the intellectual impetus of these movements. Wyndham Lewis (1914) 
took the view that technology, as an innate facet of humanity, could enable the Immanent ego 
to distribute. This would be a process of continual distribution, a new reality that would 
enhance the quality of being: 'One feels the immanence of some REALITY more than any 
former human beings can have felt it.' The discussion of the ego in the technological soma 
has developed rather slightly in the period since the Second World War. (Certainly in 
comparison to the emphasis placed upon social and cul~ural understandlngs of the human and 
the technological.) The idea of a distributed immanent presence has become somewhat fixed 
in the hysterical rhetoric of its early discourse and has proved difficult for designers to realise, 
without resorting to the social and the cultural, where some understanding of distribution has 
now become an embedded aspect of theorisation. lt is arguable, then, that the break in this 
intellectual trajectory has allowed the paradoxical discussion of modes of resistance to 
technological being to profligate. In recent theorisations, distributed immanence has become 
attached to the cultural and the social. lt is rather easy now to accept that our lives are shared 
constructions played out through a meshwork of our friends and associates. Industrial 
designers, such as Durrell Bishop cited previously in this chapter, have attempted to intervene 
in this meshwork, calling upon the trajectory of materialised technology with which they are 
familiar from the narratives that have sustained their intellectual community. The artefacts 
they produce have tended to be unsuccessful, because they are not coherent across the terms 
of the understanding of the human as a distributed and enacted immanence - a holsomatlc 
condition. 
8.3 Designing with the 'Body without Organs' 
In order for industrial designers to find a way to engage with the anoetic, it will be 
necessary for them to find the means to artefactualise the enaction of the hybrid-human 
at a subtle degree of granular complexity. Such a granular logic will demand an 
understanding of the holsomatic human at a granular degree of complexity. At this 
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scale and complexity it will become clear that no meaningful closure of the human is 
possible. 
'Body without Organs' (BwO) Is a term taken from a 1947 radio play by Antonin Artaud. In To 
Have Done with the judgment of God Artaud explored how the realm of the imagination or the 
spiritual might be considered as 'real' as the physical body. One way to understand Artaud's 
Body without Organs is as an exploration of an expression of emancipation from the tyranny 
of political subjectivity. Artaud saw this, in primarily social and cultural terms, as a raising of 
consciousness and an elimination of the anoetic. 
When you will have made him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him 
from all his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom. (Artaud, 1976, 
p. 571) 
Body without Organs is used elsewhere to develop any number of differing theses ranging 
from the political and sociological to the cinematic, fetishistic and psychological. However, it 
is perhaps best known as Deleuze and Guattari's 203 search for a distributed and intensely 
finite and granular understanding of the body as a fluxatlng condition rather than a 
materiality. The term 'Body without Organs' (sometimes colloquially referred to as the BwO) Is 
most commonly understood as it was outlined by Deleuze and Guattarl, first in 1972 in Anti-
Oedipus (see Deleuze and Guattari, 2004) and then expanded more completely in 1980 in A 
Thousand Plateaus (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Deleuze and Guattari take a 
philosophical stance that views human existence as a distributed and intensely finite collation 
of slngularlties; this view extends to their analysis of society, politics, architecture and 
technology and demands an intellectually intense engagement. The analysis of the Body 
without Organs can appear almost blithe in its indifference to the confusion of the reader. In 
some accounts this confusion can arise In the literal translation from the technical language of 
French philosophy, into English. 204 However, the nature of the Body without Organs demands 
a subtle and unfamiliar terminology for dealing with ideas that attempt to transcend 
representation and to attempt to talk In coherent terms within a topological domain rather 
203 Oeleuze and Guattari are social commentators, literary theorists, theorisers of cinema, philosophers, 
agents-provocateurs and the voice of a generation of architect philosophers. They appear rather 
infrequently in the context of industrial design, although Jamie Brassett (1996) must be considered as a 
notable exception in this respea. 
204 More recent translations have improved significantly in this respea. 
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than across scales. Rather than seeking to account for objects as solid signs to be 
encountered and negotiated, the Body without Organs constructs a bringing-together of the 
world and body as a continuum (singularity) of fluxating intensities, in terms coherent with 
their analysis of materiality, where artefacts are understood not as objects but as fluxating 
moments of intensity in human activity. 'A BwO is made in such a way that it can only be 
populated by intensities. Only intensities pass and circulate' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 
160). 
'Max as the BwO', by Theo Humphries 2007 
The Body without Organs is not simply a nominal philosophical trope, but provides a liberating 
means of understanding oneself as a distributed entity (A- life) and not as an objectified body. 
This imagining is possible because the body can be understood to be as complex as that 
which it negotiates. This is a new kind of body, a distributed and extensive dispersed 'body 
without an image' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 6). To comprehend the implications of the 
Body w ithout Organs more fully, it is necessary to understand life as a constantly uncertain 
and intangible self- activating system of infinite complexity. The difficu lty then emerges as to 
how one might talk about non-representation without reference to analogy. The Body without 
Organs is described by Deleuze and Guattari (1967) as 
not a scene, a place, or even a support upon which something comes to pass ... lt is 
not space, nor is it in space; it is a matter that occupies space to a given degree - to 
the degree corresponding to the intensities produced. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) 
279 
Body without Organs is not fixed. Its analysis and description imply a necessity to find a 
syntax that eschews the construct of the fixed entity at the centre of grammatical 
construction. Given that much of Western language is constructed in those terms (the term 
'humanisation of technology', for example, becomes immediately problematic), the Body 
without Organs can appear to defy description and to appear as an unattainable condition. 
This condition is not merely rhetorical but provides an essential poeisis such that humans are 
in a state of becoming. 'You never reach the Body without Organs, you can't reach it, you are 
forever attaining it, it is a limit' (Oeleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 10). Deleuze and Guattari 
propose that the Body without Organs is a transcendental,anoetic and infinite condition and 
that its attainment is to be the true human urge: 'in other words, the unformed, unorganized, 
non stratified, or destratified body and all its flows: subatomic and submolecular particles, 
pure intensities, prevital and prephysical free singularities' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 
43). The Body without Organs distributes the body into a theoretical condition as the residing 
host of all species conception of themselves in the universe. 205 If theories of embodiment can 
be summarised to suggest that human beings are at a loss to think in terms outside their 
embodied understanding, the Body without Organs reveals human understanding to emerge 
from an almost infinite organic and inorganic soma. The Body without Organs points to the 
delusion of imagining that the body is a self-contained and entirely organic object. lt follows, 
then, that distinctions or borders between the objective body and objective technicity are 
merely matters of rhetorical convenience and a hindrance to the realisation of a truly human 
trajectory. Kendall and Michael (200 1) remind us that the Body without Organs is a further 
iteration of attempts to understand human-technological relationships, but it could be argued 
that its implications are far more profound then those emerging from ANT. The Body without 
Organs eliminates the notion of a relationship between technology and humanity and posits a 
condition of an emergent becoming, more akin to that described by the pilots cited earlier in 
this thesis. 
one's nervous system becomes directly linked with the vehicle in a very basic way. If the 
driver decides to brake, the body performs a complex sequence of manoeuvres with the 
205 Edwin Hutchins (1995) developed distributed cognition as a mode of cognitive psychology that could 
extend earlier approaches (such as those of Vygotsky and Piaget, for example) into a more focused 
concern with the interaction of people with complex systems. If a view is taken that cognition is 
distributed, it becomes possible to overcome the tendency to reduce people in complex systems to 
cognitive processing entities. Distributed cognition is not particularly useful as a means of understanding 
anoetic technologies, because it relies upon representation and metaphor, but it points to an emerging 
model of the soma as distributed. 
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brake, accelerator and steering wheel, all acting as sense-extensions. The vehicle 
becomes body like and responds in body-like fashion to the drivers' thoughts. (Paul,-
1967, p. 131) 
Paul suggests that the car becomes 'body like'. In terms of the Body without Organs, the self 
is enacted through the organic and inorganic soma, and no meaningful distinction is invited 
between the car and the driver. The activity in that analysis becomes a schematic Intention and 
not a mediated Interaction of isolated conditions that give a culturally determined delusion of 
extension.206 Deleuze and Guattari recognise that people, as individuals, move 
through/about/within everyday In a way that seems to make sense for them. Deleuze and 
Guattarl suggest that the body, as with other supposed material and discrete artefacts, has 
been overemphasised for its materiality and for its representative value as a container of 
chaos. An attempt by design to orchestrate representation is bound to the culture it 
represents or to the reading of that culture; representations are uncertain and continually 
shifting. Merrell (2003) has argued that lived and enacted experiences should provide the 
centre of analysis. He proposes a form of semiotic enaction. 
Theorisations of the body and by extension the everyday understanding we might hold of the 
body are now dominated by representative materialism that attempts resolution across 
heterogeneity at the expense of the development of a theorisation that accounts for a 
distributed somatic potential. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the full somatic potential of the 
body remains unknowable, because so much of its terminology remains abstract and uncertain 
- a consequence of generations of the domination of materialist logic. In similar terms, 
Deleule (1992), a one-time colleague of Deleuze, has Identified the mark left upon the modern 
era by the intellectual separation of mind from the body. Sustaining narratives of industrial 
design encourage a view of technology as a realised artefact that acts as an extrinsic actor 
with an activity system. lt has seemed logical enough, then, for designers to imagine that they 
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"The belief that one can drive an automobile unconsciously is widely held. A quick web search turned 
up a number of quotes attesting to this belief. Here are a few. "Have you ever been driving down a 
highway and all of a sudden snap out of a daydream only to briefly panic as you realize you've been 
driving unconsciously for quite awhile?" "The laughter faded with the memory as he realized he had been 
driving unconsciously." "When you drive a car for long periods, you tend to slip into this bicameral state 
and are actually driving unconsciously." Philosopher Peter Carruthers offers "absent-minded driving" as 
one example of a "non-conscious experience". Not everyone adheres to this belief. Dennett suggests 
describing the unconscious driving experience as "a case of rolling consciousness with swift memory loss" 
(Dennett, 1991. p. 13n .... The absence of enduring memory for such events can lead to the Illusory 
retrospective impression that one has somehow been driving 'unconsciously' (1999)." ... on one's arriving 
at work, the driving experiences can't be recalled." (Franklin et al. 2004) 
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can intervene in this process in order to shape human social interaction through the form of 
the artefacts of technology they design. However, when, after Merleau-Ponty (2003) and 
others, life is understood to be a consequence of an intrinsic enaction in the world, the 
process of design is returned to a focus upon that individualised enaction and the distribution 
of the immanent self. The design process, rather than acting on an impulse to regard life as a 
structured response to extrinsic conditions, as much theory appears to accept, could turn its 
attention to, and place emphasis, in the process of humanisation upon individualised 
experience as an immanent condition of being. This would demand an understanding that is 
free of the limitations of representation and a revised molecular somatic understanding. 
The artefact is situated in a complex meshwork of effable and anoetic relations. If its histories 
are to be believed, industrial design has limited its attention to the visible effable materiality 
of technology as it appears to be resolved in the form of artefacts. The engagement with that 
which is not visible and effable is ahistorical. The lack of critical tools for the analysis of the 
supposed Immaterial became a concern of the artist Yves Klein. In Zones of Immaterial 
Piaorial Sensibility Klein presented an empty space for exhibition: 'the artefact that creates 
the dialogue between the viewer and the exhibit is removed (i.e. the painting or sculpture). 
Instead, one must interact with the void and recognize that the elimination of artefacts is the 
thing that is on display' o. Grant, 2006). Klein presented a deliberate attempt to grapple 
intellectually with the possibility of grasping the infinite complexity of culture without 
reduction to the artefact. One consequence of this presentation is that those who 
'encountered' Klein's project were forced to attend to their own presence in the void. The 
histories the industrial design community constructs of itself generate a view of how the world 
can be analysed through material artefacts and project a schematic construct of the artefact as 
a resolution of wider cultural and social conditions. There is, then, no history of the 
humanisation of technologies that are in a condition of materiality outside the scope of the 
topological domain of the familiar artefact as it is manifest in orthodox analysis. lt has been 
argued that this way of presenting a history reinforces the notion that industrial design 
engages with a particular degree and scale of solidity and visual materiality. Technologies that 
do not display this scale and solidity or density, such as radio, appear outside this scope and 
appear to demand a new kind of analysis. 
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While only a tiny proportion of the extraordinary extent of media studies and virtuality 
literature that has been published in the last twenty years of the twentieth century can be 
surveyed, the proliferation of those publications demonstrates how so much of the attention 
of cultural analysis has been focused on the struggle to engage with conditions of supposed 
invisibility tied to the materiality of these technologies. Digital media and radio technologies 
present an active, although apparently empty, space. Terms such as 'the virtual' and 'media' 
have sometimes been used to create a kind of semi-present metaphorical artefact that 
occupies otheiWise orthodox artefact-free spaces. The virtual has appeared as a rich site for 
analysis. One way of understanding the virtual is as something 'other' than the artefact and 
something other than space. The otherness of virtuality brings with it a sense of alienation or 
marginallsation. Virtual space Is mediated and controlled. it is politically loaded and mutable, 
mysterious, mythological and prone to a degree of subjectivity that renders its discussion 
complex and uncertain, and so much of its analysis reflects the supercomplexlty-of material 
cultural analysis with added political, psychoanalytical and conjectural logic framed about the 
uncertain (see, for example, Cambell, 200S). Many attempts at analysis set up the real and the 
virtual as a dichotomy of the material versus the immaterial. Since industrial design is 
understood to be located about materiality, it is understandable why those considerations of 
design that lack precedence In materiality or are explicit in their engagement with the 
Immaterial might be regarded by Industrial design theorisations as evidence of a critical shift 
or rupture in the orthodoxy. 207 it has been demonstrated, however, that it is possible to take a 
view that materiality is only a matter of the complexity of its analysis and that heterogenerlc 
otherness is a rhetorical trope. When designers think like material cultural theorists and then 
find themselves confronted by technologies that have no apparent materiality, in those terms, 
they have nowhere to turn other than to alienating modes of analysis that the immaterial 
appears to demand.208 Some designers, however, have contrived ways of realising the 
immaterial or the Invisible by making it material and visible. 
207 it is arguable, then, that the lack of designers' attempts to make immaterial technologies as quotidian 
as machine technology has played its part in the projection of these technologies as extraordinary and 
evidence of shifts and fractures in postmodern and post-industrial society. The fracturing that is widely 
felt and the mutability of cultural certainties may then be evidence of a lack of design's intervention. 
208 The struggle to come to terms with the immaterial nature of emerging technologies has, in its own 
lexicon, become a hyper-rhetorlcal ideology. The discussion of that which is not material abounds with 
confusion and disjunction, tangled further by so many academic texts striving to find a footing in the 
fractured face of the complexity of postmodern and uncertain times that are supposed to have emerged in 
consequence of technological change. While presenting a continually shifting and increasingly complex 
picture, a codified mode of analysis for an age of super-complexity has emerged that presents the 
283 
The 'Tangible Media Group', established in 1995 in the 'MIT Media Lab' (see Tangible Media 
Group, 2005), explores what might be learned in Human Computer Interaction (HCI) from the 
ways in which people interact with artefacts, the intention being 'to develop inquiry processes 
and to gradually build a repertoire of familiar devices and operating principles' (Brereton, 
2001). This research can be thought of perhaps as something akin to the antithesis of the 
Body without Organs. The members of the Tangible Media Group are among the most widely 
published of researchers who purposefully set out to transgress reality and virtuality, the 
material and the informational. (5ee, for example, Fitzmorris et al., 1995; lshii and Ullmer, 
1997; Ullmer et al., 2000; Bellagas et al., 2003; Koleval et al., 2003; Klemmer et al., 2004.) 
This burgeoning field of research is concerned with the design of interactions between the 
human and the computer by building upon reference to the kinds of pre-existing models of 
interaction. These models are built upon an idea of the enaction of the human in the world 
through the interaction with the culturally familiar artefacts historicised through the trajectory 
of technology. These artefacts are imagined in a topological domain that reinforces a 
particular scale of physicality of the human soma. Taking the lead from Hiroshi lshii, the 
Tangible Media Group set the 'immaterial' and the 'material' in separate worlds and focuses 
on the design of supposedly 'seamless couplings' between physicality and virtuality (Tangible 
Media Group, 2005). lt seems as if its prime objective is to build upon the physical abilities of 
humans in order to 'empower collaboration, learning, and decision-making by using digital 
technology' (lshii et al., 2004). The research is founded upon many of the hegemonic 
assumptions underpinning usability research. The Tangible Media Group misses the potential 
of the distributed soma, after all: 'if the interaction is not evident to us we are no more users 
[of technology] than we are the users of our eyes, ears, nerves and hormones' (Ascott, 1995, 
p. 23). The logic of the Tangible Media Group appears to rely upon a given and fixed 
assumption of physicality and materiality. This assumption of scale fixes concepts such as the 
material and the immaterial. Because scale is fixed, in this example apparently about the 
human body, tangibility is imagined at that scale and in consequence reiterates the material 
world at that scale. The problem with approaches to enaction such as this it that they discount 
the full range of somatic potentiality. 
designer with little means of getting to grips with anything other than an understanding of these modes 
of analysis themselves. This kind of theory is fraught with claims of fracture and disjunaure. 
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Dunne and Raby's critical designs are read very much as cultural artefacts but they can be 
understood in terms of a wider analysis. Many of the artefacts in Dun ne and Raby's 
publications (such as the Placebo screen) engage with the idea that the human body is subject 
to the electromagnetic radiation of electronic technologies, artefactualised as somatic shields. 
Dunne and Raby call these artefacts prosthetics, but they read more like skins. 
Dunne and Raby, Placebo (domestic electromagnetic radiation shield). 
The skin is porous. lt provides no boundary, and Dunne and Raby' s artefacts mimic th is 
porosity but maintain an architectural void with the organic flesh. The shields come only so 
close to the human body as to be a place to sleep to be carried or sat upon. Dunne and Raby 
cannot bring themselves to understand fully the fluidity of terminology with which they play, 
and the electromagnetic remains schematic rather than material and their analysis. The 
representation of the full scope of materiality is, of course, a huge problem for design, 
especially when it is read only in terms of the familiar topological domain that defines the 
orthodox narrative reperesentation of the artefact. Fiona Raby has described the attempts of 
some who take a hyper-architectural view of materiality (see Puglisi, 1998, or Toy, 1998, 
1999, for example) as 'a visual pornography of space denied, as yet, to biological material ' 
(Dunne and Raby, 2001, p. 92). This, however, reveals a very particular view of the scale of 
biological materiality and posits the biological human as a rather fixed entity. lt also singularly 
fails to understand how hyper-architecture merely represents an impression of its forms, 
rather than a literal reproduction. Raby projects a rather narrow understanding of architectural 
engagements with the scope of complexity. The architect Peter Eisenman's Rebstockpark 
Project, for example (see http:/ /www.eisenmanarchitects.com) calls for a means of analysing 
the spatial world in a manner that avoids reduction 'to relations among distinct elements in a 
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space-time parameter but which rather supposes a strange invisible groundless depth of 
intensive complexity' (Rajchman, 2000) 
Peter Eisenman, architectural works. 
In a description of Urban Electronics Rajchman (2000, p. 28) posits a Deleuzian approach as a 
means of analysing cities, not as the 'static urban ism' of fixed buildings set about 
cartographical plans, but as living, flowing places that acknowledge the flows of intensive 
complexity that construct a sense of place. The means to find solidity, however temporary in 
this architecture, Rajchman suggests (p. 29), is to draw upon the anoetic - in his terms, 'the 
layers of sense that exist prior to human cognition'. Rajchman proposes something much 
more fundamental and somatic in his analysis than Dunne and Raby; however, it remains an 
intellectual place that is difficult to describe in orthodox syntax. In consequence, the rhetoric 
of many hyper-architectural texts can be confusing and obscure, sometimes even vague. Many 
texts assume a familiarity with the broad scope of the philosophies that they call upon in the 
construction of their particular logic. For example, lsozaki and Asada, members of the Any 
Corporation, describe the experience of taking tea in a tearoom. 
Such an event intervenes in the flow of time, transferring the consciousness of the 
participant to the interiority of time. Time is that which according to Dogen 'comes 
flying'. In other words, an intervention in one instant draws the plural times flowing 
from different origins into one place. (lsozaki and Asada, 1999, p. 81) 
While lsozaki and Asada cannot be claimed to condemn a genre, their writing appears, at first 
sight, to display the disconnected, poetic logic of many hyper-architectural texts, employing 
vague allusions to unexplained concepts. This kind of language make questions of being-in-
the-world seem deeply mysterious, occult even, and beyond the intellectual scope of 
industrial designers, who by nature of their role in dealing with apparent and everyday 
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problems are likely to think of themselves as pragmatic (Lawson, 1997) problem-solvers who 
are active-in-the-world. There is, then, an urgent need to humanise this logic; to transform it 
from the quixotic into the quotidian. This will be no simple task. Industrial designers might 
look to architects such as Vidler (2000) or the Any Corporation (Davidson, 1999) or Eisenmann 
(1999), who are not afraid to challenge established concepts or to introduce conceptually 
difficult and complex ideas that are unfamiliar to conventional design conversation. If they are 
to do this, industrial designers will need to braid ideas of space and time, consciousness, 
territoriality or topological mathematics, for example, into the terms of their intellectual 
community. These ideas will by necessity need to infuse one another in order that a subtle and 
complex field or fabric might be constructed. The particular intellectual trajectory and heritage 
of Industrial design, described by generations of people who have taken complexity and 
brought it into the world as a series of forms, could be brought to bear upon emerging 
understandings of the world as a continuum. If designers were to eschew the tendency to 
define themselves by the nuances of their practice and instead to take a view of their expertise 
to reside within one topological domain or another, they could describe themselves in the 
terms of the scale of attention they give the world. They would then need to understand that 
the impetus to humanise technology implies that they should seek a condition of quotidian 
experience at any degree of granular attention by transforming complexity into the quotidian. 
There Is not yet any answer as to how designers might take the potential of DNA computation 
and other biotechnologies, but at least they then might have something of the terminology 
required In order to construct a brief for the design of a future. 
8.4 Design Scenario 
Joey's ordinary life 
Industrial designers have an essential autonomy that resides in their expertise. This expertise 
has tended to be traced in archaeology through artefacts that have a particular scale and 
materiality. However, design expertise is more vital than those objects suggest. Design logic 
has sustained the human species through tens of thousands of years. This thesis has 
attempted to reveal how that heritage can be connected to the future. This thesis has not 
attempted to create an operative language that will be for others who come after it. This 
concluding scenario sets out how some of the ideas discussed in this thesis might one day 
come together to form an operative design strategy. By narrating three very brief glimpses of 
the future, it shows how that trajectory might play out. These scenarios assume that designers 
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have taken up the imperative set out in this thesis, have cast aside their concern with 
eplstemic distinction of technicity, and have begun to engage with the human as an intense 
and granularly distributed soma. 
The scenario describes how someone uses a technology that is not yet developed and that we 
can hardly imagine. lt does this in order to lay out some of the issues industrial designers of 
the future will have to overcome in making this extraordinary technology seem quotidian. One 
way to approach this might have been to take an example of a future technology from a 
science-fiction novel and to deconstruct that for its design issues. However, we should remind 
ourselves that novels are a form of artistic endeavour, that their narrative has a particular 
dramatic strategy, and to take that apart is likely to produce a rather ludicrous outcome, 
bearing comparison perhaps with Babbage's reduction of Tennyson's poem cited previously 
here. Instead, the scenario described here imagines a technology of the future. This is chosen 
not for its spectacular science-fiction-like manifestation but because it is incomparable to any 
current technology and explicit in the way in which it throws into questions the epistemic 
differentiation that designers of our times have embedded in their schematic discourse. The 
technology may be a crazy pipedream, it may never be realised, it has certainly been very 
difficult to find a way to imagine it; but that is a particular characteristic of technological 
development. One imagines that the designers of the late nineteenth century might have had 
some idea of how the world of the early twenty-first-century might materialise, but they could 
almost certainly not have imagined how some of the extraordinary things that we use would 
work. They might have had difficultly in coming to terms with the prospect of life In our world 
as being entirely human; this is not something we sense, however, as we live out our lives. In 
this scenario, a future technology is proposed that enables people to retain the coherence of 
multiple conversations in what seems to them to be a form of real time. This technology has 
the means to enable the people who use it to operate conversation in similar terms to the way 
in which we can shift data about. 
The scenario is set around a protagonist Joey (a homage both to Joey the Mechanical Boy and 
to Joe and josephine) and moves through several stages. Joey lives some time hence, perhaps 
in an era where a century of design consideration has been given to a technological paradigm 
in which it has become necessary to think in terms of a holism that accounts for the human as 
a distributed and enacted life. The thesis has insisted that these designers will have learned to 
understand how their impetus to humanise technology implies that they should seek a 
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condition of quotidian experience at any degree of granular attention. In order for designers 
to find a way to engage with the anoetic potentials of this emerging paradigm, the thesis has 
proposed that it will be necessary for them to find the means to artefactualise the enaction of 
the hybrid-human at a subtle degree of granular complexity. Such a granular logic will 
demand a holsomatic understanding at a range of granular degrees of complexity. At this 
scale and complexity it will become clear that no meaningful closure of the human is possible. 
lt will be necessary then to go far further than John Thakara's new rules for design (2006, p. 
213), which were imagined for a post-mechanical paradigm only insomuch as he recognised 
the socially constructed hybrid nature of the human. The new rules will necessarily incorporate 
the holsamatic human and will understand the potentiality of a topological domain that 
recognises the molecular potential of design. For example: 
• from sense and respond to deep sensuality; 
• from deep context to distributed context; 
• from seeding edge effects to swarming possibilities; 
• from smart recombination to enacting consciousness; 
• from social fiction to somatic fact; 
• from designing with us to us designing; 
• from design as service to design as poetic possibility. 
Before we can meet Joey we must understand slightly how that idea of the open unbordered 
and Intensely complex understanding of the human will have given shape to the way in which 
technology is imagined in his time. We can do this by re imagining how joey uses technology if 
designers maintain: 
(a) Reality insistence. Industrial designers cannot come to terms with this new 
understanding and continue to project a material interactlonal model of human-
technology relationships. Stability is maintained in the topological understanding 
of the human artefact and interaction is a noetic extension of that domain. 
(b) Virtuality insistence. Industrial designers can come to terms with holsomasis but 
only as a social and cultural hybridity: semi-stability is maintained in the 
topological understanding of the human artefact. Interaction is quasi-anoetic but 
socially orchestrated such that the human artefact becomes conditioned by 
technological interaction. 
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(c) Holsomatic Insistence. Industrial designers can come to terms with a complete 
and enacted model of the distributed holsomatic hybridity. Being human Is 
reconditioned and interaction is anoetic and naturalistic. 
joey will be ordinary, unexceptional, as boring and as interesting as anyone. No more no less 
human than any of us. Some of the things Joey will take for granted will seem extraordinary to 
us. We will not, for example, be able to suggest a gender when we talk about joey or say 'his' 
or 'her' without risking offence; after a century of fluid and open discourse, ideas of sexuality 
and gender will have been rendered as unvlable as any other mechanical and dialectic vision of 
the world. We must be prepared to meetjoey in a condition of complete modesty. We must be 
humble and must recognise how we think about some of the attempts to presage our own 
times that were projected from the technic imagination of the nineteenth century. We must be 
prepared to assume that, should joey or a contemporary ever come across this scenario in 
some archive or other, they will no doubt laugh at the naivety of these projections. joey may 
be amused or astounded at the failure here to account for some other yet unforeseen 
occurrence that will render these ideas nonsensensical. When we understand technology as 
emerging as a momentary solidification of a great flowing complexity of dynamic forces, we 
must be aware that we cannot hope to account fully for the supercomplexity of that process. 
The most we can hope for is that this joey of the future will understand this as an example of 
how the great developments of his time (there he is forced into gender by the limits of 
language) were made possible by the foresight of some who understood the necessity to 
reimaglne technology in terms of the human. Let us assume that De Garis, like those who have 
made the same dire predictions before him, was wrong, that his prediction of an inter-species 
war has passed similarly into the realm of nostalgic fiction. Let us instead assume that human 
life, following the pattern of the previous twenty thousand years, has continued to be rich and 
creative and just as dull as it ever was by presenting a vision that is neither a utopian nor a 
dystopian and discounting the unaccountable complexity that goes about it. lt is not a dream, 
a warning or a manifesto; it is just an idea. 
'The Unknown Citizen' (W. H. Auden, 1940) is a poem of extraordinary simplicity in its subject 
and redolently quotidian In both its narrative and art. The poem is not quite funny or sad, it is 
neither bitter nor contemptuous, and, in keeping with its subject, it is just simply, skilfully and 
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magnificently ordinary. lt is ordinary and unexceptional. This is, of course, what makes it so 
extraordinary and exceptional. 
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be 
One against whom there was no official complaint, 
And all the reports on his conduct agree 
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a saint, 
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community. 
Except for the War till the day he retired 
He worked in a factory and never got fired 
But satisfied his employers, Fudge Motors Inc. 
Yet he wasn't a scab or odd in his views, 
For his Union reports that he paid his dues, 
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound) 
And our Social Psychology workers found 
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink. 
The Press are convinced that he bought a paper every day 
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every way. 
Policies taken out In his name prove that he was fully insured, 
And his Health-card shows he was once in hospital but left it cured. 
Both Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare 
He was fully sensible to the advantages of the Instalment Plan 
And had everything necessary to the Modern Man, 
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a Frigidaire. 
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content 
That he held the proper opinions for the time of year; 
When there was peace, he was for peace: when there was war, he went. 
He was married and added five children to the population, 
Which our Eugenist says was the right number for a parent of his generation. 
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their education. 
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd: 
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard. 
W. H. Auden, 'The Unknown Citizen' 
The scenario must not assume that technology will drive cultural change but rather that it 
becomes solidified by the culture it facilitates. This is an important assumption, because it 
points to an essential stability in the experience of being human. We can recognise holsomatlc 
hybridity just as easily in Auden's poem as we might in any DNA computational future. 
Arguably, as some facets of this hybridity have gained prominence, the 'researchers into 
Public Opinion' perhaps, so others facets have become less apparent. The work of the 
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Eugenist, for example, is played out in a more subtle and distributed and enacted interaction 
through IVF treatments and the interventions of intrauterine surgery. Although this is not at all 
his intention, Auden hints at the enacted hybridity of life that becomes solidified to a degree 
that shifts topological attention away from its distributed nature. Auden can describe 
'everything necessary to the Modern Man, I A phonograph, a radio, a car and a Frigidaire', 
because these things make solid a complex meshwork of interacting systems that go about 
them. lt might be just as viable, although not so convenient, to talk about how the people, 
materials and physical phenomena that interact in these meshworks but are made solid in the 
gramophone, which might also be essential to the modern man. Before we meetjoey, we must 
assume that, in the future, life continues to be enacted in a hybrid meshwork of possibilities. 
The topological complexity and degree of granular attention must be carefully managed in the 
scenario. What aspects of the future will bear resonance with our own times and to what 
extent with the holsomatic, distributed, and semi-infinite granular imagining of the human 
have enabled an entirely fluid imagination. If joey is to look like us and to have a certain 
tectonic physical presence in the world, then we must perhaps assume, for example, that he 
might own and rely upon some form of vehicle. joey will need this in order to move minerals 
or foodstuffs about and to move his own tectonic self about on the tectonics of the planet. 
This imagination determines ajoey who continues to eat and owns a means to keep food 
fresh. We might then productively imagine a world that acts upon joey's life very much as the 
world we know, with dust on futuristic bookshelves and leaves blocking futuristic drains. In 
that future, Joey sleeps, occasionally gets stung by a wasp and is forced to clear up after 
children. That is a very limited although perhaps realistic vision. We could, for example, 
Imagine ajoey who is so granularly distributed as to be data or electromagnetic energy. This 
would be a plausible way to engage with the pragmatics of holsomasism but might not have 
resonance with the industrial-design problem of our time. That scenario would need to pay no 
particular attention to tectonics but would necessarily engage philosophically with an idea of 
humanity at a degree of metaphysical complexity that echoes with our own times only in the 
manner of a ghost. That scenario would describe a kind of will-o-the-wisp vision of humanity. 
That future may be the inevitable consequence of an increasingly granular and distributed 
understanding of the human that makes viable a valent degree of enacted interaction. We 
must be careful to place our Joey correctly as a step towards that future and to be mindful of 
what might make us human. This is an impossibly problematic task because almost any 
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imagining is likely to be subjective and culturally inflected. joey, like Auden's citizen, for 
example, might remain fully sensible to the advantages of the saving and investing by shifting 
values about, but could have no conception of coin or a note. joey might be imagined to have 
never bought a newspaper; they will probably disappear very soon anyway. Knowing news, 
though, might be an important, If not essential, human trait, having continuity with our 
behaviour even in our most ancient history. Authenticity and neutrality might perhaps have 
returned to be a matter of consensus rather than political orchestration, because, in the 
holsomatic imagination, Information will appear more as a field than as a directed stream. 
joey will arrive at a truth through participatory discussion in a field of conversations. Like 
Auden's Unknown Citizen, our joey is not unhappy; being human he might find joy in family 
life and ideas and In popularity. But of course these are cultural assumptions founded to a 
significant extent in the placement of the author who constructs and imagines this joey. We 
might think about values of authorship and about the way in which skills are valued in others. 
Is this an important facet of being human? Will joey find art in the music of others when that 
skill is universally distributed? Certainly musicians seem to be able to enjoy other musicians' 
music because they are atuned to the more subtle and granular differences they can discern. 
Perhaps that degree of topological subtlety in critical awareness will be a necessary facet of 
humanity too. 
One thing we might think we can assert with confidence is that it will be important to joey to 
know he is an individualised self. If self-awareness seems to be a fundamental facet of 
higher-order consciousness, then there is no reason to assume that an even higher order of 
consciousness might erase this facet of being human. lt is more likely it will focus it into an 
intense but powerful singularity that remains core to a file of quantum probabilities, if that is 
the degree of granular attention we are dealing with. Can we assume that there can be no 
design without interacting selves or is that another rhetorical convenience born of an 
assumption of epistemic differentiation in individuals? For convenience sake, let us assume 
that this question is not yet necessary. This means that we have positioned joey clearly as part 
of a continuous trajectory with the stories told in industrial design histories. That trajectory 
may continue to a point of an infinite human of interacting singularities, but the moment of 
the scenario presented here is not that remote. 
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Let us assume that one essential trait of feeling human and of retaining a sense of self in a 
quotidian field of holsomatic interaction resides in staying sane. Quite how one might retain 
one's sanity as a singularity is perhaps beyond the scope of what we need to achieve here, so 
let us imagine a projection of the trajectory in which we find ourselves today some time into 
the relatively near future. The skill of staying sane in the twenty-first century is not unlike 
what it was in the twentieth century or any time prior to that. One has to be good at managing 
the flux between individualised ideas of oneself as a complete entity and the wider 
understanding of oneself as part of a greater and hybrid whole. Design is one way in which we 
manage that flux. The skill of design is to enable us to know that we have achieved the things 
we do. Like the pilot in Magee's poem (cited previously), we soar and climb and dive. In an 
increasingly granular imagination, this fluxation may require a specialist body of psycho-
engineers who manage how people do this and make it possible to retain a sense of sanity. 
Perhaps future designers will be imagined as those who give an aesthetic to psycho-
engineering - those who make it attractive and desirable. 
Conversation is one of the ways in which we believe ourselves to differ from other species. 
Being a technic species, we have hybridised conversation and, given skilful design, it is not 
extraordinary to us and today to talk at a great distance to a friend or colleague. This hybridity 
is an accepted quotidian facet of human life, an accelerated hybridity of the way that human 
beings have thought it a good idea to have conversations with people without being tied to 
tectonic time and place. One aspect of this human phenomenon is known as social media. A 
projected trajectory of social media sets up a possible technological application for the future 
that comes replete with its own engineering and design problems. 
You write a blog post. You tweet about it. lt gets posted to your Friendfeed profile. 
You share it via Face book. You save it to del.icio.us. Your friends, followers and 
colleagues comment ·on the blog. Or they say something nice via Twitter (where a 
conversation related to your post ensues). Or, they comment directly via your 
FriendFeed profile. Or they comment on your Facebook post. Or they save the post to 
their own del.icio.us account and add a comment there. Yes, you're highly connected 
with your audience. Yes, it's cool that each of your readers can view and respond in 
the social media outlet of their choice. But as a result, the conversation is broken. lt's 
not threaded. lt's discontinuous: lacking sequence and coherence. Is this a problem? 
I dunno. But I do think it's problem for the 'ideal' of social media: in a fractured 
comment sphere, individual voices can be too easily discounted or simply lost. 
(Defren, 2008) 
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We can imagine then a future technology that will overcome this fracturing, though we do not 
yet know in precise terms how this technology will be engineered. The idea of overcoming 
time may seem a matter of absolute fantasy, but only insomuch as time and duration are 
human conceptions. The problem of distance in communication might once have seemed 
insurmountable too. Distance and the problems of communication have one historical 
trajectory that can be understood as a series of eliminations of temporal discontinuity. The 
trajectory of communications and more recent telecommunications is a history of the 
elimination of waiting. The relay runner, the horse, the train, the telegraph have all hybridised 
this elimination of fracture. Delays that plagued early transatlantic voice conversations have 
been largely eliminated, and now digital media technologies appear to enable near 
instantaneous communication, just as Latour suggested the elimination of delay was tied to 
the elimination of 'mass'. In this historical trajectory direct human cognition has been 
increasingly eliminated from the wait. Temporal delay has been eliminated by shifting the 
conversation, by stretching it increasingly into a hybridised version of natural conversation. 
just as once it might have seemed extraordinarily ambitious to call for the elimination of the 
wait for a letter to be answered, is it completely without possibility that all communication will 
become instantaneous and entirely ubiquitous. The first thing we must think about is how this 
ubiquity will be managed. Three short scenarios featuring joey using this technology will be 
constructed. Each of these following scenarios will assume an intellectual position in regard to 
human-technology relationships. In reality no single position can be usefully isolated and 
presents as part of a continuum in the intellectual discourse in the industrial design 
community. 
Joey 1. A designed future of material interaction 
(a) Reality insistence. Industrial designers cannot come to terms with this new 
understanding and continue to project a material interactional model of human-
technology relationships. Stability is maintained in the topological understanding 
of the human artefact, and interaction is a noetic extension of that domain. 
In this scenario the device that joey uses is imagined as a straightforward projection of an 
early twenty-first century portable electronic device. The device functions through the means 
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of its seamless and instantaneous connectivity to a huge number of other devices, all of which 
possess huge quantum computational power. In the logic of orthodox industrial design, this 
device is imagined as a hand- held and personal node to a vast networked media substrate. 
J~ .sits in a ~tl .sippin:J a c..appuco'no ta/J:in:3 out of'ti~. J~ c.an hardly 
i~~·~ how people c.oped IAJI'thout ~·n:J able to .store and repeat 
c.ower.sation.s, drop in and out of' the~ at ~AJ~'II, l'rac.ture and dissolve the~, 
.split the~ and .share the~ and revisit th~ at IAJI'II. Ideas of' li~arity in 
c.ower.sation.s are P?erely ec.hoe.s of' a ti~ of' ~c.hanic.a/ a/lu.sion.s, when 
CAP.Se and el'l'ed were ~ore i4Portant than .f:eld.s 
and l'low.s and bel'ore ideas .swar~ed. ])oe.s J~ 
'ta!J:' IAJI'th people, or IAJI'th ideas of' people, or 
c.ollation.s of' ideas, or IAJI'th a whole C.04Pri.sed of' 
~~-~~ hjbridi.sed ideas? I:t ~atter.s not, 
becauSe the ideas to J~ are part of' a ric.h 
.Swar~in:J .f':eld of' c.ower.sation that o~ CAn .shqpe 
and direc.t, .share IAJI'th o~ other or with~~ or 
IAJI'th no~ .. . 
Joey speaks into a form of smart tool, which he holds in his hand. The electronics in this 
device utilise advanced computation and quantum logic processing that produce a 
functionality of jaw-dropping complexity. joey's device is the most popular version. lt is styled 
with a form of timeless classical beauty with a slightly retro aesthetic that recalls a look of 
some thirty years ago, which recalled a look of some sixty years prior to that. The design of 
the device bears striking similarity to the early portable electronic devices that typify the early 
twenty- f irst century. The insides of the devices have changed beyond comparison, of course, 
but human hands are still hands, the form and scale of any palm- held device, no matter how 
powerful or complex its computational power, is bound to be similar. The portable electronic 
device has now become as ergonomically fixed as the hammer or the cup. The industrial 
designers have still had some aesthetic role in the design of Joey's device. lt is, for example, a 
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testament to the designer of this artefact that it still looks good, even though Joey has owned 
it for many years. In that time, while Joey has gradually learned something of its potential, the 
device has worn with use and now carries with it some of the narrative that has made up 
Joey's life -that scratch when he dropped it in Samarkand, for example. 
Left: Sterling Hammer Catalogue. (Sterling, 2008) Right: New Hammer design by 
ATOMdesign (ATOMdesign, 2007) 
ATOMdesign was asked by Vaughan & Bushnell to reimagine the classic hammer and 
the S2 is what they came up with. ATOMdesign didn't take the challenge lightly.[ ... ] 
The Split-Head hammer offers many new features never seen before in the industry 
such as integrated overstrike plates, modular head construction, and elastomeric 
shockgaskets just to name a few. (ATOMdesign, 2007) 
The design of the hammer is largely fixed about a topological domain that fixes it at a 
particular materiality, because the world with which it acts is fixed in that domain. The 
material and form of its construction may change minimally, but any change is likely to be 
superficial. The ATOMdesign seems to be a flim-flam, because it seems to achieve very little 
more than an ancient designer might have realised. The design logic of Joey's device imagines 
an extraordinary futuristic stone tool to be carried and wielded as a means of capturing, 
mediating and reconstructing the world. Unlike a mechanical tool, this device can process 
more data than perhaps all the computers of the twentieth century combined. Joey can now 
'see' in detail places of extraordinary remoteness and 'hear' sounds from places far away, he 
can arrange these into any order he wishes, store and retrieve them, shift them about and 
reorder them. lt takes a long time to learn how to do this, of course, because that function is 
one of many on the device. lt is necessary to decide what you want to do and then to work 
through the information presented. The product designers have had very little to do, other 
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than to design a stylish and ecologically legal box with a screen. Given that every 
computational device looks almost identical, this does not look like a very difficult job. In fact 
most artefacts are designed by other computer systems, which use data to anticipate the most 
practical ecological, attractive and desirable box for any given market situation. How one uses 
this thing was a job for the interaction architects. The device is voice operated and well 
conceived, but, rather in the manner one struggles with the 'interface' of any complex 
electronic device, Joey is left exhausted by the process of using it. Joey is forced into reading 
and understanding a complex mass of data and must manipulate software that cuts up and 
stores conversations rather in the manner one might already edit sounds or movies, only 
written with almost infinite complexity. Joey plays no part in the functioning of the device, but 
it is his cognition that must be used to read and understand what he sees and hears. 
Actual illustration is Tom Tom leather carrying case for 'Go' satellite navigation device. 
(http://www.tomtom.com) 
Because this device is a tool, it modifies the world. The data it presents are not reality but 
complex data-driven simulacra. While he sits in the cafe, Joey' s bodily senses act as a 
conditioning force filtering an approximate microcosm of the world presented by the device. 
The device Joey carries acts as a convenient, reassuring mechanical reminder that a process of 
transformation has taken place. This device makes the real unreal and then converts it back 
into a form of unreal-reality; an approximated replication of that which it conveys. Joey's life 
is very complicated. This moment in the cafe offers a moment's respite. He has many similar 
devices at home and at work, all of which look almost identical, which talk together. Given the 
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computing power and the artificial intelligence these devices possess, they sometimes feel as 
if they are conspiring against Joey, anticipating and second-guessing his needs, but getting it 
wrong almost all of the time. The power of these combined Intelligences is extraordinary, and 
only a fraction of that power is revealed to joey at any one moment. lt is all he can cope with. 
Joey sits In the cafe and fiddles with the device, never quite understanding it, distracted from 
the 'real life' around him by it. Joey's world is a place of frustrated complexity. lt is filled with 
ever-more complex gadgets that contain complexity and then leave it to people to sort out 
the mess into something meaningful. 
ME AND MY VIDEO RECORDER 
I once programmed a video-recorder -
Sat there for hours growing 
Tetchy 
And 
Grumpy, 
Melded mind with plastic machine, 
Brain-cells with paper instructions, 
Feelings with electricity and silicon junctions. 
Finally broke through to 
ENLIGHTENMENT 
And found myself staring AGHAST and 
FLABBERHASTED 
At a remote 
THAT SEEMED TO BE DOING ITS JOB! 
Lost the battery the next week, 
Week after that the video got kicked, 
Week after that unplugged, 
And then my kids pressed all the wrong buttons. 
Now my buttons stay firmly UNPRESSED, 
I will not rise to the bait of HOW EASY IT IS, 
Nor will I describe in loving detail to my friends 
HOW CONVENIENT ITS MADE MY LIFE. 
lt sits there, sulking and glowering, 
And I Ignore it, 
Best way to deal with 
MACHINES THAT DON'T WANT TO FUNCTION! 
Richard Macwilliam (2008) 
joey 2. A designed future of social and cultural hybridity 
(b) Virtuality insistence. Industrial designers can come to terms with holsomasis but 
only as a social and cultural hybridity: semi-stability is maintained in the 
topological understanding of the human artefact. Interaction is quasi-anoetic but 
socially orchestrated such that the human artefact becomes conditioned by 
technological interaction. 
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In this scenario the system that Joey uses is imagined to function through an interaction of 
some form of technology implanted into the soma imagined with the orthodoxy of the 
artefactual body. The functionality of the system resides in the interaction of the devices 
Implanted in Joey's body with the extended system. This scenario presents the first of two 
holsomatic alternatives. In this scenario the system enables a becoming. When Joey moves into 
a designated proximity, he becomes another conditional state. Where the first scenario 
described a state of being constrained about a cognitive interaction, this scenario describes a 
state of being defined by an activity location. 
'Oh, who doesn't own an interositer these days?' says the scientist Or Forrester in the 1955 
science-fiction movie 'This Island Earth' (1955). The interositer: this alien (Metalunan) device 
plays an important role in the centre of the narrative. The interositer, realised by the film's art 
directors Alexander Golitzen and Richard Riedel, appears to be on something of a scale similar 
to a domestic appliance. 
Essex (the alien) demonstrates the lnterositer to his human passengers. 
The full function of the lnterositer is not explained. At first sight the device appears to have a 
considerably bulk. Its aesthetic is contemporary with atomic imaginings of the time of its 
design and art direction. Where once the lnterositer might have stood for an advanced 
technology, today it might appear quaint and utterly out of step with the more complex 
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understanding we have of the distributed and microelectronic nature of communication 
technologies. However, unlike the technology of much subsequent science fiction, in Golitzen 
and Riedal's design the artefactual construction of the device can be understood to act only as 
a theatrical placeholder. In the narrative of the movie the interositer appears to interact with 
the occupants of the spaceship through some form of mental connectivity. Its artefactual 
presence appears to be necessary merely to make it plausible to the movie's audience. The 
functic:m is explicitly distributed between the alien species, the spaceship and the Universe 
itself. 
The narrative necessity of the artefact in this case is an echo of the mechanical logic of the 
audience's intellectual placement. This Is not so extraordinary as it might sound. The rather 
familiar experience of driving a car is a condition in which there is a kind of seamless flux 
between states of holsamasis and discretionary control. I may drive for miles as unaware of 
the car as l·am of any other facet of my biological soma, but the mechanical presence of the 
car is essential because of its tectonic interaction with the world. lt is difficult to Imagine a 
world in which mechanical necessity does not provide the model by which things can be 
understood. There may be some weight behind the argument of tangible media designers that 
a form of mechanically imagined placeholder is necessary in order to facilitate the rich 
Interaction with media technologies. Following the logic of Dunne and Raby, it is possible to 
suggest that Joey may find it necessary, like the occupants of the Metalunan spaceship, to 
have some artefactual resonance with an extension of his artefactual body. Joey must be 
reminded of the artificiality of the condition he becomes when he uses the system. When Joey 
puts the system on or rides it, the system distributed in the world begins to interact with the 
components placed inside joey's body. These in turn interact with his nervous system, feeding 
directly into his cognition. There are no needs for screens or speakers.Joey hears and see 
information swarming and swimming before his eyes - then steps back out of the system and 
into the 'real' world. 
Its :Joey P?cAI'eS do.ser to the zone its dreet kcoP?eS P?ore iltten.se. 4n 
initial and iderP?itteltt zone or stutteri"j, hall' heard C.omersation.s and 
Spec.tra/ .rorP?S Shifl and diSSolVe raJe,.s a5 the COndition COP?eS eA/er :Joey 
COP?pletely. ?JissolveJ ido the zone :Joey can paMSe and reSUP?e 
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conver.sat,"on.S IA..JI•thout k""j QAJare or their tefl1Poral .sh,".f't. 77-Jat .sh,".f't,""j ;,s 
the 1(,"1/er-app that has 01/erc!omeJu.st ta/f:,""j and has A1aPe eVeryone ~ to 
~t ,"do the zone and ~tout or;t. -rnere areJunf:;e,s orc.our.se, ~ 
peop/e who CAn't eSc!ape the at..Je$OA1e ,".#te,.s,"ty or k""j $,"A1u/taneou,s/y 
d,",s,so/ved and A1,"~ed IA..JI•th a un"ver.se or po.s,s;b,·;.·t;e.s. It '.s /:no~A..J~·"j when to 
~t ~to reaJ;ty that c.oud.s. 
The zone is a socially defined place where a condition of hybridity can be orchestrated Into a 
media-becoming. lt generates questions of control and power. How does one access these 
places? Who determines whether access should be granted? Where are these places located? 
Are they public or private? Does one subscribe to a club of some kind? Is joey some member 
of an elite social group? One thing that is certain in this scenario is that the system works. lt 
has arrived in consequence of an intense developmental trajectory in which designers have 
worked to understand how the cognition can be orchestrated in the soma. 
The question is not one of whether the bioengineering brief will make this possible but one of 
how it will be possible to retains one's sense of self when this condition of intense hybridity 
takes effect. The engineering will perhaps combine advanced network communications with an 
essential and microscopic materialist understanding of some of the processes by which 
cognitive linguistics is enabled in the human soma. This presents a dramatic shift from the 
way in which the interaction was conceived in the scenario in which joey uses a hand-held 
device. In this scenario the suggestion of a design understanding of the subtle functioning of 
the evolved biological soma enables a more ·complete cognitive flow. 
In the first scenario the quotidian was understood to reside in a mechanical model of 'hold 
and use'. In this scenario the quotidian is maintained by an awareness that one can move 
between conditions of reality and virtuality. In the first scenario the interaction is entirely 
noetic. In this scenario the interaction is quasi-anoetic, in that it is socially bounded, and 
artificiality is reinforced through social construction. The artificiality of the condition 
reinforces the need for social orchestration, which is codified in orthodox topological terms by 
the spatial geographical location of the event. The designer's brief will interact with that of the 
bioengineer at an intense degree of granularity. This granularity will demand a valent degree 
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of materiality and complexity in the way in which the hybrid affordance of the technology is 
accounted. lt is quite possible, of course, that the scenarios presented here are steps in a 
developmental continuum. The trajectory of this hybridity from noetic separation to located 
condition might ape that of the telephone. One history of the telephone can track a trajectory 
from a determined geographically located enaction, in a fixed point in space (the telephone 
box) towards an eventual migration in socially located situations and then to portability as a 
mobile activity. The manner of materialisation is momentary. There Is every reason to suppose 
that that trajectory Is not finished. lt is quite plausible even in the early twenty-first century to 
predict how the mobile telephone will become more of an ubiquitous activity than a located 
activity. 
Established ideas of the brain as an intrinsic processor of information have been largely 
overturned by cognitive science In favour of a condition of mind as an emergent and enacted 
facet of embodied cognition. The designer of the future must have a very clear and Informed 
understanding of how the quotidian will arise. Will, for example, the quotidian be more likely 
to arise when the condition has resonances with the familiarity of location - the office or the 
bar as places of conversation, for example. However, it is equally plausible to suggest that the 
quotidian may be facilitated as a state of being through a form of interaction bearing 
comparison with pharmacological technologies for example. (I have used the example of the 
asthma medicine QVar.) This idea of anoetic holsomatic interaction is explored in the final 
scenario. 
Joey 3. A designed future of enacted holsomasism 
(c) Holsomat/c insistence. Industrial designers can come to terms with a complete 
and enacted model of the distributed holsomatic hybridity. Being human is 
reconditioned and interaction is anoetic and naturalistic. 
Humans are not linear and mechanical devices. The flux between states of consciousness is an 
essential psycho-evolutionary trait that makes communication possible. This shifting 
conditionallty Is not something people necessarily notice. Linguistic psychologists, such as 
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Zali Gurevitch (1989, for example, suggest that the evolved potential to flux plays an essential 
role in communication and particular vocal conversation. 
Whenever faces are engaged in a face-to-face conversation distance is evoked 
between them as a 'common dialogic space' that both connects and separates. This 
space must be dealt with in conversation. The habitual tendency is to cover it up by 
formulating a topic that is external to the immediate relation. Keeping the topic going 
'holds' the separate parties together in an ongoing engagement. When the topic for 
some reason fails to hold, the gap between the participants is exposed and they fall 
embarrassedly into silence. There are, however, ways to give presence to distance and 
still contain it within the bounds of the conversation. What this calls for is a 
recognition of the speaking voice as an emergent self rather than an utterance 
subordinate to the external topic. (Gurevitch, 1989) 
This ability to put oneself outside the voice in order to maintain stability in conversation 
appears to be an essential facet of the socialisation of the species. Most of us appear to be 
able to shift and deborder our voice without any particular awareness. The inability to do this 
can lead to ways of being that are described as being conditions of disability. Some of these 
disabilities appear to be tied to the temporality of speech. For example, a 'festinating' device 
(OAF) has been used to demonstrate improved functionality in patients with Parkinson's 
Disease (Downie et al., 1981). There are some implications as well in disorders such as 
schizophrenia, where one's own voice or remembered conversations are displaced and appear 
to be disembodied (Curio et al., 2000. Gurevitch, perhaps intent to separate conversation from 
social constructed analysis, does not talk about people but rather describes 'faces' as actors in 
a condition of conversation. 
This third scenario is perhaps the most difficult to write, because it is unbound. This third 
scenario cannot talk about devices or places where conditions are enacted because it will 
describe a quotidian condition without disability. In this third scenario, Joey will just live, 
being able to do things with his cognition that we can do, but without the inabilities we take 
for granted. In Middlemarch, George Eliot identifiedan essential stupidity that made the 
human condition possible. 
If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing 
the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies 
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on the other side of silence. As it is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with 
stupidity. 
The question for design is whether that stupidity is indeed essential. Should it be considered 
in the same light as fallacious assumptions of the effect of speed upon the human condition 
or the unnatural nature of human flight? joey will be a species that lives in an evolutionary 
nature filled with Interacting nanopartlculate DNA computers. This will be a kind of living, 
flowing physics. In The Garden of Forking Paths (2008) jorge Louis Barges imagines the 
possibility of losing oneself in possibilities. 
Look, here - a beautiful poppy, yes? But some say that it has the power to unravel 
time. And here: yes, this narcissus-flecked pool. The locals contend that If you gaze 
Into its depths too long, you are in danger of merging with your reflection and losing 
all sense of Self; for your image becomes that of all men. And there, a gallery of 
mirrors most enigmatic; and hanging here, by this coin: the skin of a most unusual 
tiger .... 
joey will have learned to live in this world as a child. He will have played in it, learned and 
loved in it, and will perhaps find it to be an extraordinary and poetic place. That poetic 
ordinariness will owe much to the designers who came to understand how that world would be 
possible and who orchestrated and shaped its beauty. 
Joey 's ordinary li.f'e: 
was as orcl··nary as shqpi"j .f'lid. 
Zs as ordinary as drin.fin::J c.o.f'.f'ee ar 301000 .f'eet ~e the l'ttiO/ftic. Oc.ean. 
will be as ordinary as .f'lowi"j out il'fto int::nity AAcl then ~ ido the 
iden.se Si"!)Uiarity o.f' oneSel.f'. 
Zs as ordinary searc.hi"j .f'or AAcl .f:ncli"j ¥hi"j in an inStant. 
will be as ordinary as Knowin::J eveJythin::J there is to Know. 
305 
Zs as ordinary as r.ncli"!) onesel.f' t::Kertaken <o/ ecstasy. 
Will be as ordinary as Sen.Si"!J thejo; MJ pain o.f' others in ePtotiona/ art. 
was as ordinary as the lenS let the ,.,icrobe dQnCL<. 
Zs as ordinary as plo/i"!J with the ca/cuiCft.ion o.f' Cft.oP?S. 
Will be as ordinary as di't'l""!) one's ConSciouSneSS deeper Me~ deeper into the 
detail o.f'the L/niv'erSe. 
was as ordinary as listen·"!) entrQnCL!d to the SnO/>'fan 'sjourney. 
Zs as ordinary as r.ncli"!) oneSel.f' dissolv'ed in the world o.f' the clu& 
C.OP?P?Union. 
W•"ll be as ordinary as allowi"!J one's eyes to be snared. 
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Conclusion 
Industrial designers have a vital expertise, which has given them an essential autonomy that 
has sustained the human species through tens of thousands of years and may yet continue 
that trajectory into a.future we can hardly imagine. That is an exciting and awesome 
responsibility, and it suggested to me that industrial design should be more rigorous in Its 
intellectual strategies. Industrial designers have had such a significant part to play in making 
life possible so far that any inability it senses to engage with the future must present a 
significant concern. 
This thesis has focused upon Western European and American industrial design as a particular 
practice and discourse at a moment in time when the trajectory of technological development 
has thrown into doubt the certainty of understandings of the boundary between the human 
and the technological. That uncertainty might have given rise to a critical moment for the 
intellectual fellowship of industrial designers, as the insights they once relied upon when 
dealing with questions of the material formation of the technological world have begun to 
seem irrelevant in the formation of the future. Rather than applying an alien theory to 
industrial design, this exploration used its design instincts to draw upon a broad spectrum of 
ideas and then assembled them through a process of synergistic analysis. This process 
assembled ideas as if they were actors in a network of interacting conversations that gave 
form to a discursive conversation. 
Rather than adding its voice to the many who have called for the end of industrial design, this 
thesis took as its impetus the opportunity for designers to reconsider the essential principles 
that have underpinned their intellectual community. Through a critical review of literature, it 
showed that, if industrial designers are to continue to talk in terms that have some continuity 
with the trajectory of the historical narratives that have sustained their intellectual community, 
a more subtle attention to the artefact than that provided by recent design theorisations was 
required. Rather, it showed that it was necessary to find a means to analyse the artefact 
without seeking closure through forms of material and representational analysis by acting 
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upon a strategy that understood materlality to be tied to the complexity of analysis. That 
strategy revealed borders and epistemic heterogeneity to be matters of conceptual and 
rhetorical convenience, and so it became possible to discuss humanity and technology In a 
single conversation. 
By calling upon the Idea of the topological domain and by using a 'designerly' form of extent 
analysis, it became possible to establish a means to engage with Ideas without necessarily 
calling upon orthodox and received understandlngs of the human and the technological as 
discrete encapsulations of terms in heterogeneous epistemlc locations. By taking a more fluid 
view of human-technological relationships, it then became possible to insist that design 
processes of humanisation could be viably accounted across terms at any given degree of 
complexity and granular sophistication in the conceptual and technical models held in human-
technological relationships. That allowed the thesis to explore how designers could 
understand questions of the human and the technological in a new way, which allowed for 
sufficient debordered and fluid granularity in terms. lt was then possible to conclude that a 
sufficiently subtle understanding of the world, which will be coherent in its terms with the 
molecular complexity of future discussions, will demand the construction and incorporation of 
a form of 'designerly' extent analysis. In that way the thesis presented a reinvigoration of the 
Industrial design community's discourse and maintained the centrality of its expertise with 
materiality, but in new terms of debate. To achieve this reinvigoration the thesis was divided 
Into eight chapters, such that, proceeding from a definition of the discipline, it was possible to 
demonstrate in stages how the problematic it confronted lay in industrial design's own 
definition and not In some extrinsic determinant. 
Chapter one opened the thesis by confronting industrial design and its particular autonomies. 
That strategy located the research, established a clear view of how industrial design could be 
identified. The chapter also interrogated the intellectual tactics that have given industrial 
design autonomy and the authority to act within its own terms and as a wider intellectual 
agent. The key claim made in this chapter was that industrial design could be usefully 
understood as an intellectual community. By establishing Industrial design as an intellectual 
community, it was then possible to reveal Its autonomy. Industrial design autonomy was 
shown to reside in Its subtle management of fluidity in terms that go about a particular 
ambition founded upon a critical position not fully accounted in its discourse. 
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Before commencing a theoretical examination of industrial design, it was important to be sure 
about what was implied by that term. One problem with the term 'industrial design' was that it 
was difficult to define without excluding any number of other ways of describing the unique 
contribution lt might have made to the world. Thinking about industrial design as an 
intellectual community provided a means of analysing the licence and scope that designers 
appear to accept when they define their own bounds and went some way towards an 
explanation of why industrial design seemed to have some coherent presence In the world. 
Although not regulated with the rigour of medicine or law, 'industrial design' was shown to be 
consolidated into a recognised profession by a number of affiliated institutions, loosely held 
together under the umbrella of a further official body consolidating other national design 
bodies. lt was shown how one important institutionalising body, the International Council of 
Societies of Industrial Design (ICSID), has suggested in its description of industrial design that 
it was an intellectual means of 'humanising technology'. In making that claim, industrial 
designers were posited as being unique among other professions and practices. Once 
industrial design was painted as a kind of intellectual community, then it could be approached 
as a rather particular although fluid discourse that orbited a rather profound but uncritical 
claim made of itself as an intellectual. means of humanising technology. 
The impetus to humanise technology has, however, intellectually placed the human and the 
technological In appositional eplstemes. Individual members of the industrial design 
community, however, have found themselves having to work with a number of fluid terms 
when they have thought about how they might construct that process. While the 'human' and 
the 'technological' have been considered as discrete epistemes, they have remained terms that 
have been almost entirely fluid. This has made it difficult for the community to frame in 
precise terms what it has meant to humanise technology. However, being a creative and 
reflective community that has dealt with a discourse of abstractions, industrial designers have 
been well placed to explore how they might have constructed, with a degree of coherence, a 
process of humanising technology when the terms of reference were in constant flux. During 
the twentieth century the Industrial design community humanised technology by making the 
extraordinary seem quotidian. Individual industrial designers have seemed to be able to 
communicate with a clarity that has belied the complexity of the forces that have shaped their 
intellectual community and the Intellectual challenge in the process of humanising technology. 
309 
They do not have a formal tradition of accounting for this expertise, and, In consequence, 
industrial design has become established as an intellectual community founded in a fluidity 
that was not always aware of the full extent of the subtlety of Its own enterprise. This chapter 
argued that, If a view was taken of industrial design, it was an intellectual community 
consolidated about an intellectual process founded in epistemic discretion. That opened the 
way for the thesis to explore with some authority how that process has become thrown into 
question by the disconnection and the progressive displacement of the human reference in 
technology. Accordingly, chapter two outlined how emergent technologies that have appeared 
unaccountable in orthodox material terms could be understood to have pointed towards a 
more critical, epistemological displacement of the human referent in understandings of 
technology. That understanding has enabled the claim to be made that rupture in the 
industrial design community's critical discourse was symptomatic of a schematic problem that 
could be resolved through a strategy of reconnection. This was an important move, because, 
while there remains much that individual members of the industrial design community could 
refer to that might have helped them to describe technology in material and cultural terms as 
a visual aesthetic, there remains little by way of a formal or technical language in Western 
culture or in readily available terminology to describe an aesthetic of use or enaction. That has 
lead to a prioritisation of the visual evaluation of the cultural values of technology over any 
other kind of aesthetic. 
The significance of this problem of the prioritisation of the visual has been brought into sharp 
focus by the emergence of new technological forms. One recent emerging technology has lead 
to suggestions by some of the emergence of a new species of Artilects (artificial intellects). 
Projections of technology such as these, which have given rise to new paradigms of human 
and post-human existence, were demonstrated to be symptomatic of a critical problem In the 
understanding of the intimate relationship between humanity and technology and to imply a 
lacuna in the understanding of the process of humanisation. Those projections have 
resonance in some of the early twentieth-century fears of man-machines. Some erstwhile 
members of the industrial design community were shown to have responded to the intellectual 
challenge posed by the apparently immaterial nature of electronic and media technologies by 
inventing new forms of design practice. However, the inclination to give discrete names to 
these diverse, but intellectually similar, design practices has served to distance the intellectual 
heritage of the Industrial design community from the intellectual capital it has generated in 
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any discourse connecting the process of 'humanising' mechanical technologies. That inability 
to connect has caused the rupture In the community's intellectual discourse. Despite this, for a 
number of years industrial design has been promoted as an adjunct of successful business 
development and growth. The success of the industrial design community at finding clients 
among corporations and small manufacturers could.have suggested that design intellect 
remained a vibrant focus of cultural, strategic and economic creativity. There remain any 
number of ways that the industrial design community might have progressed by overcoming 
the rupture in its intellectual discourse; however, these are not without pitfalls. While 
designers might embrace a form of limited continuity in a model of their practice as a fixed 
condition or as a means of overcoming ecological disaster, or might become a kind of 
fantastical lmaglneer, these developments would be likely to·distance designers from a 
substantial part of their intellectual heritage. However, the industrial design community can 
now draw upon the model of continuity presented in this thesis. By understanding how the 
industrial designer has been projected and by showing how that has been responsible for 
rupture, the thesis could move to connect biotechnology and the other emerging technologies 
of the future to industrial design's intellectual trajectory. lt has become possible to establish a 
vision of the future where a trajectory of biotechnological development, for example, could 
play out as a quotidian facet of future culture. Once the rupture in the industrial design 
community's critical discourse was understood to be symptomatic of a schematic problem, as 
was established in chapters one and two, then a necessary strategy of continuity founded in 
an aspect of discourse that had resonance in past practice and in some consolidating aspect 
of industrial design practice could be outlined. This opened the way for chapter three to 
explore more fully how the industrial design community could be understood to be formed 
around a sustaining narrative in which the artefact acted as the keystone of analysis. Particular 
focus was placed upon the causal link in the tendency to rupture in the industrial design 
community. This was revealed to emerge from a strategic lacuna in technological artefact-
based histories, where the process of humanisation was regarded as ahistorical. 
Further consideration of the 'artefact' revealed it to be defined by the evidence it has provided 
of the process of humanisation as a provision of a particular type of 'solid' evidence of human 
interventions into the world. A heritage populated by people of the lowest social standing was 
posited as evidence of a vernacular and informal construction underpinning the 
Interchangeable theoretical and historical discourse models that have emerged from within the 
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industrial design community. Together, design histories, repeating a similar story, have 
reinforced one another and have provided a consolidating narrative for the industrial design 
community. This consolidating narrative has become built around a coherent, although largely 
invariant and chronologically constrained, model of the industrial design community's 
trajectory- scholarly industrial design histories that are told through industrially produced 
artefacts largely drawn from the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Histories of the 
process of humanisation can then be accountable only in material cultural terms. Artefacts 
presented in that manner, in the absence of people and as fully resolved entities, belie any 
fluidity in their terms of analysis. 
lt became evident that industrial design could visibly connect its consolidating narrative with 
emerging technologies only if they were able to avail themselves of the orthodox accounts 
that were used to track the process of humanising technology. A more subtle attention to the 
rethinking of the artefact was provided in this thesis - a means of exploring how the process 
of humanising technology can be retrieved in industrial design narratives. In chapter four 
emerging understandings of cultural networks were used to interrogate how the 'resolved' 
technological artefact has informed and shaped understandings of the process of humanising 
technology. The strategic lacuna identified in chapter three was posited as an emergent 
consequence of a deficit in reductivist methodologies, which have paid insufficient attention to 
autopoietic cultural networks, and to the impact of agency and supercomplexity. However, by 
understanding the materiality of the artefact as an emergent consequence of autopoietic and 
flowing materialisations of intellectual forces, then it became possible for the thesis to show 
how the artefact at the locus of industrial design logic was connected to the developmental 
logic of biotechnology. 
The consolidating narrative provided by industrial design histories could lead designers to 
suppose that artefacts could be interrogated to reveal something of the culture of the people 
who made them. However, the argument of this thesis has proposed that such linear histories 
of technology are unreliable. lt has shown how histories of technology have been selective in 
their sources and have projected one among any number of possible trajectories for any given 
artefact. By taking account of how the enduring quality of the artefact cannot record the 
passions, laughter and tears that go to make up the rich complexity of individual lives, it 
became clear that the artefact can have provided only some fractional evidence of a process of 
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humanisation and the full complexity of the forces that determined its appearance. A number 
of ideas were brought together in the thesis to show how artefacts are better understood as 
self-emergent (autopoietic) and flowing materialisations of supercomplex intellectual forces. 
When artefacts were understood In those terms, it became possible to see why attempts to 
'reverse engineer' or to unpick supercomplexity might have been beyond the scope of human 
intellect. lt was shown, therefore, that it was necessary to eschew closure In any productive 
understanding and revealed how orthodox presentations and analysis of the artefact are 
problematic. With this new account, a history of the process of humanising technology became 
possible where artefacts were understood as self-emergent (autopoietic) and flowing 
materialisations of supercomplex intellectual forces. History was freed from the constraints 
applied by deterministic shifts in materiality, because development could now be shown to be 
an Intellectually imagined process. Shifts in materiality should be understood as an emergent 
consequence of paradigmatic shifts in intellectual understandings. The revelation opened up 
the possibility of constructing a more connective narrative for the industrial design 
community. 
Once the ground had been set, chapter five then tested that reconnection. lt extended the idea 
of the topological domain (an analytical tool of biology) in order to demonstrate how it could 
shape understanding of what it meant to humanise technology. The historical narratives that 
sustain the industrial design community were re-imagined through two speculative 
historiographies. These were specifically designed in order to demonstrate how the process of 
humanising technology could be tracked alongside developments in intellectual logic. 
Complexity in understandings of the human in the world were tracked through a trajectory 
that revealed how technology came to be understood and represented in terms that were tied 
to the complexity of understandings of the human. That developmental trajectory was tracked 
initially through humanist understandings of the man in an antagonistic landscape through to 
ecological understandings of interconnected species; and then through understandings of the 
human as a corporeal entity through to understandings of cultural construction. The virtue of 
incorporation of the topological domain into the thesis as a strategy revealed the world to be 
only as material as the complexity of the analysis applied to it. When the sustaining narratives 
of industrial design were reviewed utilising this strategy, the periodisational tactic of the 
'machine ages', although problematic, was revealed to be a reflexive means of grouping, or 
collating, rather uncertainly codified ideas. (On occasion, the historical periodisation of the 
313 
'machine ages' was used here, but only when this was necessary as a _colloquial term in 
reference when it was employed elsewhere.) In industrial design histories, the machine ages 
have represented changes in the way that artefacts have been consolidated in forms that have 
lost both scale and density. This was shown to be a linear process that has moved from the 
massive and noetically obviously monumental towards microscopic evanescence and only 
recently into anoesis. However, in recognising the 'machine ages' for their artificiality, it was 
possible to show them as providing evidence of shifts in the scope and extent of analysis (the 
topological domain) rather than physical materiality. The manner in which materiality was 
Imagined could then be feasibly tied to broader philosophical understandings of the place of 
the human in the world. That broader understanding revealed how any supposed material 
reality was a cultural construction. This alternative history demonstrated how technology 
could be imagined in humanist terms as a tectonic landscape in sympathy with broader 
intellectual understandings of the world. Similarly, it demonstrated how technology could be 
imagined in terms of organic life. By extension, it then became possible to insist that 
materiality is now understood to be a fluid and mutable construct, because it is tied to the 
complexity and fluidity of contemporary analysis of the human. lt was also possible to explain 
successfully why large monumental technologies were not discussed in these terms. Previously 
the intellectual location of the industrial design community has necessarily shifted in order to 
ensure that its process of humanisation has remained coherent in terms of pertaining 
topological dom.ains. lt also became possible to suggest that another shift in topological 
domain would make it possible for the industrial design community to regain its autonomy. 
Once it had been established that technology comes to be understood and represented in 
terms that are tied to the complexity of understandings of the human, it became necessary to 
set out some steps to show how industrial design might recover its autonomy. That autonomy 
would be determined, not by the development of a new material form of technology, but by an 
emergent intellectual understanding, having resonance with the biotechnological 
understanding of the human. In chapter six a number of intellectual opportunities that 
biotechnology, for example, offers to the conceptualisation of technology were interrogated. 
That process, in which the human was understood in terms of enacted moments of a hybrid 
condition, revealed how the imperative of design could viably be understood as a process of 
the orchestration of valence at the material site of interaction. The chapter then showed that 
the humanisation of technology can be understood as an intellectual and creative process in 
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which valence is maintained between prevailing understandings of the world and its 
manifestation in the material artefact. In those terms, it will become increasingly difficult to 
talk about the human and the technological in discrete terms. A model of actor network 
theory, drawn from sociology, was employed at this point in the thesis as a means takeoff 
taking a more fluid view of human-technological relationships. The criticisms of actor network 
theory were understood to reflect a realisation that closure has become a nonviable objective 
and that the provisional should be better accepted as a reality of an emergent holanthropic 
analysis of the human. Actor network theory made it possible to understand how lives are 
played out in cooperation with technologies·and to take a more subtle and unbounded view 
that accounted for interplay without seeking closure but rather accounted for the 
materialisation of artefacts in terms of hybrid social and cultural energies. 
Once a simple, viable model had been established, it was necessary to subject it to critical 
scrutiny and to ask why industrial design has not incorporated a process of the orchestration 
of valence at that material site of interaction into the terms of its analysis. Chapter seven took 
its lead from an anthropological understanding of technology as an evolutionary component 
of intelligence-given form and enacted through social and cultural processes. Attempts to 
resist a necessary inclusion of hybridity into analysis were reviewed. Ideas of alienation were 
shown to emerge from classical ideas of technicity, which have denied the evolution of the 
hybrid species. Dourish's previous attempt to understand enaction from a design standpoint 
was reviewed and shown to be limited by its failure to account fully for the distributed soma in 
its analysis. Many attempts to unpick the hybrid nature of the human condition have been 
founded upon ideas of an essential heterogeneity. Ideas such as that of cyborg theory have 
not fully accounted for hybrid holanthropic evolution and have been forced to imply that 
somehow people are alienated from their true selves by technology. Those theories have 
considered the human and the technological in degrees of differentiation and have frequently 
made the ordinary seem traumatic through their focus of attention upon technology as an 
alienating force, rather than a facet of a hybrid holanthropic condition. Industrial designers, 
lacking confidence in their intellectual heritage, have allied the process of humanisation to 
attempts to reverse that supposed alienation and to reconstruct a social narrative of the 
cyborg by intervening into social situations and by separating the human from the 
technological. Environmental scientists, reflecting other recent moves in scientific logic, have 
argued that linear and reductive modes of science are no longer sufficient to enable 
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understandings. Classical ideas that have underpinned much Western logic and have reduced 
the human species to an entity In antagonistic relation to the world are now unsustainable in 
intellectual and ecological terms. Those assertions appear in any case to go against the way in 
which people have anecdotally described their lives. Holanthropic analysis understood 
technology as a component of intelligence tied to the evolutionary trajectory of the species 
and given form through social and cultural processes. When the thesis began to talk in terms 
of evolutionary biology, however, the soma could no longer be discounted nor isolated from 
any analysis of the world and invited a new form of holsomatic analysis. However, in industrial 
design discourse the theoretical construction of the physical human has, for the most part, 
remained fixed about a perceived materiality that has had resonance with the familiar and 
everyday body. 
While humanity and technology can now no longer be considered as anything other than a 
hybrid holanthropic condition in social and cultural analysis, the same could not be said of 
attempts to understand the human soma. While it may have previously appeared self-evident 
to designers that humanity and technology were heterogeneous, cognitive scientists have 
come to recognise that cognition should be understood, not as a purely perceptual 
interpretation and analysis of the world, but in terms of an embodied and somatic 
engagement with the world. Some design-led approaches to embodied interaction have 
appe·ared to be entrenched in methods of analysis that have made it difficult to incorporate 
the full holsomatic account into design logic. 
Reluctance to the idea of holsomasis in terms of coextensive experiences of human-
technological interaction may be rooted in its association with previous more hysterical claims 
of the Futurists and of the 'New Ego'. joe and josephine, the familiar ergonomic line drawings 
of the human developed in the mid-twentieth century, have provided a bounded model of the 
human for designers and an attempt at stability by fixing the human body as a given 
artefactual form. While everything else may have appeared to be fluid, designers have been 
able to imagine that they could at least rely upon that model of the human as a fixed material 
entity. By fixing the human body as a resolved and material artefact, hysterical continuity has 
been provided for industrial designers, but that has made it impossible for them to account 
for the ways in which humanity could be considered as a hybrid holsomatic condition. In order 
to overcome these objections it was important to return to how granularity in analysis could 
316 
provide a changed view of reality and not a changed reality. When human-technological 
relationships are considered through a form of extent analysis, valence must be maintained in 
terms. A number of attempts to maintain stability in terms have been made by members of 
the industrial design community, but these must be overcome if a form of extent analysis that 
accounts for holsomasis can be included in their discourse. The function of chapter eight in 
the thesis was to deal with this in order to provide a closing argument. In order for industrial 
designers to find a way to engage with the anoetic, it is necessary for them to find a means to 
'artefactualise' the enaction of the hybrid-human at a subtle and intense degree of granular 
complexity. At this scale and complexity it has become clear that no meaningful closure of the 
human is possible and that, therefore, a means will be required for some kind of extent 
analysis to engage productively with a new-found holanthropy. The thesis concluded with a 
speculative scenario, which reviewed some of the ideas contained within the thesis, and set 
out three parameters for a future form of industrial design. 
Material scale and extent are linked to the granular sophistication in the conceptual 
and technical models that are applied to their analysis. 
An artefact is a collusion of many differing modes of analysis set about a range of 
topological domains. 
The humananthropic and holsomatic human must be understood in similar terms of 
granularity and complexity to the model of technology applied. 
By eschewing the limited artefact models of the human that they have held, industrial 
designers can come to terms with this understanding. Then they will find their imagining of 
the artefact will have shifted to a scale coherent with emergent intellectual understandings of 
the world as a complex and unbound singularity. When artefacts are understood as a 
materialisation of some hybrid-human enaction, then the anoetic will point to a need for 
materiality to be understood in similarly complex and molecular terms. The particular 
Intellectual trajectory and heritage of industrial design, described by generations of people 
who have taken complexity and brought it into the world as a series of forms, can thus be 
brought to bear upon emerging understandings of the world as a continuum. 
Designers must eschew the tendency to define themselves by the nuances of their practice 
and must instead take a view of their expertise as residing within one topological domain or 
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another. They can now productively describe themselves in the terms of the scale of attention 
they give the world. The impetus to humanise technology implies that designers should seek a 
condition of quotidian experience at any degree of granular attention by transforming 
complexity into the quotidian. In order for industrial designers to find a way to engage with 
the anoetic, they must artefactualise the enaction of the hybrid-human at a range of granular 
degrees of complexity. At the extreme, it is clear that no meaningful closure of the human is 
possible. In keeping with its holanthropy, the thesis has not attempted to provide any absolute 
answer or to provide any eternal veritles as to how designers might take the potential of DNA 
computation and other biotechnologies, but has outlined a philosophical basis in order to 
construct a brief for the design of one kind of future. 
I have demonstrated that the discourse of the community remains an essential human 
conversation that should be tied not to any particular material form of technology but to an 
ongoing engagement between the intellectual and experiential understanding of the world. My 
community's unique contribution to human development has been quite simply to make it 
seem quite quotidian to live one's life as a hybrid technological species. Industrial designers 
must stand up for that autonomy and must reject assumptions of technology as an alien 
intervention into human life. The convenient assumption that distance must be found between 
the human and the technological must be rejected, so that a sensible and intelligent 
conversation can start with respect to the design of a biotechnological future where no such 
distance will be found. This thesis has gone some way to make it possible for the industrial 
design community to continue that contribution to human culture. However, there is much 
scope for future research and the journey must continue. 
There are two particular directions that might be taken on a subsequent research journey. One 
direction for research might be to take a pathway towards the development of a critical form 
of extent analysis in order to enable the development and activation of a technical language to 
describe an aesthetic of enaction. That research journey could explore more fully individual 
facets of the technic placement of the human outlined in this thesis and could deconstruct 
these in order to lay out a codifiable and applicable language for designers. That journey 
might produce something akin to Dreyfuss's joe and josephine, although any new model 
would necessarily be constricted in more open and complex terms. In the manner in which a 
good adventure story often starts with a mysterious clue, another direction the research might 
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take after this thesis might be track back to the very start of this journey and think again 
about Ayrton Senna.feeling the pain of an engine grinding itself to death. With the benefit of 
the connective logic of this thesis, the research could return and revisit some of the emerging 
discoveries of neuroscience regarding the autonomic and non-conscious mechanics of the 
soma. That research would build upon the design discourse I have outlined here and begin in 
earnest the task of understanding the soma as an engineering potential. it could start the 
journey towards a more subtle understanding of an aesthetic of enaction that would have 
resonance in consciousness studies and it might provide the basis of a quotidian but no less 
extraordinary future. 
I believe that my research over the past years and embodied in this thesis has gone some way 
to continue the rich Intellectual heritage of the industrial design community. This thesis Is a 
small contribution to the continuation of the intellectual value of those industrial designers 
who have gone before and an important means of allowing that intellectual voracity to have a 
voice in the future of humankind. 
Stephen Thompson :July 2008 
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Appendix 1 
Coda: Joey the Mechanical Boy 
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Cod a 
joey the Mechanical Boy 
An allegory eschewing closure, showing how process of humanisation 
is tied to the intellectual coherence of the complexity and granular 
sophistication in the conceptual and technical models held of the 
artefact as a component of the whole human. 
Joey 
Joey.l 
Joey.2 
Joey.3 
Introduction to the Coda 
The allegory 
Joey the Mechanical Boy: His Story 
Introducing Bruno Bettelheim's account of joev the Mechanical Boy. 
Joey the Mechanical Boy: The Onhodox Analysis 
joey's cure (his humanisation) is imagined to reside in a process of therapy, 
which enables the emergence of a social model of his humanity from the cold and 
unfeeling realm of his heterogeneous, technologised self through a process of 
social and cultural alienation. 
Joey the Mechanical Boy: An Unonhodox Analysis 
The story of Joey the Mechanical Boy's therapy as a design analysis, revealing 
how Joey realised his own therapy, through a process that enables his selfhood as 
an emergent condition that accepted continuum rather than the resolution of 
heterogeneous entities. 
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Joey Introduction to the Coda 
The allegory 
In this coda the story of Joey the Mechanical Boy is deconstructed in order to provide an 
allegory that illuminates how the process of humanisation can be understood to be t ied to a 
process of intellectual coherence in the complexity and granular sophistication in the 
conceptual and technical models held of the artefact as a component of the whole human. 
'Joey, when we began our work with him, was a mechanical boy.' (Bruno Bettelheim, 1959) 
This story provided much of the impetus to the research and remains in the thesis because it 
provides a means to open out a number of ideas contained within the main thesis. After an 
introduction to Bruno Bettelheim's account of Joey the Mechanical Boy as it appeared in 
Scientific American in the mid- 1950s (appearing at face value to be an account of trauma and 
therapy, this coda questions the process by which Joey is liberated from a particular and rather 
exceptional, technology- engendered psychosis. The story of Joey is sometimes used as an 
argument in favour of the cyborg nature of human existence and is claimed as evidence of the 
traumatic alienating effects of an imagining of the body in machinic terms. Joey's own voice 
has no part to play in the very few accounts that refer to his story nor in the narrative laid out 
by Bettelheim's narrative of trauma and cure, illustrated with Joey's own drawings. When it is 
read from a design perspective, the story invites a closer visual analysis of Joey's drawings. 
These are Joey's only voice; they provide his side of the story and can be understood by a 
322 
designer, who is perhaps familiar with sketching and drawing as a conceptualisation process, 
to reveal much that appears to be unnoticed in other accounts. The analysis of these drawings 
from a design perspective makes it possible to observe, by allegory, how many orthodox 
readings of human-technological relationships might occlude or simply miss the opportunity 
to adopt an intellectual stance considering and testing how technology and humanity might 
reside in a single episteme and be considered coextensive. Rather than as an escape from his 
machinic self, Joey's therapy can be understood to reside in developing coherence in the 
conceptual and technical models he holds of himself and of technology. This process enables 
Joey's sense of self to emerge in a condition that accepted continuum rather than the 
resolution of heterogeneous entities. Broader ideas of granularity emerging from this 
interpretation of Joey's therapy are explored as a means to understand how changed views of 
reality do not necessarily reflect changed realities but may have consequences for the material 
scale of analysis. Joey's story could be understood as a means to an end in the development of 
this thesis. lt might perhaps appear to make sense to treat this story as part of the sketch 
material or scaffolding of a process of research and to dispense with it. The prejudices that 
underpin the conception of therapy that Bettelheim describes can be understood to mirror 
many of the assumptions that can be understood to reside at the core of Industrial design 
discourse, and so the story can function as an allegory of the problem and situation in which 
industrial design finds itself. Joey's cure (his humanisation) is imagined as residing in a 
process of therapy, which enables the emergence of a social model of his humanity from the 
cold and unfeeling realm of his technologised self such that he might become a resolved and 
complete human. The story of Joey the Mechanical Boy's therapy when it Is reanalysed reveals 
how Joey realised his own therapy, through a process that enabled his selfhood as an 
emergent condition that accepts anoetic continuum rather than the resolution of 
heterogeneous entities. Joey's illustrations chart a developing granular sophistication in the 
conceptual and technical models he holds. This idea is extended to demonstrate, through the 
example of an industrially designed artefact, how the scale of materiality is tied to the 
complexity of its analysis. In other words, the more complex the analysis applied, the more 
granular the representation of materiality. The assumption that materiality determines the 
design process, underlying much orthodox analysis, is thereby inverted. 
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joey.1 Joey the Mechanical Boy: His Story 
Introducing Bruno Bettelheim's account of joey the Mechanical Boy; 
The account of joey the Mechanical Boy and his supposed cure under the care of Dr Bruno 
Bettelheim, appeared in Scientific American in 1959. Given Bettelheim's subsequent reputation 
for embellishment and invention (see particularly Pollak, 1997 and Raines, 2002), the 
authenticity of the story of joey the Mechanical Boy must be considered to be in some doubt, 
and it is perhaps best read, at least in part, as mythology. Although considered inadequate 
today as an account of psychological therapy, Bruno Bettelheim's account published in a late 
1950s edition of Scientific American of a supposedly schizophrenic210 child nevertheless 
continues to provide an illuminating insight into 'emotional development in a mechanised 
society' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 117). To take Bettelheim's account at face value: when joey was 
first admitted to the Sonia Shankman Orthogenic School at the University of Chicago, he 
displayed signs of serious trauma. Joey was a frail 9-year-old child who believed himself to be 
a machine. 
According to Bettelheim, so complete was joey in his machine behaviour that he was able to 
convince others who encountered him that he might be some remarkable, although obviously 
mechanical, android. For joey the 'delusion' was complete. He would move from room to room 
stringing 'an imaginary wire from his "energy source", an imaginary electrical outlet, to the 
table. There he "insulated" himself with paper napkins and finally plugged himself in. Only 
then could Joey eat, for he firmly believed that the "current" ran his ingestive apparatus' 
(Bettelheim, 1959, p. 117. To their bemusement, the staff and the other children found 
themselves stepping over these 'imaginary' wires and being careful to avoid the other 
'apparatus' with which he surrounded himself. Mostly joey would hum along unnoticed like a 
domestic appliance, but on occasion he would suddenly 'shift noisily through a sequence of 
higher and higher gears until he exploded screaming "Crash, crash!"' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 
117). joey would hurl his apparatus around the room; he was particularly fond of stealing light 
bulbs and, if any broke, would 'retire to mute, motionless non-existence' (Bettelheim, 1959, 
p. 117). In contemporary engineering terms, joey seemed to imagine himself to be a form of 
210 Although described by Bettelheim as schizophrenic in 1959, joey might be considered autistic by 
contemporary therapists, a fact noted by Benelheim in a subsequent retelling of his story (see Bettelheim, 
1976). 
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hybrid, a combination of electrical motors and internal combustion; while his wires connected 
him to his current, he breathed through a carburettor and exhaled through exhaust pipes. 
In Bettelheim's account, Joey, being 9 at the time, displays a remarkable cognisance with 
mechanical complexities for such a young and disturbed child. We might wonder whether he 
was as much a product of the interpretation of the nurses who cared for him as a product of 
his own mind, although Joey certainly became something of an expert at taking apart and 
reconstructing machines at a very early age. Bettelheim speculates that this early fascination 
coupled with the inadequacies of remote and unloving parenting led him to develop 
'preventions' protecting himself from the world, feeding through pipes. His pathological 
behaviour seemed the 'external expression of an overwhelming effort to remain almost 
nonexistent as a person' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 119). Conversely, Joey gave biological names to 
his apparatus: his tubes 'bled' when cut, his machinery sometimes 'got sick'. On one occasion 
Joey bumped into a piece of the hospital apparatus; in rage he began to kick it, until restrained 
by a nurse, who explained that the hospital apparatus itself, being hard, would hurt his foot. 
Joey's response was to cry indignantly: 'That proves it. Machines are better than the body. 
They don't break; they're much harder and stronger' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 120). When Joey 
demonstrated any human physical or intellectual frailty, he would demand that a limb or his 
brain should be hit to make it work, or torn off and replaced. Once, later in his treatment, 
when he was rebuffed by another child to whom he had formed something of an attachment, 
he cried, 'He broke my feelings' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 120), as if his emotions had some kind 
of mechanical construction. 
Joey's supposed restoration to 'humanity', Bettelheim informs us, was a gradual process. Joey 
progressed over the course of five years from a disturbed and isolated frail child to become 
human enough to escape Bettelheim's treatment. At the age of 12 Joey wrote a slogan on the 
hospital memorial day float: 'Feelings are more important than anything under the sun.' This 
was evidence enough for Bettelheim that his cure was effected. 'Feelings, Joey learned, are 
what make for humanity; their absence, for a mechanical existence. With this knowledge Joey 
entered the human condition' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 127). Between the screaming machine and 
the emotional and cultured citizen, a story is told of a child emerging slowly from trauma 
under the patient and gentle care. Whether his story truly reflects some of the later more 
brutal accounts of life in the Orthogenic School or not, Joey's life appears to be an 
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extraordinary and remarkable story. Bettelheim suggests that it is a story of Its times. 'lt Is 
unlikely that Joey's calamity could befall a child in any time and culture but our own ... our 
society of mechanised plenty' (Bettelhelm, 1959, p. 126). joey 'chose the machine and froze 
himself In its image' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 117). lt was constructed from the world as it was to 
hand, a mid-twentieth-century world, presumably close to a second great mechanised war, a 
time of the rapid proliferation of domestic appliances and motor transport, the apotheosis of a 
process begun a century before In the steam age and the nascence of a new era of electronic 
apparatus. Joey's condition, and his construction, mirrors his time, his hybrid nature of 
electricity and combustion reflecting the transformations that were taking place in the world 
about him, his behaviour both violent and mechanical and passively electric. 
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Joey.2 Joey the Mechanical Boy: The Onhodox Analysis 
Joey's cure (his humanisation) is imagined to reside in a process· of therapy, 
which enables the emergence of a social model of his humanity from the cold and 
unfeeling realm of his heterogeneous, technologised self through a process of 
social and cultural alienation. 
Bettelheim imagines that Joey's cure resides in a process of the humanisation of the 
technologised self. Bettelheim suggests that his process of humanisation is undertaken by 
teaching Joey to repress the dread of his machine self and to come to terms with himself as an 
emotional and cultural human. In his lost humanity Joey is the ultimate, pathological cyborg. 
Only by refinding his humanity can he be expected to live at peace with himself. The story, as 
it is presented, suggests that Joey imagined himself as a technology in need of humanisation. 
In Bettelheim's analysis Joey presents a complex retraction from the world. The child is 
trapped in trauma, but is then gently freed from an all-consuming delusion. This delusion, 
Bettelheim reasons, is sustained by the world in which the child finds himself, conditioned 
internally in reaction to infantile events but determined by the times in which Joey lives. The 
child is brought both into the world and into himself. Joey's humanity is thus revealed as some 
form of soulful warmth buried beneath the cold hostility of his autistic defence: 'the body can 
operate without a human spirit, that body can exist without a soul' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 117). 
In that moment when he recognises the necessity of feelings, and through a number of 
sensitive drawings thatjoey makes of the world, the human is revealed. Joey is no longer a 
machine. He is evidentially a human being, because he has culture and emotion, and these 
define the terms of Bettelheim's imaginary conception of how we should measure our 
humanity. The centre of this therapy resides in the transformation from machine boy into a 
human being who controls machines. 
For Bettelheim control represents an important aspect of the overcoming of trauma; he makes 
several references to it in his account of Joey's restoration. Toilet training, of course, and the 
control of his bowels are a focus for Bettelheim's scrutiny. Although it was not 'anal' in the 
Freudian sense, it is supposed that rigid toilet training had in some way mechanised Joey's 
behaviour. Joey overcomes fears that his 'whole body be sucked' out during defecation into a 
superior machine toilet. This, and his contradictory fear that the removal of his particular 
digestive 'prevention' tubes might lead to his body filling with faeces, 'leaving him no room to 
live' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 122), seem to indicate an awareness of his organic nature even at 
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the apotheosis of his mechanised trauma. Bettelheim is now considered to be wrong, even 
fraudulent, in his hypothesis that autism emerges in consequence of parental behaviour. 
Nonetheless, a lack of emotional attachment, as well as a mechanistic treatment by unloving 
parents (were these shown to be true), might be reasonable grounds to develop a defensive 
view of oneself isolated within a machine. Bettelheim charts the slow and painful retrieval from 
this isolation by tracking the expansion and dissolution of Joey's illustrated conceptions of his 
place in the world. Joey's first drawing describes the 'papoose', an 'artificial, mechanical womb 
... into which he locked himself' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 127). joey represented the papoose in 
drawings as an isolated box, strung on taught wires, suspended in an infinite void. Gradually 
over time and in the process of therapy, the papoose became more intimate and eventually 
more akin to a skin, closely contouring the organs of the body. In simultaneity with this 
intimate wrapping of the organs, the body itself became progressively less isolated, grew 
hands and acquired sensory organs. With the development of the means to engage with the 
'outside' world, it became necessary for joey to construct a new conception of his psychology. 
joey began to draw the 'Carr'. 
Three drawings of the Carr family. 
The 'Carr' is a drawing of a machine in which Joey is able to undertake a psychological journey 
into the world. The 'Carr' may refer to joey's childish misspelling of the 'Car' or the 'Autocar'. 
However, Bettelheim might be playing a rather subtle joke upon us, while simultaneously 
revealing something of the fictional or allegorical nature of the story of joey that he tells. The 
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term 'Carr' may hint atjoey's true name, or may be Bettelheim's subtle allusion to the Ancient 
Egyptian concept of the 'Kah' or 'Ka', somewhat uncertainly translated as the 'soul' or 'vital 
energy' or as the essential quality that defines our sense of self in the world. joey's Carr is 
mechanically imagined, and joey is a mechanical boy. The Ka is a means for the deity to travel 
into humanity, and the Carr Is joey's mechanical means to travel into the world of humanity 
(see Kemet, 2006). Bettelheim claims the Carr was designed by joey to move and thus to 
provide a means of 'exploring the possibility of leaving the school .. .' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 
127). As the 'papoose' entered the 'Carr', it was at first a passenger, and then eventually took 
control of the vehicle. In taking control, Bettelheim argues, joey became human. The logic of 
this argument is that machines are not human; they are controlled and extrinsic to conditions 
of humanity. By taking control of this extrinsic condition, joey convinced Bettelheim of his 
cure, and, in making his final step Into the human condition as a cultured American, with his 
contribution to the carnival float, he was allowed to leave the hospital. 
For Bettelheim this is a story of therapy and the emergence of humanity from the soulless 
mechanism of the human body. That Bettelheim's Scientific American account was presented 
in an exhibition at Vancouver Art Gallery, entitled 'The Uncanny; Experiments in Cyborg 
Culture' (see Grenville, 2001),2 11 is an indication that his story has taken on a late-twentieth-
century resonance. For' some, joey's condition is evidence of the uncanny nature of the cyborg 
condition, a symptomatic response to an age in which humans have become machine. For 
Bruce Grenvllle, who collated the exhibition and edited the catalogue, the story represents his 
own feelings of dread, the same terror he felt when a mechanical lung sucked the air from his 
chest. If Bettelheim proposes a cure, a realisation by the child that he is not a machine, then 
Grenville argues that a repression of joey's awareness of the machine nature of his body has 
occurred. 
My proposition is simple. The cyborg is an uncanny image that reflects our shared 
fascination and dread of the machine and its presence in modern culture. This 
proposition is rooted in Sigmund Freud's dictum that the uncanny 'Is in reality nothing 
new or alien, but something familiar and old-established in the mind and which has 
become alienated from it only through the process of repression. (Grenville, 2001, p. 
10) 
211 Bettelheim's Scientific American account is presented alongside Marcel Duchamp, Lee Bull, Donna 
Harraway, William Gibson and others, who reoccur as focuses of attention in cyborg literature. 
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Only by repressing the dread of the machine can joey escape into something of a semblance 
of life in the mechanical age. joey's trauma merely reveals the terror of life in his time. He 
must simply learn to forget, or at least to ignore, the oppressive nature of the technological 
and mechanised world in which he can live. Bettelheim uses the word 'uncanny' to describe his 
patient/12 although he gives the term little weight. 'Uncanny' appears almost colloquially, 
perhaps as a: figure of speech, perhaps unconsciously connecting Joey with a Freudian 
revelation. 'Perhaps Uoey was] so uncanny because [he] remind[s] us that the human body can 
operate without a human spirit, that body can exist without soul' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 117). 
The body, in this logic, must be understood to be a machine for living in, and we are today 
now more familiar with the concept of a body, brain dead but breathing with the aid of 
apparatus. But nevertheless we are reminded at every turn that the body is never just a 
machine. 213 The body is warm, vital and gene rational; the machine, at least in Bettelheim's 
analysis, is cold, geological and transfixed in time. If the body is a machine, it occupies an 
extraordinarily intimate relationship with our sense of ourselves. joey, however, is imagined as 
an artefact. He can be humanised only by denying the machine nature of his body and by 
learning to externalise his humanity as an emotionalised culture. On closer inspection, the 
drawings presented as evidence of the process of his therapy suggest that joey comes to a 
broad understanding of the nature of the human condition, performs a necessary artifice to 
convince Bettelheim of his cure by completing the required normative expectation of himself 
as an American citizen, escapes the orthogenic hospital, journeys out into the world and melts 
into legend. 
212 Bettelheim, of course, was almost certain to have been familiar with Freud's exploration of the 
uncanny (see Freud, 1917). 
213 For example, the moral outrage at the removal of organs from dead children In a Liverpool hospital 
without permission of the parents (Liverpool, BBC, 2005), the veneration of a saintly finger, or the recovery 
of our DNA from a stray hair all remind us of the totality of humanity in both the abstract and the material 
body. 
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Joey.3 Joey the Mechanical Boy: An Unorthodox Analysis 
The story of Joey the Mechanical Boy's therapy as a design analysis, revealing 
how Joey realised his own therapy, through a process that enables his selfhood as 
an emergent condition that accepted continuum rather than the resolution of 
heterogeneous entities. 
Bettelheim's treatment, enabling Joey to come to terms with the need to have emotions, seems 
to be both subtle and expert, and, in combination with the care and patience of the nursing 
staff, seems to have been effective. In Bettelheim's account, the hospital helped Joey to 
understand that emotions, connected to a social and cultural model of the world, are the 
essential terms of being human. This is not in question here. However, if the three drawings of 
the Carr family are subjected to a revised analysis, a rather different picture emerges. Joey's 
own voice has no part to play in the very few accounts that refer to his story, nor in the 
narrative laid out by Bettelheim's narrative of trauma and cure, illustrated with Joey's own 
drawings. Drawings are Joey's only voice from those times; they provide his side of the story 
and can be interpreted to reveal much that appears to be unnoticed in other accounts. The 
illustrations 'of the therapeutic journey through the Carr family, when viewed by a designer, 
and in the context of an investigation of the nature of the process of 'humanising technology', 
can be read in a manner rather different from that which Bettelheim describes from his 
perspective of the therapy. To remind ourselves of Bettelheim's analysis of the Carr family, it is 
presented as evidence of 'GROWING AUTONOMY' (Bettelheim, 1959 p. 124). The top 
illustration is supposed to show a Carr with no human in it. In the second illustration the 
figure rides within the Carr as a passenger, and in the bottom drawing the figure has taken 
control of the vehicle. These drawings, Bettelheim suggests, illustrate how Joey is at first a 
remote and isolated machine. Joey's humanity then emerges, first as an accomplice of the 
machine, and finally as the master. 
But it is plausible, when one examines his drawings more closely, to take a view that Joey did 
not imagine himself to be a mechanical boy at all and was not cured. Rather than seeing the 
drawings as showing Joey learning to repress the machine nature of his body, it is quite 
possible to take a view thatJoey realised his own therapy by discovering the full complexity of 
his humanity. In a design analysis, the 'papoose' and the 'Carr' family are evidence, not of the 
human gaining control of the machine, but of an emerging realisation of the hybrid nature of 
the human condition. Bettelheim could understand the machine only as something other than, 
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and in opposition to, humanity. Joey's therapy, and by analogy the process of humanising 
technology, are then imagined as a transition between states (machine to boy) in which the 
technological machine of the body is repressed in favour of an externalised humanity that 
interacts with the body, rather as one might interact with an artefact. But this is not the 
evidence of the drawings. 
The Carr Family 
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The top drawing certainly appears to be an empty and unoccupied machine. We can perhaps 
accept Bettelheim's analysis of the figure as a passenger in the second drawing, although, of 
course, many vehicles - railway engines, for example - are often driven from this position. The 
Carr certainly appears to have something of a resonance of the train in its wheel 
configurations and its pantograph. However, the third (bottom) drawing in the sequence is 
perhaps the most telling. Here the internal mechanism ofthe Carr and the internal mechanism 
of the figure are drawn with the same care and attention to detail. We can see the digestive 
system, the spinal chord and the brain as well as something that appears to be an electronic 
valve mechanism and the wheel bearings. Most tellingly, the Carr and the figure appear to be 
symbiotic. The brain and digestive system are not merely connected to the components of the 
Carr; they appear as part of a larger machine, part biological and part mechanical, connected 
together with energy as an essential motivation. The Carr, for example, functions because it 
draws power through the pantograph, but also by collecting excreta in a tank and drawing 
energy from it. The eyes and ears of the figure are directly 'tapped' into the system, in which 
electricity and energy flow about, powering the Carr. 
The Carr then, as it appears in this drawing, is not something that is merely controlled by the 
human, but a complete and coextensive activity system, synthesising energy, cognition and 
mechanics into one entity. The third Carr family drawing appears to represent the Carr as an 
autopoietic system, a topological domain that is enclosed and self-directed, although active in 
the world. Isolated analysis of the non-human system (vehicle) and the human (the figure -
can we be sure this is joey?) is no longer meaningful. Rather than simply a vehicle in which to 
travel, the Carr is a complete system that realises joey's humanity. Being human is an activity 
realised through a singular coextensive being that extends into every facet of the soma and 
into every facet of the technological world. There is no beginning and no end of Joey. He is a 
being embodied in a biological and technological machine. Is it possible thatjoey's trauma is 
not that he thinks he is a machine, but is symptomatic of what happens when one so young 
comes to the realisation of the hybrid nature of the human condition? If the drawings of the 
Carr family are looked at from a design perspective, they appear to track a process of self-
realisation that Bettelheim does not describe at all. From a close study of these drawings it 
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becomes possible to suggest that joey, rather than emerging from trauma, merely came to a 
more sophisticated understanding of his condition as he matured intellectually. This 
sophisticated understanding enabled Joey to function in the world as an apparently normal 
human being. When he was admitted to the hospital, joey imagined that he himself was 
realised through machine processes that were childish and crude. The only model of the 
machine available to his intellect was the artefact, remote and resolved. joey attempted to 
replicate himself as an artefact, remote and operated by radio control. He was a single entity 
isolated from other machines. 
As joey began to attach himself to an infrastructure of technology, he moved from isolated 
radio control to more direct connections with crude models of technological systems. joey 
now understood himself to be part of a distributed system of machines. Joey's early attempts 
to realise himself as part of a distributed system were crude and metaphorical. He used string 
instead of wires and other ephemera he could purloin to stand in for machine components. 
Over time, joey came to a more sophisticated understanding of machines as being comprised 
of many smaller components and networks of other components. In the process of his 
developing experience and knowledge of technology joey came to realise that technologies are 
complex, and his knowledge extended to increasingly finite understandings of that 
complexity. The detail of the machine became increasingly intense and subtle as well as more 
literal, practical, less metaphorical and more realistic in engineering terms, and this is 
reflected in the drawings. When admitted to the hospital, joey drew himself as a simple 
creature, outlined with shimmering lines, a simple box body and limbs that were hardly there. 
Over time joey came to an increasingly complex understanding of the machine nature of his 
body. The detail of that machine becomes increasingly finite in each drawing, as joey realised 
himself through more subtle and sophisticated machine processes. joey came to represent his 
own body as a complex system of intestines, spinal chord, brain, skeleton and so on. This 
representation mirrors the developing sophistication in his understanding of machine as an 
increasingly finite series of interacting components. The symmetry in this developing 
sophistication and the granularity of attention paid to the component of the machine (body or 
technology) are evident. joey the Mechanical Boy enacted and realised his therapy by 
accelerating the complexity of the understanding he held of his condition. In the developing 
Carr drawings we can track a gradual intellectual shift from a mechanical model of the self, 
towards more distributed and interactive understanding. 
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Joey's drawings suggest that throughout his therapy he continued to understand himself as a 
machine but realised that he must understand himself as a distributed system that did not rely 
upon metaphorical props to support his schema. Joey came to understand that his body and 
the technology distributed around him were functioning together to make him conscious. As 
he matured, the Carr drawings demonstrate how joey developed an increasingly finite 
understanding of technology and of the machine nature of his body. joey's drawings suggest 
that he realised he could not simply copy the machines he saw about him in isolation, any 
more than he could isolate and copy any of the components of his body. Rather than isolating 
the components of his soma, joey realised they must be considered as a complete system. As 
the therapy enabled the development of a more sophisticated understanding of the human, 
joey maintained coherence in his self-perception by accelerating the sophistication and 
complexity of his understanding of the machine. joey realised that he was and was not a 
machine; the machine was and was notjoey; humans are machines and machines then are 
human.214 This was the only plausible means for joey to realise himself as being in the world 
in terms that could incorporate his being as a condition emerging from the systems that give 
rise to and support his being. Some of these systems, joey understood, were built of organic 
tissue, others of metal and plastic; together these systems act as an extended soma. joey's 
therapy came from this realisation. His drawings suggest that he did not suppress his 
machinic qualities but accelerated the complexity and subtlety of his understanding of the 
machine nature of the organic and inorganic soma, such that he was able to 'enter the human 
condition' (Bettelheim, 1959, p. 27) by understanding his humanity as residing in a rather 
special realisation of being. Coming to this rather sophisticated conclusion, we can perhaps 
speculate that, realising the futility of attempting to explain his realisation to Bettelheim, joey 
painted a picture of a tree 215 and slipped into mythology. 
The narrative of Joey the Mechanical Boy ends at the moment when Bettelheim considered him 
to be cured. There is no account of joey's life after this period. He remains entirely 
anonymous, which suggests it is possible that the story is a fictitious colluding of several 
separate accounts. Even if this were the case, the termination of the story at this moment 
suggests that Bettelheim accepted a generalised view of the normal relation between humans 
214 In this account joey would find the idea that one could humanise technology to be an oxymoron. 
215 A tree painting was one of Bettelheim's key indicators of Joey's humanity. 
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and technology. Joey's therapy appears to be complete when his relational positioning of his 
self and technology are placed in a relationship that is thought normal in everyday experience. 
Joey's drawings, however, suggest a rather different account of his therapy. We might ask 
whether Joey accepted the normalised view of human-technological relationships or whether 
he merely masked his true understanding in order to effect his liberation from Benelheim's 
care. lt is likely that we will never know the truth in this respect. 
Benelheim suggested thatjoey the Mechanical Boy chose to be mechanical because the 
mechanical world about him had come to dominate his imagination. The more subtle reading 
is thatjoey comes to an increasingly mature metaphysical understanding of the nature of the 
human condition as an emergent consequence of the soma. Joey understands his soma to be 
continuous In the organic and inorganic. Joey is not a machine, but he recognises that 
'machines can be considered as organs of the human species' (Canguilhem, 1992, p. 55). His 
body then extends far beyond the biological artefact. This is a view that has much resonance 
In twentieth-century technology philosophy. Joey's drawings imply that he effected his own 
therapy by maintaining coherence between developing granularity in his knowledge of his own 
soma, with his growing understanding of the complexity of machines. We can find this 
coherence in the representation of his own soma concurrently with the inorganic soma of the 
Carr. As Joey becomes more sophisticated in his understanding of the inorganic components 
of the Carr, he develops his understanding of the organic components. Joey realises himself 
by finding a form of coherence In his understandings of himself as a machine. lt could be 
argued then that, notwithstanding Benelheim's direction and the expertise of the staff in the 
Orthagenlc hospital, Joey realised his own therapy. This self-directed therapy could be 
understood to have occurred as Joey came to realise that his self-perception was insufficiently 
complex and could not be limited to a narrow conception of himself as a machine. Joey de-
objectified himself, stripped his understandings of the world as a series of discretely ordered 
taxonomy, and came to realise himself as neither purely Boy nor Machine. By understanding 
his selfhood to be enacted through a distributed and extended soma, Joey could come to 
terms with his place in the human condition and could escape Benelheim's regime. If Joey's 
trauma is understood as an analogy of the state in which industrial design finds itself, 
struggling to resolve a perceived difference between the fluid interpretation of the human and 
the objectified view of technology, then it is possible that Joey's therapy can provide an 
analogous model for industrial design too. The orthodox story of therapy that Benelheim 
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describes tells of joey's gradual coming-to-terms with understandings of himself as culturally 
constructed. This model would seem to bear some similarity with contemporary industrial 
designers' attempts to reimagine the process of humanising technology in a cultural and 
social construct. The alternative model of joey's therapy presented here invites a view of the 
process of humanisation as a coming-to-terms with continuum. joey comes to understand 
that he Is continuous with the machine, not because he is a bounded and fully resolved 
machine, but because he manages to understand his continuity at both the macro and micro 
scales. In one sweeping and material imagination joey can sense his soma to be internalised 
organically and externalised mechanically as a continuum. 
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